
















AUTHORITY and CONTROL: 
BORDERLAND DYNAMICS and 
















Department of Politics and International Studies  
School of Oriental and African Studies 




Declaration for PhD Thesis 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the 
SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material 
presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole 
or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from 
the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in 
the work which I present for examination. 
 
 






Critical statebuilding as a subfield of International Relations explicitly engages 
in mutually constitutive dialogical interaction with the practice of international 
statebuilding and peacebuilding. Beyond challenging formal institutionalist 
approaches to international statebuilding, critical statebuilding highlights – 
‘local’, ‘interactive’, ‘process’, ‘power’, ‘ownership’ and ‘territorialized’ 
dimensions of quotidian statebuilding and peacebuilding in practice. The 
networked and fluid positionality of critical scholars, multifaceted statebuilders 
and pluralized subjects of international statebuilding interventions necessitate 
the constant renegotiation of operational and positional boundaries in 
knowledge production about statebuilding processes and their outcomes. 
However, by emphasizing a blend of neo-modern and postmodern analyses 
critical statebuilding research in IR has largely overshadowed grounded and 
reverse engineered approaches that reflexively reconstitute predominantly 
informal everyday socio-political processes. Quotidian informality provides the 
empirical basis for understanding competing and negotiated claims to 
pluralized territoriality and sovereignty within contexts of flux and uncertainty. 
 
This thesis deploys a grounded experiential ethnography to discern 
territorialized understandings of the implications of quotidian human processes 
on postwar statebuilding. By reverse engineering quotidian processes of 
informal ordering, authority and control within borderlands under 
international statebuilding intervention in Liberia, it provides a counter 
narrative to dominant state-centric and formal statebuilding theory in IR. Prior 
knowledge of – Liberia’s civil wars (1989-1996 and 1999-2004); successively 
negotiated peace accords; and international investment in postwar 
reconstruction – provided the backdrop for the research project. This thesis 
thus centralizes borderland manifestations of pluralized informal ordering, 
networks and quotidian experiences in understanding postwar statebuilding in 
Liberia. 
 
Quotidian organization of social livelihoods within Liberia’s borderland cities 
evidences fluidly negotiated symbolic and spatial positionality by organized 
non-state borderland actors over time. This multifaceted tapestry of borderland 
dynamics of informal ordering, embedded authority and social control expose 
the empirical content of negotiated territoriality and pluralized sovereignty in 
everyday practice. The historical, contextual and social embeddedness of these 
borderland processes contrast, yet unavoidably interact with internationally 
imagined and sequentially deployed statebuilding. Interaction between “the 
embedded” and “the imagined” evidence syncretic dissonance with the 
appropriation, objectification and incorporation of the latter by the former 
endangering statebuilding restructuring long-term processes of state formation.  
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ACS: American Colonization Society 
ACF: Action Contre la Faim 
AFL: Armed Forces of Liberia 
ATU: Anti-Terrorism Unit 
CBO: Community-Based Organization 
CC:  Community Chairperson 
COBOL: Commercial Motorbikers of Liberia 
CMR: Commercial Motorbike Rider 
CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CWF:  Community Watch Forum 
ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring  
  Group 
EDP:  Externally Displaced Person  
EVD: Ebola Virus Disease 
GEMAP: Government and Economic Management Assistance Program 
GOL:  Government of Liberia 
IDP:  Internally Displaced Person  
IGNU: Interim Government of National Unity 
IGO:  Inter-Governmental Organization 
INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization 
LAMCO: Liberian American Swedish Mining Corporation 
LAP: Liberia Action Party 
LCDA: Lofa County Development Agenda 
LFF:  Liberian Frontier Force 
LIMCA: Liberian Motorcyclist and Tri-Cyclists’ Union 
LMTU: Liberian Motorcycle Transport Union 
LURD:  Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy  
MEND:  Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
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MODEL:  Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
MTG: Micro-Territorial Governor 
NGO:  Nongovernmental Organization 
NPFL:  National Patriotic Front for Liberia 
NPP:  National Patriotic Party 
NPRAG:  National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government 
NTGL:  National Transitional Government of Liberia 
NUP: National Unification Policy 
ODP: Open Door Policy 
PAL: Progressive Alliance of Liberia 
PBC: Peacebuilding Commission 
PIC:  Peacebuilding Industrial Complex 
PRC: Peoples Redemption Council 
QC:  Quarter Chief 
QIP:  Quick Impact Project 
UP:   Unity Party 
ULIMO: United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNO: United Nations Organization 
UNSC:  United Nations Security Council 
UNSCR:  United Nations Security Council Resolution 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
States, Borderlands and the Spaces In-Between 
 
The cartographic representation of international borders as a solid black line 
demarcating states belies the complex interplay of the political topographies of 
social actors and related human livelihood processes within borderlands, and 
the states they straddle. Bordering provides the de jure international 
justification and national administrative rationale for the institutionalization of 
statehood. Neo-Westphalian impulses have consistently imposed formalized 
bordering and ordering imperatives to tame international anarchy and 
insecurity. These inure into macro-level and interrelated top-down 
institutionalized approaches to global and state ordering that often ignore 
complexly organized borderland informalities. These socially organized 
informalities constitute the empirical content of territoriality and sovereignty 
within the liminal spaces of states. Hence, the quotidian reality of intra-national 
and international bordering, are shaped by both the de facto empirical content 
of territoriality and the micro-manifestations of sovereignty historically 
embedded within state borderlands. These processes of informal ordering 
within borderlands form an unavoidable set of bottom up processes with 
implications for explaining and understanding geopolitical economies of war 
(Pugh et al. 2004: 3) and by extension, postwar statebuilding outcomes. 
 
Critical engagement across social science disciplines has generated conceptual, 
empirically and theoretical output questioning the territorial fixity and 
sovereign monolithism prevalent within IR (See Kahler, 2002:18; Newman 2006: 
86; Sassen 2013: 23; Korf and Raeymaekers 2013: 6). While territoriality captures 
the use of territory for political, social and economic ends, effective sovereignty 
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is often not necessarily predicated on and defined by the strict and fixed 
territorial boundaries of individual states (Agnew, 2005: 437-38). 
Acknowledgement of the political determinism of pluralized micro-territoriality 
and disaggregated sovereignty emerging from critical political geography 
coincided with the rise of conceptualization around the “autonomy fallacy” in 
Comparative Politics (See Migdal, 1988: 6; and Migdal et al. 1994). Without 
endorsing the notion of the post-polar retreat of the sovereign and territorial 
state, the autonomy fallacy challenges the ideal-type notion of the monolithic, 
uniform and bureaucratized state through a “states-in-society” approach to 
understanding political phenomena. It offered the dual proposition that – states 
are seldom the unique central actors in societies; and that states are almost 
never autonomous from social forces (Migdal et al 1994: 2). They rejoin the 
Foucauldian proposition that the effective, real, daily operations of the actual 
exercise of sovereignty point to a certain multiplicity, but one that is treated as 
the multiplicity of subjects (Foucault 2004: 11). The move to explore the 
empirical content of micro-territoriality and pluralized sovereignty benefits 
from the conceptual premise of these critical approaches. 
 
The states-in-society approach importantly contributes to a disaggregated and 
multidisciplinary micro-exploration of territoriality and sovereignty with intra-
disciplinary implications (across political science subfields). Coalescing 
perspectives from critical political geography, critical statebuilding and 
comparative politics provide important foundations from which to problematize 
micro-territoriality and micro-sovereignty viewed through the quotidian 
practices of non-state organized social actors as inherently political processes 
that impact upon statebuilding outcomes. Constitutive of political processes, 
these social actors and their actions understood as part of a historical 
continuum have implications for the configurative dispositif of power within 
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postwar statebuilding. Thus, critical conceptualizations of micro-territoriality 
and micro-sovereignty are foundational to the exploration of quotidian 
pluralized informal ordering within Liberia’s postwar borderlands in 
engagement with international statebuilding.   
 
Statebuilding processes are generally deliberate, intrusive, definitively 
programmed and multifaceted. International statebuilding intervention is 
premised on the reification of state territories as fixed units of sovereign space, 
which has tended to de-historicize and decontextualize processes of state 
formation and disintegration (Agnew 1994: 59). In everyday practice, 
statebuilding as a conscious attempt at establishing an order often coexists with 
state formation as the contingent social processes that accompany and deform 
the politics of statebuilding (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010: 113) – simultaneously, 
interactively and heuristically occurring across overlapping and networked 
local, national and international spheres. Coexistence between statebuilding 
and state formation does not imply synchrony as Bliesemann de Guevara (2012: 
16) argues that statebuilding interventions clash with social structures and long-
term state formation processes. It ought to also be noted that the nature, form 
and justification for statebuilding differ across multiple spheres of interveners.  
 
Within classical IR, International statebuilding has often been justified on the 
grounds that state fragility and failure, by creating an enabling environment for 
vectors such as war, disease and climate change, pose clear and present threats 
to international order and security (Rotberg, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; Bates, 
2005; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). Taking the perceived “dysfunction” of non-
western states as the point of departure in their inquiry, formal institutionalist 
scholars of state failure make leaps of logic between three phenomena – 
disequilibria in the demand and supply of stateness, the permanence of state 
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fragility and failure; and outcomes of international insecurity and disorder 
(Fukuyama 2004: ix). Stateness is analyzed in terms of the functions, capabilities 
and legitimacy of governments (Fukuyama 2004: xi). The capitalist analogy is 
omnipresent within the instrumental and programmed approach that assumes a 
Manichean separation between the demand and supply of statebuilding 
especially within postwar contexts. This devolves into assumptions about the 
nature, power and outcome expectations for demanders and suppliers of 
statebuilding.  
 
International statebuilding interventions largely aim to institutionally re-order 
the state in order to enhance and restore its functionality within the 
international system. Thus, it forms the core of measures aimed at countering 
state fragility and restoring failed states. The institutionalist focus assumes 
deviation from the ideal-type institutionalized, hegemonic and monolithic state 
as a dysfunction that ought to and be corrected (Sisk 2012: 42). It also takes for 
granted the normative preponderance of the crosscutting and often entrenched 
socio-political topographies of power that underpin the state in quotidian 
practice. This focus on state institutional form rather than relational substance 
has necessitated international statebuilding interventionary repertories that 
have tended to emphasize governance (as neo-modern capacity valorization) 
over processes of government (as state-society relations) (Chandler 2010: 14; 
Kaplan, 2010: 88); privileged programmed security sector reform over organic 
processes of livelihood securitization; and promoted the restoration of a version 
of the rule of law that is often disconnected from and at odds with social norms 
and practice. 
 
By focusing on the actions, policies and programs of the statebuilding 
“suppliers” that inevitably end up in failed statebuilding outcomes (Richmond 
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2004: 65-70), the critical international statebuilding literature has itself 
generated critiques of eurocentrism from which it has often sought to escape, 
given its methodological bypassing of the target subjects in research 
(Sabaratnam 2013: 261). Centralizing target subjects in critical statebuilding 
research is an enduring challenge that can be approached by seeking to 
understand the empirical and quotidian manifestations of socially organized 
processes within contexts of international statebuilding intervention. This 
scientific endeavor benefits from a states-in-society approach that does not only 
recognize, but focuses on social actor disaggregation, agency and interaction. 
Thinking in more disaggregated terms allows for imagining the engagement of 
state and society where patterns of domination are determined by key struggles 
through society’s multiple arenas of domination and opposition (Migdal 1994: 
9). While “multiple arenas of domination and opposition” importantly 
emphasize the spatial dimension of engagement within statebuilding, this 
approach remains predominantly centrifugal – from the center towards the 
margins. It centralizes the state in order to understand its relations to society, 
meanwhile actions of subordinate social groups remain largely gauged through 
the prism of dominant political paradigms (Bayart 2008:33). Nevertheless, it 
contributes to a relational understanding of state-society relations as central to 
critiquing top-down interventionary statebuilding.  
 
Critically exploring micro-territoriality and sovereign multiplicity as emergent 
from organized social processes, allows for a more nuanced understanding of 
engagement between the disaggregated state in practice and pluralized 
quotidian societal livelihood processes built within informal social organization. 
By focusing on the political implications of non-state socially organized 
informal ordering, this thesis critically engages the foundational premise and 
argument underlying the “state fragility as justification for international 
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statebuilding interventions” prevalent within Institutionalist IR. It 
acknowledges the premise that the softening of state sovereignty in the early 21st 
century has generated a number of non-state actors, benign and malign, who 
sometimes compete and sometimes collaborate with the state in providing 
governance and security though bottom-up and horizontal forms of 
organization (Clunan, 2010: 6). The ensuing enquiry focuses on the interactive 
nature, content and implications of agency-laden micro-territorial social actors 
on the state and international interventionary postwar statebuilding architects. 
This critical engagement provides the empirical basis for evidencing the 
syncretic dissonance between international statebuilding interventions and 
political sociologies of ordered informalities from which alternative 
interpretations of territoriality and sovereignty emerge within postwar polities. 
Finally, it also raises the specter of mutually transforming circular and 
networked interaction between the non-monolithic state and pluralized 
informal social actors. In that sense, a circular link is produced between effects 
and causes where an effect from one point of view will ostensibly be a cause 
from another (Foucault 2004: 21).  
 
By employing a centripetal ontological approach, this thesis inversely puts 
borderlands – understood as a complex spatial, social and symbolically 
grounded construct – at the center of the interrogation of postwar international 
statebuilding. Power is a central factor in borderlands, as these spaces are 
deeply marked by borders – which constitute institutions that enable 
legitimation, signification and domination, creating a system of order through 
which control can be exercised (Newman 2006: 148). Hence, this thesis does not 
only to implicitly critique state-centered approaches that picture borders as 
uncontested, unchanging and unproblematic (Baud and Van Schendel 1997: 
216) but evidences the appropriation and subjectification of statebuilding by 
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socially organized informal borderland actors in explicit power based political 
interaction. It problematizes social organization in quotidian practice outside 
metropolitan centers where peace processes are brokered and negotiated and 
where statebuilding thought and practice are conceptually and artificially 
designed, programmed, benchmarked and deployed.  
 
The spatial prism of borderlands centralizes that which is often the liminal 
object of postwar statebuilding interventions. In order to understand the nature 
of the interplay of power dynamics underlying the quest for control during 
statebuilding processes, it is necessary to take on a deliberate “politics from 
below perspective,” focusing of the political behavior of social actors; and 
reintroducing in this way the historical dynamics of African societies (Braathen 
et al. 2000: 10). This coincides with interest in understanding the macro-
political consequences of local level configuration of power and politics since 
control over persons, resources and access to markets are political assets 
(Boone 2003: 20-21). Thus, a process of ontological inversion benefits from 
historicizing borderlands through the life histories of its mobile and networked 
social actors as power-based encounters, which contribute to a slow and 
heuristic process of state formation. It uses borderland to introduce and 
highlight the interplay of complexly ordered informality with formal processes. 
 
Borderlands in Civil War: Between National Dynamics and Regional 
Connections 
 
Like much of the developing world, Africa in the early 1990s witnessed a 
proliferation of civil wars. Most of these evolved into intractable, interrelated 
cross-border conflict systems – with “conflict systems” (Mwangiru, 1997 and 
Sawyer, 2004) and “conflict complexes” (Pugh and Cooper, 2003) used 
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interchangeably to capture the regional spillover of civil wars. Cross-border 
conflict systems have brought borderlands into sharp focus in the 
understanding of conflict dynamics, while not necessarily translating into a 
greater interrogation of the borderland dynamic in wartime and postwar 
statebuilding. Sudan’s civil wars (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) saw involvement of 
state, non-state and borderland actors from Chad, Kenya and Uganda 
embedded within the Horn of Africa conflict system (Mwagiru, 1997:9). 
Meanwhile, the Great Lakes conflict system that evolved around the Rwandan 
Civil War (1990-1994) involved actors from Uganda, Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Mwagiru, 1997: 12). Meanwhile the Mano River 
conflict system included actors from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Guinea (Sawyer, 2004: 439 - 440). In all of these cases, the analytical emphasis 
on states’ roles in the creation and sustenance of conflict systems occludes 
borderland spaces, which often become territorialized epicenters of conflict 
complexes. Regional conflict systems with their informal and socially 
embedded borderland actor, structure and process linkages often operate 
outside of metropolitan mediated settlements arguably sustaining local violence 
amid national “peace” (Auteserre, 2006). However, it is important to understand 
borderland dynamics after mediated settlement usher in a context of postwar 
peace building. 
 
The African state is problematically often characterized as lacking foundations 
of empirical statehood because of the vulnerability of the state to the 
particularistic norms of surrounding multi-ethnic society (Jackson et al 1986: 
22). The difficulty the state faces as it seeks to administer effective territorial 
control is attributed to the normative differentiation of multi-ethnic society. 
This view unfortunately does not account for the embeddedness of state 
formation within societally based processes. If it did, empirical statehood would 
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centralize the negotiation of interdependent social contracts between state and 
society. However, the notion of “empirical statehood” provides a conceptual 
premise from which to problematize notions of micro-territoriality and 
sovereign multiplicity in postwar statebuilding. This is would contribute to 
understanding how borderlands grow from liminal to restive spaces from 
whence organized armed factions seek to wrestle for control of the centralized 
state. It provides an analytical prism to elaborate micro-dimensions of 
borderlands spaces under capture, occupation and sieged by splinter rebel 
factions, which then use these territorial trophies in exchange for inclusion and 
leverage in peace negotiations as part of the long-term process of state 
formation. As the state has successively lost its monopoly over the uses of 
violence, a context of oligopolies of violence forces vulnerable populations to 
escape expanding violence by seeking refuge both internally and externally. In 
the case of Liberia, Sawyer (2005: 38) shows patterns of internal displacement 
from the periphery towards Monrovia in some cases, and retreat of civilian 
populations into the rainforest. Externally displaced populations have also 
often sought refuge with kin communities across national borders. Macenta, 
Nzerekore and Gueckedou in Guinea; as well as Toulepleu and Douekoue in 
Cote d’Ivoire have served as composite hubs for victims and perpetrators of 
violence – zones for refugees and for the recruitment of fighters. These 
categories are not that clearly bifurcated as roles evolve over time, as Externally 
Displaced Persons (EDPs) seek to negotiate livelihoods within borderlands and 
beyond. Hence the need to understand the actor, structure and process 
dynamics in borderlands as a prelude to explaining their interaction with 
postwar statebuilding processes. 
 
After Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) began its 
onslaught to oust Samuel Doe’s military-turned-civilian regime in December 
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1989, Liberia quickly became the epicenter of the Mano River conflict system. 
Although the NPFL’s operational training and indoctrination space was in 
Libya, its staging, personnel and materiel support came from Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea and Burkina Faso (Sawyer, 2005: 24; Adebajo, 2002: 42-43; Ellis, 2006: 
73-74). In order to stage its final assault on Monrovia, the NPFL capitalized on 
the disaffection between Nimba County residents and the Doe regime. Hence 
the border hamlet of Butuo in Nimba’s border with Cote d’Ivoire was the entry 
point for its 168-member NPFL assault force. While neighboring states 
provided materiel and logistical support to the NPFL, entrepreneurs inhabiting 
the Guinea-Sierra Leone-Cote d’Ivoire borderlands with Liberia provided 
different kinds of support to the war effort as warring factions multiplied. 
Liberian exile elements in Ghana and as far as the United States of America 
provided support to Liberia’s many belligerent factions (Ellis, 2006: 94). 
Liberia’s civil wars have been directly interlinked with the subsequent civil war 
in Sierra Leone, and somewhat tangentially to the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire and 
state fragility in Guinea creating a Mano River conflict system (Sawyer 2004: 
445).  
 
This narrative, situated at the macro-level of the regional networks that 
underpinned Liberia’s civil wars, largely omits the interaction between warring 
factions and socially organized actors under siege and occupation. While 
borderlands may geographically be sites of overlapping interstate and intrastate 
security dilemmas, the social actors and processes embedded therein have 
agency. As uncertainty feeds into states’ assessments of and reaction to their 
(in)security based on perceived threats from both borderland actors and their 
neighbors (Jervis, 1976: 173; Roe, 1999: 184) generating overlapping security 
dilemmas, borderland social actors develop innovative ways to enhance their 
resilience and livelihood options amid these uncertain conditions. These 
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micro-analytical blind spots highlight the need for further elaboration on how 
quotidian borderland dynamics transform and are transformed by changing of 
wartime and postwar statebuilding contexts. 
 
The geo-strategic importance of borderlands – the territorial margins of the 
state – is historically evident both during war and war to peace transitions. The 
use of maps at peace tables to cartographically represent the status of 
belligerent forces reflects the enduring leveraging of territoriality for political 
gain. In Liberia, for example, as peace deals were being negotiated from 
Yamoussoukro in 1991 to Cotonou in 1993, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces used 
their superior military capabilities to prop up Amos Sawyer’s Interim 
Government of National Unity (IGNU) in Monrovia (Adebajo, 2002; 73-75). 
Simultaneously, Charles Taylor’s proxy National Patriotic Reconstruction 
Assembly Government (NPRAG) controlled vast mineral-rich hinterland spaces 
from its headquarters in Gbarnga, Bong County, while struggling to ward off 
territorial challenges from the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for 
Democracy (ULIMO) (Ellis 2006: 91-93). It can be argued that failed peace 
accords spawned belligerent factions that used territorial control to gain access 
to the peace table. However, the geo-strategic wrangling between warring 
factions often occludes continuities and change as organized non-belligerent 
social actors morph in the longue durée to deal with the wartime and postwar 
permanence of uncertainty and flux. The importance of borderlands in regional 
conflict dynamics, necessitates an interrogation of conflict systems beyond the 
limited analysis of interstate relations based on deliberate mutual 
destabilization as characterized by Gebrewold (2009: 179). 
 
Continuities and change in wartime and postwar bordering and ordering 
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dynamics allows for situating borderlands at the relational epicenters of 
intrastate wars, while simultaneously capturing their regional connection. 
Beyond the political topography of loosely networked intrastate warring 
factions, temporal implications point to social processes of resilience and 
survival developed by organized social groups during wartime, spilling over into 
postwar contexts as they engage with postwar statebuilding. Therefore, 
understanding the temporal, spatial and operational interconnections of 
borderland economies goes deeper than exploring the theatrics around formal 
and informal border checkpoints. A deeper investigation looks to the 
alternative ordering, authority and social control dynamics produced by what 
Korf and Raeymaekers (2013: 5) describe as the co-presence of state practices 
with other systems of rule circulating in the borderland spaces.   
 
Wars create economic winners and losers within borderlands as well as within 
the global economy. Given the highly contested and besieged nature of 
“centers” in times of war, borderland spaces grow in importance as channels 
for economic exchange. These borderland flows and exchanges, which are 
executed by differing configurations of borderland actors, contribute to the 
creation and sustenance of war economies. War economies built within 
regional conflict complexes are often penetrated by flows of external goods and 
services supplied by a complex network of diasporas, private security firms, aid 
workers, and commodity markets, and are thus deeply interconnected with 
both regulated and unregulated global trade and financial flows (Pugh et al. 
2004: 18). Historically, these dynamics adapt and evolve through different stages 
of protracted war as well as in postwar contexts. Given that borderland cities 
often sit at the geographical center of regional conflict complexes there is a 
need to understand how borderland actors engage with postwar statebuilding 
processes. Especially as these statebuilding processes are often state-centric 
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and often only loosely connected to regional conflict dynamics.   
 
Borderlands represent a complex temporal and spatial reality. Borderland 
dynamics are often characterized by degrees of transience and permanence in 
relationships between seeming polarities (the licit and illicit, entrepreneurial 
and menial, trafficker and trader and the industrial and subsistent 
agriculturalist). It is in these borderlands and society at large that the attributes 
of “stateness” – monopoly over the principal means of coercion; autonomy from 
domestic and outside forces; differentiation of state components in governing 
the details of peoples’ lives and coordination of governance (Migdal 1988: 18-19) 
– are tested and constantly renegotiated.  
 
Borderland actors develop and subscribe to processes, which enable them to 
negotiate individual and collective livelihoods. These processes develop and 
sustain networked connections, which extend beyond borderland spaces into 
the home state and sub-regional spheres. They place borderlands at the center 
of conflict complexes which Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998: 623) describe as 
situations where neighboring countries experience internal or interstate 
conflicts, with significant links between the conflicts. Changes in conflict 
dynamics or resolution of one conflict often affect the interlinked neighboring 
conflict. This thesis elaborates everyday practices informal social ordering, 
authority and control within borderlands in engagement with hegemonic 
externally driven approaches of postwar statebuilding. 
 
Problematizing Borderlands and Postwar Statebuilding in Liberia 
 
Whether as the result of a peace treaty or victory by one belligerent party over 
another the guns never completely and simultaneously fall silent to usher in the 
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postwar moment. Like a toddler learning to walk, peace returns with unsteady 
steps in environments scarred by years of war. Meanwhile, the physical and 
psychological traumas of war linger on for generations. Systematically, post 
conflict spaces are complex figurations of networks and authorities and shifting 
local-global relationships (Heathershaw et al. 2008: 272). However, Jones (2010: 
15 – 16) metaphorically alludes to the scars of human suffering (with fortitude 
born of resilience and survival) often marking the contour lines upon which 
postwar peace building mechanics are mapped. Peace building processes are 
predicated upon eradicating the root causes of conflict but the perennial 
challenge remains about how peace is built. In spaces affected by protracted 
intrastate war, temporal and contextual realities evidence the emergence of 
dialectical dynamics, which provide the socially organized framework for 
engagement with postwar statebuilding. Within complex postwar contexts, 
borderlands represent liminal spaces centralized and made even more salient 
through the evolution of war. For some, borderlands become central spaces for 
the negotiation of survival, positionality and symbolic power. Meanwhile, for 
others war transforms borderlands into sites of occupation, expropriation, and 
military victory. Both sides shared the same space, the same history, with 
different roles and differing outcomes. Although social actors within 
borderlands are not so bifurcated, the processes within which they engage in 
the long term reflect continuities akin to processes of state formation. Hence 
borderland dynamics, given their social embeddedness constitute an important 
part of bottom-up state formation that sets the stage for engagement with top-
down statebuilding. 
 
As the hegemonic imperatives of externally driven statebuilding take hold, 
borderland entrepreneurs of violence position themselves within postwar 
political and economic arrangements (leveraging options on either side of an 
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international border). They seek to adapt and/or adapt wartime modes of 
economic production to a postwar environment where international 
statebuilding architects provide new resources (through contracts) while 
leveraging their services (food provision, hotels and entertainment). Postwar 
challenges bring together myriad local, national and international actors and 
structures to design processes, which seek to consolidate peace through 
statebuilding practice. There are territorial control imperatives both implicit 
and explicit to international statebuilding outcome expectation. The mechanics 
of ordering that underpin micro-territorial dimensions of international 
statebuilding necessitate a problematization of they how they relate to and 
engage with the pluralized informality of borderland social configurations. 
 
The centrality of state-society relations as integral to postwar reconstruction, 
takes seriously interactive dynamics as determinants of statebuilding and 
peacebuilding outcomes. Governance as an essential aspect of international 
statebuilding provides a prim through which to problematize its engagement 
with socially organized borderland dynamics and their alternative 
configurations of order, authority and control within postwar context. Hyden’s 
(1999: 185) broadly characterizes governance institutionally as the stewardship of 
formal and informal political rules of the game. Governance refers to those 
measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling 
conflicts over such rules. This process of rule-making frames formality and the 
formal and seeks to incorporate or marginalize the informal through processes 
of formalization. The formal “rules of the game” inure into ideal-type attributes 
of “stateness” – monopoly over the principal means of coercion; autonomy from 
domestic and outside forces; differentiation of state components in governing 
the details of peoples’ lives and coordination of governance (Migdal 1988: 18-19). 
Meanwhile informality is evident in implicit practices, rules, understandings 
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and socially sanctioned norms of behavior that (while widely accepted as 
legitimate) often rely on expectations of reciprocity, which are neither officially 
established nor codified (de Soysa and Jütting 2007). It is in the spatially 
dispersed and simultaneous process of rulemaking that arenas of opposition 
and domination emerge between the state and society. The aspirational 
attributes of stateness are at the center of international postwar statebuilding 
and so are the arenas of opposition and domination where state and organized 
social actors engage. It is in the process of interaction that both state and non-
state social actors are emerge and are transformed. 
 
The dominant focus on a purely institutionalist approach to postwar 
statebuilding reduces law to an administrative code, politics to technocratic 
decision-making, democratic and civil rights to those of the supplicant rather 
than the citizen and replaces citizenry with civil society and the promise of 
capitalist modernity with pro-poor poverty reduction (Chandler 2010: 40). This 
internationally driven approach to postwar statebuilding explicitly connects the 
political dimension of governance to the more technocratic elements of macro-
economic management and public administration operational capacity 
(Brinkerhoff 2005: 5 – 6). Hence the emphasis on advancing the reconstitution 
of legitimacy, the reestablishment of security and rebuilding of effectiveness as 
the hallmarks of governance reform in postwar states.  The aforementioned 
approach to postwar statebuilding, while seeking to cater to the root causes of 
the conflict, tends to widen the chasm between government and the governed, 
creating justification for renewed contestation. Hence the interest of this study 
to understand how borderland dynamics engage with these postwar 
statebuilding approaches in quotidian practice. 
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Borderlands both lexically and cartographically, are areas at a territory’s edge or 
a point where things overlap. However, sociologically, borders denote a spatial 
dimension of social relationships that are continually being configured and, in 
the process, the meaning of borders is produced, reconstructed, strengthened 
or weakened (Banerjee and Chaudhury 2011). Border fluidity thus challenges 
assumed notions of border stasis emanating from treaty and conventionally 
agreed de jure understandings of sovereignty. In Liberia, for example, despite 
declaring independence in 1847 in order to stave off land grabs from colonial 
powers – the Great Britain in Sierra Leone and France in Guinea and Cote 
d’Ivoire – and official borders treaty recognition circa 1916 (Gershoni 1985: 46), 
successive Liberian governments failed to exercise effective territorial control. 
Despite the disposition of the Liberian state, communities on both sides of the 
border that is sometimes more imagined than real have continued to give 
everyday meaning to micro-territorial manifestations of sovereignty. 
Sociologically constructed historical narratives of bordering and ordering 
processes highlight the human element in the social construction of borders 
and non-state orders. It also points towards engagement in a heuristically 
endless reconfiguration of social relations with implications for both 
borderland social actors and the postwar state. However, tensions persist 
between the rather inflexible geo-political structuring of borders as delimiting 
markers of political control with specific functions; and the more flexible 
human appropriation of borderlands in the process of negotiating livelihood 
through different forms of exchange. Therein concretizes the problematique of 
socially organized borderland dynamics in postwar statebuilding. 
 
Borders serve different functions to different actors from inside and outside 
borderlands. Border functions include – ownership delimitation, authority 
delimitation, the establishment of defensive lines and as markers of difference 
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between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Goodhand 2008: 226). These functions transform 
borders into mental constructs that become social and physical realities, 
making boundaries paradoxical zones of simultaneous uncertainty and security. 
Socially organized borderland actors often appropriate the existence, position 
and functions of borders in their engagement with state. It is in this process of 
appropriation taking place in the co-presence of a version of the disaggregated 
state that the micro-territorial and informal economic manifestations of non-
state actors provide insights into their implications for postwar statebuilding.  
 
Since borderlands straddle borders, configurative element and empirical 
functioning of differentiated borderland actors contribute to shaping the 
fluidity that characterizes these straddling margins of states. Borderlands 
contribute to operationalizing territoriality and sovereignty albeit in alternative 
forms evident in daily practice. The borderlands between Liberia and Cote 
d’Ivoire, for example, provide a spatial and temporal lens through which to 
historicize the movement of the NPFL into Nimba County in 1989. The NPFL 
moved from bases in Cote d’Ivoire through Nimba County to launch a full-scale 
assault on the Doe regime (See Sawyer 2004 and Ellis 2006). Meanwhile the 
borderlands between Liberia and Guinea provide insights for the analysis of 
the 1999 incursion by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) rebel group and its implication for inter-war governance and conflict 
recurrence. So does the 2003 MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia) 
onslaught on Monrovia from the Liberia-Cote d’Ivoire borderlands (Bøås 2005: 
83; Bøås and Hatloy 2008: 34). These specific instances in the origin and 
evolution of the Liberian Civil War place borderlands at the center of Liberia’s 
conflict dynamics without necessary capturing the interaction between socially 
organized borderland actors and different warring factions. As geopolitical 
broad strokes, they do not engage with how the intrastate war shaped the 
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quotidian elements of micro-territoriality and disaggregated sovereignty, which 
inevitably contribute to a deeper understanding of the background to postwar 
statebuilding.  
 
Borderlands provide an interpretive dimension for interrogating the complex 
micro-politics of alternative ordering, authority and social control from the 
multiple margins of states over time. However, borderland discourses have 
been remained fairly silent in critical statebuilding literature. As Liberia 
grapples with the challenges of postwar international statebuilding under the 
watchful mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 
engagement between socially organized informal, yet networked, dimension of 
borderland actors, structures and processes and the re-emergent state ought to 
be taken seriously.  
 
Some Key Assumptions 
 
This thesis elaborates an understanding of borderland dynamics as central to 
understanding postwar statebuilding outcomes. It assumes that while borders 
and bordering are structured political processes, their socio-political meanings 
and implications emerge when individual and social actors interact with them – 
whether as state agents or society-level actors. Social actors whose life histories 
are inscribed within borderlands in the longue durée interpret and engage with 
the emergence, make-up and enforcement of international borders. From this 
position, they interact with multiple social actors who also exhibit varying 
permanent, transient and traversing characteristics. By focusing on the 
capturing the negotiated interaction of formality and informality within 
borderlands, this study shows how these liminal social actors alternatively 
strengthen or weaken postwar statebuilding. 
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The explanation is based on fundamental assumptions underlying the creation 
of alternative and informal forms of order, authority and control by organized 
social actors based within borderlands and the implications for all these on 
broader international statebuilding processes within Liberia. Assuming the 
structural absence of a monolithic state, micro-territorial configurations of 
authority have implications for the empirical nature and content of statehood. 
Quotidian participatory practices of accountability, representation and social 
control undergird legitimate micro-territorial governance and bottom-up 
economic production within postwar borderlands. These complementary 
economic and socio-political processes set up informal social actors to engage 
with the postwar state, which often does not possess the same legitimacy in the 
governance of social processes within borderland spaces. Even the perception 
of “informality” depends where one stands. The borderland social 
configurations that operationalize informal micro-territorial governance and 
support economic informality are internally rules-based. Operating in 
quotidian practice within borderlands, they are recognized and engaged with by 
state representatives and their international statebuilding partners. However, 
they are not explicitly recognized by the centralized state and are largely absent 
in a literature that prefers to explore the encounters of state and traditional 
society. 
 
The disconnect between embedded borderland social processes and the 
emergent postwar state is based on the assumption of differing historical 
trajectories. Additionally, the contested nature of statebuilding and state 
formation of which intrastate wars often constitute an integral part inures into 
the coexistence and interaction between embedded informalities and 
constructed formalities. In practical terms, borderland dynamics exhibit greater 
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degrees of permanence than the state and its institutionalist statebuilding 
practices. Thus, while borderland dynamics (analyzed as part of long term state 
transformation processes) exist in a mutually constitutive and interdependent 
relationship with postwar statebuilding, they invariably represent a more 
permanent and reliable social formation than that of the classical state form. 
This encounter of the impermanence of statebuilding and the resilient 
durability of bottom-up state formation interpreted from the borderlands 
reflects the empirical reality of postwar micro-territoriality.   
 
Given the assumption that borderland social actors have agency, the social 
actor is a negotiated, mediated and configured collective based on social and 
economic norms defined within territorial communities and social communities 
such as sodalities (Cubitt, 2013). The social configurations and the processes 
they generate, evolve through and adapt to different forms of incipient and 
manifest conflict – whether between proximate ethnic groups or larger scale 
conflicts such as civil wars. Given their resilience they constitute unavoidable 
actors in the political topographies of postwar states as they enter arenas of 
opposition and domination opting for bridge or breach engagement with the 
postwar state under construction, of which they are also a part. From their 
positions within borderlands, their political, social and economic networks run 
deep into the centers of their home state and neighboring countries. The 
maintenance of these micro-social relationships coexists with the official 
diplomatic maneuvers of postwar statebuilding architects at the sub-regional 
level. Quotidian practice shaped by informal ordering, authority and control, 
have implications for postwar statebuilding and the state ability to capture the 




Important Research Questions 
 
The ordering imperatives of international bordering assumed within the IR 
discipline often focuses on the juridical functions of borders, rather than the 
empirical content of borderland spaces – those spaces that are simultaneously 
on the margins of the state (Eilenberg 2012: 4) and that abut the international. 
These spaces that often straddle states are interesting points of study in 
themselves, and they also provide a productive entry point for asking broader 
questions about the nature of the state, violent conflict and peace-building 
(Goodhand 2013: 245). This study raises important questions about the 
implications of borderland social actors, configurations and process dynamics 
on postwar statebuilding in Liberia. The principal research question and sub-
questions derive from the problematization of borderland dynamics in postwar 
statebuilding in Liberia as well as the socio-historical and political assumptions 
that devolve thereof.  
 
The main research question that this thesis explores is – how do borderland 
social actors re-configure themselves at war’s end? Understanding this aspect of 
reconfiguration focuses on the quotidian negotiation of positionality, space and 
place within communities as they resettle their homelands after war. Important 
in this endeavor was ethnographically capturing historical continuities and 
change in the social configuration. A focus on borderlands also deliberately 
takes a non-elite focused approach to understanding postwar statebuilding. 
That is not to imply that in practice, elites are completely absent from the 
political topographies within borderlands spaces. It only implies that in the 
inquiry, the objective was to understand how subaltern social actors constituted 
and positioned themselves to engage with hegemonic statebuilding in practice. 
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A set of sub-questions associated with this main question related to 
understanding authority, participation, access and representation at the micro-
political level.  
 
Related to the main research question around social configuration was one that 
related to the coalescence and deployment of social power (which is inherently 
political) – what are the repertoires of social control deployed by borderland 
social configurations? This question sought to understand how pluralized social 
configurations within borderlands negotiated and achieved social control over 
human and material processes. The deployment of social control actually goes 
to the empirical content of informal social actor engagement within arenas of 
opposition and domination with postwar statebuilding architects.  
 
Finally, an overarching question that runs through the entire thesis is – what 
are the implications of borderland dynamics for postwar statebuilding in 
Liberia. This crosscutting question sought to situate the spatial, social and 
symbolic implications for borderland dynamics for the achievement of the 
statebuilding imperatives of state authority, autonomy and monopoly over the 




The research questions informed the development of a multi-instrumental 
qualitative framework deployed to understand configurative and interactive 
process dynamics. Grasping elusive borderland dynamics within postwar 
statebuilding necessitated focusing on the way borderland actors articulated 
their social processes and also remembered multiple interactive processes over 
time. Furthermore, the configurative results of social processes were also 
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evidenced through interviews and participant observation. Turning the 
ontological lens on daily practices within two Liberian borderland spaces – 
Foya and Ganta – further evidenced multiple modes of pluralized informal 
ordering. Of these modes of pluralized informal ordering two form the core 
illustrative operationalization within this study – informal ordering through 
Micro-Territorial Governors and ordering informal economic activity through 
Commercial Motorbike Rider (CMR) Unions.  A political ethnographic 
approach evidenced the historical and configurative aspects of pluralized 
informal ordering in Liberia’s borderlands. This approach, while 
acknowledging the importance of structural dynamics such as sub-national 
administrative and international borders, focused on daily practice or “habitus” 
of borderland individual and social actors. Social actors as negotiated 
configurations represented an extension of the represented and participating 
individual. Therefore, the nexus between the individual and the informal social 
order represented an analytical space through which to understand the 
construction of alternative authority and control in daily practice. Meanwhile, 
the interaction between the social group – through its “democratically” 
designated leader – and state representatives provides a nexus though which to 
understand the interaction between borderland social configurations and 
postwar statebuilding. The specific actions of these social actors as they deal 
with the quotidian ordering of social livelihoods within borderlands carries 
implications for the postwar state and statebuilding.  
 
This study leans heavily on antecedent political ethnographies in contexts of 
crisis by E. J. Wood in El Salvador and S. Autesserre in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. However, rather than evolving a monistic understanding of 
subaltern social ordering, its development of an understanding of social 
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processes of informal ordering and ordered informality evidences the pluralized 
complexity of postwar spaces.  
 
Contributions of this Study 
 
Borders are central to the understanding and explanation of the modern state 
given the salience of norms of autonomy, territoriality and sovereignty in 
ordering the inherently anarchic international system. However, within 
contexts where civil wars have developed cross-border regional linkages (which 
sustain them), while borders stay in place, borderland dynamics are given new 
meaning through the interaction of state and non-state actors, structures and 
processes. The negotiation of the peaceful settlement of conflicts remains a 
largely modernist, formal and metropolitan process. Meanwhile the quotidian 
reality of informal borderland social actor, configurative and process dynamics, 
far from being steeped trapped in a traditional time capsule, reflect complex 
engagement with both the national and the international. By focusing on the 
implications of this informal ordering on postwar statebuilding, this thesis 
contributes to the bourgeoning subfield of critical statebuilding in International 
Relations.  
  
The objective of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, it seeks to bring the historicity 
of borderland social actor, configurative and interactive process dynamics into 
sharp focus within the broader context of the postwar “peace-building as state-
building” project in Liberia. While wartime socio-political and economic 
studies of borderlands have contributed an understanding of the interaction 
between rebel factions and local communities in daily practice, the focus has 
tended to be on the flows and trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs) 
and extractive natural resources (Keen, 2005; Pugh and Cooper, 2004; Reno, 
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1999; and Richards; 1996). These provide an understanding of war economies 
and social practices under siege without paying much attention to the 
continuities and change of social configurations during these moments of crisis. 
Situating borderland social configurations within a general disposition of 
informality makes them both malleable and resilient to the temporal ebbs and 
flows of crisis. Furthermore, locating these pluralized informal ordering 
dynamics in daily practice also points to their embeddedness and justifies their 
ability to appropriate contextual disparities from rebel violence to postwar 
development assistance. Thus, this thesis contributes to understanding the 
social configurative continuities and change inherent in borderland dynamics 
as important for understanding postwar statebuilding.  
 
Secondly, it understands and places the territoriality and sovereignty 
implications of borderland social actors within two inter-related but often 
separate sets of literature – critical political geography and critical postwar 
statebuilding in International Relations. Both sets of literature variably engage 
with spatial, positional, interactive and power constitutions and their 
implications for the theory and practice of statehood. However, the 
implications of these same concepts on the empirical content of territoriality 
overlaps both subfields without the subfields ever being in heuristic 
engagement with each other. The heuristic engagement occurring throughout 
this thesis provides an empirical basis for the multidisciplinary understanding 
of linkages and disconnects between micro-territorially based quotidian 
practices and internationally driven postwar statebuilding processes. 
 
The specificity of borderland dynamics challenges the generalizability that is 
the cornerstone of theory formation, given that borderland dynamics differ 
from one area to the next. This thesis does not aspire to develop a grand theory 
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about borderland dynamics and postwar statebuilding. However, by providing 
an ethnographic understanding of pluralized informal ordering within 
borderlands and its implications for postwar statebuilding, it serves a heuristic 
purpose. It elucidates a set of practices from Liberia’s postwar borderlands that 
illustrate how alternative social orders emerge and are maintained on the 
cartographic margins of the state. It adds to the already existing literature that 
provides a deeper and comparative understanding of borderland social process 
in state formation and statebuilding. Here the project seeks to highlight 
borderland individual and collective agency in negotiating complex positioning 
with multiple others through the narratives from borderland actors themselves. 
 
Thesis Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter one problematizes borders, borderlands and society as interrelated 
constructs essential to understanding states and statebuilding processes in 
critical political geography and international studies. It centralizes symbolic, 
social and physical positionality in the exploration of the relational interaction 
between borderland actors and postwar statebuilding architects. By exploring 
statebuilding through the observation and interpretation of daily practices of 
informal ordering, authority and control within borderlands, this thesis builds 
upon Migdal’s states-in-society approach. This introductory chapter also 
historically situates the relationship between borderlands and statebuilding in 
Liberia. This historical exploration is divided into four periods –  
i) 1821/22 – 1964 looks at the ‘founding’ and institutionalization of “two 
Liberias”;  
ii) 1964 – 1980 highlights Tubman’s National Unification Policy and the 
failed reinvention of state-society relations in Liberia;  
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iii) 1980 – 1990 explores state collapse and borderlands as battlefields in 
Liberia; and;  
iv) 1990 – 1999 looks at balkanization and territorial control as war 
strategy in Liberia.  
These different illustrative and symbolically delineated phases in Liberia’s 
history show the centrality of Liberia’s borderlands in a multidisciplinary 
understanding the political economies and sociologies of statebuilding. It also 
gives synoptic historical context to the troubled backdrop of the contested and 
problematic relationship between borderland social groups and statebuilding in 
Liberia. While showing the multidisciplinary, methodological and interpretive 
significance of this study, this chapter provides a brief roadmap for the three 
main themes – informal order, authority and control – which course through 
the thesis. 
 
Chapter two connects the literature on critical statebuilding and peacebuilding 
with interdisciplinary perspectives on borderlands and borderland dynamics as 
empirical manifestations of territoriality and sovereignty in historical 
perspective. It analytically integrates perspectives from critical statebuilding 
and peacebuilding to theoretical positions from critical political geography. 
This multidisciplinary approach evidences the analytical overlaps that arise 
when social science disciplines speak past each other while failing to engage 
one another. For example, the emergence of the “local turn” as a concept of 
interest in critical statebuilding research (Mac Ginty et al 2013: 275; 
Schierenbeck 2015: 1024) antedates its emergence in the disciplines of 
development studies and anthropology (Paffenholz 2015). By putting critical 
statebuilding in engagement with critical political geography, this chapter 
highlights the importance of social, spatial and symbolic dimensions in 
explaining postwar statebuilding outcomes.  
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Chapter three reconfigures the methodological repertoire that undergirds this 
study. It traces the experiential process of participant observation, borderland 
spatial navigation, focus group discussions and individual interviewing which 
provides the interpretive basis for this study. It justifies the empirical focus on 
community leaders, commercial motorbike riders (and CMR Unions) in 
interaction with the postwar state and its international statebuilding partners. 
Brief descriptions of the specific research sites situate them historically in 
relation to the top-down, yet contested process of center-driven statebuilding 
in Liberia. Thus, the historical relevance of borderland dynamics to Liberia’s 
tenuous war to peace transition is accounted for. Finally, it explains how the 
nature of the research question and the research subjects determined the 
research method, thereby providing a posteriori justification for a reverse 
engineered understanding of the postwar statebuilding implications of informal 
ordering, authority and control in Liberia. 
 
Chapter four identifies and presents actors and social processes that shape the 
informal ordering of territorial space within Liberia’s postwar borderlands.  Its 
premise is that an ontology of sites and forms of order can either precede or 
antecede “an ontology of relationships and the performativity of authority” 
(Albrecht et al 2014: 15). Implicitly, the identification of social actors can drive 
enquiry about the form, nature and content of social action as much as social 
action itself – observed in quotidian practice – can generate curiosity about the 
social actor. Consistent with its critique of statebuilding – that constitutes a 
distinct set of ordering processes to re-monopolize the legitimate use of 
violence within an autonomous and centralized rational-legal authority while 
enhancing its relations to society – this chapter begins to highlight alternative 
processes of ordering and the informal social actors who make it possible. This 
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informal ordering illustrated through the activities of Micro-Territorial 
Governors (MTGs) situated within borderlands, takes place outside the state, 
yet in relation with the state and international statebuilding actors. Processes of 
informal ordering processes inscribed within the quotidian practice at the 
state’s margins – its borderlands – are embedded, socially organized, 
structurally amorphous and mainly informal.  
 
Chapter five expands the range of understanding informal ordering by 
illustrating the configurative ordering of labor and productivity in economic 
informality. Simultaneous to the community leaders who are central to the 
daily ordering of human and material processes within borderlands, there are 
Commercial Motorbike Riders (CMRs). These are youth borderland navigators 
whose livelihoods are based on mastering the socio-political and physical 
topographies of their borderlands and the international. To interact with 
permanent and transient dimensions of their borderland spaces, this highly 
unregulated informal mode of economic production has grown exponentially 
within borderlands in the postwar years. This growth has driven process of 
unionization that serve several purposes including – to order informality, 
agenda setting, agenda building and advocacy. Unionization, the cornerstone of 
ordering informality, has also contributed to shaping the internal performativity 
of CMR unions thereby generating in-house credit schemes – known as the 
“susu” – within these unions. This credit function fills an economic gap within 
borderlands and has made these unions sites of both economic and political 
power, while attracting investment from older commercial motorbike owners 
(CMOs). CMR Unions also evolve informal labor management and conflict 
resolutions mechanisms between CMRs, the state and the society. Overall, this 
chapter elaborates how the CMR sector interacts with the postwar state through 
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the daily navigation of internal and international borders; and it engages with 
the international through training, safety and public health programs.  
 
Chapter six deepens the understanding of processes of informal ordering and 
ordering informality taken together by moving from its configurative form to 
comparatively evidence patterns of authority-based legitimation and 
accountability. These pluralized and simultaneously occurring processes of 
informal ordering and ordering informality endow borderland social actors 
with grounded authority and control of territoriality, social and economic 
processes. It also points to the dispersal of sovereignty as non-state actors 
become central to some modes of service provision for their communities. 
Legitimacy within pluralized informal orders is derived from socially grounded 
interpretations and the routinization of accountability and participation in 
developing a system of direct representation embedded within borderland 
communities. Meanwhile, presidentially appointed mayors interact with 
pluralized informal orders differently often discouraging the use of election to 
designate Micro-Territorial Governors while largely steering clear of the 
governance of CMR Unions. Socially grounded authority derives from a 
specificity of spatial (physical), social and symbolic ordering. Socially grounded 
authority is embedded, decentralized, legitimate, representative and 
empowered to act on behalf of borderland communities. Socially grounded 
authority derived from pluralized informal ordering differs markedly from 
Weberian rational-legal authority and its neo-patrimonial derivatives. However, 
the limited presence of the postwar state facilitates the interpenetration of 
socially grounded informal authority and state authority thereby confirming the 
pluralization of sovereignty. This chapter evidences the evolving constitution 
and deployment of socially grounded authority in daily practice within 
borderland spaces and its implications for postwar statebuilding.  
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Chapter seven explores the deployment of socially grounded authority derived 
from informal ordering and ordering informality in postwar borderlands. These 
result in the development and political maintenance of multiple and differing 
forms of social controls. Informal borderland social actors and the state vary 
along a spectrum from contestation to collusion in the development and 
maintenance of social controls especially when spaces, places and symbols 
overlap. The itinerant nature and licensing of CMRing, the overlap of 
marketscapes and household spaces and gatekeeping community access provide 
illustrative spheres for explaining how social grounded authority deploys social 
control within postwar borderlands. Thus, the social control outcomes of 
informal ordering processes in Liberia’s postwar borderlands alternate from 
conflict to cooperation with the postwar state. Meanwhile in daily practice the 
prevalence of incipient violence challenges both the state and informal social 
actors. The challenge of imposing social controls on the informally non-state 
orders is also evidenced in the proliferation of a culture of violence among 
CMRs. Social controls, while centralized and hierarchically structured, remain 
very ineffective in imposing behavioral shifts on the intended subjects of 
control. 
 
Chapter eight develops an understanding of politicized social controls 
emanating from borderland social orders. The issue of politicized social 
controls goes to the heart of how locality in terms of positioning and everyday 
social action contribute to testing top-down postwar statebuilding. The 
intersection of everyday social control dynamics with centralized state-enforced 
social control processes produces the empirical social control reality of 
borderland spaces.  
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The concluding chapter highlights the contributions that an ethnographic 
exploration of informality contributes to the needling problem of statebuilding 
in International Relations. It also relates this thesis to interpretations of local, 
hybrid and negotiated forms of authority – recurrent themes in the critical 
statebuilding and peacebuilding literature. This study concludes that informal 
ordering illustrated through borderland dynamics is central to understanding 
postwar statebuilding outcomes. Informal ordering processes simultaneously 
occurring alongside international statebuilding and peacebuilding processes are 
mutually constitutive. As illustrated through MTGs, CMRs and CMR Unions 
within Liberia’s borderlands pluralized informal ordering leverages 
opportunities provided by international statebuilding to entrench and 
institutionalize their control over human and material processes.  
 
Thus, social controls resulting from pluralized informal ordering are important 
in explaining both the performance and consolidation of informal orders; and 
the positional and spatial marginality of the postwar state within borderlands. 
Far from creating synchronically hybrid governance, pluralized informal orders 
challenge the autonomy of the postwar state. Furthermore, they prevent 
effective centralization of authority and re-establishment of a monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence by the state. Hence effective postwar statebuilding 
cannot be achieved without addressing the emergence and resilience of 
pluralized informal orders that are relatively more visible, accountable, 
representative and legitimate than the emergent postwar state – given their 
longevity and social embeddedness – within borderlands. However, it generates 
further questions for research that cut across theoretical and arenas pertaining 
to – how to enhance the social embeddedness of postwar states the territories 
over which they seek to exercise effective control and total sovereignty? 
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Chapter 2  
 
Liberia: Borderlands in Historical Statebuilding Perspective 
 
This chapter synoptically historicizes the relationship between borderland 
dynamics and the state in Liberia with a focus on bygone ‘critical junctures’ 
and more proximate relation to Liberia’s Civil Wars (1989-1997 and 1999-2003). 
The causal, constitutive and evolutionary elements of Liberia’s civil war history 
have been variously chronicled and debated across disciplinary lines (Ellis 
2006, Sawyer 2005, Levitt 2006, and Waugh 2012). However, presentation of 
this history relative to processes of statebuilding and state transformation in 
Liberia has tended to gloss over the infrastructural, social and political 
specificities of borderlands social dynamics while sticking to an elite meta-
narrative. The enshrinement of differentiation between Liberia’s coastal 
settlements and its hinterlands in the Republic’s 1847 constitution set the 
precedent for a uneasy relationship between mutually transforming settlers and 
‘indigenes’. Re-reading Liberia’s history with from a borderlands perspective 
emphasizes the importance of borderland agency in the negotiation of 
territoriality and sovereignty. Contemporaneous patterns of international 
statebuilding in Liberia are therefore represent continuity of externally-driven 
and socially un-embedded process being grafted upon on antecedent pre- and 
post-independence statebuilding challenges that resulted in a bloody coup and 
two civil wars.  
 
Borders, borderlands and society are interrelated constructs historically 
essential to understanding both short-term statebuilding and long-term state 
formation processes in politics and international studies. Exploring these 
process dynamics from borderlands necessitates centralizing quotidian 
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symbolic, social and physical constitution and manifestations of non-state 
borderland social processes. These social actors that are largely informal 
develop out of the necessity to provide, manage, regulate and control human 
and material processes within borderlands. The configuration of non-state 
social actors provides the basis for collective engagement within arenas of 
opposition and domination with processes of postwar statebuilding. Meanwhile 
the engagement transforms both social actors and states, and also shapes the 
nature of successive encounters. Hence there is a need to understand anterior 
historical dispositions of borderland social actor engagement with different 
iterations of the pre-independence, post-independence, post-coup and postwar 
state.  
 
Interrogating postwar statebuilding through the observation and interpretation 
of daily practices of informal ordering, authority and control within 
borderlands, this study benefits from Migdal’s (2001) states-in-society approach. 
A states-in-society approach assumes that the non-monolithic state deploys 
both coercive and non-coercive methods to impose effective territoriality and 
exact submission to sovereignty. However, rather than looking at what the state 
does, it becomes necessary to find and understand the agency of non-state 
social configurations in engagement with the state in historical perspective. In 
the case of Liberia, Moran’s (2006:12) exploration of how local people interpret, 
resist and accommodate local events and institutions builds on ethnographic 
research conducted in the 1980s and subsequent communications through 
Liberian diaspora networks. More so, it importantly sets the stage for escaping 
state centric interpretations of political phenomena and challenges culturally 
deterministic interpretations of wartime behaviors and attitudes. This approach 
veers towards a societies-in-states approach that highlights the importance of 
understanding state transformation and statebuilding outcomes as products of 
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simultaneously occurring and interactive processes of societal reconfiguration 
and state reconstruction. In this thesis, it is done by focusing the interpretive 
lens on borderland social actors in engagement with postwar statebuilding.  
 
This chapter provides a background understanding of the historical 
relationship between borderlands dynamics and statebuilding in Liberia. 
Liberia’s history starts from a rather bifurcated premise – with the American 
settlers on one side and indigenous Liberian groups on the other. Historically, 
Liberia’s statebuilding process has been constituted by various challenges and 
responses to the emergence of central authority (Dunn et al. 1988: 194) borne 
out of its bifurcated origins. Thus, the historical exploration of this chapter is 
divided into four periods – i) 1821/22 – 1964 – the ‘founding’ and 
institutionalization of the independent Republic of Liberia; ii) 1964 – 1980 – 
Failure of national unification and the reinvention of state hegemony in 
Liberia; iii) 1980 – 1990 – Liberia’s post-coup state and borderlands as 
battlefields; and iv) 1990 – 1999 – Balkanization and Territorial Control as War 
Strategy in Liberia’s Civil Wars. These different phases in Liberia’s history 
provide a frame understanding the struggle to establish effective territoriality 
and sovereignty in Liberia. The bifurcated origins of the Liberian state set a 
precedence of Americo-Liberian (Dunn et al. 1988: 2) hegemony and the 
construction of central authority based on that group’s conceptualization and 
operationalization of statehood. Given that the settlers mainly inhabited coastal 
settlement and the evolution of groups, relationships and contexts, a historical 
contextualization of statebuilding contributes to situating contemporaneous 
borderland dynamics in postwar statebuilding. Differentiated social 
configuration of communities have evolved over time as borderland villages 
have grown into towns and cities within which traditional authority has been as 
marginalized as the authority of the modern state. This evolution has also seen 
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the emergence of non-traditional and non-state social actors stepping in to 
shape informal order, authority and control – the themes that course through 
this study. 
 
The different phases of Liberia’s history, while arbitrarily divided to represent 
critical junctures, also represent important signposts in individual life histories 
and the evolution of the political topographies of collective social actors. 
However, Liberia’s borderlands were neither terra nullis nor terra incognita prior 
to resettlement by freed slaves from the United States of America and those 
liberated from slave ships on the high seas. These borderlands were populated 
in multiple waves of migration, conquest and alliance formation that 
contributed to the constitution of highly developed political organization and 
strong military organization to the forest belt region extending from Sierra 
Leone through Liberian to Cote d’Ivoire (Gershoni 1985: 2). These migratory 
waves benefited from and were supported by the establishment of sahelian 
trade routes and coastal commerce. 
 
The American Colonization Society and the Institutionalization of Two 
Liberias (1821 – 1964) 
 
The American Society for Colonizing Free People of Color in the United 
States, that later evolved into the American Colonization Society (ACS) arrived 
on the coast of West Africa in 1820-21 and bid to set up settlements for freed 
slaves from the Americas. Between 1822 and 1867 the ACS that was part of the 
movement for the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, brought 18,858 
immigrants to the coast of West Africa (Gershoni 1985:8). The history of the 
encounter between repatriated settlers and local communities, points to the 
coercive use of conquest to gain and maintain a foothold on Cape Mesurado 
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initially. Settler rebellions against ACS agents in 1822 and 1824 led to the 
negotiation of a stable administrative framework through which Cape Mesurado 
settlement was defined as a colony named Liberia with its capital in Monrovia 
(Gershoni 1986: 10). Meanwhile this new colony was to be governed by an ACS 
agent with the help of a local council. Disagreements within the ACS in the 
United States of America saw similar settlements emerge along Liberia’s coastal 
stretch from Cape Mount to Maryland. These settlers have collectively been 
referred to either as “Americo-Liberians” (Ellis, 2006; Levitt 2005) or as 
“repatriates” (Dunn et al. 1988: 1). With help from the United States, and 
despite facing initial environmental, political and geo-strategic challenges the 
Americo-Liberian configured and maintained a privileged hegemony that 
would govern Liberia for more than a century (Liebenow 1987: 48).  
 
These settlers had arrived with a benevolence that was inseparable from their 
firm conviction that theirs was a superior civilization, however, once in Liberia 
they endeavored to recreate the only social and political order they knew – the 
antebellum south – with themselves as the master class (Ciment 2013: xviii). The 
constitution of this master class that was neither firmly American nor distinctly 
African was perpetuated through a uniquely Liberian blend of assimilation, 
acculturation and indirect rule. The institutional and administrative dimensions 
of territoriality and sovereignty, which devolved from this history provides a 
backdrop for understanding subsequent and successive statebuilding illogic 
over the longue durée in Liberia. Central to this understanding of statebuilding 
is the complex interplay of dynamic identity as well as identity dynamics, 
expropriation, and revenue generation and appropriation. These socio-political 
facets through which governance was operationalized in Liberia showcase how 
the privileged minority consolidated and maintained hegemonic colonial 
governance in Liberia the Republic’s founding in 1847 to the coup d’état of 
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April 1980. It also evidences the continuity of an uneasy interaction between 
Liberia’s borderland dynamics and temporally differentiated processes of 
statebuilding.  
 
The declaration of independence by the Republic of Liberia in 1847 was a 
project undertaken by settlers – seeking to rid themselves of ACS governance; 
and fighting to maintain territorial gains in the face of colonial expansionism by 
France and Great Britain, amid waning financial backing from the United 
States Congress. In the establishment of the Republic, its motto – “the love of 
freedom brought us here”; it’s flag – the lone star and stripes; and its 
constitution tacitly evoked the sense of Liberia as an American overseas 
territory. While Monrovia sought to maintain close ties to the United States of 
America, it also struggled to assert control over its relatively new territory with 
fiscal, infrastructural, security and healthcare challenges. The evolution of 
statebuilding regimes in Liberia was historically a relational process between 
settlers and indigenous populations (Dunn et al. 1988: 26; Gershoni 1986: 42; 
Waugh 2011: 25). The identity politics embedded in this dynamic inured into the 
social construction of an identity hierarchy, which placed the Americo-Liberian 
above indigenous identities.  
 
The necessity for effective territorial control led to the establishment of systems 
of indirect and direct rule constituted and shaped interaction between the 
administrative center and the administered distant hinterlands. These occurred 
simultaneously with the deployment of assimilation and enculturation of 
indigenous communities geographically proximate to settler colonies. Both 
internal and regional challenges to territoriality and sovereignty contributed to 
this three-pronged approach to governance. Indirect rule promoted the 
cooptation of traditional rulers into the governance apparatus for the collection 
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of hut taxes and to exercise other forms of population control (Akpan, 1980:59). 
The hut tax was higher in the countryside, which was bereft of economic 
activity beyond subsistence modes of agricultural production, than it was in 
Monrovia and the other settler colonies (Levitt 2005: 139). Subsequently, 
education provided an avenue for indigenous Liberians to develop credentials, 
which made for their insertion into the growing Liberian public service system. 
This new cadre of “Native African Commissioners” (Akpan, 1980: 61) 
constituted the main means through which the Liberian government exercised 
political and economic control over the indigenous African of Liberia. 
However, Gershoni (1986: 35) notes the situational complexity in Liberia with 
life being conducted on two parallel levels – “the level of everyday life was one 
of constant economic, social and personal contact with Africans both on the 
coast and in the hinterlands. On the other level of official contacts, however, 
there was an almost total division between the Africans and the Americo-
Liberians.” 
 
With independence came the institutionalization of the system of political 
parties in Liberia with the True Whig Party (which was actually an ever 
changing “ad hoc coalition of oligarchs – Gershoni 1986: 19) dominating 
political activity. Despite constituting the demographic minority, power was 
safely imbued within and coercively deployed by the Americo-Liberian elite. 
Successive Americo-Liberians acceded to the presidency through the 
domineering presence of the True Whig Party in Liberia’s political space (Ellis 
2006: 62). Liberia’s founding constitution of 1847 had largely ignored the 
natives, except as objects of paternalist protection – much like the slaves the 
Americo-Liberians had once been, at least in the minds of the planters who 
owned them (Ciment 2013: 67). To become Liberian indigenous people had to 
prove that they were “civilized”. Civilization could be acquired through 
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apprenticeship, ownership and cultivation of one’s own land; relinquishing 
paganism for at least three years and accepting Christian religion (Gershoni 
1986: 22).  
 
The centralization of power in Monrovia, with rule by proxy on the hinterlands 
was determined policies of extraction and taxation, which solidified horizontal 
inequalities between settler communities on the coast and indigenous 
communities in the hinterlands (Waugh: 2011). President Arthur Barclay (1904-
1912) the first Liberian leader to present a comprehensive plan for imposing 
Liberian control over the hinterland proposed the integration the native 
population into the state of Liberia to create a united nation. However, this 
plan reinforced differentiation in the administration of coastal counties 
governed by Superintendents and the hinterland provinces ruled by 
commissioners from 1914 – 1964 when they also became counties. Until the 
1960s the hinterland provinces were governed through a patronage system that 
incorporated government-selected town, clan and paramount chiefs into a 
Monrovia-based system represented within the hinterlands by provincial 
commissioners.  
 
Two important aspects of Liberia’s administrative governance trace their 
origins from the Barclay Plan – the creation of the Liberian Frontier Force 
(LFF) in 1908 (Nevin 2011: 276) and the hierarchical administration subdivision 
of hinterland spaces (even in previously acephalous spaces). During the making 
of the Liberian state, these local chiefs were incorporated into the structure of 
the state by a combination of brute force and indirect rule through district 
commissioners (Bøås et al 2014: 49). Through the LFF, the state sought to 
monopolize the use of violence, however illegitimate it was in coercive 
pacification exercises. Much attention has been given to the wars that were 
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fought between coastal communities and settlers between 1822 and 1847 and 
between coastal communities and the Liberian state between 1847 and 1915. 
Between 1822 and 1947, Levitt (2005: 42-85) documented wars between the Dei 
(1822), Bassa (1835), Kru (1838) and Vai (1839-40) and the Americo-Liberian 
Settlers. These were followed by subsequent wars between the newly 
independent Liberian government and the Bassa (1851-52), Kru (1855, 1909, 1912 
and 1915); and Grebo (1856-57, 1893, 1910) (Levitt 2005 94 – 110; Gershoni 1986: 
104-107). These wars contributed to the changing composition of the LFF to 
incorporate indigenous Liberians who brought with them traditional 
techniques of warfare (Nevin 2011: 282) and the consolidation of the Liberian 
state on the coast. However, this narrative largely omits the complex hinterland 
proxy war dynamics in Northwestern Liberia (today’s Lofa County) involving 
Kissi associates of Mende chief Kai Lundu and Gbandi associates of Malinke 
warrior, Samori Touré approximately dating between 1889 and 1904 (see Dunn 
et al. 2001: 185 on Kai Lundu expedition of 1889; Massing 1981). According to 
Dunn et al (2001: 185) the Kai Lundu expedition was symbolic for its 
implications on the growth of central authority in Mendeland towards the end 
of the 19th century. These processes of social and political configuration were 
supplanted by the administrative instrumentalization of territory by the Barclay 
Plan and an LFF frontier pacification mission led by Lieutenant William 
Lomax. However, these twin instruments of ordering for effective territorial 
control were both destabilizing and repressive. They ended up creating enough 
unrest within Liberia’s northwestern borderlands that the British colonial 
authorities in Sierra Leone and French colonial authorities in Guinea were 
compelled to intervene. Subsequently, the frontier commission established 
official boundaries so that Liberia could deal with its territorial concerns 
relating to its ongoing statebuilding effort.  
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In practical terms, Barclay’s administrative ordering created – townships 
headed by a town chief; clans composed of several townships under a clan chief 
(hardly understood in the anthropological sense); and several clans brought 
together under a centrally-appointed paramount chief. In the process, the 
traditional regal functions of chieftaincy were eroded, thereby altering chief-
community dynamics in ways that undermined cohesive indigenous allegiance 
to Liberia’s sovereignty and territoriality integrity. In some cases, it even 
fostered inter-communal rivalry. Reactions to this new administrative 
organogram ranged from collaboration to contestation on the part of hinterland 
communities. Another dimension to this interaction between the government 
and indigenous communities was to privilege some communities at the expense 
of others, which then made them beholden to the ruling class.  
 
The eventual arrival of Firestone with the establishment of the Harbel rubber 
plantations in Margibi County was an economic boon for the Government of 
Liberia (GOL), which received an injection of foreign direct investment, menial 
employment for indigenous Liberians and set off the construction and 
modernization of the Freeport of Monrovia (Van Der Kraij, 1980: 199; Ellis, 
2006: 72). The implications of the entry of Firestone into the Liberian economy 
weaned the GOL of dependence on foreign debt and tax revenue for fiscal 
solvency. It also introduced revenue streams that would eventually exacerbate 
income inequalities between the Americo-Liberians and their ruling cohort and 
the rest of the country.  This period has also been described as one of 
segmental, intermittent, societal segregation – characterized by colonists 
remaining relatively segregated from the indigenous population, who entered 
occasionally into functional relations with them – as for trade and defense 
(Wrubel 1971: 190).  
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Failed National Unification and the Reinvention of State Hegemony in 
Liberia (1964 – 1980)  
 
After the Barclay Plan of the early 1900s, the next significant attempt to 
strengthen state sovereignty and territorial control in Liberia came with 
Tubman’s twin Open Door (ODP) and National Unification (NUP) Policies of 
the mid-1940s. The economic liberalization advocated by the ODP was based on 
using Liberia’s newly discovered natural resource endowments to attract 
foreign direct investment as well as a crop of expatriate personnel to manage 
this economic expansion. Meanwhile the NUP ostensibly sought to dispense 
with the bifurcated administration of Liberia – crystallized through the 
differentiated governance of coastal counties and provincial hinterland – that 
had prevailed since independence. These interconnected and potentially 
transformative projects, however, entrenched elite privileged and further 
marginalized non-elite social groups culminating in a “state-led creation of 
inequality” (Sæther 2000:117). Vestiges, symbols and enduring legacies of both 
policies endure alongside more contemporaneous relics of war across Liberia’s 
landscape and within social and political discourse and practice in Liberia.  
 
Take the example of Nimba County as an illustration. Sanniquellie is the capital 
city of Liberia’s northernmost Nimba County (bordering both Guinea and Côte 
d’Ivoire). Its landscape symbolically attests to the complex historical 
relationship between and betwixt hinterlands and different state administrative 
projects in Liberia. Approaching the city from Monrovia stands a rugged and 
timeworn statue of President William V.S. Tubman, the man who in 1959 
hosted within this hinterland city a meeting that birthed the Organization of 
African Unity. It was also within the framework of Tubman’s National 
Unification Policy that the Central Province became Nimba County in 1964.  
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With the discovery of natural resource endowments, marginal and marginalized 
Nimba County provided the core empirical basis of Tubman’s Open-Door 
Policy. It also importantly provided the material basis for the construction and 
consolidation of a hegemonic Liberian state. The discovery of iron ore reserves 
in Mount Nimba in the 1950s operationally led to the establishment of the 
LAMCO (Liberian American Swedish Mining Company) mines in Yekepa. By 
1972 iron ore production in Liberia had reached an output of 22.6 million long 
tons worth US$182.1 million accounting for 75 per cent of the total earning 
export (Mehmet 1975: 510). This spawned the construction of a 250km railway 
line linking Yekepa to the port in Buchanan and the nascence of unionized 
labor within the mines. These political and industrial dynamics provide the 
basis for understanding the empirical continuities and cosmetic changes that 
characterized the relationship between coastal elites and hinterland bases of 
economic production.  
 
The National Unification Policy emerged out of a complex set of historical 
processes – of which the Second World War and the rise of African 
independence movements were the most impactful for Liberia. WVS Tubman’s 
election to the presidency in 1944 coincided with the abating of WWII and the 
birth of independence movements, which crystallized into African political 
parties such as the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the Rassemblement 
Democratique Africain (RDA) in Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea. These independence 
movements – given the filial linkages between Liberia’s hinterland populations 
with ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire – represented 
immanent challenges where colonial powers had once threatened Liberia’s 
territoriality and sovereignty. Pre-empting the appropriation of these 
emancipatory discourses by Liberia’s borderland and other ethnic groups, 
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Tubman deftly developed a sluggish NUP. While the origins of the policy can 
be traced to 1947 (Fahnbulleh 1964), the first National Unification Conference 
did not take place until 1954 in Maryland County. This conference set out a 
program for an administrative survey of Liberia, leading up to the second NUC 
in 1959 in Sanniquellie. It was not until the third NUC in Voinjama in 1963 that 
plans were made to nominally transform the hinterland provinces to counties 
with the appointment of superintendents and judges from Monrovia to ensure 
the administrative functioning of these new counties. This process of territorial 
ordering, however, failed to either account for historically antecedent forms of 
social organization or the administrative political sociology that that resulted 
from the Barclay Plan. Hence another administrative layer was being added 
atop the arbitrary creation of town, clan and paramount chieftaincies.  
 
In terms of establishing effective territorial control and entrenching state 
sovereignty, the NUP coincided with the mutation of the LFF into the Armed 
Forces of Liberia (AFL) in 1944. This military modernization sought to transfer 
the LFF’s border control, tax collection and hinterland pacification missions to 
a reformed and more territorially expansive National Police Force of Liberia. A 
number of legislative acts in the 1940s expanded the role of the National Police 
Force of Liberia to perform some of those law and order functions that had 
hitherto been performed by the LFF (Kromah 2007: 20). Meanwhile Monrovia 
retained highly centralized command and control of the police operations. 
Occurring during the Second World War, the transformation from the LFF to 
the AFL sought to create an outward looking army – capable of protecting 
Liberia from foreign invasion and capable of fighting alongside allied forces. 
Despite these changes in the Liberian security sector dispositif within the 
general framework of Tubman’s NUP, the security establishment continued to 
reflect the hierarchical differentiation with Americo-Liberians and “civilized” 
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hinterlanders occupying command and control posts, while indigenous 
Liberians filled the rank and file. This constitutes an important aspect in the 
antecedent episodes of problematic statebuilding in Liberia.  
 
Windfalls from foreign direct investments recouped from natural resource 
extraction, fiscally supported the alterations in Liberia’s administrative 
configuration within the framework of the NUP. Substantial economic growth 
in the 1950s and 60s gave Tubman the material base for establishing a system of 
reciprocal assimilation of elites by providing a base for his use of public 
resources to build a personal political following (Sæther 2000: 116). Meanwhile, 
the Open-Door Policy, which was originally seen as a potential threat by 
conservative members of the dominant minority, earned government monetary 
benefits that were in turn redistributed to members of this elite, thus giving 
them added economic advantage (Wrubel 1971: 196). However, over a century of 
assimilation, the ‘dominant minority’ had become socially hybrid, incorporating 
an acculturated, intermarried and educated group of Liberians from the 
hinterlands. Meanwhile the transfer of labor from the subsistence sector to the 
concessions tended to undermine the traditional social mechanisms of rural 
areas, where male elders exercised authority through their monopoly control of 
land, trade and women (Ellis 2006: 49). This transfer of labor, whether it was to 
operations run by Firestone in Margibi County or LAMCO in Nimba County 
also created an environment for the nascence of unionized labor. The economic 
boon amid deepening horizontal inequalities provided the basis for enduring 
contestation between the hybridizing coastal elite and indigenous hinterland 
social groups. 
 
When the maiden OAU summit was hosted in Saniquellie in 1959, it was the 
capital of Liberia's Northern Province and hardly benefited from the same 
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privileges administrative status as Counties like Montserrado, Grand Bassa or 
Maryland. Hosting the pre-OAU talks away from Monrovia was significant step 
in the subsequent crystallization of Tubman's landmark National Unification 
policy (Carter 1970, Sawyer 1994, Ellis 2006, Dunn et al. 1988). Under Tubman's 
administration that lasted from 1944 to his death in a London hospital in 1971, 
Liberia witnessed a number of largely symbolic administrative shifts. Tubman’s 
National Unification Policy resulted from a complex set of international, 
regional, national and sub-national factors. It granted county status to 
hinterland provinces, while simultaneously assuring the governing True Whig 
elite that its position would not be challenged as a result thereof. Meanwhile 
the economic boon resulting from the discovery of natural resources in Liberia 
provided the material basis for – allaying the fears of the dominant minority, 
establishing a patronage system and exacerbating horizontal identity-based 
inequalities between the dominant minority and the dominated majority. 
 
Tolbert built upon Tubman’s legacy and went a step further. It was under his 
administration that the modernization of borderland spaces occurred. This 
modernization principally took the form of the incorporation of border 
boomtowns into cities. The productive economic basis of these border 
boomtowns was commercial – this was the case of the two border cities (Foya, 
Lofa County and Ganta, Nimba County) at the center of this study. Their status 
as trade nodes and hubs of commercial activity antedated their statutes of 
incorporation. However, incorporation sought to put the state at the center of 
processes of order making within these commercial spaces through the 
appointment of City Mayors and the provision of National Police Forces of 
Liberia posts. In the process, however, alternative modes of ordering emerged 
within these spaces that escaped the control of arbitrary paramount, clan and 
town chiefs imposed by the Barclay Plan and constantly sought a voice for 
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engagement in arenas of opposition and domination with representatives of 
state authority. 
 
The 1980 Coup, Liberia’s Post-Coup State and Borderland as 
Battlefields 
 
The 1980 military coup in Liberia was cumulatively a symptom and 
manifestation of broader failures in Liberia’s statebuilding project and signaled 
a new turn in the long-term process of state formation. It was the culmination 
of a political season that had been ushered in by the formation of opposition 
parties including the Movement for Justice in Africa in 1973 and then 
Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) in 1975. Both political parties challenged 
the century-old True Whig Party domination of what had become a party-state. 
This grouping of leftist activists and intellectuals also demanded opening the 
political space for participation and inclusion, accountability and 
representation. These activities kicked off internal debate that can be 
simplistically described as opposing pro-democracy reformists and hardliners 
within the True Whig Party. Meanwhile, the Tolbert regime simultaneously 
responded to demands for openness by relaxing Tubman’s repressive 
mechanisms within the “security ministry” (Ciment 2013: 234-236) and 
expanding its patronage networks within Liberia’s rural communities in an 
attempt to weaken opposition fervor (Ellis 2006). The formations of organized 
political parties by a collection of social and student activists and public 
intellectuals contributed to the emergence of alternative voices across Liberia’s 
political landscape. It also forced introspection within the True Whig Party and 
the state. 
 
While these political movements remained fairly centrally based in Monrovia, 
they provided a platform for organized civil engagement with the Liberian state 
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within arenas of opposition and domination. The rice riots of April 1979 
became a proving ground for this nascent confrontation with the state. Riots 
erupted when the government, through its Minister of Agriculture raised the 
price of a 100-pound bag of rice from $22 per bag to $26 ostensibly to 
incentivize rice production within Liberia. However, Liberia’s opposition saw 
in this move an attempt by rice importers to benefit from price gouging a food 
staple and further impoverish Liberians. The price of the bag of rice, like that 
of the loaf of bread preceding the French revolution, affected almost every 
Liberian. PAL seized the moment calling for peaceful protests, which were met 
with public enthusiasm on the one hand and by government repression on the 
other. Tolbert even requested that warplanes from Guinea be deployed to buzz 
over Monrovia’s protesters (Cooper 140-141). Liberia’s growth without 
development (Clower et al 1966) was heralding a post-True Whig party stage in 
state formation. Tubman’s focus on using public revenue generated through 
the Open-Door Policy to strengthen self-serving political patronage had 
forgone the alternative of strengthening and diversifying Liberia’s economy to 
create and expand opportunity across social strata.   
 
A combination of political restiveness and volatility characterized by the 1979 
Rice Riots set the stage for the 1980 military coup which brought Samuel K. 
Doe and the Peoples Redemption Council PRC) to power. Four incidents – the 
1980 coup, the 1985 presidential election, the 1989 onset of the Liberian Civil 
War, and the 1999 LURD-led conflict relapse, provide analytical markers for 
the changing social configuration and role of borderlands in statebuilding. 
While the implications of these occurrences on the state and statebuilding have 
scantly been previously explored, Goodhand (2013: 256) suggests that sudden 
changes in the rules of the game and shifts in the power balance between 
center and periphery are clearly crucial in shifting borderlands from being 
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marginal and neglected (or powerful and advanced) to becoming unruly and 
militarized. A historical interrogation of Liberia’s borderlands – considering 
Scott’s (1998: 21) homogenizing cartographic rendering of social legibility by the 
state – is thus operationalized through the most basic administrative unit 
abutting the borders on the Liberian side i.e. district level. The prism of these 
landmark historical phases and events provides insights on how complex and 
immanent borderland dynamics contribute to altering power shifts within the 
state and vice versa in a process of transformative interaction. It provides 
historical insights on the role and implications of engagement between the state 
and its borderland spaces in the negotiation of territoriality (as a political 
construct) and the emergence of empirical manifestations of sovereignty. 
Implicitly therefore, Liberia’s borderlands evidence historically cumulative 
transformation ordered interaction with the state. These borderlands also 
exhibit characteristics of restiveness, exile and escape from repression by 
central authority. These historical processes provide an important starting point 
for understanding the evolutionary dynamics upon which cotemporary 
statebuilding is being added.  
 
Historically, the development of instruments and mechanisms of ‘ordering’ and 
control informs an understanding of the state’s pursuit of effective territorial 
control and absolute sovereignty over borderlands. Conversely, these 
instruments of control have implications on the nature and form of violence 
within borderlands. However, where the state and dominant non-state actors 
compete for and share the use of force within liminal spaces, oligopolies of 
violence that blur the line between public and private use of force emerge. The 
Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) served as the Leviathan enforcer in the 
borderlands from 1908. Its successor Armed Forces of Liberia continued the 
pursuit of the state’s securitization, while sharing the responsibility for ordering 
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and control with the National Police Force of Liberia. This process of state 
securitization in Liberia was shaped by the inherent political and social nature 
of successive regimes and their social relationships with society. Given the one-
sided exploitation of borderlands for taxes, import duties, mineral and 
agricultural resources with the meager development of infrastructure, 
livelihood in these refuges warranted the evolution of competing ordering and 
control mechanisms for circumventing and countering state control and the 
state’s quest to bring borderlands under its control. 
 
The government’s political and economic self-securitization through the 
establishment of authoritarian control of borderlands invariably centralized 
anti-government contestation in Monrovia. The 1980 coup brought the first 
group of indigenous Liberians into the presidency was fomented and executed 
from Monrovia. A 25-member National Constitution Committee was created in 
1981 under the Chairmanship of Amos Sawyer to review Liberia’s 1847 
constitution, thereby adapting it to Liberia’s new reality. The revised 
constitution was approved by referendum in 1984 after being tweaked by the 
Doe regime to increase the presidential term limits from four to six years – 
among other propositions that favored military participation in politics. 
However, it did not come into effect until after the General Elections of 1985. 
The significance of this constitution was its extension of full rights to all 
Liberians to education, while prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender, 
religion or ethnicity.  
 
Despite the strides made by this new constitution to lay the foundation for a 
much fairer nation, the Doe regime’s politicization of identity and the 
continuation of personality cult leadership set a series of events in motion that 
culminated in the First Liberian Civil War in 1989. First were the October 1985 
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elections in which Samuel Doe defeated Jackson F. Doe, previously a Senior 
Senator for Nimba County (Liberia Action Party). These elections were marred 
by irregularities, with Jackson F. Doe thought to have won. A month later, in 
November 1985 there was an attempted coup by Doe’s former brother-in-arms 
Gen. Thomas Quiwompka (of Nimba descent). These events resulted in the 
Mano and the Gio of Nimba County becoming pariahs of the Samuel Doe 
regime. The AFL was purged of Mano and Gio element from Nimba County, 
and flooded with Krahns from Doe’s ethnic group. Subsequently, Nimba 
County was subjected to coercive “pacification” missions orchestrated by the 
Armed Forces of Liberia (Ellis 2006). Meanwhile, the Liberian state continued 
its system of patronage, only this time around it did so by building privileged 
ties and extending economic advantage to the Mandingo communities within 
Nimba region (Ellis, 2006: 142). The twin coercive pacification of Nimba County 
by the AFL and extension of commercial privileges to the Mandingoes 
amounted to the pervasive instrumentalization of ethnicity for political gain and 
breeding inter-group tensions.    
 
As a result of Doe’s repression, many military-aged males in Nimba crossed the 
border into kindred Gio communities in Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea. Meanwhile 
Mandingos capitalized on their privileged position with Doe to control artisanal 
diamond mining operations across much of Nimba County. Many Nimbaians 
would return as freedom fighters “against a government that had forsaken its 
responsibility to protect its citizens and was persecuting them” 1  noted a 
community leader in Ganta. Unsurprisingly, the NPFL incursion from Cote 
d’Ivoire came in through Nimba County where the support they got from local 
communities that had grown hostile to the Doe regime provided a rear base 
within Liberia from which they could launch sustained assaults. Obviously, 
                                               
1 Interview with CC3 in Ganta, Nimba County on August 12, 2015. 
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there was a differentiated treatment of borderland communities by the Doe 
regime. However, by their telling, there was a lot of grievance against the Doe 
regime underlying the decision of different communities within Nimba County 
to support what initially was Taylor’s rebellion. This historical dimension of 
borderlands dynamics points to their importance in the onset of the conflict in 
Liberia. 
 
Balkanization and Territorial Control as War Strategy during Liberia’s 
Civil Wars  
 
Charles Taylor acceded to the Liberian presidency after the 1997 elections in 
which his National Patriotic Party (75% of votes) defeated Ellen Sirleaf-
Johnson’s Unity Party (10% of votes) in what was a rather bizarre election 
opposing two individuals who had shared a common goal of ridding Liberia of 
Doe’s oppressive regime. These elections were preceded by a number of peace 
agreements signed between the warring factions in Cotonou, Akosombo and 
Abuja between 1991 and 1995. These peace agreements evidence the importance 
of territorial control as war strategy in Liberia. The fracturing belligerent 
factions was a fact of the Liberian civil war. Hardly had the war began when 
Prince Y. Johnson’s Independent National Patriotic Front for Liberia 
splintered from Taylor’s NPFL. The United Liberation Movement of Liberia for 
Democracy that had also been formed in 1991 split up into a ULIMO-K 
component with Alhadji G.V. Kromah at its helm and ULIMO-J led by General 
Roosevelt Johnson. The splintering of these rebel groups fosters oligopolies of 
violence, strategy and military objectives with human and territorial 
implications. 
 
Between 1991 and 1995 Liberia was effectively a country balkanized territoriality 
under different and differing forms of rebel and government control with 
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borderlands trapped in the strategic positioning of belligerent forces. 
Borderlands are not only notionally complex, but their horizontal and vertical 
expressions make them means by which factional warring interest achieve 
postwar ends. Both war fighting and peace building are in essence collective 
action problems involving processes of ‘de-bordering’ and ‘re-bordering’ 
(Goodhand 2008:225). In essence, the sets of “re-bordering” processes in which 
the state engages (in a bid for state securitization) are mimicked by belligerent 
factions seeking different ends through the means of civil war. However, 
Liberia’s borderlands social actors have characteristically respond with their 
own sets of processes, which take advantage of their position on the edges of 
states. Liberia’s borderland elites, cognizant of their dual role within the state 
(often as gatekeepers into the borderlands) as well as at the edges of the state (as 
representatives of borderlands in elite spheres) skillfully navigate both spheres 
to their advantage.  
 
Liberia’s IGNU that had been formed after negotiations in Gambia and which 
was led by President Amos Sawyer benefited from the de jure legitimacy of 
state office. However, under conditions of civil war, the IGNU’s controlled 
Monrovia and a few coastal pockets with the help of the remnants of the AFL 
and the support of ECOMOG forces (Adebajo 2002). Given ECOMOG 
deployment to Monrovia and the inability of the NPFL to secure outright 
military victory, they settled for the re-bordering of Liberia by creating a de 
facto shadow government in Bong County.  
 
From 1991 to 1994, Taylor was instrumental in setting the pace for wartime 
internal re-bordering and alternative ordering in Liberia. He did this by 
establishing the NPRAG (the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly 
Government) with capital in Gbarnga (Bong County). Bong County, borders 
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southern Guinea. Its capital, Gbarnga (122 miles from Monrovia) sits at the 
strategic crossroads of the northward highway leading to Nzerekore in Guinea 
and the eastward highway leading to the Liberian border boomtown of Ganta 
(40 miles from Gbarnga) in Nimba County. The establishment of the NPRAG in 
Gbarnga led to indiscriminate and at times targeted retribution against 
Mandingo elements (who were seen as mercantilist accomplices to the Doe 
regime) and ethnic Krahn, Doe’s ethnic brethren (Ellis, 2006). The NPRAG 
might not have legally been a recognized state, but in fact it exhibited all the 
attributes of statehood including – border controls, a monopoly over the use of 
violence, a currency, an assembly, a justice system, tax collection and the 
attribution of contracts for the exploitation of mines within its space – much to 
Taylor’s benefit.  
 
The NPRAG manifested tropes of state performance through its construction of 
internal borders, albeit with murderous consequences for some potential 
travellers suspected of belonging to rival ethnic groups. The politicization of 
ethnicity within NPLF controlled enclaves, led to the internal and external 
displacement of communities with implications for the social configuration and 
character of borderlands and the formation of new rebel groups constructed 
along ethnic lines. Given the continued presence of ECOMOG in Monrovia, 
most of these dynamics were crystallized in Liberia’s borderlands. However, the 
control that the NPFL had exercised over large swaths of Liberia after its initial 
invasion in 1989 was challenged on multiple fronts by nascent rebel factions, 
which themselves were born out of the ongoing civil war dynamics. ULIMO-K, 
marching from Guinea wrested almost entire control of Lofa County. Foya 
residents, for example, describe the 1991 ULIMO-K incursion commanded by a 
Guinean fighter nicknamed “Saah Tchui” (the first-born axe).  
 
 68 
The brutality of the ULIMO-K invasion towards the Kissi people compared to 
the NPFL’s recruitment of territorial managers from within the occupied ethnic 
group is etched in the memories and on the city’s landscape with a memorial 
hut. “ULIMO them set up their big guns on the hill and asked all the town 
people to gather in the airfield. Then they gathered us the Quarter Chiefs and 
told us that we had to supply them with slave laborers to carry everything that 
they could take from here over to the other wide [ndlr Guinea]. We had to give 
them women to cook for them too,” noted a community elder in Foya2. Thus 
ULIMO-K capitalized on the land, labor, agricultural and materiel resources at 
its disposal to also exercise a state-like governance of territories under its 
control. These local dynamics of territorial control and occupation were meant 
to be sustained by local populations and their resources for long enough to 
allow the factional leaders access to and leverage at the peace table. However, 
they also provide insights to differing degrees of ordering that successive 
iterations of the Liberian state had failed to negotiate with its borderlands.   
 
Warlords and their “mid-level commanders” (MILCs) (Themner 2012: 206) 
definitely had a grasp of indigenous knowledge and understood the 
configuration and character of borderland dynamics better than previous 
iterations of the Liberian state. They did not only capitalize on the empirical 
elements of differentiated territoriality to use these spaces as operational bases, 
but fostered hitherto neglected cross-border economic linkages that were 
personally beneficial to them and their war effort. These linkages extended as 
far as international supply chains. Evidence abounds of Charles Taylor building 
a personal fortune through diamond, iron ore and forestry resource 
exploitation in Liberia and Sierra Leone for patronage as well as to finance his 
wars in both countries (Reno, 1999: 99; Keen, 2005: 49-50; Global Witness, 
                                               
2 Interview with a wartime QC on 23 March 2014. 
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2003:22; Waugh, 2013: 62). Borderlands and its multiple interactive complex 
levels of entrepreneurs are often the conduits of natural resources into global 
supply chains. Often perceived as constituting shadow economies (Pugh and 
Cooper, 2004), they often negotiate their existence and survival within and as 
parts of formal economies (Duffield, 2001: 72 and 2007: 35). As wars end, these 
economic linkages do not fade away but rather mutate to fade into the changing 
socio-political landscape. In the process of postwar operational transformation 
however, individuals appropriate social organizational continuities to legitimate 
non-state patterns of ordering that protect themselves – with communities also 
benefitting from collateral protection. This is seen in the confluence of life 
histories with social and spatial histories. There is a recurrence of individual 
actors who have been marginalized from the postwar processes by international 
normative prescriptions. These individuals become social actors by negotiating 
a place as community leaders and union leaders, thereby wielding power over 
human and material processes within borderlands and also setting themselves 
up as principal interlocutors with the state and statebuilding architects. Thus, 
wars transform borderlands and borderlands shape wars making borderlands 
an unavoidable space from which to interrogate postwar statebuilding and 
understand state formation.   
 
Conflict Relapse and Fighting for Liberia’s Borderlands  
 
Charles Taylor finally fulfilled the goal he has set out to accomplish by 
unleashing the civil war on Liberia when he became president following the 
1997 elections. While Taylor remains a popular figure in Liberian politics the 
charismatic authoritarianism he displayed in interwar governance proved 
incapable of rebuilding Liberia’s wrecked state. The complex blend of fear and 
adulation which drove voter preferences during the 1997 elections were 
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captured in the pro-Taylor slogan “he killed ma pa, he killed ma, be killed ma pa, 
but I will vote for him” (Harris 1999: 433). Taylor’s years as a ruthless regional 
warlord had alienated him from potential regional partners where he was 
perceived as a fomenter of destabilization and earned him many factional 
enemies at home. This complex blend of factors made it extremely challenging 
for Taylor to either capitalize on state formation processes or to build a viable 
Liberian state.  
 
Scant public revenue exacerbated the challenge of imposing effective territorial 
control and centralized sovereignty in Liberia. While he might have enriched 
himself through war, Taylor acceded to the helm of a shell state he had 
contributed to gut. Liberia’s public finance system was devastated, 
infrastructure was in disrepair, with the human toll of the war through deaths 
and internal and external displacement – alarming. To deal with these 
challenges, having alienated potential national, regional and international 
partners, Taylor employed his favored charismatic authoritarianism. Fear and 
adulation had brought him to the presidency and he was going to rule the same 
way he had gotten there. Given the state of the Liberian state, life histories 
collected from borderlands evidence apprehension towards Taylor’s 
government. Fathers returned to “see”3 and “recover” their homes, leaving 
families behind in internal and external displacement.   
 
While Taylor struggled to gain effective control of Monrovia, within 
borderlands antecedent forms of social ordering, authority and control were re-
emerging – albeit tinted by patterns of resiliency and survivability developed 
through war. The emergence of these antecedent forms of social ordering 
                                               
3 “See” was a term used by a Youth Leader in Foya to describe the phased return of refugees 
home. Interview conducted in Foya, Liberia on March 28, 2014. 
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blended with the implantation of Taylor loyalists, who carried out 
entrepreneurial functions as part of a vast informal network of operatives (UN 
Group of Experts Report 2001). Taylor also moved to secure himself and his 
revenue streams. He did the former by weakening the AFL and constituting the 
Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) in 1997 – a paramilitary group trained by ex-South 
African Defence Forces operatives. The ATU presented a means by which 
Taylor could maintain a loyal fighting force that could be mobilized and 
deployed for combat operations in the event that he ever lost power. While the 
ATU operated mainly in Monrovia, Taylor’s intelligence gathering operations 
spanned all of Liberia. To secure his revenue streams, Taylor appointed trusted 
allies to key revenue generation agencies such as the National Port Authority 
and the General Accounting Office, which he had once le himself.  
 
Meanwhile during Taylor’s presidency Liberia’s borderlands became a complex 
hub for the transaction of small arms and light weapons, mercenary services, 
intelligence and military training and mineral contracts. This hodgepodge of 
illegal activity took place alongside the quotidian livelihood processes of 
borderland inhabitants. However, given their connections to different centers 
of power, operators within these nodes of illegality contributed to shaping the 
informal rules by which human and material processes were governed within 
these spaces. Furthermore, these borderlands became hubs for the 
destabilization the Mano River Region. Vestiges of these activities are captured 
in the occasional UN Group of Experts report on Liberia.   
 
It is not surprising therefore that given - Taylor’s repressive leadership; the lack 
of infrastructural development; economic stagnation and Taylor’s 
personalization of political power – Liberia relapsed into civil war in 1999, this 
time with the Lofa County side of the border with Guinea providing the entry 
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point for the Guinea-backed LURD – Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Development under Sekou D. Conneh (a reincarnation of ULIMO-K from the 
1989 Civil War). They were joined in the fighting by the MODEL who had 
organized on the Ivorian side of the Liberian side of the border. Leadership by 
fear, led to the outbreak of the second Liberian civil war in 1999. Taylor’s 
inability to deliver on a postwar polity for Liberia and his subsequent ouster 
following the Accra 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, points to the 
relevance for a deeper exploration of the role of the president in postwar 
statebuilding. 
 
Accra and Postwar Statebuilding in Liberia: Bringing the State Back 
into Postwar Borderlands 
 
The August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra, Ghana 
brought together the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL), Political Parties and Liberia’s civil society. This peace 
agreement ended the Second Liberian Civil war and set out a framework for a 
two-year transitional government at the end of which elections were going to 
lead to the first postwar government. United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1509 established the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) with mandate to support – the implementation of the peace process 
and ceasefire agreement, humanitarian and human rights assistance and 
security reform (UNSCR 1509, 2003). Meanwhile in the governance side, 
Liberia’s “international partners” negotiated the Governance and Economic 
Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) with the National Transitional 
Government of Liberia (NTGL) (Bøås, 2009). Despite the drawdown of UN 
troops in Liberia from their initial 16,000 contingent in 2003 to 7000 in August 
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2014, within a country with a population of approximately 3 million inhabitants, 
UNMIL’s political and security presence looms larger than those of the AFL 
and Liberian National Police (LNP). Meanwhile GEMAP continue to be 
refracted across Liberia’s macroeconomic infrastructure. Liberia’s international 
partners sought to rebuild the Liberian state going from understanding of the 
causes of the Liberian Civil Wars while largely misreading Liberia’s socially 
networked micro political topographies. These micro political topographies 
evident within reincarnated social configurations forged through resilient 
survival during two civil wars provides the empirical basis of active territoriality 
and sovereignty evident in quotidian practice. Thus, at its end, the civil war had 
created new sets of political and economic dynamics variably dissonant from 
and continuous from pre-war and wartime pasts.  
 
The state’s re-entry into Liberia’s postwar borderlands has been manifested 
through the securitization, management and enforcement of border trade, and 
immigration controls. These statist practices have encountered the active 
agency of informally ordered borderland social actor dynamics. The transition 
from war fighting to tenuous statebuilding has involved complex conflict and 
cooperation between the state and non-state social actors over the physical 
form, social content and symbolic character of borders. From the state’s 
position, Liberia’s international borders are guaranteed by international 
conventions. However, at the end of Liberia’s civil war, international re-
bordering through the institutionalization of official border controls has proven 
more attainable than meeting the socio-economic necessities of a complex 
admixture of socially organized borderland actors through postwar 
statebuilding. Taming the wartime strategic imperative of grabbing borderlands 
for access and leverage at the peace table coupled with a wartime political 
economy of abusive labor practices and illicit natural resource extraction 
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represents an enduring challenge for the postwar state in Liberia. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that informally social groups within these borderlands 
spaces are organized in ways that they seek to maintain control over and 
optimize gains from prevailing and future management of human and material 
processes. The historically and socially entrenched practices of informal 
ordering constitute part of ongoing state formation that remains elusive to the 
homogenizing blinders of internationally designed and driven statebuilding.  
 
Going from the premise that there could be no durable peace without the 
security of the state, the securitization of the postwar Liberian state has set 
itself the triadic purposes of – maintaining de jure state sovereignty 
internationally; establishing effective territorial control over Monrovia; and 
negotiating quasi-territorial control over the hinterlands as a way of managing 
potential regional war dynamics. From the onset of postwar statebuilding, 
UNMIL guaranteed Liberia’s sovereignty while working with a diverse group of 
governmental and nongovernmental partners to rebuild Liberia’s national 
security apparatus (Armed Forces of Liberia, Liberian National Police and the 
Liberian Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization). The task of reconstituting 
both the AFL and Liberia’s Ministry of Defense was wholly contracted out to 
the private sector with only DynCorp and PA&E allowed to submit bids 
(McFate 2008: 646). The Demilitarization, Demobilization Rehabilitation and 
Rehabilitation (DDRR) process for ex-combatants was a key component of 
Liberia’s SSR programming. DynCorp was responsible for demobilization and 
then recruiting, vetting and training the AFL and MoD while PA&E was 
responsible for fielding the AFL and providing mentorship once the units were 
in place (McFate 2008: 646). This instrumental two-prong approach to the 
securitization of the postwar state in Liberia had implications for the inclusion 
and exclusion of trained Liberian military personnel (who considered 
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themselves legitimate stakeholders in postwar reconstruction) based on criteria 
established by private sector US entities rather than Liberians themselves.  
 
However, for immediate state securitization purposes, UNMIL physically 
positioned battalions in each county from Montserrado fanning out to the 
border counties – with specific attention to those borderland counties (Lofa, 
Nimba and Grand Gedeh counties) which had become the epicenters of war 
onset and relapse. In 2015 UNMIL bases remained in Lofa County and Nimba 
County. Lofa County residents affectionately recall the way UNMIL swept 
across the battle-scarred terrain to occupy the Foya airbase at the northern tip 
of Liberia in close proximity to the borders with Guinea and Sierra Leone in 
2003. What was an emergency response to the occupation of Lofa County by 
LURD rebels, failed to materialize into transformative peacebuilding. Over the 
years, UNMIL has gone through force level attrition and a recalibration of its 
mission necessitated by changing security dynamics and the re-election of 
Liberia first postwar president in November 2011. Meanwhile, the Government 
of Liberia has been both unwilling and unable to exhibit a similar force 
presence to UNMIL. Despite huge investments made in rebuilding Liberia’s 
security sector, the report of the representative of the UNSG to Liberia noted 
that “the police [Liberian], with limited presence and mobility, were on some 
occasions overwhelmed by large crowd and required intervention by UNMIL to 
restore order and protect civilians” (UNSC S/2014/123). These deficiencies in 
crowd management and civilian protection capacity reflects a police presence 
that is more cosmetic and predatory than focused on fostering law an order. 
Especially in borderlands, this tendency vacuum has been filled by alternative 
modes of ordering that breed non-state forms of social control. 
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Meanwhile former wartime mid-level commanders (MILCs) marginalized from 
formal statebuilding processes have created a space for themselves within their 
borderland communities thereby transferring territorial logics of war to the 
postwar context. These territorial logics tend towards spatial occupation and 
reconstituting networks of former combatants into informal economic schemes 
ranging from agriculture and motorbike riding to private security service 
provision. Successive UN Panel of experts’ reports have hinted at connections 
between individuals and groups in Grand Gedeh County borderlands, for 
example, with factions implicated in the cross-border destabilization efforts in 
Cote d’Ivoire (UNSC S/2012/901; UNSC S/2013/683; Africa Confidential, 2013).  
Africa Confidential reported in 2013 that Thomas Yaya Nimely, Liberia’s ex-
Foreign Minister (2003 – 05) and leader of the defunct MODEL may have been 
behind the guerrillas who carried out the cross-border attacks into Cote 
d’Ivoire on 12 June 2013. This former warlord owns a farm and employs 
hundreds of ex-MODEL fighters in Grand Gedeh County. The logics by which 
these individuals operate differ across the borderlands. However, where they 
have found resistance in usurping existing informal social orders, they have 
segued into economic informality where they remain relevant in controlling 
human (labor) and material (commodity) processes. 
 
Operationally, the state’s re-entry into the borderlands has been refracted 
through its partnership with international statebuilders. Despite the waning 
visibility of the military aspects of this partnership within borderlands, the 
international statebuilder’s presence dominates the infrastructural landscape. 
Internal border infrastructures, which delineate district and county boundaries 
bear markers of the contribution of the international community to Liberia’s 
formal administrative reconstruction. In both Foya and Ganta, most official 
state building such as those that house the LNP and the Bureau of Immigration 
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and Naturalization (BIN) were built as part of “Quick Impact [Statebuilding] 
Projects”. The same is starkly branded on their facades. The United Nations or 
European Union funding that enabled their construction is frontally 
acknowledged as if to perpetually justify statebuilding intervention. These 
markers do not only point to the State reasserting its presence in the 
borderlands through the benevolence of the international community. They 
also diminish the expectations borderland social actors have of the state with 
implications for its ability to permanently exercise its authority in daily practice. 
Meanwhile it simultaneously amplifies expectations of international 
governmental and non-governmental statebuilders who provide the postwar 
resource base for appropriative contestation.  
 
Simplistically, borderland social actors expect more of Liberia’s international 
partners than the Liberian government itself. Too often have they heard the 
refrain of the postwar state’s inability and incapacity to contribute to meeting 
their basic security, access and emancipatory needs. This catalyzes into 
borderland communities negotiating an extractive relationship with the state in 
which they strive to score infrastructural gains from the state – such as schools, 
roads and hospitals. Although Liberia’s borderlands evidence the poor track 
record of state provision of these infrastructures – and where these needs are 
being met, the state has often benefited from both missionary and INGO 
assistance to make it possible. Meanwhile borderland social actors look to the 
configuration of informal orders to meet their basic human and collective 
needs. Hence, it is the state’s process of tepid re-bordering and reordering – 
seen through its re-entry into the postwar borderlands – rather than the 
international borderline per se, that has significance for quotidian 
manifestations of informal ordering, authority and social control mechanisms 
within borderlands. The state’s autonomy and authority within borderlands is 
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imperiled by its unwillingness to integrate immanent social processes into 
postwar statebuilding.  
 
A Postwar Development Partnership Viewed from the Borderlands 
 
Border posts inscribe power politics onto geography and territory, symbolizing 
the extent of the state’s remit (Jackson 2008:268-269) while borderlines are 
empowering, regulatory, identity carving markers of difference that often cut 
across peoples (Zartman 2013: 12). However, states, international non-
governmental organizations and historically embedded borderland social actors 
interact and interpret the ordering imperatives of international bordering 
differently. Encounters around these symbols of the state in borderlands in 
postwar contexts are perverted by the continuities emanating from the 
enduring influence of pre-war and wartime logics within borderlands. Nowhere 
is the state’s actual “decentralization”, “reach” or “resilience” better 
operationally interrogated and interpreted than within its borderlands. These 
borderlands go beyond the physical geography of spatial delineation to the 
networked political topographies that seek to optimize the relevance of 
borderland social actors during processes of statebuilding.  
 
Given the interwoven formalities and informalities that characterize the 
networked political topographies of borderland social actors their influences on 
postwar statebuilding are evidenced in everyday practice. The realities of the 
immediate post war contexts cast borderlands as epicenters for emergency 
humanitarian response. Thus, borderlands from Goma in the eastern DRC to 
Foya in Liberia symbolize the typical objects of humanitarian intervention – 
zones of bedraggled destitution. These humanitarian responses predominantly 
undertaken within the immediate postwar context by IGO and INGO actors are 
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ostensibly tailored to meet the needs of the most vulnerable segments of 
society.  However, these humanitarian groups become another set of social 
actors in the quotidian political topography of borderlands – a presence that is 
salient in its interaction with borderland social actors within arenas of 
opposition and domination.  
 
As the guns fell silent in Liberia’s borderlands, an alphabet soup of 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and governmental aid 
agencies flooded borderlands with varying graduations of often overlapping 
agendas. Working from a predominantly “development” agenda, INGOs 
pushed a mono-agenda “transformation” of human livelihoods within 
borderlands. Plan International for example supported vocational training 
programs for women and young girls, Concern Worldwide catered to water 
provision and the Carter Center worked on postwar rule of law and justice 
reform. Meanwhile governmental aid agencies with far greater resources 
engaged in cross-sector development engagement. The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) engaged in sectors ranging from 
education to animal husbandry. Eleven years later, billboards posted at 
strategic entry and exit points of borderland districts continue to showcase the 
presence of international NGOs, most of which have since withdrawn from 
these borderlands and others which have survived their emergency missions by 
attempting to contribute to the changing phases of postwar consolidation.  
 
These largely externally driven development processes have created winners 
and losers within borderlands thereby contributing to the reconfiguration of 
political topographies. As aid agencies enter borderlands with either mono-
agenda or cross-sector agendas they encounter both official and non-official 
gatekeepers. There are multiple outcomes for this engagement that has been 
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central to the romanticization of “local ownership” of postwar peace and 
development processes. While in fact there is little ownership of the INGO and 
IGO postwar peacebuilding agendas, there most certainly is evidence of 
external aid appropriation by borderland social actors. The appropriation 
however, often works to the detriment of the postwar state as it strengthens 
alternative forms of informal orders, while deepening their authority and 
providing further justification for their forms of social control. Far from being a 
moralistic argument, these aid agencies could – in the process of postwar 
statebuilding – invariably be contributing to strengthening long term and 
parallel processes of state formation. The 2008 – 2012 Lofa County Development 
Agenda (LCDA) – prepared as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy process – 
evidences the official dependence of borderland communities on INGOs given 
what is noted as “the lack of economic prospects in Liberia’s border regions” 
with Sierra Leone and Guinea. The official document states that the situation is 
compounded by the decreasing presence of humanitarian and development 
organizations. However, the story it does not and cannot tell is that of 
government unwillingness to invest in human and material resources to 
facilitate the quotidian livelihoods of borderland communities. Neither does it 
capture the coping mechanisms that borderland social actors develop as 
alternative forms of social configurations to build resiliency amid historical 
state-constructed vulnerability.  
 
The state benefits by outsourcing borderland development to International 
NGOs who work within these communities, largely with the tacit consent of the 
national government. Their work within borderlands is also both facilitated and 
hamstrung by local representatives of the state depending on the borderland 
site under study. The emergent postwar Liberian state, has tacitly been 
outsourced its developmental function to INGOs. Despite their best intentions, 
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the interventions of these organizations remain limited to very narrow sectors 
of specialization at the expense of much larger scaled, wider developmental 
programming. This narrow programmatic focus makes for individualized 
success stories that shape life history narratives within borderlands. For 
example, narratives abound about skills learnt in refugee camps that have been 
transposed to livelihood processes within the postwar context – especially by 
women. Therefore, it remains an analytical challenge to situate the role of 
INGOs in postwar statebuilding within the limits of geographical borderlands 
thereby necessitating a more interpretive understanding of social implications 
of subjective appropriation of these resource-laden interventions.  
 
The state’s ceding of the developmental role to INGOs has also spawned the 
exponential growth of Community Based Organizations as INGOS seek “local” 
implementing partners. Although CBOs tout their indigenous knowledge, 
operational agility and maneuverability – the over 650 registered with Liberia’s 
Ministry of Internal Affairs as of July 2015 – are largely shell entities seeking to 
capitalize on the flow of foreign aid into specific thematic sectors ranging from 
Action Aid’s program to rehabilitate refugees in Nimba County to Plan 
International’s program to increase women’s earning capacity through skills 
training. Given their limited resources and thematic foci, functional CBOs are 
cost-efficient partners in operationalizing INGOs skill development programs 
for sustainable/subsistent livelihoods and “social transformation”. However, 
these formal CBOs are an invention of the postwar development aid topography 
and they starkly differ from borderland pluralized informal social actors. Their 
rootedness in Monrovia-based development politics reflect a neo-indirect rule 
mechanism through which INGOs seek to achieve their goals by using “local” 
middlemen and women. However, even when refracted on the borderland by 
their local implementing CBO partners, INGOs remain integral social actors in 
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altering political topographies, which have a bearing on state, society and 
market relations. 
 
Massive population returns with borderlands and a lack of economic prospects, 
coupled with low levels of respect for state authority and rule of law, have led to 
a surge of local and cross-border crime that challenge law enforcement 
agencies and local authorities (LCDA Report 2012). Borderland communities in 
both Lofa and Nimba Counties have combined traditions and informal conflict 
resolution, arbitration and adjudication mechanisms to deal with ad hoc 
communal problems outside the purview of state legal apparatus. QC1, a 
quarter head in Lofa County noted that recidivist Guinean and Sierra Leonean 
criminals from neighboring borderlands were subjected to informal extradition 
procedures towards their communities of origin. However, these informal 
systems were powerless in enforcing the permanent expulsion of repeat 
offenders from their communities4. However, he insisted on the fairness of 
informal process of arbitration that took place to ascertain guilt of the accused 
party as well as the resulting penalty – expulsion from Foya. In the case of 
repeat offenders, intricate consultations were engaged with traditional (as 
official leaders) and community leaders from the “offender’s” community of 
origin, to ensure his return. These processes take place alongside activities by 
INGOs such as the Carter Center, who are also working in the borderlands to 
strengthen the rule of law, given what they perceive to be prevailing patriarchal 
tendencies in the communitarian enforcement of informal justice.  
 
The postwar developmental template, which is refracted to borderlands by the 
state and its development partners is one which places INGOs at the center of 
the pursuit of an opaque quest for sustainable development. The objective, 
                                               
4	Interview with QC1 in Foya, Liberia on March 28, 2014.	
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being to mitigate or even eliminate conflict relapse vulnerability. Hence, there 
is a preference among borderland actors not only to negotiate their livelihoods 
with the INGOs, but also to shape their needs according to what the perceived 
sector interest of the INGO seems to be. Being very well informed of what 
sectors are thematic foci of specific INGOs, borderland actors reflect the 
necessity for aid during needs assessment exercises. If an INGO focuses on 
public health, the community (through its leaders) echoes the community’s 
public health needs which might not necessarily coincide with the 
developmental priorities/necessities of the given borderland community – since 
any resource is better than nothing at all. The reason being, in the absence of 
adequate state investment in borderland livelihoods, any investment by the 




The postwar state in Liberia, given the nature of its re-entry into the 
borderlands, has struggled to effectively order borderland spaces. State 
infrastructure is evident in physical buildings, large-scale infrastructure 
development projects and Quick Impact Projects. Some of the QIPs have 
retained their starkness from the days they were implanted as part of the 
immediate postwar emergency rehabilitation of state infrastructure. Buildings 
lacking the requisite amount of staffing and materiel to effectively perform the 
state’s ordering function in the borderlands.  
 
This limited presence of the state has created a vacuum within which local 
actors have implanted and entrenched themselves. Borderland entrepreneurs 
have shown dexterity in using their place on the edges of states to impact 
livelihood within borderlands, while developing network of influence on both 
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sides of the border. Their positioning as money brokers or transport gurus, fill 
a void left by the limited reach of the state’s monetary infrastructure, while 
boosting an informal transport economy outside of the state’s regulation. 
 
The crystallization of the roles of these borderland actors over time, makes 
them insurmountable partners with whom the state would have to negotiate to 
enhance its autonomy, develop effective control over its entire territory, 
recapture its monopoly over the use of force and connect the informal 
economies into the formal economy. As part of the statebuilding process, all 
these are necessary to develop an effective postwar state with the ability to 





Chapter 3   
Borderlands, Peacebuilding and Statebuilding – The Need for an 
Integrative Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter develops an integrative analytical approach to interrogating and 
understanding the centrality of formal bordering – internal and international – 
and informal ordering dynamics from postwar borderlands. Both constantly 
evolving sets of processes are intricately interactive and mutually constitutive 
providing the empirical basis for understanding the nature, function and 
content of states, in general and postwar states and statebuilding outcomes in 
particular. Over the past decade, multidisciplinary interest has grown in 
grounded understandings of how the liminal spaces of late developing states 
have become epicenters of alternative and embedded forms of contestation of 
state order, authority and control. Enduring instances and examples of intra-
state contestation have persisted through manifest and latent phases – such as 
the northern-based Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda or the southern-based 
Casamance Democratic Forces Movement in Senegal. Meanwhile more 
contemporaneous forms of liminally-based violent intra-state contestation have 
emerged epitomized by the southeastern-based Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and northeastern-based Boko Haram 
insurgency emerged in a democratizing Nigeria and the northeastern-based 
Ansar Dine in Mali. These organized violent groups have used their positions 
within liminal spaces of states to – rationalize their existence; transact 
international borders; construct formal and informal alliances; ensure their 
resilience and sustainability; and to leverage engagements with states which 
straddle international borders. Therefore, they challenge the classical state and 
its sovereign and territorialized manifestations.  
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However violent manifestations of borderland based organized violent groups 
often occlude the implications of routinized borderland daily practices on 
statebuilding processes. Furthermore, the coexisting of the relative transience 
of borderland traders and the permanence of borderland agriculturalists often 
eludes ontological curiosity of micro economists and pastoral anthropologists 
within their respective disciplinary silos. Nevertheless, violent and postwar 
borderlands attract different forms of local, regional and international 
securitizing interests. These interests are often geared towards amplifying 
controlling forms of subjection and penetration from the state. Given their 
historical origins and the disparate rationales for their emergence, differing 
manifestations of liminally based intra-state contestation highlight mutually 
interactive engagements between informally organized borderland social actors, 
states and international actors. These engagements also evidence emerging 
forms of pluralized patterns of informal ordering, raising important questions 
about the assumed dominance of formalized state-centered monistic 
interpretations of sovereignty and territoriality. They also place the inter-
subjective phenomena of ordering and re-ordering, squarely at the 
multidisciplinary intersection of political sociology and international relations.  
 
Despite the regional and international ramifications of post-polar intra-state 
wars, contestation of international borders has diminished considerably. 
However, contestation over intra-state political arrangements that have evolved 
into protracted violent conflicts. This has coincided with a turn towards deeper 
understanding and explanation of local and global interconnectedness of 
phenomena within politics and international studies. Lapid (2001: 2) highlights 
the new recognition that mobility and flux (rather than fixity and stasis) will 
increasingly determine the mercurial horizon against which the contemporary 
International Relations theory project needs to be reworked. This theoretical 
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shift necessitates the deployment of multidisciplinary sensitivity in the 
exploration of inter-related phenomena that simultaneously cut across 
geographical space (simultaneously occupying multiple spaces), are embedded 
in historical dynamics and include changing social processes.  
 
A multidisciplinary exercise warrants a pivot from the cartographic certainties 
of settled international borders towards an empirical understanding the 
unsettled spaces that abut them. Where the state’s reach is limited either by 
choice or by design borderland spaces exhibit complex forms of social 
organization, structuring and process dynamics. Hence these dynamics have 
social and symbolic power implications on broader statebuilding processes. 
The complex interactions between borderland social actors and states gain even 
greater salience during moments of crisis – whether arising out of the outbreak 
of violent conflict, organized crime, terrorism or health pandemics. At these 
margins of states, sovereignty is often actualized through the pluralization of 
order and territoriality transcends classic binary interpretations of internal and 
external geopolitical violability. The spatial, symbolic and social complexity of 
borderland dynamics is evidenced in routine daily negotiation of pluralized 
informal ordering that generates alternative yet fairly classical patterns of 
authority and social control. These processes are often networked with social 
actors outside borderlands, necessitating a de-centered and interaction-based 
exploration of borderland implications on postwar statebuilding.   
 
It is in the interaction of disaggregated social actors (state and non-state) 
through daily practice within multiple spaces of domination and opposition 
that pluralized empirical sovereignty and effective or pervasive territoriality are 
operationalized. Binary top-down and bottom-up understandings of 
statebuilding occlude the processes by which organized social actors negotiate 
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belonging and positionality within both sets of processes that are often 
occurring simultaneously. This interaction takes place within a framework that 
conceptualizes borderland dynamics and statebuilding as complex process-
oriented phenomena with differing, yet interconnected, levels of negotiated 
social embeddedness. Organized social actors – as collective entities – 
deliberately engage in and with both sets of processes from differing positions 
of a power – intending to maintain and optimize their interactive and spatial 
maneuverability. In daily practice, disaggregated social actors, engage the 
process of statebuilding from differing spatial, social and symbolic positioning, 
with evolving outcome expectations. However, contested and accommodating 
interactions within arenas of opposition and domination shape the 
renegotiation of these expectations. In the process, there is mutual 
transformation of social actor teleology with implications on both formal and 
informal ordering, authority negotiation and deployment and social control 
during postwar statebuilding. The paradoxical outcomes that often emerge 
from this complexity, evidences processual heterodoxy in confrontation with 
the supplanted orthodoxies of postwar statebuilding interventions. 
 
This chapter engages with the flawed neo-modern premise of contemporary 
statebuilding policy and research that does inadequately accounts for the inter-
subjectivity of disaggregated social actors involved in the processes in daily 
practice. This critique of neo-modern statebuilding acknowledges emergent 
heuristic interdependences between peacebuilding and statebuilding research 
and policy that occludes in-depth reflexively organized social actor 
problematization of the interrelated constructs. It goes on to advance a society-
in-statebuilding approach that focuses on patterns of interaction between 
disaggregated, networked social actors within contexts of postwar statebuilding. 
This disaggregation turns the ontological focus of statebuilding away from its 
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institutionalist rules-based tropes, towards an understanding of the state as a 
product of socially based inter-subjective engagement. It is within the multiple 
spaces of domination and opposition that empirical orders, authority and 
control are thus negotiated, appropriated and contested.  
 
Getting to the Postwar State in Liberia 
 
On 18 August 2003, the Liberia Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was 
signed in Accra, Ghana. At the negotiation table for the talks (which began on 
June 4, 2003) were representatives of – the Taylor-led Government of Liberia, 
the Liberians United for Reconciliation and democracy (LURD), the Movement 
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), political parties, a cross-section of 
Liberia’s civil society, representatives of regional and international 
organizations and partner states (such as Ghana and Nigeria). Despite this 
seemingly broad representative base of international and social actors, it 
predominantly remained a warlord’s deal given that its foundational document 
was the ceasefire signed by the belligerent parties. The deployment of United 
Nations and United States forces added pressure for the mainly belligerent 
parties to get to agreement.  
 
Varying actors at the Accra peace talks came in with different sources of 
legitimacy. The legitimare bellum exercised by warlords clearly contrasted the 
“democratic” institutional legitimacy of political parties. Meanwhile religious 
and civil society actors deployed their grounded legitimacy ostensibly to 
vocalize the “peoples” expectations of the peace accord. They also sought to 
pressure the belligerents into agreement by pushing a truth and reconciliation 
agenda. Meanwhile the regional and international partners came to the table 
with economic and political carrots and sticks. In Accra, the negotiation of the 
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CPA saw the expansion of the participatory parties from the belligerents who 
signed the June ceasefire agreement to incorporate more political actors by the 
time the CPA was signed in September. Nevertheless, the postwar statebuilding 
processes that ensued led to shrinking of the political space though a 
technocratic and institutional focus on the state. The marginalization of mainly 
informal actors and processes through postwar statebuilding in practice has 
proven inimical to its objectives of postwar peacebuilding.  
 
According to Adebajo (2002: 89-91) 14 previous peace agreements between 1990 
and 1997 had failed to lay the framework for the sustainable postwar 
reconstruction of Liberia. He identifies three main obstacles to getting to the 
postwar moment – the strategic positioning and proliferation of belligerents, 
regional incoherence of ECOWAS and Africa’s international strategic 
marginality. However, the 2003 Accra CPA ended the Second Liberian Civil 
(1999 – 2003). It also outlined a framework for a two-year transitional 
government. The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was 
expected to organize elections, which in turn were supposed to usher in the 
first postwar government. In many ways, therefore Liberia represents a classic 
case of postwar statebuilding programming as captured from the International 
Relations literature on international statebuilding (Chandler, Sick, Paris and 
Sisk, Richmond, Mac Ginty). In order to implement Liberia’s postwar 
statebuilding and peacebuilding roadmap sequenced, benchmarked and 
programmed sets of interrelated frameworks were developed largely by the 
international community.  
 
Firstly, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1509 established 
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).  UNMIL’s mandate supported 
– the implementation of the peace process and ceasefire agreement, 
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humanitarian and human rights assistance and security reform (UNSC Res 
1509, 2003). These focal points decidedly lacked human development 
components and reflected the international drive to build a centralized 
internationally compliant semblance of a state. However, UNMIL deployment 
across Liberia ensured that for the first time in two decades, a single actor 
assured Liberia’s territorial integrity.  
 
Secondly, to supplement the international effort already underway through 
UNMIL, the NTGL Chairman, Gyude Bryant, launched the Results Focused 
Transitional Framework Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) 
on March 25, 2004. Its purpose was to administer and monitor postwar 
international aid as a condition set out at an international donor conference for 
Liberia that took place in February 2004. While Gyude Bryant served as 
RIMCO Chairman, country representatives of the United Nations and the 
World Bank were Vice Chairs. This infringement of Liberia’s sovereignty was 
justified on grounds of excessive corruption and the lack of capacity within the 
postwar country.  
 
To complete what Bøås (2009) describes as a trusteeship approach to good 
governance, the establishment of the Economic Governance Steering 
Committee (EGSC) further compounded the international bureaucratization of 
postwar Liberia. The EGSC was set up to implement the Governance and 
Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP). The GEMAP was 
imposed on the NTGL by its international partners working through the 
International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL)5 ostensibly out of “shared 
                                               
5 The ICGL was made up of representatives from the United Nations, the Economic 
Community for West African States (ECOWAS), African Union, the European Union (United 
Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Sweden), World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
United States. 
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concerns regarding Liberia’s economic governance” (Bøås, 2009). The signatory 
document expressed concerns of “a danger that the targets of the Results-
Focused Transition Framework will not be met, which threatens to undermine 
donor support for an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP).” 
Expressing the conditionality embedded within the GEMAP, the signatory text 
noted that, “sound economic governance is seen by the international 
community as a prerequisite to increased financing of the RFTF.” Hence the 
program’s interlocking components that imposed international “experts” with 
“binding co-signature authority” included – financial management and 
accountability; improving budgeting and expenditure management; improving 
procurement practices and granting of concessions; establishing effective 
processes to control corruption; supporting key institutions; and capacity 
building.  
 
This programmed, benchmarked and multipronged international approach to 
statebuilding in Liberia was based on the premise that Liberia in 2003 was 
effectively a failed state. Therefore being ‘present at the creation’ means 
international actors – through the IGCL as was the case in Liberia – could play 
a formative role in setting the parameters of state action, such as the orientation 
of the state in relation to markets, civil society and social provisions (Mac Ginty, 
2013: 19). The trouble with approach to social engineering (Krause and 
Jutersonke 2005: 448) is that it often ignores social actors, practices and 





Postwar Peacebuilding and Statebuilding – Evolving Interventionary 
Concepts 
 
Since the early 1990s, there has been a heuristic evolution in international 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding coalescing around ever-narrowing 
institutionalization of statebuilding practices. Within the context of the post-
polar global transformations of the late 1980s, An Agenda for Peace (1992) 
normatively inscribed peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
(including preventive diplomacy) into the mission and purpose of the United 
Nations Organization (UNO). The codification of these concepts gave them 
working definitions, however their operationalization across different contexts 
proved more problematic. Despite the corrosive implications of statebuilding 
interventions on state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 
operationalization of peace missions evolved over time to normatively 
rationalize statebuilding interventions ostensibly as part of peacebuilding 
imperatives. So did the diverse number of state and non-state security and 
development aid agencies and non-governmental organizations who took upon 
themselves the statebuilding and peacebuilding mantras from differing 
ideological and operational perspectives (Paris and Sisk 2009: 6-8). All this took 
place within an international context where spurious linkages between the 
fallacious conceptualization of “failed”, “fragile” and “weak states” and 
international terrorism and violence (Call, 2008: 1493) were advanced to 
strengthen the case for neo-modern interventionary statebuilding.  
 
Despite recent attempts to conceptually refine “peacebuilding” and 
“statebuilding”, there remain horizontal and vertical overlaps between both 
concepts.  The Agenda for Peace (1992) defined peacebuilding as “…an action 
to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict…with particular reference to 
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rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and 
strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at 
war.” Chapter 59 of The Agenda for Peace clearly articulates a new requirement 
for technical assistance within the UN with an obligation to develop and 
provide when requested – “support for the transformation of deficient national 
structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic 
institutions.” Hence statebuilding was an essential corollary to peacebuilding 
from the drafting of The Agenda for Peace.    
 
However, peacebuilding has undergone conceptual refinement over the years 
under the aegis of the UNO. It was refined upon review by the UNSG’s policy 
committee in May 2007 agreeing that “Peacebuilding strategies must be 
coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on 
national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, 
and therefore relatively narrow set of activities” aimed at addressing the root 
causes of conflict and preventing its recurrence (Chetail 2009: 4). Despite 
multiple conceptual refining, the focus of peacebuilding has largely remained 
structural, linearly sequential and intervener outcome-oriented.  
 
Changing civil war patterns, peace treaty arrangements and the relative success 
and failure of multifunctional international peacekeeping-cum-peacebuilding 
missions in shepherding war to peace transitions, have broadly contributed to 
the heuristic evolution of peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions. 
Lessons learnt from narrow and short-term first generation peacekeeping 
missions have shaped the content and orientation of subsequent broader and 
longer-term second and third generation peacekeeping initiatives (Paris and 
Sisk, 2009: 12). Despite the broadening of peacebuilding missions and mandates 
and the institutionalization of a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 
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(PBC) in December 2005 international peacebuilding remains fraught with 
ideological challenges. 
 
International peacebuilding has largely evolved into a set of interventions 
expected to address the root causes of war and prevent conflict relapse. 
However, the problem remains that peacebuilding as defined by the UN, has 
remained highly dependent upon the political motivation of its promoters, from 
continental bodies to state agencies involved in disparate civilian, 
developmental or security dimensions of peacebuilding (Chetail 2009: 6). 
Meanwhile, the very language of peacebuilding can disclose manifest implicit 
ideologies that systematically work to naturalize it as a given or natural referent, 
thereby justifying a broad range of interventions and reinforcing the hierarchy 
between the intervener and the intervened (Richmond et al 2015: 35). This also 
reinforces the enduring analytical dichotomization between the intervening 
peacebuilding “agent” and the silent local “object” of peacebuilding 
interventions. Dichotomized analyses largely miss the heuristic evolution in 
peacebuilding and statebuilding practices as resulting from “lessons-learned”. 
These lessons that often come from the after-action evaluation of specific 
country experiences hardly ever result in paradigmatic shifts and 
reconceptualization of the ideological fundamentals of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding.  
 
The Westphalian variant of modern state formation provides the basis for a 
specific understanding of social contracting, the accumulation and 
centralization of coercion and capital that can be traced back to 1648. Viewing 
history analogically therefore, would favor a return to an engineered form of 
state formation through “statebuilding” to build both national and international 
peace. Tilly (1990: 20-24) evidences the historically rooted and geopolitically 
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negotiated interconnections between the violent accumulation of capital by 
coercion and the origins, configuration and purpose of the modern state 
formation nationally, as well as its implications for international order. 
Therefore, there is a subtle distinction between statebuilding defined as a 
“conscious attempt at establishing an order, and ‘state-formation’ as the 
contingent social processes that accompany and deform this politics” 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2010: 113). This definitional distinction opens up the 
inevitable analytical overlaps between state formation and statebuilding 
especially within complex postwar contexts. Statebuilding inevitably affects 
state formation in the sense that “any purposeful attempt at statebuilding 
influences local power constellations through consciously or unconsciously 
providing power resources to certain groups in society, while closing social and 
political opportunities for others” (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010: 16). However, 
clearly, where state formation highlights the historical understanding of 
contingent social processes, statebuilding largely inures into conscious, 
deliberate institutional construction for purposes of political ordering.  
 
Hence contemporaneous postwar statebuilding remains largely been based on a 
Weberian understanding of the modern bureaucratic state represented in – a 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force, autonomy from domestic and 
outside forces, differentiation of state components in governing the details of 
peoples’ lives and coordination of governance (Migdal 1988: 18 – 19). In 
attempting to build these Weberian attributes of stateness into late developing 
postwar spaces, international statebuilding interventions tend to privilege 
governance over “government”, based on the “assumption that the political 
process is a product of state policies rather than constitutive of them” 
(Chandler 2007: 71). This inevitably sets statebuilding up in arenas of opposition 
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and domination with historically embedded and antecedent social processes of 
state formation that are acted out in quotidian practice.  
 
The transposition of knowledge derived from the historical emergence of the 
modern state into contemporary neo-modern international statebuilding 
practices has failed to reincarnate the strong state in areas around the globe 
where states have been deemed “weak”, “failed”, “fragile” or “postwar”. A major 
justification for the failure of neo-modern statebuilding lies in its diagnostic 
generalizations and monistic process fallacies. Postwar statebuilding 
interventions especially, have often underestimated local actors’ appropriation 
of unfolding possibilities created by external interventions to further their own 
state-related agendas – be it within or outside of formal state institutions 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2010: 115). Thus, there is a wholesale theoretical 
questioning the passive and static local object as opposed to the determining 
international during contexts of postwar statebuilding (Kappler 2015: 876) with a 
quest to understanding the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down interactions 
and the implications for peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2010: 396).  
 
Meanwhile, statebuilding imperatives are not only premised on the Weberian 
structuring and functioning of the modern state, but on the neo-realist notion 
that states are the central actors in international relations. The functional 
symbiosis between the state and the international sphere, feeds the assumption 
that alterations in hegemonic state hierarchy within a specific territory pose 
threats to international security. Hence the need to re-engineer rule-based 
institutionalized state hegemony in order to ostensibly restore effective 
territorial integrity, thereby fostering international security. Call (2008:5) 
defines statebuilding as actions undertaken by international or national actors 
to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation 
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to society (which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding). This definition 
does three things – it captures the top-down dimension of statebuilding; it 
highlights its rational-legal institutional focus; and peripherally acknowledges 
the necessity to consider state-society relations in statebuilding.  
 
Despite the acknowledgement of a caveat that statebuilding may or may not 
contribute to peacebuilding, there are conceptual and operational overlaps 
between both concepts and more contingent social processes of state 
formation. This conceptual confluence is evident when statebuilding is 
described as a particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the 
recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from 
civil war partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate 
governmental institutions (Paris and Sisk 2009: 2). However, its focus the 
formal dimensions of these processes marginalizes informal social processes 
that lie at the heart of everyday peace and the operationalization of the postwar 
state in practice. 
 
Between International Means and Local Ends: Interpretively 
Grounding Postwar Statebuilding  
 
Statebuilding constitutes a complex set of political re-ordering processes. 
Shifting the empirical lens from the international to the local, it is important to 
magnify the definitional premise that distinguishes statebuilding from postwar 
statebuilding. Barnett and Zurcher (2009: 28) distinguish postwar statebuilding 
from “normal” statebuilding by focusing on spatial and temporal context 
specifics. Thus, postwar statebuilding is characterized by a lingering dual crisis 
of security and legitimacy within spaces that have prior existence of conflict. 
The context of fear and mistrust thus leads individuals to continue to seek 
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security from alternative security organizations and militias. Hence individuals’ 
willingness to comply with the government’s decision depends on whether they 
believe it is legitimate. Lack or legitimacy could contribute to a resumption of 
violence (Barnet and Zurcher 2009: 29). Within postwar contexts, these 
ordering processes involve an admixture of international, national and local 
actors with differing political agendas.  
 
Recent research has contributed to shifting the ontological focus on process 
dynamics that engender the emergence of social organizations. Such dynamics 
have been framed through the understanding interconnections of the ‘local’ 
(Lemay-Hubert 2011: 1830; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 769; and Mac Ginty 
2015: 845) ‘ownership’ (Chesterman 2007: 6 and Donais 2012: 13), ‘legitimation’ 
and ‘participation’ (Call 2012: 45); and hybridity (Meagher et al. 2014: 6 and 
Luckham et al 2013: 7). These modes of theoretical and empirical framing 
centralize ‘local’ dimensions of peacebuilding without essentializing the local 
by emphasizing dynamic and interactive processes in the interpretation of 
evolving temporal, spatial and social positionality within peacebuilding and 
statebuilding. By framing the problem of ownership of peacebuilding programs 
as one of legitimizing it in the eyes of local actors Donais (2012: 3) questions the 
current emphasis on the outside-in transmission of international norms and 
institutions with a greater recognition of local values, traditions and practices. 
The asymmetric interaction between intervener and object of intervention does 
not foreclose possibilities of disaggregated social actor engagement with 
postwar statebuilding processes. It is within the broad range of engagement 
patterns that processes of organic social organization contribute to determining 
statebuilding outcomes.  However, Sisk (2009: 8) advances the notion that 
“dedication to the principle of local ownership, however well-intentioned, is 
fraught with problems. Local ownership, a concept with its origins in 
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approaches to community-level development, is difficult in practice when 
outsiders meet the realities of post-war environments, where the scope of the 
challenge of humanitarian catastrophe and recovery is immense, where local 
ruling elites may act in a predatory way, and where there is deep social distrust 
of the state to begin with.” This provides a justification for the vertical power 
hierarchies built into statebuilding, which then struggle to tame and 
domesticate local practice. 
 
The differentiated groups of statebuilding actors employ varying approaches to 
the process, with international statebuilders seeking to achieve three main 
objectives. Firstly, they seek to rebuild state institutions in order to re-
monopolize the legitimate use of violence within an autonomous and 
centralized rational-legal authority. The statebuilders’ preoccupation is not 
whether violence and dispossession exist, but whether these take the right form 
and are exercised in a legitimate manner (de Heredia (2012: 76). Secondly (and 
simultaneously) international statebuilding seeks to strengthen the relationship 
between institutions of state and society, often after re-establishing a semblance 
of state hegemony. The expectation is that that devolving from these dual 
objectives, postwar statebuilding would, thirdly, prevent conflict relapse 
vulnerability. However, ideological contradictions and social actor dilemmas 
within international statebuilding and the postwar environments within which 
statebuilding programs are implemented often compromise its outcomes and 
often leads to building weak states (Paris and Sisk, 2006; Barnett and Zurcher 
2009). This reflects international statebuilding’s emphasis on monolithic 
reengineering of state autonomy, authority and monopoly over the legitimate 
use of violence, at the expense a transformative state reformation based upon 
its national and local realities.  
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While statebuilders’ intents are reflected in policy and program documents 
quotidian approaches to and processes of postwar reconstruction developed by 
national and local actors and the outcomes they expect of statebuilding are 
often mired in experiential complexity that is not readily documented. The 
dominant state-centered theorization of postwar statebuilding has therefore 
attracted welcome critical epistemological engagement. This engagement with 
the empirics of statebuilding in practice has contributed to two important 
ontological shifts.  
 
Firstly, it has centralized complex “local”, “locality” and its networked 
dimensions in statebuilding research. The theoretical focus on the role of local 
and national actors in international statebuilding (Auteserre 2007, MacGinty 
2010, Richmond 2010, 2015, Paffenholz 2015) has not only valorized the ‘agency’, 
but it has also evidenced the multifarious power implications of the complex 
local in postwar statebuilding. Although national and local actors’ engagement 
with postwar statebuilding has been described as involving paradiplomatic, 
transnational practices to obtain political and material support from outside 
parties (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008:269) a focus on the interaction of 
different statebuilding social actors within arenas of opposition and domination 
delves into the emic social mechanics that underpin the complex social 
configuration of the local.  
 
Secondly, critical statebuilding research has provided a strong evidentiary base 
for the imperialistic origins and manifestations of international statebuilding’s 
within the global borderlands that contributes to creating “subjects” out of 
passive objects of international intervention (Duffield 2001; Chandler 2013). 
Therefore, beyond the broad teleological and material content of local 
engagement with international statebuilding, it is necessary to also understand 
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the internal mechanics of local actor organization and to the effect of these 
alternative modes of organization on territorial and sovereign aspects of 
postwar statebuilding.  
 
This thesis steers clear of the oppositional bend in the road to the “local turn” 
in statebuilding research. Paffenholz’s (2015: 861) critique of the 
conceptualization of the local within the current “local turn” in peacebuilding 
as one of everyday resistance against the hegemonic international liberal actor 
and his/her dominance warrants empirical engagements with the actual 
resistance to statebuilding. However, the local cannot be conceived as a 
monolithic blob based on its cartography, social positionality and societal 
functionality as has often been evidenced where the local is defined in 
opposition to international, and local agency is viewed as resistance to the 
liberal peacebuilding project. This simplistically binary presentation of 
statebuilding is captured in the interpretation of the “bifurcation of two worlds 
– the local and the international” which uses the cases of UN intervention in 
East Timor and Kosovo to evidence local forms of resistance (Hebert-Lemay’s 
2011:1829). It is supplemented by the observation of statebuilding interventions 
as inherently clashing with social structures and long-term state formation 
processes (Bleisemann de Guevara 2013). The trouble with these interpretations 
of the oppositional interaction between two monolithic entities – the local and 
the international – is that they evolve singularized narratives of the local as if 
local agency only produces resistance. A predominantly oppositional focus 
occludes the complex processes of conflict and cooperation that reshape all the 




There is more to local agency than the constructions of modes of resistance to 
international interventions. It is important to also understand ways in which 
differentiated and apparently marginal and marginalized objects of state and 
statebuilding interventions go beyond resistance to appropriate and subjectify 
these interventions in a process of leveraging. Through these processes of 
appropriation and subjectification, non-state social actors effectively determine 
the empirical content of territoriality obliging the state to accommodate 
alternative configurations of sovereignty.  
 
Statebuilding Interventions: From Problematic Assumptions to 
Uncertain Outcomes 
 
Peace and war are interrelated social and political phenomena. Meanwhile 
treaties and peace accords provide a negotiated frame for transitioning from 
war to variations of positive or negative peace and possibly back to war. War, 
peace and the treaties that usher security-based developmental transitions 
between them continue to preoccupy politics and international relations 
scholars. Contemporaneously classical geopolitical framing of the problem of 
global insecurity have shifted from inter-state wars to the malady of ineffectual 
states (Fukuyama 2004: x-xi; Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 10 Call 2008b: 1493 and 
Chandler 2010:6). Hence the assumption that fixing “fragile” states would not 
only enhance state capacity for territorial control and foster state stability but it 
would also attenuate global insecurity.  
 
Unsurprisingly therefore, statebuilding in its varying forms different forms 
continues to dominate the agenda of diplomatic, military and development 
communities, while attracting multidisciplinary social research inquiry. 
Indicators of “stateness” though the products of excessive aggregation (Call 
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2008b: 1494) being more readily quantifiable than indicators of “peacefulness” 
makes intervention in that which is visible and doable more obvious than 
engaging with the more subjective and amorphous concept of “peace”. Despite 
heuristic evolutions in international statebuilding and peacebuilding 
interventions, the assumptions and rationales undergirding these interventions 
remain trapped in objectivist fallacies, which then justify cookie-cutter 
approaches to statebuilding that pay lip service to local ownership, yet barely 
acknowledging indigenous and embedded ways of doing – even when these 
contribute to statebuilding. Interventionary objectivism is premised in three 
sets of inter-related diagnostic fallacies, assumptive misconceptions and process 
contradictions that mitigate postwar statebuilding outcomes within.  
 
The diagnostic fallacy emerges from perception and articulation of state 
“fragility” and/or “collapse” as a set of naturalistic and pathological 
dysfunctions afflicting non-western states. This approach to explaining and 
understanding the state in Africa is described as a largely ideological 
developmental approach, which simplistically assumes that what is happening 
in Africa is a ‘pathological’ deviation from the real world (Chabal and Daloz 
1999: 40). Meanwhile, the social research community exhibits important 
epistemological differences regarding the identification of nature, causes and 
manifestations of pathological “stateness”. These differences reflect and are 
refracted upon the policy community that consistently grapples with the 
problematic definitions and characteristics of state “weakness”, “fragility” and 
“failure” upon which myriad doses of intervention or non-intervention are 
justified. The concepts of “fragile” and “failed” states are western-centric 
political labels and portmanteau concepts based on analytical reductionism and 
lacking in empirical evidence (Nay 2013: 3-4). Based on the problem 
identification, solutions are centered on the non-western state as the object of 
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intervention with trickle down monistic ordering expectations across its entire 
territory. This value based labeling of non-western states does not account for 
causality in interconnections with western states. They also aggregate social 
actors within states to broad “objects” of intervention expecting that by 
calibrating the doses of intervention over time, the expected neo-modern 
reincarnation of the state would materialize. Despite the proclaimed objectivity 
of “fragile” and “failed” state diagnoses, international statebuilding and 
peacebuilding interventions remain subjectively based on asymmetric power 
negotiation between national, regional and international social actors. Hence, 
they remain based on normative, resource and diplomatic dynamics (not stasis). 
 
The contradiction in process is built upon a neo-modern construction of 
postwar statebuilding that seeks an end state – often epitomized in Weberian 
tropes – while simultaneously undermining sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the “object” of intervention. The reification of dichotomies such as – 
formality and informality; top-down and bottom – up approaches, insiders and 
outsiders, intervening agent and object of intervention – often characterize 
statebuilding practice. This dichotomization often views the objects of 
intervention as fairly static and unchanging. Hence its coerced subjection to the 
state would inevitably occur after the administration of internationally 
calibrated doses of securitizing and developmental aid panaceas. Hence there is 
a linear conceptualization to most statebuilding interventions. However, in fact, 
the process is not so linear. Statebuilding processes often take place alongside 
other social processes whose complexity often has unexpected consequences on 
statebuilding itself necessitating a degree of reflexivity which often eludes 
intervening statebuilding agents.  
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While statebuilding acknowledges the need to strengthen ties between state 
and society, the process often overhangs and stays largely disconnected from 
society. Hence international statebuilding interventions continue to “adopt a 
single sovereign perspective which assumes the individuality of the state and 
fails to capture how international strategies re subverted appropriated and 
resisted on the ground” (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008: 276). Even where 
local statebuilding agency is acknowledged through powerful, yet informal 
social groups seeking to institutionalize their power as a legitimate form within 
the state, these recursive and mutually transformative process are largely 
ignored within broader statebuilding processes. This marginalization lies within 
the assumption of peacebuilding missions that indigenous civil society lacks the 
quality of ‘relationality’ required for democratization (Cubitt 2012: 91) as well as 
the inflexibility of peacebuilding mission to accommodate informality.  
 
Despite the evolution in peacebuilding missions from short to long-term 
engagements and from mainly humanitarian post-war to statebuilding and 
remedial justifications, they have largely ignored the interpenetrative process of 
non-state and informal social actor involvement that occurs through quotidian 
practice. Non-state groups are often broadly labeled as an aggregate 
representation of “society” or “civil society,” with the statebuilders arbitrarily 
choosing to work with these groups that align with their understandings of civil 
society. Where these are few, they invest in statebuilding programs that 
engineer civil society into existence. Hence those socially embedded 
communitarian groups that culturally and by guild as everyday configurations 
for coping with vulnerability and building resilience often fall outside classical 
understandings of civil society. This despite their embedded authority, practical 
accountability and legitimacy. Hence, the evolution of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding processes as micro-political sociology evident in daily practice 
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remains largely disconnected from global purveyors of statebuilding 
interventions as these everyday informality is consistently overlooked.  
 
Given the involvement of formal and informal social actors in the force field of 
postwar statebuilding, there is unavoidably a shared stake in the outcomes – 
with varying stakes for the interdependent international social actors, regional, 
national and local actors. The emergence of third generation peacebuilding 
missions have sought to leverage longer timeframes, and greater investment in 
personnel and equipment without altering the objective of the emergence of 
neo-modern states out of the rubble of war ravaged or “fragile” countries. 
However, this has itself created tensions between the imperatives of the 
‘intervener’ in engagement with the object of statebuilding intervention. 
According to Paris (2004) immediate postwar contexts require political stability 
and the establishment of effective administration over the territory, rather than 
democratic ferment and economic upheaval. This expected outcome rests on a 
problematic assumption that a sophisticated, yet still utopian, ‘social 
engineering’ approach could replace, or accelerate, a process of state formation 
that occurs rather more organically (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005: 448). Neither 
does it acknowledge the conscious and unconscious redistributive power and 
resource consequences of statebuilding interventions. It barely acknowledges 
the fact that alongside this process of ‘social engineering’ orchestrated by 
international interveners and their national clients, simultaneous processes of 
reconstructive social organization are also taking place. The outcome therefore 
is often a more complex set of interactive and simultaneously transformative 
processes with power implications for both state and non-state actors with 




It is based on these problematic diagnostic fallacies and process assumptions 
that justify a more empirically based disaggregated interrogation of postwar 
statebuilding that focuses on arenas of opposition and domination. These 
arenas determine patterns of ordering which derive from plural sources of 
authority and control.  This study therefore builds upon the body of literature 
that problematizes spatial, symbolic and social complexity within 
internationally driven postwar statebuilding.  
 
Statebuilding as Bordering and Ordering  
 
The logics of securitization and territorial administrative ordering embedded in 
statebuilding interventions inure towards the de jure crystallization of 
monolithic state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Acts of bordering 
invariably carry major ramifications for political ordering at all levels of analysis 
(Lapid 2001: 7). However, the very imperatives of international statebuilding 
transform postwar states into de facto trusteeship territories where official 
decision-making is often subject to decentralized and decentered processes of 
international and national networking and consultation.  This situation creates 
multiple overlapping spheres of engagement across sectoral spaces (such as the 
control of security or fiscal and monetary policy), physical spaces (towns, cities 
and villages), human spaces (through controlled movement and labor rules) and 
symbolic spaces (multinational flags fluttering together with national flags 
above buildings). These spheres of engagement are made up of different 
configurations of local, national and international social actors.  
 
Poly-spatiality is therefore an intrinsic characteristic of postwar statebuilding 
polities. Hence understanding arenas of opposition and domination within 
these contexts necessitates disaggregation of social actors ranging from the 
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state-level to the community level organization. Political engagements between 
social actors are thus brokered through the negotiation of everyday practices 
that produce and reproduced precarious interdependences. The precariousness 
is premised on the impermanence of some international actors and the 
differentiations of stakes, options and choices for pluralized social actors. These 
precarious interdependences come together in turn to determine peacebuilding 
and statebuilding outcomes. These processes could be explained and 
understood through the prism of spatial and temporal dimensions of quotidian 
borderland dynamics in postwar statebuilding.   
 
Interrogating international statebuilding through the prism of borderland 
dynamics implies an enquiry into statebuilding-in-practice. Borderland 
dynamics highlight decentered informal ordering, authority negotiation and 
social control dynamics. This perspective also acknowledges that the 
institutionalized is not always formal, meanwhile the informal does not always 
lack institutionalization. In order to understand post-conflict spaces of 
intervention and statebuilding it is necessary to grasp the spatial imaginaries of 
intervener and intervened (Heathershaw and Lambach (2008: 208). This 
perspective, while providing a prism for analytical clarity, runs the risk of 
crystallizing polarity between intervener and intervened, while occluding 
multiple levels of intervention and patterns of engagement in arenas of 
domination and opposition that are generated through intervention. Hence the 
importance to disaggregate not only the social actors but to engage their social 
actions in quotidian practice as this is where the implications for statebuilding 
are most evident. In this case the social actions of bordering and ordering that 
are central to postwar statebuilding are brought into social enquiry within two 
Liberian borderland cities.    
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Continuities in bordering and ordering processes from wartime to postwar 
contexts often coexist with postwar forces seeking to alter these dynamics. The 
management of international border posts might change from rebel factions to 
postwar states without fundamentally altering the legitimacy and social 
embeddedness of internal and international borders. Depending on the degree 
of civil war contagion, borderlands on both sides of international borders 
became wartime economic epicenters leading to the “empowerment of 
borderlands as sanctuaries for combatants and nurseries for recruits and also as 
centers for shadow economic activity” (Pugh et al. 2004: 2). These economic 
hubs strengthen the interdependence between borderlands as well as their 
connections to power centers, contributing to strengthening pre-existing modes 
of informal ordering, authority and social control in daily practice. These 
modes of social ordering, authority and control incorporate local, state and 
international social actors. They also exhibit differing degrees of continuity and 
change from wartime borderland dynamics. The conceptual distinction 
between individual and social actors seeks avoid deterministic binaries between 
public and private, and public or state and non-state. It also eschews the 
romanticized interpretation of borderlands as teeming with shadow economies 
instead of seeing their informalized structuring.   
 
Quotidian Borderland Dynamics: Informalities in Statebuilding 
 
To explore the configurative centrality of borderlands in postwar statebuilding 
is to engage in a threefold exercise – firstly, it is necessary to conceptually grasp 
borderlands; secondly one needs to interrogate the emic mechanics of 
borderland internal physical, social and symbolic constitution; and thirdly, 
explore its physical and symbolic constitution in relation to the state (across 
historical periods). Statebuilding is essentially a largely formalized ordering 
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process. Evidently order is necessary for managing violence especially within 
postwar contexts, as much as the threat of violence is crucial in cementing 
order (Kalyvas et al. 2008: 1). The inherence of violence to statebuilding points 
to the emergence of complex arenas of engagement between borderland social 
actors and the state. Especially given that borderland actors, by virtue of their 
spatial, social and symbolic positionality on the margins of the state and the 
international, have often challenged a key element in the image of the state – 
“its claim to be an avatar of the people bounded by that territory and its 
assumption of the connection of the people encompassed by state borders as a 
primary social bond” (Migdal 2001: 26). Borderlands are intrinsically therefore, 
spaces of national contestation.  
 
Asiwaju et al (1989: 28-30) define a borderland as a territory or zone close to the 
boundary of a political unit which may sometimes be identified on the basis of 
the formation of the frontier which pre-dated boundary delimitation and 
demarcation. This definition, while importantly drawing on the cultural history 
underlying political processes of ordering, does not cover the critical political 
sociological dimensions of borderlands important to this study. Thus, 
borderland dynamics are defined within this thesis as interactive and discursive 
processes of informal quotidian ordering developed by social actors (with 
differing degrees and sources of authority) within the liminal spaces of states. 
Given their degrees and sources of authority they legitimately interact with 
interventionary postwar statebuilding architects and processes. States make 
borderlands through international bordering and internal administrative 
ordering. Meanwhile, borderlands give meaning to effective statehood through 
the intra-state negotiation of order, authority and control. The centrality of 
borderland dynamics to postwar statebuilding is therefore based on 
configurative (constitutive), process and outcome assumptions. These provide 
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the empirical content for understanding actual as opposed to theoretical 
sovereignty and territoriality.  
 
Postwar statebuilding imperatives necessitate the re-establishment of an 
administrative order through a structured functional relationship between the 
sovereign state and the territory over which it is expected to exercise effective 
control. Central to the peacebuilding problematic, especially within postwar 
contexts, is the re-forging of the relationship between the central state and its 
margins (Goodhand 2008: 239). In this process, the consequence of borderland 
marginalization is the imperiling of statebuilding through the emergence of 
alternative stakeholders to territorial control and micro-sovereignty. This 
process is shaped through competition and/or accommodation in the 
negotiation of access to revenue streams derived from international aid as well 
as the establishment of control over human and material modes of production 
and surplus accumulation. The material base underlying the complex 
negotiation between central state and borderland elites is only one dimension 
of a complex negotiation in which the state is complicit in continuities of 
pluralized informal ordering, authority and control.  
 
Given that borderlands represent a distinct physical, social and symbolic space 
on the margins of states in close proximity to the state’s international border 
both state agents and borderland based social actors establish parameters for 
existence and interaction. These interactive dynamics necessitate an 
interrogation of statebuilding that departs from state-centered interpretations 
of borderlands as uncontested, unchanging and unproblematic (Baud and Van 
Schendel, 1997: 216) towards a multidisciplinary exploration of borderland 
dynamics. A critical political sociology of borderlands incorporates first off, an 
ethnographic approach that attempts to understand notions of ‘state’ from the 
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margins, in political administrative and social senses, and from the limits of the 
state back to its center (Donnan and Wilson 1994: 11).  
 
Thus, an interactive exploration pursues an interpretive understanding of 
organized social action – even when it is informal – and with an 
ethnographically constituted explanation of its course and outcomes. The 
deployment of ethnographic sociological lenses in the interrogation of 
borderland dynamics in postwar statebuilding presents the most viable means 
to capturing the emic interactive mechanics occurring within arenas of 
domination and opposition that determine postwar statebuilding outcomes. It 
also gives interpretive priority to borderland voices in the articulation of their 
encounters with the evolving state and informal dimensions of the 
international.  
 
A critical geo-political sociology of borderlands assumes that positionality has 
implications for the constitution and manifestation of locality and (broader) 
state negotiation of order, authority and control. Borderlands represent a 
complex temporal and spatial reality. Borderland dynamics are often 
characterized by degrees of transience and permanence in relationships 
between seeming polarities (the licit and illicit, entrepreneurial and menial, 
trafficker and trader and the industrial and subsistent agriculturalist). Border 
and borderland research has largely challenged state-centered geopolitical 
interpretations by advancing more multidisciplinary understandings of 
borderlands as spaces of social interaction and economic exchange that have 
implications for both state formation and statebuilding. Literature on the 
interaction of borderlands and nation or statebuilding has contributed to a 
deeper understanding of borderlands and peacebuilding (Goodhand 2008: 263); 
border transactions with authority, livelihood and trade implications 
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(Raeymaekers, 2012: 336 – 337); borderlands as the epicenters of regional 
conflict systems (Pugh et al. 2004: 11 and Scorgie 2013: 37) and interwar 
borderland governance (Zeller 2012: 200-202). Borderlands are sites where the 
state’s presence has somehow been limited in its monopoly of violence and 
political authority is finite, unraveling, or subject to severe contestation (Korf 
and Raeymaekers 2013: 8).  This multidisciplinary evolution, however, has not 
adequately engaged the pluralizing implications of decentered and informal 
modes of ordering, authority and social control on the state’s autonomy or its 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. 
 
International and internal borders are central to situating international and 
internal borderlands, despite their functional and administrative 
differentiation. Unsecured borderland are spaces where state authority is 
suspended or violently challenged by alternative claims to power and providers 
of security, including non-state armed groups (Luckham and Kirk, 2013: 11). 
However far from being ungoverned, such border spaces tend to have their 
own hybrid forms of political regulation, often involving complex interactions 
among various armed group (Luckham and Kirk, 2013:11). Clearly, “unsecured 
borderlands” are not necessarily vacuous borderlands. Secondly, the absence of 
the state or limited state presence does not necessarily devolve into these 
spaces being occupied by violent forces. This is a transplant of a frontier logic 
to borderlands that labels them a priori as violent spaces.   
 
However, this study focuses on international borderlands and looking inwards, 
seeks to understand their internal social ordering dynamics. Borders denote a 
spatial dimension of social relationships that are continually being configured. 
In the process, the meaning of borders is produced, reconstructed, 
strengthened or weakened (Banerjee and Chaudhury 2011). Border fluidity 
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challenges received notions of border stasis emanating from treaty and 
conventionally negotiated de jure sovereignty. It does not only highlight the 
human dimension in the social construction of borders, but provides an 
important take off point for problematizing borderlands in postwar 
statebuilding. Thus, is justified the exploration of borderlands as a researchable 
complexly ordered space in discursive engagement to the state and the 
international, particularly within postwar contexts.  
 
Statebuilding processes represent sudden inflections in the alternation of 
content and relationship between borderland social actors, their states, 
neighboring states and international statebuilders. The period of stabilization 
following peace treaties introduces more than just new rules. It introduces new 
actors and sets of resources as attempts are made to bring wartime resources 
under the control of the new state. Sudden changes in the rules of the game 
and shifts in the power balance between center and periphery are clearly 
crucial in shifting borderlands from being marginal and neglected (or powerful 
and advanced) to becoming unruly and militarized (Goodhand 2013: 256). Hence 
postwar borderland spaces ought to be viewed more than simply as a finite 
geographical space but one that situates itself at the intersection of the national 
and the international with connections to both.  
 
Borderland actors develop and subscribe to processes, which enable them to 
negotiate individual and collective livelihoods. These processes develop and 
sustain networked connections, which extend beyond borderland spaces into 
the home state and sub-regional spheres. Fitted within the organizational 
configuration of states, borderlands are the most proximate administrative sub-
units (departments, provinces, cantons, counties, districts, townships etc.) to 
the international border. Hence, the critical geopolitical conceptualization of 
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borderlands provides a definitional premise upon which to explore the 
question of borderland dynamics in peacetime and in postwar statebuilding. 
However, the limitations of classic geopolitical conceptualizations necessitate 
opening the analytical prism to multidisciplinary interrogations of social 
dynamics underlying borderland engagements with states. 
 
Borderlands and Statebuilding – A Process-Oriented Approach 
 
Beyond the configurative mapping of territorial subunits within states, differing 
sets of processes shape the emergence and relational evolution of borderland 
administrative units to the centralized states. Based on the conceptual 
understanding of borderlands, it is clear that they are territorially part of the 
state. However, the concept of empirical sovereignty delves into the 
effectiveness of full territorial control by the state, which itself is important in 
understanding borderland dynamics in postwar statebuilding. Having 
conceptualized borderlands, it is relevant to look at the processes that 
constitute an effective modern state.  
 
The Weberian state is conceived as a centralized bureaucratic unit that seeks to 
develop administrative models to – entrench its sovereignty, ensure its 
autonomy, and exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence across 
its entire territory. The hierarchical and hegemonic process assumptions 
embedded in this conceptualization of the state, imply that states develop 
administrative micro-mapping in order to better manage territorial sub-units 
extending from the sovereign to the community. The expected outcome is not 
only effective territorial control, but also effective control over the social 
livelihoods present within these territories. Therefore, the intrinsic purpose 
underlying the process of statebuilding would be to ensure the most effective 
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administrative configuration that would optimize the state’s functionality in 
relation to society. This process leads to the assumption that the borderland 
may be territorially part of the state in juridical term, however the state’s 
capacity to exercise control over the borderland determines the de facto 
effectiveness of the statebuilding effort. Hence this study assumes two sets of 
processes at work – with a multiplicity of actors engaged in these processes. 
However, the study maintains an emphatic focus on the observation of both 
borderland dynamics and statebuilding within borderland spaces.  
 
Borderland dynamics are part of a complex set of social and political processes. 
Goodhand (2008: 239) notes that, “the bargaining processes between state and 
borderlands, which are central to war-to-peace transitions can be 
conceptualized as a ‘double diamond’ model with four sets of actors- 
international/transnational players, central elites, and borderland elites and 
borderland populations.” These multiple social configurations, being 
hierarchical in nature, generate internal rules and modes of operation, which 
determine internal ordering, authority and control. These are largely shaped by 
a process of interaction at what Goodhand (2008: 239) further characterizes as 
occurring within the country and with players across the border. However, as 
war-to-peace transitions evolve, the formalizing dynamics of process 
bureaucratization tends to marginalize and even criminalize the informal – 
further setting up arenas of opposition and domination.  
 
Borderland dynamics inscribed within the longue durée, assume the co-existing 
permanence and transience of livelihood processes. While borderlands could 
be spaces to be traversed in the quest of centralized greener pastures there is a 
great degree of permanence to borderlands. While border-crossers are an 
important dimension to understanding borderland processes more important 
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are the permanent social processes inscribed within borderlands. These 
permanent social processes derive their legitimacy from social embeddedness 
and authority. They then seek to mediate and regulate all forms of interaction 
with and between the borderlands and “others”. These relatively long-term 
borderlands processes provide insights into social organization from whence 
emerge alternative forms of ordering, authority and control. They also provide a 
socially organized basis from which to engage with state forms of ordering, 
authority and control. For the purpose of this study, borderlands are assumed 
to be spaces where life histories exhibit generations of permanence. These 
depict the constitutive elements of organized social ordering, authority 
negotiation and hierarchical social control, albeit devoid of the sovereignty 
embedded in the state. Effectively, from the borderland perspectives these 
social organizations despite their informality are for from working in the 
shadows of the postwar state.  
 
Far from being static, borderland dynamics exhibit an evolution in patterns of 
informal ordering, authority negotiation and social control, which emerge out 
of their internal spatial positionality, symbolic and social configuration. 
However, within these dynamics there are also a multiplicity of social 
configurations either networked to or seeking to be networked to the center or 
the international in order to negotiate social positionality and socio-economic 
options within borderlands. These multiple social configurations, being 
hierarchical in nature, generate internal rules and modes of operation, which 
determine micro-political balances of power in internal ordering, authority and 
control. The socially organized representations of borderland permanence 
characterized by complex political and relational dynamics are unavoidable 
spaces in the negotiation of postwar statehood.  
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These interactions occurring across multiple spaces of opposition and 
domination occlude clear distinctions between borderland “formality” and 
“informality”. Both its structuring and characterization of formality and 
informality, shape the negotiation of positionality and power relations within 
the borderlands and the state.  Hence, borderland insider engagement with 
outsiders entering borderlands comes with the legitimization of their 
multifarious social structures. These groups are inherently political – exhibiting 
internal political dynamics; they are rules-based; they evidence internal and 
external patterns of alliance formation. Therefore, they have social backing, 
which they deploy in engagement with statebuilding architects.  
 
The second set of processes is that developed by the postwar state in 
engagement with its borderlands. These processes are borne out of the nature 
and capacity of the postwar state and the statebuilding project. Here, it is 
assumed that the postwar state exercises limited sovereignty, given its 
dependence on a broad array of international partners in the execution of its 
functions. The limited postwar sovereign often outsources the important 
pursuit of the monopoly over the legitimate use of force to international 
institutions, while subcontracting many technocratic and social development 
roles to international non-governmental actors. In many cases of security and 
development intervention, international actors may be the gravitational center 
of politics (Blieseman de Guevara 2010: 115) however, this perspective 
underestimates local actors’ ability to use the possibilities unfolding in the 
course of external interventions to further their own state-related agendas. 
However, by looking to borderland cities to understand statebuilding, local 
actors provided the interpretation for interconnected sets of statebuilding 
processes. They articulate their quotidian engagement with the state as well as 
international organizations, international governmental organizations, 
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multinational corporations and international non-governmental organizations. 
International statebuilding processes essentially enter borderland spaces 
expecting to strengthen statebuilding outcomes. However, upon encountering 
the first set of processes, both are mutually altered  
 
Given the lack of vertical and horizontal programmatic harmonization across 
this spectrum of international statebuilding actors, negotiated statebuilding 
processes are subjected to differing borderland patterns of ordering, authority 
negotiation and social control. The outcome therefore is a pattern of 
sophisticated appropriation of postwar statebuilding processes by subaltern 
borderland patterns of informal order, authority and control. These interactive 
processes are best capture through an ethnographic understanding of 
statebuilding in everyday practice. Fairly ad hoc hybrid governance 
arrangements that develop out of borderland social actor engagement with 
international statebuilding remain inherently unstable, unsustainable and 
untenable. The unpredictability of hybrid arrangements within postwar 
contexts neither sustainably secures the state nor the borderland social 
livelihoods.  
 
The sophisticated appropriation of postwar statebuilding processes within 
borderlands challenges the notion that hybrid order (which greatly derives from 
research on what works in failed, weak and failing states) is a long-term 
sustainable and stable arrangement for state-society relations in postwar 
contexts. Postwar statebuilding brings institutions, actors, resources and norms 
into borderlands, which are far from pristine. However, the appropriation of 
these by-products of postwar statebuilding is the prerogative of borderland 
social organizations.  
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This thesis therefore, questions the extent to which the glorification of hybrid 
governance synergies between the international, the state and the non-state 
reflects empirical reality. It then proposes interrogating the emergence of 
alternative modes of social control and how these rather than reflecting 
hybridity evidence modes of competitive co-existence. Alternative modes of 
social control, in their interdependence, simultaneously exhibit elements of 
competition, collusion and extraversion. Taken holistically, empirical evidence 
would appear to show that the very nature of postwar statebuilding undermines 
the monolithic understanding of the centralized modern state. The emergence 
of alternative forms of ordering, authority and control within sub-state 
territorial units (facilitated by current patterns of internationally-supported 
postwar statebuilding) create fracture and dissonant autonomy, competing 
authority and limits the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence. This amounts to the building of a pseudo-state, not 
one based on harmonious, symbiotic hybrid governance. 
 
Focusing on borderland dynamics, this study shows that hybrid governance is 
informally polycentric with a multiplicity of interdependent social 
organizational actors simultaneously involved in patterns of collusion, 
competition and extraversion. These modes of interaction are determined by 
the borderland (local, sub-state) social construction of order, authority and 
control. Therefore, capturing local construction and deployment of order, 
authority and control elucidates the operationalization of statebuilding its 




Borderlands in Postwar Statebuilding: A Question of Pluralized 
Authority 
 
Situating borderland dynamics in postwar statebuilding within the states-in-
society approach necessitates a disaggregation of social actors and a move away 
from monistic interpretations of ordering, authority and control. Focus on the 
implications of informal orders and ordering on the constitution of authority 
and the emergence of social controls outside the state and in relation with the 
state. Explored through interaction within arenas of domination and opposition 
which have implications for power distribution within the emergent postwar 
state, recursive implications on both borderland dynamics and the state and are 
hardly integrated. 
 
Processes of informal ordering and ordering informality endow borderland 
social actors with grounded authority and control over territorial administration 
and social processes. Socially grounded informal authority differs markedly 
from Weberian rational-legal authority and its neo-patrimonial derivatives. 
However, due to the limited nature of the postwar state there is 
interpenetration between socially grounded authority and state authority. 
Socially grounded authority derives from a specificity of spatial (physical), social 
and symbolic ordering. The evolving constitution and deployment of socially 
grounded authority in daily practice within borderland spaces has implications 
for postwar statebuilding.  
 
The legitimate authority wielded by borderland social actors in postwar 
contexts is the kind of authority that most states seek. It is a socially negotiated 
authority organically emerging from the recognition of mutual coexistence and 
tacit consent to informal governance arrangements in exchange for a place in 
the specific non-state order. According to Call (2012: 45), the main sources of 
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state legitimacy are – i) internal embedded legitimacy – which is derived from 
prior “state formation” or other historical dynamics; ii) performance legitimacy 
– which reflects the effective and equitable delivery of expected services; and iii) 
process legitimacy – which reflects how accepted and proper the rules, 
procedures, and institutions of policymaking and governance are perceived to 
be. He uses this conceptual understanding of legitimacy to provide a framework 
for understanding the role of international actors in inhibiting or fostering 
exclusionary behavior in postwar states. However, borderlands provide 
alternative and plural authority structures in coexistence with authority sought 
through statebuilding.  
 
Socially grounded authority is embedded, decentralized, legitimate, 
representative and empowered to act on behalf of borderland communities. 
These are unquantifiable qualities the postwar state cannot purport to possess. 
The evolution of socially grounded authority within informal ordering and in 
the process of ordering informality is subject to proximate demands for 
effective representation and accountability. Both processes differ in their 
engagement with the state and in the demands that the state representatives 
make of actors who wield socially grounded authority. Especially noting that 
socially grounded authority derives from a degree of social cohesion, which 
eludes the overhanging postwar state.  
 
There are constitutive parallels between the state’s quest for legitimate 
authority and that of non-state actors. Call (2012: 45) defines legitimacy as a 
generalized perception of a political community that the claim to authority by a 
collection of institutions over its territory is proper or appropriate. Meanwhile 
vertical legitimacy refers to the broad sense of appropriateness of the state and 
its functioning, including the rules by which leaders are selected. Horizontal 
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legitimacy refers to the extent to which various social groups and communities 
within a territory “accept and tolerate each other.” 
 
Informal ordering in territorial governance generates borderland leaders whose 
functions often fill gaps in state governance, hence the prevalence of overlaps 
and the tendency towards both conflict and confluence. Meanwhile, the process 
of ordering informality necessitates the construction of authority into private 
sector modes of production. This chapter highlights the embedded nature of 
socially grounded authority in community leaders as captured through 
interviews and focus group discussions. Socially grounded authority provides a 
platform for engagement with the state and provides the state with an entry 
point to the communities. Both practices are evidenced in the management of 
crises such as the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease and violence resulting 
from social strife.  
 
The legitimacy derived from socially grounded interpretations of accountability 
and direct representation contributes to the emergence and sustenance of 
social controls within borderlands. However, socially grounded authority 
remains subject to the internal politics of communities, which are swift to 
change leadership in the event of perceived incompetence or lack of 
accountability. In this setting, presidentially appointed mayors constantly seek 
to de-legitimize socially grounded authority by discouraging the use of elections 




Borderland dynamics evidence micro-sociological understandings of 
territoriality and sovereignty in quotidian practice. Social actors in engagement 
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with both state representative and the communities from whence they garner 
legitimacy and authority, inscribe quotidian meaning and interpretation to state 
designed territorial administration. This interaction of disaggregated social 
actors – whether formal or informal – within arenas of opposition and 
domination provides insights into social actions and the outcomes they 
produce.  Within postwar statebuilding contexts in particular, discerning the 
outcomes of social actions is made more complex given the engagement 
between myriad social actors with differing social program outcome 
expectations. However, a grounded understanding of statebuilding through the 
prism of borderland dynamics engages with existing conceptualizations of 
locality, ordering, authority and social control. The integrative analytical 
framework the emerges thereof advances disaggregated borderland social actor 
and mutually transforming interactive process dynamics to understand the 
empirical content of micro-territoriality and pluralized sovereignty and their 






Chapter 4 : Interrogating Space, Place and Process: Political 
Ethnography in Complex Emergencies  
 
“Even the most passive observer produces ripples worthy of 
examination, while the activist who seeks to transform the world can 
learn much from its obduracy.” Buroway (1998)  
 
Introduction: Borderland Dynamics – Organizing Social Livelihoods 
Amid Postwar Flux and Uncertainty  
 
This chapter traces the methodological process deployed to understand 
everyday socio-political organization of order (informal), authority and control 
in postwar borderlands and their implications for postwar statebuilding. The 
methodology devolves from the premise that everyday practice routinizes 
patterns of interaction amongst borderland social actors and between them and 
postwar statebuilding social actors networked across local, national and 
international levels. Everyday borderland practices give rise to simultaneously 
competing and colluding immanent forms of pluralized ordering, authority and 
social control mechanisms. This chapter describes and rationalizes the use of a 
comparative political ethnography to understand borderlands trapped in 
complex emergencies. This spatial and socio-political state of flux raises 
methodological challenges that warrant empirical adjustments and 
readjustments. Such adjustments are necessary for the researcher to stay 
connected to selected organized borderland social actors. However, it is 
impossible to claim exact instrumental replication from one borderland 
research site to another – as time, individual and situational dispositions made 
every encounter unique – despite the whole process providing the basis for 
understanding the emic dynamics of borderland social organization. Organized 
borderland social actors are the custodians of the narratives and interpretations 
of their daily practice that provides the core analytical material for this thesis. 
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Nevertheless, the researcher confronts these interpretations to bourgeoning 
research on locality and local dimensions of postwar statebuilding. These social 
actors also clarify the researcher’s observation of everyday practice within 
Liberia’s postwar borderlands. 
 
It is necessary to state what is being compared in a comparative political 
ethnography of postwar borderlands and why this comparison is central to the 
understanding of postwar statebuilding. This study focuses on the comparison 
of two internal borderland cities in Liberia – Foya in Lofa County and Ganta in 
Nimba County. However, a third borderland city, Zwedru, serves as a 
comparative area for observing borderland phenomena from a County capital 
sitting on the edges of the state. Zwedru in Grand Gedeh County was selected 
to understand the possibility generalizable patterns of socially organized 
(similarities and differences) daily practice. The choice of these cities emerged 
from a reading of Liberia’s troubled history of nation building and 
statebuilding since the arrival of the American Colonization Society (ACS) on 
the shores of Mesurado in 1820-21. 
 
This chapter outlines a multi-sited comparative political ethnography of 
informal ordering within Liberia’s postwar borderlands highlighting a research 
process, rationales underlying methodological choices and challenges 
encountered. Firstly, it provides a narrative of how the researcher’s entry, 
engagement with and appropriation of a set of instruments that constantly 
adjusted to the flux of everyday life within borderlands. This mode of enquiry 
was dictated by the necessity to both observe everyday life in the context of 
postwar statebuilding (a political process rife with spatial, symbolic and social 
power implications); and the need to hear local narratives and interpretations of 
engagement with different statebuilding and peacebuilding interveners over 
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time and from multiple interpretive perspectives. Central to this endeavor is the 
deployment of – the process of participant observation through transportation 
and attendance of social group functions; the conduct of focus group 
discussions; individual interviewing; the collection of borderland histories and 
individual life histories; and the exploration of archival material. Additionally, it 
provides empirical justifications for focusing on community leaders, 
commercial motorbike riders (and their associative live) and their interactions 
with the postwar state and its international statebuilding partners.  
 
Secondly, it provides a set of justifications for the choice of research sites 
through a reading of local history in interaction with statebuilding in the long 
durée, from settlement of the American Colonization Society in 1820-21 to 
postwar statebuilding (2004–2015). While this process has been outlined in 
historical perspective in Chapter One, this history is inalienably linked to the 
spatial methodological choices made in during the course of the experiential 
fieldwork process. Brief descriptions of the specific research sites show their 
historical relevance in the tenuous war to peace transition in Liberia. It also 
justifies the focus on informal encounters with postwar statebuilding to 
evidence the salience of oft-ignored embedded informal order, authority and 
control.  
 
Thirdly, it highlights some of the social and security challenges encountered 
during the execution of the research project and ways in which these 
challenges were dealt with. It concurrently presents the ethical considerations 
negotiated between the researcher and the interviewees, focus group discussion 
participants and some observed individuals during the course of the research 
project. Finally, it explains how a multi-sited comparative political ethnography 
provides a posteriori justification for a reverse engineered understanding of 
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borderland order, authority and social control in interaction with postwar 
statebuilding in Liberia. 
 
Researcher engagement with borderland social actors evolved dialogically. This 
dialogical evolution shaped the nature and process of the engagement, the type 
of information that was gathered for analysis and the nature of the analysis. 
There were casual and more formal conversations with immigration officials 
and focus group discussions with commercial motorbike riders on the Makona 
River (Lofa) and St. John River border crossing. Union leaders, community 
chairpersons and mayors provided multiple dimensions of ordering, authority 
interaction and multiple loci for the negotiation and maintenance of social 
control. Meanwhile money-changers, sitting at the center of the borderland 
economy performed functions akin to a central bank on a daily basis – with the 
proximity to the specific border being a determinant in the kind of currency 
which they traded. They shared their hopes and defined themselves and their 
socially organized public forms, not in terms of resistance, but as negotiators of 
process and practice. They cared more about the outcomes of their liminal 
orders and authority, than the outcome of the postwar state, while paying scant 
attention to the interconnectedness of both outcomes. Combined with 
participant observation, the interview evidenced the centrality of borderland 
dynamics to postwar statebuilding outcomes. From their position within 
borderlands (yet networked to national, regional and international social actors 
and their actions), organized social actors interact with multiple social actors 
who also exhibit varying permanent, transient and traversing characteristics. By 
focusing on understanding the negotiation of formality and informality within 
borderlands, this study shows how these liminal social actors develop and 
maintain alternative forms of informal order during processes of postwar 
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statebuilding. Thus, this was far from being a linear technical process of 
questionnaire design, interviewing, transcription and information analysis. 
 
Liberia: Historically Contextualizing Borderland – State Interaction 
 
Liberia’s politics continues to evidence deep influences of “black colonialism” – 
the institutionalization of a privileged settler group over indigenous 
communities after the arrival of the ACS in 1820-21 (Liebenow 1969, Sundiata 
1980, Saigbe 1983, Gershoni 1985). From independence in 1847 till date, 
Liberia’s motto remains: “The love of liberty brought us here.” It’s lone star flag 
hearkens back to the American flag. Symbols of settler privilege continue to 
dominate Liberia’s socio-political landscape despite the institutionalization of 
the national integration policy in 1964 by President W.V.S. Tubman. Up until 
the post-coup 1986 constitutional review process, Liberia’s independence 
constitution of 1847 had sanctioned the differentiation between coastal Liberia 
(mainly settler colonies) and its hinterlands. Liberia’s “black colonialism” 
effectively created two main identity groups – a hegemonic settler group and 
the marginalized 16 indigenous ethnic groups. Far from ascribing a dominant 
ethnic character to Liberia’s civil war the establishment of hegemonic privilege 
in Liberia evidences the necessity to understand contemporary Liberian 
politics through everyday practice. It is in everyday practices that patterns of 
informal ordering, authority and social control emerge and their existence 
negotiated. Their emergence therefore sets the stage for engage with the state 
within arenas of opposition and domination. 
 
Nation building in Liberia was a challenge which different statebuilding policy 
interventions unsuccessfully sought to address over the years. It can be argued 
that, since independence, the creation of successive hegemonic encounters 
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between state and society replaced one another without fundamentally altering 
purposes, mechanics and ends of statebuilding in Liberia. More than a century 
of settler domination was replaced after the 1980 coup by Krahn and allied 
ethnic group domination. The systematic state-sanctioned repression of the 
Mano and Gio ethnic groups of Nimba County after the 1985 Quiwompka Coup 
attempt created further fissures, mistrust and uncertainty. Hence when Charles 
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) marched through the Butuo 
on the border with the Ivory Coast in December 1989, many in Nimba County 
welcomed them as liberators. However, they themselves fractured with the 
emergence of the INPFL under the command of Prince Yormie Johnson. 
Subsequently, in 1993, Alhaji G.V. Kromah’s United Liberation Movement for 
Liberia (ULIMO-K) attacked the NPFL through Foya to seize control of Lofa 
County. Thus, specific historical examples point to the salience of Liberia’s 
hinterlands in shaping statebuilding means and ends.  
 
Liberia is administratively divided into 15 counties – of these, seven abut 
neighboring countries. Each county is divided into districts and statutory 
districts. Each district is made up of overlapping towns and cities, clans and 
villages with internal administrative boundaries often cutting through ethnic 
groups. For the purpose of this study site visits were undertaken in three 
counties – Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh Counties.  Within these counties two 
city sites were selected for research – Foya, Lofa County and Gompa – Nimba 
County. These sites were deliberately selected as a result of archival research at 
the Liberian archives in Indiana which provided insights into the evolution of 
the administrative division of Liberia; the origins and movement of the 
different factions engaged in Liberia’s civil wars; and their historical 
importance in both wartime and peacetime economies. Within each of these 
contexts, I sought to uncover emic (insider perspectives on political and social 
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life and/or ground-level processes involved therein (Bayard de Volo and Schatz, 
2004: 267). 
 
This prior knowledge about Liberia that captures strategic and elite narratives 
of war, politics and statebuilding, informed the development and execution of 
comparative ethnographic research from two borderland cities. Different 
attempts at statebuilding crafted institutional arrangements and forms that were 
refracted upon Liberia’s borderlands that reacted to statebuilding in differing 
ways. Thus, a comparative ethnography from the borderlands takes the broad 
historical strokes seriously. Meanwhile it proceeds by seeking to understand the 
coalescence of individuals into social organizations to forge resiliency amid 
vulnerability and through complex emergencies. It is here that is situated a 
grounded understanding of postwar borderland configurative and interactive 
process dynamics as they have historically interacted with previous attempts at 
statebuilding. Instrumentally, political ethnographies seek to uncover emic 
(insider) perspectives on political and social life and/or grounded processes 
involved therein (Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004: 267). This perspective 
underscores the dynamic and mutually constitutive nature of social encounters. 
Hence the malleability of experiential ethnographic research processes that 
adjust and readjust to the flux of everyday borderland livelihood. The reflexive 
inclination of this particular study, in highlighting the complex ethnographic 
worlds of the contested local, challenges the oft-assumed omnipotence and 
autonomy of the international, whether it comes from international 





The rationale for two case study site selection from theoretical lens  
 
The two case studies were selected based on the significance of the historical 
relationship between borderlands and interrelated dynamics of state collapse, 
warfare and state building in Liberia. Historically, the process of state 
construction in Liberia was premised on centrally-based Americo-Liberians’ 
declaration of independence in 1847, and then subsequently seeking to develop 
a social compact that would incorporate “indigenous” populations. These 
dynamics are self-evident in Liberia’s initial constitution that institutionalized 
two Liberias – coastal Liberia and the hinterlands.  
 
Triadic intersection of labor, natural resources and taxation deepened 
antagonisms between the state and some parts of its hinterlands. By the early 
1950s, these hinterlands had become the motor of economic production in 
Liberia without wielding much political power. Cheap labour from the 
hinterlands fueled coastal rubber plantations. Meanwhile the discovery of iron 
ore reserves in Mount Nimba in the 1950s led to the establishment of the 
Liberian-American-Swedish Mining Company (LAMCO) and the construction 
of the country’s first railway line from Yekepa to the port of Buchanan in Grand 
Bassa County. Meanwhile the installation of a hut tax system further 
antagonized hinterland populations who were expected to contribute more to a 
government in which they were barely represented than coastal settler 
communities.  
 
These politico-economic processes had differing implications in Foya, Lofa 
County and Ganta, Nimba County. Foya, that provided much of the manpower 
for Firestone’s plantations experienced an exodus of able-bodied males, some 
of whom returned to contribute to the explosion of a boomtown, according to 
local historians. Meanwhile others resettled on Liberia’s coast. However, Foya 
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emerged as a border boomtown which depended more on commercial 
exchange with towns like Gueckedou in Guinea and Kenema in Sierra Leone, 
than Monrovia. Meanwhile, for Ganta, which supplied labor to LAMCO, the 
unionization of labor within the mines contributed to the development of 
socio-political consciousness that the Liberian state was slow to gauge and 
accommodate. Meanwhile Ganta quickly superseded Sanniquellie as the 
commercial hub in Nimba County benefiting from its relative proximity to the 
Freeport of Monrovia borderland hubs in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire.  
 
These formative and evolutionary dynamics made these cities central to 
understanding the changing relationships between borderlands and state 
building. Hence, they purposefully were selected as liminal spaces from which 
to understand bottom-up postwar reconfiguration of informal ordering, 
authority and social control and their implications for international 
statebuilding processes.  
 
The heuristic importance of studying borderland dynamics in Liberia’s postwar 
statebuilding cannot be overstated. While studies have empirically explored 
regional war economies (Pugh and Cooper 2005), on networks and informal 
power in intrastate war (Utas 2012) on borderlands in war economies 
(Raeymaekers 2010, 2013), borderland in state formation in Indonesia (Eilenberg 
2005), and the regional dimensions of the Liberian Civil War (Sawyer 2004), the 
ontological lens has hardly been turned to the permanence of micro-political 





Reflexivity: Researcher and Theory as Instrument 
 
The methodological process reflectivity through constant intermediation 
between historical contexts of episodic statebuilding in Liberia, everyday 
borderland manifestations of informal social ordering, authority and control 
and critical statebuilding and peacebuilding literature. Critical statebuilding 
research has predominantly been aggregative. Its theoretical interests have 
largely focused on the articulation of ideological and relational power schisms 
and asymmetries between interveners and reactive subjects of intervention 
(Richmond and Franks 2009, Chandler 2008, Mac Ginty 2013, Sisk 2013, and 
Paffenholz 2015). In the case of Liberia multiple biographical texts have traced 
the life histories of elite warlords (Waugh 2013) and postwar leaders (Johnson-
Sirleaf 2009), while ethnographies have focused on the cultural political 
dimensions of the civil wars (Ellis 2006); the forms and consequences of 
regional and international intervention (Adebajo 2002: 34-38) and civil war as 
state formation (Geddes 2014). However, despite contributing to the empirical 
content of micro-territoriality and pluralized sovereignty, seldom are “semi-
literate” voices heard over the din of elite accounts on and about the postwar 
state in Liberia. When they emerge, local voices are a complex cast of 
characters alternating between victimhood and active participation in regional, 
national and local networks of violence (Autesserre 2013). They even sometimes 
exhibit complex coalescence of victimhood and agency to project what Utas 
(2005: 426) describes as “victimcy” – the non-linear relational trajectory 
appropriated by the self-incorporate both elements of ‘victimhood’ and ‘agency’ 
as survival mechanisms in contexts of social vulnerability such as civil wars. 
However, these “local actors” are also cast as second-hand buyers and therefore 
passive “owners” of interventionary peacebuilding processes that are largely 
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programmed from global centers (Donais 2013). While these perspectives 
provide asymmetric variations in postwar statebuilding encounters, social actor 
homogenization and assumed hegemonies underestimate the negotiated 
positioning and options available to and deployed by socially embedded local 
actors within borderland spaces. 
 
This study contributes to understanding social actor configuration, social action 
and their implications for postwar statebuilding. This enquiry is based on an 
ethnographic uncovering of disaggregated and pluralized micro-level 
mechanisms of social interaction in engagement with complex statebuilding 
processes. A process perspective views interveners as more than the sum total 
of their interventionary policies and programmatic practices, but as integral 
social actors to the postwar statebuilding project within transitional states. The 
distinction between social actors and their ‘actual’ social actions is 
methodologically important, firstly because it shift the interpretive focus away 
from analyses of UN, OECD, World Bank, or International Alert policy 
documents to the micro-dynamics of local borderland social actor engagements 
with statebuilding interveners. Second, it is at the level of everyday local 
engagement that statebuilding actually gets attempted and alternative social 
forces harness social and symbolic power, which is then deployed in interaction 
with the state and its international statebuilding patrons. Thirdly, it is through 
this process of social interaction that the empirical outcomes of statebuilding 
projects and programs are shaped through contact with informal social 
ordering, authority and control. This informality within postwar statebuilding 
normatively and operationally challenges the re-emergence of the state and in 
turn reshapes long-term engagement between the intervener and active ad 
differentiated informal subjects of statebuilding intervention. 
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Grasping the complexity of borderland social dynamics within postwar 
statebuilding necessitates understanding multiple interactive processes 
occurring simultaneously over time.  It assumes that while states often view 
borders as structurally static outcomes of political bordering processes, the 
socio-political meanings and implications of borders and bordering emerge 
when individuals interpret and interact with them – whether as state agents and 
instruments, international statebuilding agents or society-level actors. Every set 
of social actors engages with borderlands with different expectations. Hence 
borderlands are not power neutral fields. Given the consideration of power 
embedded within borderlands, locally embedded social actors unavoidably 
become active agents in engagement with the resource-rich and empirically 
driven statebuilding interventions. Indeed, it seeks a deeper understanding of 
the outcomes of the encounter between entrenched networks of local resilience 
and transformative outcome expectations of externally-drive statebuilding 
intervention.  
 
In understanding the outcomes of local and interventionary engagement, from 
the viewpoint of the borderland social actors, it is also necessary to understand 
the configuration (in structure and process) and symbolic interaction of postwar 
borderland social forces. Mead views symbolic interaction assumes that – 
people act towards things based on the meaning things have for them and; 
these meanings are derived from social interaction and modified through 
interpretation (Van Manen 1990). Therefore, engagement provides the empirical 
basis for interpretation and meaning. This political ethnography privileges 
organized social actors – the products of federated or negotiated individual 
action – and their social actions in everyday practice as the primary levels of 
analysis. By focusing on organized social actors and then exploring the 
interaction of subunits within these organized groups, patterns of internal 
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accountability, legitimacy and representativeness which provide the bedrock for 
socially embedded informal order, authority and control emerge. Local political 
dynamics shape the rules that determine legitimacy, accountability, 
representativeness and discipline within informal orders. Understanding these 
processes is not only an interpretive project, but one which depends on 
anecdotal evidence and participant observation. Focusing on organized social 
actors provides a basis from which to interrogate the view within critical 
statebuilding research that – one of the primary limitations of postwar 
statebuilding lies in the neoliberal ideological inclination of the interveners.  
 
Furthermore, by focusing on arenas of domination and opposition, it provides 
alternative explanations for statebuilding failure not exclusively situated in the 
intervener’s motivation, but as the product of discursive power interaction and 
syncretic dissonance between the intervener and the active subject of 
intervention. While borderlands can themselves be characterized as arenas of 
domination and opposition, grounded empirics pointed to – marketscapes as 
physical spaces; the territorial realms of community leaders as social and 
symbolic spaces and Commercial Motorbike Rider Unions (CMR Unions) as 
social and symbolic spaces – as salient to understanding social action within 
arenas of domination and opposition.  
 
More so, it was important to capture interpretive dissonance of interventions 
from the perspective and interpretation of the subjects (active agents) of 
intervention. This is working from the assumption that policy documents 
provide insights into the intent of international statebuilders. Thus this 
ethnographic experience required reflection on the dialogical principles of 
reflexive science, which demands constant – cognizance of the interventionary 
role of the observer in the life of the participant; demanding an analysis of 
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interaction within social situations; uncovering local processes in a relation of 
mutual determination with external social forces; and regarding theory as 
emerging not only in dialogue between participant and observer, but also 
among observers now viewed as participants in a scientific community 
(Buroway 1998: 16). Social actors whose life histories are inscribed within 
borderlands in the longue durée interpret and engage with the re-emergence, 
make-up, negotiation and enforcement of internal and international borders as 
part of the postwar statebuilding process. This interaction provides a 
understanding empirical content of micro-territoriality and pluralized 
sovereignty as outcomes of postwar statebuilding.  
 
Approaching postwar statebuilding from the bottom-up had ontological, 
epistemological and methodological influences on my research endeavor. 
Ontologically, by privileging critical engagement with quotidian borderland 
livelihoods within a postwar context, the quotidian management of economic 
and socio-political spaces and the processes therein took center stage in my 
interpretive endeavor. This in turn shaped my epistemological preference for 
seeking a multiplicity of voices within the community to articulate 
interpretations of their lived experiences within postwar spaces. Assuming the 
natural construction of social hierarchies and gendered roles in everyday 
processes necessitated recourse to a multiplicity of voices that situated 
themselves along different positions on the power spectrum. The recourse to 
ethnographically based participant-observation positioned me as an outsider 
looking in and seeking to understand emic constructions and engagement with 
issues of territoriality and sovereignty – which are central tenets to postwar 
statebuilding. Being of western-educated Cameroonian origin, I clearly stood 
from a position of privilege in relation to my interlocutors.  
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However, given their experiences with many dimensions of the polyphormic 
international, I sought to negotiate difference by conforming to the social rules 
of adopting a “stranger-father” and living, eating, shopping and traveling the 
borderlands like the borderlanders themselves. Over time and through multiple 
pre-Ebola outbreak and post-Ebola visits to the same research sites, I was able 
to confirm and develop an understanding of everyday governance processes 
and micro-territorial interpretations of pluralized sovereignty within the 
Liberian borderlands. 
 
Researching Centralized Margins and Marginality in Moments of Crisis 
– Interrogating Configuration of Informal Orders 
 
Researching marginality in moments of crisis stokes curiosity about pluralized 
modes of engagement (intra-local, local-national, local-international, national-
international) that encounter the flux inherent within these crises. What may 
appear as monolithic structures – the local, national and international are 
refracted into myriad nodes of interactive everyday practice within the margins. 
Compounding the flux of everyday life within borderlands, crises reveal the 
complex dual coexistence of patters of vulnerability and resiliency embedded 
within them. Operating on the edge of the central, entry into margins in 
contexts of complex emergency is often mediated through prisms of fear, 
mistrust, uncertainty and expectation. Negotiating entry and establishing rules 
of engagement are therefore essential to the conduct of ethnographic research 
within borderlands.   
 
Reflexivity embraces participation as intervention because it distorts and 
disturbs as a social order reveals itself in the way it responds to pressure 
(Buroway 1998: 17). This pressure is described by the uncertainty and flux that 
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characterized most postwar contexts. Studies on crises have overwhelmingly 
focused on the ideological postures, policies and programmatic orientations of 
international statebuilding interventions with only nascent attention going 
toward the exploration of localized engagement with these interventions. Even 
this ontological shift has tended to highlight local interpretations of external 
processes such as Security Sector Reform in Africa (Bagayoko 2012) and Truth 
and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone (Millar 2014). This is still far from 
understanding notions of local gatekeeping and the informal norms that 
undergird them or the subjection of international statebuilding interventions to 
locally embedded social orders.  
 
The triadic encounter between the flux and uncertainty inherent within 
postwar statebuilding, social embedded informal ordering and international 
statebuilding interventions makes for complex ethnographic research. However 
micro-societal complexities that undergird this triadic encounter and 
contribute to shaping everyday livelihood outcomes remain largely silenced, 
despite a number of notable exceptions.  Shifting the ontological lens towards 
micro-level complexities in the shadows of crises, Woods’ (2003) develops an 
in-depth ethnographic understanding of insurgent collective in El Salvador’s 
civil war and Autesserre (2010) exhibits linkages between local and regional 
conflict complexes amid the paradoxical prevalence of national peace in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Both studies deploy differing political 
ethnographic approaches to understanding the micro-dynamics of societies 
emerging from protracted civil war.  
 
A study on borderland dynamics in postwar statebuilding continues in this 
tradition of shifting the epistemological lens to the micro-level individual and 
networked community that shape socio-organizational processes amid macro-
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level, top-down postwar statebuilding. This political ethnographic approach 
acknowledges and gives serious consideration to macro-positivist 
interpretations of the institutional nature, content and outcomes of 
international statebuilding. Yet these positivist institutional forms despite their 
role in social interaction are not the central issue under study. The focus 
remains on the ways in which local actors within liminal communities organize 
to engage, negotiate and interpret their social, symbolic and physical positions 
within ongoing national and international statebuilding processes. Postwar 
statebuilding outcomes do not singularly depend on international intervention 
– if anything international statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions are 
inherently limited in their reach and impact by routine everyday practices. 
These everyday practices are borne of the complex admixture of vulnerability 
and resilience forged in contexts of sustained emergency.   
 
Local individual and collective agency evidenced through informal ordering, 
construction and deployment of authority and social controls in daily practice, 
play a central role in the shaping the empirical reality of postwar states. This 
study privileges descriptions and interpretations of social actors, actions and 
processes by ‘insiders’ (in this case borderlanders). They contextualize social 
continuities and change within Liberia’s postwar and post-Ebola context.  
 
However, the role of the researcher within the ethnography being to closely 
study and experience social and cultural contexts of statebuilding interactions 
within complex transitional state in order to provide a more accurate account of 
local perspectives on statebuilding. Situating this ethnography within 
borderlands implies the necessity to understand both the role of marginality in 
the state and expressions of state forms from the margins. The construct of the 
borderland, being a geographical construct necessitates an understanding of 
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the administrative cartography of the state. For purposes of administration, 
there is a homogenizing tendency inherent to the state. Administrative units 
may mirror one another around a country, however they differ in their resource 
and personnel endowments, the nature of their networking into central power 
structures and autonomy in decision-making. 
 
Entering the Foya Borderland: Memory, A Funeral and A Traveling 
Pandemic 
 
In March 2014, after travelling 16 hours from Monrovia, I arrived on Broad 
Street, Foya, in northeastern Liberia at five a.m. A local family had graciously 
agreed to host me in Foya Kama quarter. Foya Kama is one of Foya’s nine 
quarters and one of the oldest settlements in the borderland city. As evidence 
of its historical importance, Foya Kama’s grassy hilltop hosts the Foya Borma 
Hospital, an Episcopal church whose missionary purpose includes supplying 
medical personnel to the hospital and operating a missionary secondary and 
high school. I had planned on spending two weeks in Foya making to begin a 
multi-stage ethnographic engagement with local postwar socio-political 
dynamics viewed from borderlands.  
 
As I sat for what to me would have been early lunch with my host family, they 
inquired about the purpose of my visit, wanting to know how they could 
facilitate my study visit. As I synoptically told them about my research a family 
uncle (Old Man F.) interrupted me. He went into a 20 minute narrative of that 
day in 1993 when “Fine Boy”/aka/” Saah Tchui” (a ULIMO/Guinean rebel mid-
level commander) had led an invasion from across the border in Guinea. His 
purpose was to seize Foya and the entire Lofa County, from the control of 
General Faiyah (NPFL). His spotty recollection evoked memories of the 
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villagers – men, women and children – being thronged to the Foya Airfield 
(situated at the southeastern end of the city at Ndama Road). He had been a 
quarter chief at that point. This is where I garnered interest in the concept of 
the Quarter Chief, which fell outside the customary realm of paramount, clan 
and town chiefs and the administrative realm of the City Mayor or District 
Commissioner. The concept of the Quarter Chief, though not a formal one, 
contributes to understanding everyday dynamics of micro-territorial 
governance from the borderlands.  
 
The Foya quarter chiefs who had stayed through the 1993 ULIMO invasion 
were assembled and instructed to provide a labor force for the invading 
contingent. This labor force was coercively required to meet the logistical needs 
of the invading army, as well as ensure the economic sustenance of the 
invading force. They were coerced into pillaging the city and marching 
everything that could be sold in markets across the border in Guinea. The use 
of siege strategies by rebel forces spans most of human history, and in this case, 
it signals the importance of local economies to invading forces. In his lifetime, 
Old Man F. had seen different forms of forced labor. He had seen young men 
embark on the perilous journey to work in contemptible conditions on 
Firestone plantations in Margibi County. He had lived through the hut tax and 
multiple rounds of Kissi-Gbandi tribal wars. I listened carefully, took mental 
notes and asked curious questions. I realized that my ethnographic journey had 
begun and it had completely caught me by surprise. This old man in Foya 
Kama had not been on my list of preplanned potential informants however his 
vast historical insights on this borderland space stoked my curiosity and 
exposed the complexity of the task at hand for me. Most importantly was the 
realization that the memories of different era in the borderland’s territorial 
history were interwoven with the lived social experiences of its residents.  
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Memory – however fractured, selective and pained by physical and 
psychological trauma – provided a frame through which to appreciate the 
historical evolution of borderland territorial ordering in relation to the state 
and in relation to contested informal micro-territorial ordering. Over the next 
couple of days, Old Man F. described some of the local customs and courtesies 
that were extended to outsiders – like myself – entering their relatively close-
knit borderland community. He also advised me of who to meet negotiate 
access the individual and social spaces relevant to my research. Over the course 
of the ethnographic experience the individual and social spaces only grew 
wider and deeper in complexity. Old Man F. had assumed that I needed special 
information, which only certain people within the community could provide. 
However, I needed more than just verbal information to discern the emic 
mechanics of informal ordering within borderland spaces. The information I 
had gleaned within a week of my scoping visit in Foya coupled with the 
informal rules of borderland city engagement further deepened my curiosity 
about the engagement between programmed international statebuilding and 
pluralized informal ordering within borderlands.  
 
Initially I had sought to escape the metaphor of researching along the main 
road – implying sticking to that which is seen from a rather convenient lens. 
So, I thought to visit multiple formal border crossings and then working my 
way backwards into the city – Foya. Of the six “official” border crossings from 
Foya Statutory District to Guinea and Sierra Leone, I purposefully selected two 
to visit – the Mankona River Crossing to Guinea and the Mende-Koma overland 
crossing to Sierra Leone. Firstly, this was a deliberate attempt to situate myself 
territorially through an observation of border administration and enforcement 
in everyday practice. The focus was to observe patterns of transport, checks, 
 146 
controls and commodity movement between Foya and the neighboring 
countries. Secondly, I sought through this endeavor to understand the 
references of memorial points at the border mentioned during my encounters 
with borderland inhabitants. It had been difficult to understand the constant 
reference to the Makona river border control building that had been 
transformed by ULIMO fighters into a holding area for the Foya boys who 
would carry looted wares on their heads and had been reconverted its original 
purpose of border control building after the war.  Navigating the territory came 
the dual realization – firstly that this building was actually approximately 25 
miles away from Foya’s city center and allowed me to visualize the 
reconstruction of individual memories. Secondly the building that epitomizes 
different modes of repression stood emblazoned with its epithet acknowledging 
the contribution of international statebuilding to its reconstruction. 
 
Prior to making any official contacts, I spent a couple of days at the Mankona 
River border crossing with Guinea. The border control post sits approximately 
one mile away of dirt track from the river crossing. The crossing is done mainly 
by canoe. After the border control checkpoint and right on the banks of the 
river was a Commercial Motorbike Rider (CMR) staging area. They provided the 
relay of human and material traffic from the river to the Foya and its environing 
villages. At this river crossing, a signpost announced a SIDA-funded (Swedish 
International Development Agency) Sorlumba-Foya road construction project 
that was due completion the following October, “in collaboration with the 
Republic of Liberia.” The riverbank was an intermittent beehive of commercial 
activity with successive waves of traffic punctuated by long quiet lulls. Amid 
this transience though, was the semi-permanence of riverbank retailers who 
attracted the occasional visit of the revenue collection authority from the office 
based in the city – Foya. The riverbank crossing was far more active with 
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everyday traffic than the Mende-Koma overland crossing to Sierra Leone, 
where activity was largely predicated upon the much-acclaimed Saturday Foya 
market day. The relative openness of access to the riverbank crossing also 
contrasted the closed nature of the overland crossing where the border control 
supervisor asked that I get official documentation from the district authorities 
before I could conduct any kind of research. I was already beginning to see 
regulatory differentiation of border control practice within the same 
borderland.  
 
On Saturday, March 22, a funeral serendipitously introduced me to the 
networked dimension of borderland and centrally–situated elite politics. From 
Thursday, March 20, the tents that began being erected in the space around a 
brick home in Peace Community Quarter, were a rather curious sight within 
Foya. Then the “4X4” sports utility vehicles, some adorned with the Liberian 
and Lofa County flags – the mark of official county senators and 
congresspersons – started rolling into town. Citizens of Foya from far and wide 
were congregating for the funeral of former and a postwar Foya City Mayor, 
Agnes W. Saa. Old Man F. informed me that it would be a good place to meet 
up and exchange with the City Mayor and the Quarter Chiefs (QC). The 
concept of the City Mayor seemed fairly straightforward, but the concept of the 
QC raised some questions. This funeral space was an arena of social 
engagement through which I got to meet up with all the Quarter Chiefs, 
without being able to meet up with the City Mayor who was very busy. 
However, head of the QCs pledged to convey my interest in Foya to “City” (as 
the mayor is referred to), while informing me that their doors were open to me 
anytime following the long tradition of Kissi hospitality. Foya is the heartland 
of the Kissi ethnic group in Liberia. 
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The importance of the funeral to the ethnographic experience was threefold. 
Within Foya’s close knit community it provided a context within which I was 
introduced to the QCs by a former QC and respected member of the 
community. To the extent that during the subsequent days I ran into QCs while 
walking or motorbike riding around the City, we exchanged pleasantries as they 
taught me to start exchanging greetings (at the very least) in the Kissi language. 
Secondly, it provided a basis from which they, as well as the members of their 
community served as my instructors of local social history, culture and 
processes, which they seemed to enjoy doing. Finally, it provided the basis for 
an inquiry to the interwoven life histories of QCs, to their micro-territorial 
spaces, their communities and the borderland city in general.   
 
A few weeks into my scoping trip, Liberia was confronted with another crisis - 
the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) on its northwestern Lofa county 
bordering both Sierra Leone and Guinea. Foya happened to be the epicenter of 
the EVD outbreak in Liberia, given its proximity to the area in Guinea that has 
been declared the point of origin of the outbreak by the World Health 
Organization. While in Foya, the Chief Medical Officer at Foya Borma Hospital 
succumbed to what, at the time, was a mysterious disease. By March 24th it had 
been confirmed that there were cases of EVD at the Foya Borma Hospital. The 
interconnectedness between Gueckedou, Guinea; Foya, Liberia and Kailahun, 
Sierra Leone made this triangular zone the epicenter of West Africa’s EVD 
outbreak. While at that point people mourned without knowing the cause of 
death, the EVD that had started in neighboring Gueckedou had crossed the 
border into Foya. This health crisis represented another complex emergency 
adding to the vulnerability and necessitating even greater resilience from 
borderland communities.  
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National and international community response to the pandemic included – 
international border closures; the hardening of internal borders into 
quarantine barriers; hybrid national and international health teams working 
with community leaders to stem its spread; public sensitization messaging to 
promote collective participation in combating the virus; and the provision of 
primary care resources in the form of buckets of chlorinated water for the 
washing of extremities across the country. A member of the Lofa County Ebola 
Response Team later would inform me that, “There were so many factors at 
play. As we went out to sensitize the people about this new disease, which we 
had never seen before, we realized disparities in the response to our 
sensitization between predominantly Muslim communities of Kolahun District 
and Christian communities in Lofa Statutory District for example. As infections 
recurred in the Muslim communities mainly due to postmortem cultural 
practices relating to burial rites, we discovered that we could better use their 
children as intermediaries in sensitization. This was very effective. Lofa County 
was declared Ebola free before the rest Monrovia. We did it.”6  Again the 
international and national agency had applied a monolithic solution to a 
problem with heterogeneous manifestations with reliable differences occurring 
through heuristic adjustments in practice based on local knowledge and 
territorial mapping of cultural differences onto epidemiological patterns.  
 
Returning to Foya after the pandemic, I had to engage with two temporal 
prisms of complex emergency – one defined by war, the other by a pandemic. 
Both phases of crisis, seemed to have contributed to the realignment of 
informal ordering, authority and control and the deployment of informality in 
engagement with the state and its statebuiding benefactors. The EVD outbreak 
obliged the government to leverage informal orders in both sensitization and 
                                               
6 Interview with HW1 conducted in Foya, Liberia on August 2, 2015. 
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securitization campaigns, given that the pandemic was considered a national 
security issue. Therefore both Mayors and community members took a greater 
interest in the performances of informal micro-territorial governors. Meanwhile 
Micro-territorial governors also capitalized on this moment to promote the 
institutionalization of Community Watch Forums – which at the quarter level 
basically contributed to the enforcement of quarantine rules. However, in most 
communities the CWFs outlived the EVD with implications for the 
enforcement of social controls based on norms developed through informal 
ordering.  
 
Entering the Ganta Borderland: Memory, Generational Tensions and 
Impending Urbanization  
 
Understanding spatial political dynamics within post-crisis contexts demands 
an ethnographic engagement – a constant negotiation of spatial and symbolic 
meaning and intention – between the researcher, their individual and collective 
interlocutors and the flux of daily practice. Thus, entry into Ganta was shaped 
by lessons learnt from Foya, the absence of a host family and the differences in 
the historical relationship between the territory and different iterations of the 
Liberian state or collapsed state. Given the relative lack of contacts within this 
borderland city, entry was slightly more formalized. Arriving in the City, I made 
contact with the City Mayor, Dorr Cooper (the current County Development 
Superintendent for Nimba County). A former intelligence officer during the 
Liberian civil war, he provided insights into the issues, challenges and hopes 
for his city. Since my initial interest, before entering the communities, was to 
understand the lay of the land a phone call to the border joint security 
command operating at the St. John border crossing on Guinea Road, provided 
access to both border officials, the bridge over the St. John River, which was 
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the only official crossing point from Ganta to Guinea.   However, memory of 
the Liberian Civil war turned around a narrative of self-defense against the Doe 
government, which had failed to provide security and secure livelihoods and 
then persecuted the Mano and Gio of Nimba County. This memory of 
justification for collective action takes form in narratives about how “single-
barrel’ soldiers defended communities against the Doe government initially, 
and then against other rebel movements who sought to occupy Ganta. Old Man 
K., for example provided insights of entire communities running to their “bush 
farms” where they sought refuge by living off the land during the war. Single-
barrel soldiers who developed “civil defense” mechanisms ostensibly to protect 
civilian populations protected these “bush farm” displaced communities. 
Although he averred that some of these civil self-defense units eventually 
coalesced with rebel factions to engage in offensive war operations. 
  
However, as the war ended, myriad challenges emerged relating to the return of 
internally and externally displaced populations. Land was heavily contested in 
Ganta, former mid-level wartime commanders converted to the private sector 
and the youth developed an economic force with Commercial Motorbike 
Riding. The combination of factors set the stage for inter-generational tensions 
in Ganta. CMR was seen by youth as representing a lucrative informal and 
opportune business sector that “did not require a college certificate for those of 
us who were born during the war,”7  as Milton M., a young CMR noted. 
However, a border control official decried the impact of CMR on the erosion of 
educational standards as “young boys all want to ride a motorbike. How can you 
help us convince these young people that getting something into their heads is 
more important than this motorbike think which is only temporary?”8 queried a 
                                               
7 Interview with Milton M, a young CMR in Ganta on April, 2, 2014. 
8 Notes from informal discussion with border control officials at St. John River crossing, Ganta 
on April 2, 2014.  
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senior border control official. However, it must also be noted that older 
residents of Ganta expressed a fondness for agricultural production, which was 
not necessarily shared by its youth. These differing perspectives on economic 
utility and production mirrored the postwar intergenerational angst that I had 
also observed in Foya.  
 
Ganta sits approximately 161 miles away from Monrovia and about 50 miles away 
from the commercial city of Nzerekore, Guinea, where many from Mano and 
Gio sought refuge during Doe’s persecution and the brutality of Liberia’s two 
civil wars. It is also a commercial hub and arguably the economic capital of 
Nimba County. Since the end of Liberia’s Civil War, successive Ganta City 
Mayors have pushed for rapid urbanization. The process of postwar 
urbanization was definitely going to make local winners and losers. It was also 
going to alter internal power dynamics inherent in everyday borderland social 
ordering, authority and control. This alteration in power dynamics is bound to 
affect the same postwar statebuilding processes, which are at their origin. 
Communities, such as Catholic Community, have emerged in areas that were 
rubber plantations during the war years.  
 
Furthermore, the push towards rapid urbanization has exacerbated land 
tensions as the state has exercised eminent domain in the process of town 
planning, reserving space for public use for projects such as a market and a 
cemetery. Municipal ordinances have proscribed burials within private plots 
and required that commercial buildings on Main Street be at least two-storeys 
tall. Meanwhile, the state’s lack of effective social control creates tensions 
between arbitrary administration of justice and public law enforcement. In the 
process, public spaces have become arenas of domination and opposition 
between the emergent state and borderland social actors.  
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The methodological implications of the scoping visit to Ganta, Nimba County is 
fourfold. Firstly, it affirmed the importance of life histories and oral historical 
in understanding the evolution of borderland configurations over time. 
Secondly, it highlighted the necessity to “find” a stranger father to negotiate 
entry into personal narratives, as well as aid in the process of verifying 
information and observations.  Thirdly, it evidenced the comparability of social 
actor categories – Commercial Motorbike Riders and associated unions and 
Community Chairpersons – across borderland spaces in their relationship with 
statebuilding. Finally, it provided the foundations for seeking a deeper 
understanding of the directional interactive patterns between formality and 
informality in processes of ordering, authority and social control. This means 
that it stoked an interest in understand when and how informal social actors 
sought to formalize themselves. It also necessitated an understanding of the 
purpose and extent to which informal social actors pursued their formalization. 
Given the interest in discursive relational dynamics, the reverse process also 
gained relevance, i.e. understanding when and how formal statebuilding social 
actors sought to build relationships with informal social actors and the 
rationales underpinning these process choices (from the perspectives of the 
informal social actors). 
 
Stranger Father: Mediated Ethnographic Rapport in Postwar Spaces 
 
Seeking to understand borderland actors necessitated probing life histories, 
memory, alliances, trauma and survival. However, it also required the 
observation of daily practices in order to attempt to capture a deeper 
understanding of patterns that emerge thereof.  These observations took place 
through travel, participation in meetings, negotiating terms of research 
 154 
permissibility with authorities and questioning about personal and community 
challenges within the postwar context. 
 
I inadvertently came upon the cultural construct – “stranger father”. The 
stranger father is an individual with family ties within a specific community, 
which generally run several generations back, who serves as an entry point for 
the ‘stranger’ who is visiting the community. They basically are socially 
responsible for the stranger’s safety and conduct within the community. This 
piece of the research puzzle within the Liberian context contributes to both 
processes of participant-observation which Schatz (2013: 6) notes are 
centerpieces of political ethnography. His understanding of sensibility 
transcends the artificial distinction between fieldwork and deskwork to imply 
epistemological commitments that are more than about particular methods and 
implying the multiplicity of tools of inquiry at the disposition of the 
ethnographer (Schatz 2013: 6). However, the “stranger-father” adds another 
dimension to the flux within ethnographies of crisis for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, while the concept breaks the ice by providing a local point of reference 
for the researcher and interviewee within the community, it is extremely 
difficult to gauge the relationship between the stranger-father and the 
interviewee. This is despite the fact that the stranger-father does not sit in on 
the interviews. However, given that the reflexive ethnographic approach that 
takes the context as a point of departure and not the point of conclusion, the 
dialogical process of researcher-respondent data collection over time alters 
their interactions and refines exchanges.   
 
Years of war breed suspicion, fear and mistrust, which are neither erased by 
letters of accreditation nor affiliation or pledges of interviewer/observer-
interviewee confidentiality. Hence, effective access to communities was 
 155 
facilitated through the negotiation and retention of a ‘stranger father’. The 
‘stranger father’ often does not only know the social and physical space, but 
they understand the social space, individual networks and its cultural codes 
which guide social encounters – for example where to eat and not to eat, where 
and when the acceptance or the rejection of gifts may be conceived to be 
offensive, what signs portend insecurity or safety, who the authority figures are 
etc. They are local custodians of knowledge about the communities within 
which they also are networked. However, they also introduce a mediated 
dimension to the researcher’s positionality within the spaces under study.  
 
Beyond breaking the ice between the researcher and the local communities, the 
stranger-father contributes alternative and in-depth interpretations to everyday 
local practice – contributing to making the distinction between sporadic 
occurrences and patterned behaviors. For example, there was a house in Blegey 
Pa Community in Ganta with lots of rocks on the roof. So, I asked my stranger-
father, whether it was a postwar architectural innovation. He explained that the 
rocks had ended up on the roof due to an altercation between the owner of a 
private water well and well users within the community, which had ended up 
involving the police who solicited help from lumpen youth from Congo 
Community. The anecdote often gets narrated in the city to highlight a varying 
number of issues including – evidence of the water and sanitation crisis which 
continues to grip Liberia’s postwar borderland communities, the weakness of 
the police to deal with a belligerent and exploitative well owner, the informal 
power of lumpen youth who operate out of areas with limited social control and 
collusion between the state and informal actors in the pursuit of a variant of 
social justice. Thus, the stranger-father contributed to providing context to 
what appeared to be an architectural curiosity.  
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However, the use of a ‘stranger father’ also raises questions about the nature of 
the observations made and how much the observations could be influenced by 
the perspective and explanation of the ‘stranger father.’ However, seeking 
multiple respondents’ explanations of phenomena in both formal and informal 
settings provides a clear understanding of consensual meaning. More so, 
stranger fathers were preferably not embedded within the political structure of 
any given community, their backgrounds had to be non-threatening, had a long 
and respected history within the community and were still living within the 
community. These were researcher pre-conditions aligned with the researcher’s 
ethical considerations. Researching during and after crises requires sensitivity 
to personal life trajectories, memory and power dynamics in social 
reconstitution. Hence the stranger father was supposed to be as minimal a 
distraction from engagement with the borderscapes as possible. They remain 
my points of contact within the community and a point of contact by which the 
community can reach me.   
 
Borderland Gatekeepers’ Contribution to Understanding Informal 
Order, Authority and Control 
 
Local borderland gatekeepers represent a complex point of entry into 
understanding patterns of postwar informal ordering, authority and control in 
interaction with statebuilding processes. Given the tendency for social research 
to focus on borderland transience, community gatekeepers who mark 
themselves through permanence and mobility provide a frame from which to 
understand borderland power constitution and distribution. Interrogating 
length of service in the position of Quarter Chief and Community Chairperson 
provided an understanding of the longevity of these social actors within 
borderlands. Furthermore, it provided a starting point for gaining an 
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understanding of their roles within their communities and in relation to the 
state and intervening statebuilding actors who come into borderlands.  
 
Whether official or nonofficial, the daily process of borderland gatekeeping is a 
communal function. The City Mayor may hold the key to the city, but the 
informal community chairpersons have a lock on the city. Meanwhile the 
informal community chairpersons also depend on an array of expertise and 
networked individuals within their communities to strengthen their positions as 
gatekeepers at the socially organized “community” level. Therefore, a 
borderland political ethnography requires an interaction with multiple 
gatekeepers and understanding how and why they deploy their authority. 
However, a fuller understanding is gained once again by exploring the 
intertwining of gatekeeper life histories to borderland social dynamics.  
 
The reasons for understanding these personal and territorial connections are 
threefold. Informal governance takes time and effort, yet it is a fiscally 
unremunerated job, hence there it raises the question of why the pursuit and 
maintenance of local territorial authority and control. Secondly, there is a need 
to understand how the different occupational positions of gatekeepers and 
social capital embedded within gatekeeping informal orders, rationalizes 
contestation for local authority and control. Finally, there is the need to 
understand how the emergence of these informal gatekeepers, shapes arenas of 
domination and opposition within the postwar state. 
 
To understand the nature of hierarchies that emerge in the construction of 
social communities (sharpened in crisis situations) necessitated the 
identification of and interaction with community-based social gatekeepers as 
well as their community members. While stranger-fathers serve an introductory 
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and trust building purpose, community gatekeepers often provide insights, 
which are further developed or challenged during focus groups discussions 
within the same communities. Given their social positioning within the 
communities within which they themselves live, and the power embedded in 
their role as gatekeeper, their engagement with the researcher and the stranger 
father is understandably, not often power-neutral. Hence the very process of 
negotiated entry into borderscapes provides unique insights into the politics of 
power embedded therein. 
 
An eventual encounter with the community leader often leads to the flipping of 
positionality. The gatekeeper plays the role of the researcher asking questions 
about the nature, purpose and potential outcomes (benefits) of the research 
project being undertaken – both for their communities and for themselves. 
Within a postwar context, within bordercapes which are distant from power 
centers, the community leader’s understanding of the purpose of the study 
could make the difference between a hospitable and cordial research 
environment and roadblocks within a non-responsive community. However, it 
must be understood that either outcome provides insights into social, symbolic, 
spatial, power and authority configurations and their deployment.  
 
A Comparative Political Ethnography of Permanent Crisis in 
Borderlands 
 
In this study, two process dynamics are in interaction – statebuilding and 
borderland society building – within a temporal context (one of crisis). 
Statebuilding takes place within a specific geographically delimited territorial 
space. Borderland dynamics occur within liminal spaces on the geographical 
edges of the state, yet are networks to national, regional and international 
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power centers. However, the relationship between borderlands and states and 
the role of borderlands within states are both called into question. This mode 
of inquiry draws upon the emergent tradition the “states in society” theoretical 
approach to explaining and understanding political phenomena. However, in 
this study the ontological lens is less on the state and more on society, hence 
the necessity to understand the complexities of the intersection of social space, 
symbolic space and physical space as constitutive of borderland dynamics n the 
aftermath of crisis. 
 
Order, Authority and control are embedded within social, symbolic and 
physical nexuses of borderland spaces. Understanding the micro manifestation 
of ordering, authority and control within borderlands and its implications for 
postwar statebuilding necessitates a comparative political ethnography which 
focuses the research lens at a level of analysis that is often ignored or assumed 
to be insignificant – the micro-level (Bayard de Volo and Schatz, 2004). It 
requires a fusion of both the instrumental elements of scientific inquiry (the 
case selection, the interview, the participant observation) with sensitive 
elements of scientific inquiry (patience, empathy, humility and curiosity), which 
are often not taken seriously enough in political science. While the positivist 
political scientist is passionate about the explanation of causal dynamics 
between variables there is much that the interpretive political scientist can 
contribute to the explanation of variable complexity from the in-depth micro-
level analysis of social phenomena. A comparative political ethnography of 







Memories of war and survival in Foya and Ganta provide a comparative prism 
of victimhood and resiliency under occupation versus community resistance 
and resiliency respectively. In December 1989, the NPFL rolled into Liberia 
through the border town of Butuo, which sits on the border with the Ivory 
Coast. As Taylor’s forces marched on to take Monrovia they split off at Bong 
county with a faction led by General Fahyia, heading out toward Lofa County. 
Though the NPFL splintered with the emergence of the INPFL under Prince 
Yormie Johnson in 1990, they easily overwhelmed the internal defensive lines 
of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). After losing his commanding officer in 
an ambush in 1990, for example, Commander FB, a current Community 
Chairperson in Ganta switched over and joined forces with the NPFL, leading 
combat operations in Kakata, Margibi County. While memories of resistance 
proliferate war narratives in Ganta, narratives of occupation and eventual 
collusion with occupying forces characterize war narratives from Foya. These 
different memories of war provide a basis from which to trace the social 
organization of ordering, authority and control, while seeking to understand 
patterned similarities and differences across borderland spaces in comparison.  
 
More importantly though, is the fact that the memories continue to capture 
narratives of permanent crisis and reaction to crisis by hinterland communities 
in Liberia, since the arrival of the ACS in 1820-21. Foya for example was 
occupied by different warring factions between 1989-93 (NPFL), 1993-97 
(ULIMO-K) and between 1999-2003 (LURD). Foya residents narrate modes of 
occupation but post-NPFL forces, which were consonant with historical inter-
tribal rivalries between the Kissi (Foya District) and Gbandi (Kolahun District) 
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communities. After the war, humanitarian aid agencies contributed to building 
health and sanitation amenities including water pumps and public latrines 
within already settled communities. However, important questions were raised 
to understand how the amenities constructed during the immediate postwar 
stabilization period provided the resource base for subsequent contestation of 
authority and control. As a corollary interrogation, this study was interested in 
how the politics of unequal public, private and NGO resource availability 
between communities affected ordering and the emergence of new modes of 
authority and control. The focus was to capture the nuanced differentiation in 
social control across borderland communities.  
 
It is against this already vulnerable backdrop that the EVD outbreak occurred 
in March 2014. Borderland communities that had been at the epicenter of the 
Liberia’s two civil wars found themselves yet again at the center of the EVD 
outbreak. Quarantines officiously hardened internal and international borders, 
negatively impacting subsistent economic and social livelihoods highly 
dependent on cross-border trade. An incoherent knee-jerk government 
response to EVD by imposing border closures created livelihood pressures on 
borderland communities which depend on sub-regional trade for subsistence. 
Communities within borderscapes responded broadly by negotiating with local 
state authorities to maintain partially open borders, while liaising with local 
health authorities to develop heuristic models for identifying, tracking and 
combating infection. Meanwhile, they also resorted to using clandestine and 
nonofficial border crossing points. Borderland actors proved more adept at 
using the emergent state to meet their health and economic needs than the 
reverse. This example also provided the most valid counterargument to border 
closure as the best means for combating regional health pandemics. Meanwhile 
intra-state quarantine measures also proved ineffective in curbing an outbreak, 
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which did not clear until a year later.  Epidemiologists combating its spread 
through 14 harrowing months in Liberia have charted the movement of the 
EVD. However local health experts were at the front lines of a battle, which 
challenged local communities to organize themselves and alter behavioral 
patterns in daily practice in order to overcome the threats posed by the EVD. 
 
Behind quarantine lines, borderland communities depended on a mix of state 
and INGO community interventions for EVD testing, triage and primary care. 
A stigmatized subset of these communities also depended on the INGO 
community to provide immediate and post-crisis relief. However, these 
borderland communities also eradicated the EVD long before it was eradicated 
from Monrovia’s liminal spaces. This triggered a need to understand the role of 
borderland ordering as a resilient response to vulnerability. Central to this 
effort across both borderland cities – Foya and Ganta – was the centrality of the 
Community Watch Forum (CWF). Drawing from the need to establish hybrid 
securitization platforms within areas of limited state control, CWFs were 
developed at the initiative of the UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia) 
and the LNP (Liberian National Police). This arbitrary and controversial 
program provides a framework for understanding state-community interaction 
in security service provision from a comparative borderland perspective – given 
the assumption that the state is expected to exercise a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence.  
 
Donor aid plays a central role in the quest for authority and control within 
borderland informal orders. The occurrence of crisis (natural disaster or health 
crisis) results in the deployment of relief aid to affected communities. Who has 
access to this aid is as important as the individual who assesses individual 
impact. With the EVD, for example, those biologically unaffected by the 
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disease often complained about inequalities caused by donor aid with 
specifically targets EVD survivors. However, the feeling was that, just as was the 
case during Liberia’s Civil War years, large swaths of the population endured 
grave collateral loses – either economically, through the loss of a breadwinner, 
or the stigmatization resulting from the loss of a loved one. While the state and 
the INGO community reacted to crisis, pre-Ebola and post-Ebola research site 
visits provided a comparative temporal frame to gauge the kinds of changes in 
informal leadership that had occurred during the crisis. Understanding 
comparative patterns of why and how these changes took place provides 
insights into the interactive purpose underlying borderland ordering.  
 
Moments of crisis, representing “critical junctures” – a major event or 
confluence of factors disrupting the existing economic or political balance in 
society (Robinson and Acemoglu 2012: 101) – often set in motion differing social 
action responses that shape interconnected macro and micro environments. 
However, seeking to discern social livelihood processes within contexts of 
permanent crisis, post complex methodological challenges. By shifting the 
ontological lens to borderland communities, this study zeroed in on community 
leaders who operate between the family unit (the basic filial form of social 
organization) and the city/clan/village leaders (often the basic formalized 
incarnation of the state within liminal spaces). These community leaders are 
variably called quarter chiefs, community chairpersons or community 
representatives. However, given the governance functions they perform in daily 
practice they would be referred to as Micro-Territorial Governance within this 
thesis. Being unpaid servants of their communities, despite their informality (in 
official terms) they sit at the intersection between the formal state 
representatives and their communities. They interact with city mayors, work 
with INGOs in various capacities and wield symbolic power within 
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borderscapes. Therefore, their motivations for service and tenure longevity 
point to the political power dynamics within borderland spaces. They also 
evidence the social actions deployed by informal social actors during critical 
junctures to optimize and entrench their positionality. 
 
In order to understand the nature of borderland political dynamics, therefore it 
is as important to interact and engage these coexisting competitive 
formal/informal leaders as it is to engage with their communities. Engaging 
with these community leaders evidences the quotidian negotiation of order, 
authority and control, essential for the interpretation of social and symbolic 
dimensions of statebuilding from the borderlands. From the researcher’s 
position, this engagement takes the form of informal encounters, formal 
interviews and participant-observations of quotidian livelihoods from 
borderland spaces. Further information is gleaned from interaction with youth 
and women’s representatives within the communities – they provide insights to 
the complex nature of social organization within times of crises within which 
the “known devil may be preferred to the unknown angel”9. Meanwhile the 
nature and content of focus group discussions exhibit insights on the issue 
prioritization and social ordering within borderscapes. Evidence of life histories 
are brought in to buttress responses in formal and informal conversations 
which evidence actor positionality and the depth of their networked 
connections to power centers of the state.  
 
Life histories also provide insights on how personal experiences are interwoven 
to the physical, social and symbolic borderscapes. Life histories eliminate stasis 
and in some cases, show individual resiliency in the navigation of crises. Life 
histories provide an understanding of the social construction of positionality – 
                                               
9	Interview with womens’ leader in post-Ebola Foya on July 28, 2015.		
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whether based on wealth, character or coercion – over time. Life histories also 
exhibit permanence of livelihoods within the borderlands, evidencing the 
dynamics that are salient for understanding the motivations of social actors who 
deliberately position themselves within borderlands as opposed to political 
centers. If anything, there is predominance of rational choice decision-making 
at both the individual and community level. Interest negotiation seems to guide 
both individual and communal interaction with the postwar state and 
neighboring others.  
 
Another group which provides interesting insights on the “in”formalized 
ordering and social action within borderscapes were unions. Unions differed in 
composition, organization and purpose – ranging from moneychanger unions 
and fuel seller unions to unions of cash crop traders. However, they shared the 
common characteristic of evidencing malleability and adaptability to crises. The 
observation of different ‘operational’ groups within borderscapes and the 
symbolic power they seemed to wield on a daily basis led to the development of 
questions to understand modes of group organization, which were not often 
based on the geo-physical spatial location within specific quarters of 
communities. The example of commercial motorbike riders’ unions, tailors 
unions, money changers unions, petrol sellers unions and garage unions 
provide an understanding of how these groups as collective entities stamp their 
presence on borderscapes and engage with the postwar state to advance their 
different agendas.  
 
The political ethnographic experiences of this study were complemented by 
archival research at the Liberian Archives at the University of Indiana, 
Bloomington. Research was also completed on Liberian newspaper archives 
and complementary desk research (mainly on borderland testimonies from 
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Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission process) was done. Desk 
research was also completed to get an understanding of the proliferation of 
local NGOs and INGOs within Liberia’s borderscapes. This is because NGOs 
are a permanent feature of the physical space within borderlands. Whether 
through their imprimatur stamped on projects funded over a decade ago, or 
billboards which are the relics of some postwar emergency program, long 
completed. However, they evidence the complex triadic INGO – State – Local 
community relationship which largely contributed to undermining local 





Transportation was a central element in the comparative political ethnography 
of Liberia’s postwar borderland dynamics. During the dry season, it took 
approximately 16 hours, traveling in a public transport vehicle to go from 
Monrovia to Foya. During the rainy season, the same trip is subject to the 
caprices of road conditions and the roadworthiness of the vehicles plying the 
roads, thus the same trip could take 30 hours. In April 2014, it took me six 
hours to go from Monrovia to Ganta City in Nimba County. A year later, it took 
me four hours less – the road from Gbarnga (Bong County) to Gompa had been 
tarred. However, traveling between Liberia’s borderland cities and Monrovia 
does not only depend on the road conditions, as transportation is a process of 
negotiating internal borders mounted by the state to exercise effective 
territorial control. These internal border checkpoints, often located at the entry 
of every county are also supplemented by inter-district joint security 
checkpoints manned by different units from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As 
a foreign traveler, these internal border points provided a point from which to 
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observe the negation of state authority by the very state officials who are 
expected to implement “the rules”. Therefore, these internal border 
checkpoints often become arenas of opposition to state authority and attempts 
at domination by the state in everyday practice.  
 
The different modes of transportation also evidence patterns of the 
informalization of formal social actors such as INGOs. There are three main 
modes of transportation from Liberia’s borderlands to ‘town’ (as Monrovia is 
normally called) – public transport (regulated by the Liberian Motor 
Transporters’ Union); “NGO Car” (regulated by NGO rules and non-official) 
and the private vehicle. The private vehicle is often out of reach to most 
borderland residents; hence they opt for either public transportation or “NGO 
Car” (which is the preferred mode of transportation). Liberia’s National Transit 
Authority (NTA), and commercial bus and taxi operators are the main licensed 
providers of inter-city public transportation. The NTA serves most of the major 
cities in Liberia’s 15 counties. However, those cities not served by the NTA 
depend on commercial bus and taxi operators. Transport is important because 
each mode of transportation comes with different modes of engagement with 
the postwar state under construction. The process of traveling, thus provides 
insights into physical and material movement within space and the implications 
of certain practices of resistance to state order, authority and control by 
borderland communities. Furthermore, the insertion of NGO cars and 
company vehicles into the public transport business, for which they are not 
licensed further informalizes the sector and undermines the NTA.  
 
Archival research at the Indiana University Liberian Archive Collection in 
Bloomington, evidences that infrastructural connectedness between 
hinterlands and Monrovia and its hinterlands has been a perennial problem. 
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Local communities react to their “enclavization” in differing ways. Poor 
transport networks strip communities, devoid of government jobs, of the 
capacity to develop alternative livelihoods beyond subsistence (especially when 
most of their production is agriculturally based).  However, during the postwar 
years, transportation within borderscapes has become largely dependent on 
another category of transporter – the commercial motorbike rider (CMR) – who 
is generally regulated and unionized under the Liberian Motor Transport 
Union (LMTU).  
 
The buzz of the CMR is a staple of Liberia’s borderlands. They meet the 
transport demands of traders, parents, students, workers, everyone who needs 
to displace themselves over relatively long distances in a limited amount of time 
and at a cost. They are a central part of borderland economies – contributing to 
the inflow of foreign exchange as they transport passengers across borders; 
providing jobs for the gas retailers who get supplied by wholesaler who 
themselves get supplied by the LPRC from the Freeport in Monrovia; and 
constituting community-based micro-credit schemes called the “susu”. 
However, they are also accused of being the source of social woes such as – 
increasing school dropout rates for boys; increased teenage pregnancies; 
delinquency and age conflicts. In various instances, they have represented the 
most potent challengers of the re-emergent state, given their strength in 
numbers and the financial resources, which circulate within their networks. 
Their influence extends beyond borderlands as CMRs have been known to have 
benefactors within power centers. Thus, the formalization of a rather informal 
economic activity, CMR provides a framework from which to understand the 
internal ordering of economic informality within borderland and its 




Challenges in the Conduct of Research 
 
Safety, time and trust are all intangibles that have to be managed and 
negotiated as part ethnographic research projects. The role of local informants 
with a historical understanding of the settings, who would contribute to 
verifying some of the information received through counter interviews. The 
role of the stranger-father which did not only provide an additional cost to the 
research project, but contributed another layer of mediated entry into 
communities. 
 
A political ethnography in the shadow of crisis comes with methodological, 
ethical, instrumental and security challenges. Methodologically, gaining an 
understanding on individual evolution through crisis contexts necessitates 
probing memories of trauma (both as victims, perpetrators and as hybrid victim 
perpetrators). While at the macro-level the framework of truth and 
reconciliation processes has provided an official medium for recording wartime 
experiences, it remains a delicate subject of discussion. Therefore, there are 
glaring gaps in some life histories where the war years are unaccounted for. 
Some victims simply understandably declined discussion of their wartime life 
histories. Meanwhile others went into details about their survival “on the farm” 
as a place of refuge or on refugee resettlement within the sub-region. There is 
also an active effort by some local actors to whitewash their wartime life 
histories in order to either avoid potential future prosecution or justify their 
belied in ‘the revolution’ while maintaining positions of symbolic power within 
borderscapes. However, within the borderscapes I did not encounter anyone 
who had been externally displaced beyond the immediate neighboring 
countries – Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. While these varying 
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representations of life histories do not provide for a complete understanding of 
each individual’s evolution through crisis, taken together with their symbolic 
and social positioning within postwar contexts provides an understanding of 
the delicate balance between the individual and the community in interaction 
within a postwar state.  
 
Crises are often characterized by a reduction of individual and collective 
security. This insecurity does not automatically end once crises abate. 
Therefore, the insecurity posed by both the postwar context and the EVD 
outbreak, were conditions I had to contend with as a researcher. While my 
respondents were largely immune to and resilient in the face of myriad 
insecurities, I had to proceed with caution. However, the guidance of my 
“stranger father” was primordial in maintaining my medical, physical and 
psychological safety within this context.   
 
The security challenges inherent in crisis environments necessitated a 
sharpening of ethical considerations in conducting research. Sensitivity to 
hierarchies, security posture and informant safety are central to the conduct of 
social research within borderscapes. In this case, the decision to respect social 
and symbolic hierarchies was as much about expediency as it was an ethical 
one. Therefore, for entry into the research space, I engaged with a community 
gatekeeper who did the requisite introductions to the city mayor. No money 
was exchanged with in the process. While this could be considered submitting 
to existing hierarchies, having the acquiescence of the City Mayor to conduct 
ethnographic research within his jurisdiction was not considered to 
compromise the study. My position as a research student from the School of 
Oriental and African Studies at the University of London placed me squarely as 
an ‘outsider’ within my research environment. Therefore, submitting to 
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multiple local authority – the City Mayor and later the Quarter 
Chiefs/Community Chairpersons – contributed to reducing the epistemic space 
between the ‘insiders’ and myself. The challenges provided by these issues and 
the ways in which they were surmounted are central to understanding the 
importance of ethnographic fieldwork and subaltern engagements in contexts 
of permanent crisis – War and subsequently, Ebola. 
 
Methodological Limitations and mitigation 
 
There were a number of conceptual and temporal limitation to the current 
research project that I consciously addressed through the entire research 
process. Conceptually, I approached the issue under study – postwar 
statebuilding – with notions borne of years of study. There were the structural, 
symbolic and process dimensions to postwar statebuilding. However, seeking to 
understand these processes from the borderlands raised conceptual challenges, 
given that as researcher, I was looking through a deliberate conceptual prism 
that was not necessarily the same as those of my interlocutors. While I 
understood their interaction with international NGOs and the state as part of a 
bigger post-war statebuilding process, they understood these processes as part 
of the negotiation of everyday livelihood processes. Therefore, I had the 
challenge of synchronizing their everyday and historically grounded narratives 
to observed phenomena and a bourgeoning literature on postwar statebuilding. 
In the instances where attempts were made to verify these linkages between the 
conceptual and the empirical, my interlocutors expressed difficulty relating to 
macro-theoretical positions on statebuilding.  
 
This position is also intertwined with linguistic comprehensions. A majority of 
the individuals who provided core interpretations of borderland livelihood 
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processes use English (my main language of enquiry) as a second language. 
Their mother tongue was principally Kissi in Foya and Mano or Gio in Ganta. 
The first step to overcoming this limitation was choosing a linguistically gifted 
“stranger-father” who was also sworn to confidentiality. While most of the 
interviews were conducted in English, in the two cases where there was the 
absolute need for translation, the stranger father played the role of translator. 
The second step towards overcoming this limitation was triangulating all 
information received through a double confirmation or rejection process. This 
process often confirmed the accounts captured in translation. The final step in 
overcoming this limitation was seeking multiple interpretations to the same 
phenomena – whether they pertained to the mechanics of micro-territorial 
governance or the negotiated navigation of borderland spaces by CMRs.  
 
Another challenge encountered during the course of the study was the 
outbreak of the deadly EVD during the course of my first research trip to what 
happened to be the epicenter of the Ebola outbreak – the Foya (Liberia); 
Gueckedou (Guinea) and Kailahun (Sierra Leone) borderland triangle. This 
limited the time I could spend on the ground during my first trip. However, I 
sought to overcome this temporal limitation through a two-step process. The 
first step was to develop a historical understanding of statebuilding in Liberia 
based on archival enquiries about the evolving relationship between borderland 
communities and the centralized bureaucratic state in Liberia. This archival 
enquiry contributed to situating contemporaneous conflicts within the broader 
understanding of continuities and change in the administrative evolution of the 
state in Liberia. The second step was taking a second post-EVD research trip to 
the same borderland research spaces to pick up from where I had left off, but 
this time with a better understanding of the historical importance of these 
borderland spaces to state construction.  
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The Non-Negotiable Safety and Confidentiality of Respondents  
 
Respondents from whom formal interviews were solicited were provided with 
confidentiality and engagement forms. These forms outlined the purpose of the 
study the nature of the interviews and the fact that confidentiality would extend 
beyond the formal interview to subsequent encounters with the researcher. For 
individuals who were not literate, the contents of the form were translated and 
their permission ensured before any formal interviews were conducted. These 
forms were not only a trust-building instrument, but they were backed by the 
codification of electronic interview files and their deletion from the recording 
device once interviews had been downloaded and password protected. Beyond 
guaranteeing the security of the respondents, I also ensured that when the 
situation became compromising, I placed the present and future safety of my 
stranger father ahead of the research’s objective.  
 
Sensitivity to uncomfortable issues within individual life histories was also a 
primordial ethical consideration. I was not going to badger research 
participants into answering questions about their whereabouts and activities 
during Liberia’s civil wars and during the Ebola crisis. However, I was always 
going to interpret the reasons they provided for the gaps in their life histories, 
with the help of informal information triangulation and participant observation. 
However, some respondents were volunteered information during secondary 
informal encounters, which filled in some blanks and either confirmed or 






Turning the ontological lens towards a comparative understanding of daily 
practices within two Liberian borderland spaces evidenced pluralized patterns 
of informal ordering and the ordering of informality. These patterns of informal 
ordering in everyday practice determined the deployment of a comparative 
political ethnography of borderlands in order to understand informal sources of 
authority and social control. Maintaining a historical perspective allowed for an 
analysis of continuities and change. This approach takes structural dynamics 
such as national and international borders very seriously, but focuses on 
patterns of socially organized daily practice or “habitus” within borderlands in 
interaction with postwar statebuilding.  
 
Central to this study are temporal elements of transition amid the permanent of 
crisis. Borderland social actors appeared both temporally and spatially 
anchored within their spaces. However, this rootedness was also made mobile 
through instances of crisis. Life histories provide insights on personal 
experiences interwoven with the physical, social and symbolic borderscapes. 
Life histories eliminate stasis and in some cases, exhibit individual resiliency in 
the navigation of crises. Life histories also evidence continuities and changes in 
social networks and the values that determine these patterns. There is 
predominance of rational choice decision-making at both the individual and 
community levels. For example, while the international community might be 
preoccupied with truth and reconciliation programs, borderland communities 
are preoccupied with building resilient livelihoods. Interest-driven negotiations 
guide social actor interaction with the postwar state and statebuilding 
architects.  
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Thus, through an admixture of rootedness and mobility borderland individual 
and social actors develop resiliency within contexts of sustained vulnerability. 
These coping mechanisms inure into socially organized forms of informal order 
within which quotidian modes of coping and attempts at collective valorization 
are built. The complex nexus of symbolic, social and spatial processes that 
produce borderland dynamics shaped the use of political ethnographic 
methods to discern them. These micro-political patterning of borderlands that 
have a historical dimension which often fuses the landscape to individual and 
social experiences. All of which have implications for analytical discernment.  
 
While, the comparative prism applied in this study traces patterned similarities 
and differences in ordering, authority and control within borderlands in 
engagement with the postwar state, it does not claim generalizability or that it 
can replicated.  However, it ought to serve the heuristic function of pushing the 
interrogation of the impact of locally embedded informal everyday processes on 
postwar statebuilding.  
 
The political ethnographic experiences of this study were complemented by 
archival research at the Liberian Archives at the University of Indiana, 
Bloomington. Research was also completed on Liberian newspaper archives 
and complementary desk research (mainly on borderland testimonies from 
Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission process) was done. Desk 
research was also completed to get an understanding of the proliferation of 
local NGOs and INGOs within Liberia’s borderscapes. This is because NGOs 
are a permanent feature of the physical space within borderlands. Whether 
through their imprimatur stamped on projects funded over a decade ago, or 
billboards which are the relics of some postwar emergency program, long 
completed. However, they evidence the complex triadic INGO – State – Local 
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community relationship which largely contributed to undermining local 
expectations of the state and hence the state’s legitimacy, authority and control 
within borderscapes. 
 
The material mainly gathered through interviews with approximately 150 
members of different borderland communities, 10 Focus Group Discussions 
and participant observation (travel and youth meetings) provide the analytical 
basis for explaining the impact of informal ordering, authority and control on 
postwar statebuilding. Borderland social actors articulated their positionality in 
relation to one another and in relation to the different intervening actors – 
governmental and nongovernmental. Through their narration of encounters 
with the state and statebuilding social actors, evidence emerged of deliberate 
social ordering to construct embedded authority and social controls, which are 
then deployed for the sophisticated appropriation of statebuilding 
interventions. These interventions then contribute to either strengthening and 
entrenching informal orders or fostering transformations within these orders. 
Life histories interwoven with the borderland spaces they inhabit exhibit a 
deep and embedded connection to social and symbolic borderland spaces that 







Chapter 5  : Informal Ordering – Micro-territoriality, Social 




Postwar statebuilding within borderlands (which are effectively spaces of 
limited statehood) inevitably encounters interrelated phenomena of local 
informal ordering, authority and control. Exploring patterns of postwar socio-
political ordering within borderlands, this chapter develops the first of a two-
part analytical framework explaining informal ordering, its constitution into 
constellations of micro-territorial governance (MTG) and its encounters with 
postwar statebuilding. Informal ordering frameworks emerge out of distinct 
territorially, socially and symbolically grounded construction of quotidian 
modes of social organization outside state and traditional (customary) 
institutions. Quotidian mechanics of social organization endow behavioral 
predictability to socio-political and economic relations within borderland cities 
as well as in their interaction with surrounding villages. By empirically drawing 
upon observations of micro-territorial ordering and bordering processes within 
borderlands and interviews with Micro-Territorial Governors (MTGs) – leaders 
of territorially based organized borderland communities – emic patterns of daily 
informal ordering inherent in human and material processes of exchange, begin 
to emerge.  
 
These informal orders are then deployed to engage with nationally and 
internationally constituted postwar statebuilding processes. Community-based 
non-state social organizations crystallize into informal orders vested in 
governing borderland human and material processes. They thereby effectively 
alternately strengthen and undermine the emergent postwar state’s quest for 
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autonomy, authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. 
Meanwhile, they simultaneously set up arenas of domination and opposition 
with customary traditional authorities, which have a history of cooptation into 
the state bureaucracy. However, far from seeking to completely subvert the 
state informal orders engage with postwar statebuilding processes to negotiate 
vertical (power-based) and horizontal (spatially-based) positionality within 
borderlands. 
 
Socially grounded patterns of quotidian informal ordering within borderland 
cities are instruments of non-state micro-territorial governance. While they are 
distinct from ordering devolving from state and traditional authority, they are 
part of both as they borrow their operational logics from both state teleology 
and traditional custom. Thus, they provide structural and functional bases from 
which to understand the formation and maintenance of informal social rules 
and hierarchies networked into state and traditional authority within 
borderland cities.  
 
Furthermore, informal orders have implications for postwar statebuilding. 
Understanding informal ordering as a set of processes interconnected with 
multiple states and traditional authority structures implies a dynamic 
constitution and constitutive malleability – subject to internal borderland and 
external national and international influences. 
 
The complexity of informal borderland ordering conforms to an extent with 
paradigms of governance hybridity, which contribute to grounded theorization 
of the interaction between non-state actors and statebuilding and securitization 
processes. Despite the problems inherent in the use of the term ‘hybrid’, it 
allows conceptualization of the fusion of different factors operating within 
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processes of social interaction, that combine to produce the problematic nature 
of contemporary international peace-support environments (Mac Ginty 2011: 
83). Theorization on postwar governance hybridity broadly seeks to understand 
process synergies that emerge out of the bifurcated interaction of local and 
international, formal and informal, traditional and modern, order and disorder, 
state and non-state. The interactive outcome of these naturalized polarities 
corresponds to the social crystallization of informally ordered hybrid 
arrangements. The outcome is relational instability shaped by the transience of 
the structural content of both informal orders and postwar states despite both 
their inherent structural permanence.  
 
Exploring hybridity within the liberal peace has tended to focus on how “the 
liberal peace” projects the international while taking on board some local 
values and mores (Mac Ginty 2011: 79). This ontological positioning ostensibly 
puts the liberal peace at the center of the interpretation of hybrid outcomes. 
However, where informal ordering predates the hegemonic return of postwar 
statebuilding (as an extension of the liberal peace) the ontological lens shifts 
slightly. It moves from a paradigmatic critique of liberal peace interventions to 
centralize how resilient patterns of informal ordering reshape international 
statebuilding within liminal spaces of postwar states. Thus, the precariously 
balancing postwar arrangements forged between state and non-state social 
actors hardly totally coincides with synergistic hybrids, but is fraught with 
differentiated rational choice decision-making. This decision-making 
determines conflict or cooperative interactive choices. Informal ordering 
provides a territorially based socially organized platform through which non-
state actors negotiate entry into and navigate arenas of opposition and 
domination with postwar statebuilding processes.  
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By exploring local actors’ appropriation of territory, space and symbols to build 
a base upon which to engage with national and international statebuilders, 
informal ordering highlights the distorted autonomy outcomes of international 
statebuilding interventions. By seeking to strengthen the state’s relations to 
society sequentially after operationally rebuilding the state’s institutional 
content and capacity, international statebuilding interventions invariably 
circumvent the state’s emancipation from society – its autonomy – making the 
postwar state a battlefield of contestation by societal groups. Autonomy is the 
extent to which the state acts upon its preferences by shaping, ignoring, or 
circumventing the preferences of even the strongest social actors (Migdal 1988: 
6).  
 
The degree of a state’s emancipation from society, being a hallmark of the 
modern state, raises important questions about the autonomy expectations of 
postwar statebuilding interventions. Inflections of informal ordering – as 
epitomized in MTG – effectively bring the quotidian management of human 
and material processes under informal control, particularly within borderland 
cities. This starkly contrasts the theoretical salience of autonomy in 
international statebuilding from the everyday subjugation of the state to 
informal orders. Far from claiming homogeneity and unity of strategy, content 
and purpose in micro-territorial governance resulting from postwar informal 
ordering, this chapter describes differentiated mechanics of informal 
borderland ordering. Informal borderland orders structurally emerge from the 
negotiation of tacit social contracts that endow proximate neighborhood leaders 
with representative authority in engagement with “outsiders” – with the focus 
here on postwar statebuilders.  
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Despite the interpenetration of political and social ordering in immediate 
postwar contexts, teleologies of international statebuilding reify and harden 
new binaries between state and society, formal and informal, order and 
disorder. The instrumental construction of institutionalized binaries through 
international statebuilding simultaneously actualizes and naturalizes local fields 
of opposition and domination – for influence and resources – between the 
postwar state and informal orders. Within these arenas, Richmond (2016: 5) 
argues that subaltern agency operates to circumvent and negate the direct and 
structural power of the state, the international geopolitical system and the 
global economy. This mode of engagement effectively undermines state 
autonomy within borderland spaces where the state already has a very limited 
presence. Overcoming the postwar state autonomy paradox in practice would 
require relationally equilibrating the top-down imposition of an 
institutionalized liberal political order with the bottom-up emergence of 
informal social ordering processes, which deliberately seeks to escape 
statebuilders’ control in order to maintain its relevance.  
 
Both the state and society overlap and compete as social actors seeking to 
optimize political advantage within the same postwar force field. Nowhere is 
this more evident that within liminal borderland spaces where state and socially 
organized groups compete for social service delivery and the management of 
development aid. Therefore, empirically discerning differentiated patterns of 
informal borderland agency in postwar statebuilding, it was necessary to 
develop a congruent analytical framework that integrates explanations of 
informality and ordering as emerging from quotidian interactive practices. 
Managing social services – such as security and water and sanitation – and the 
development and relief aid within their micro-territorial spaces sets up arenas 
of opposition and domination with statebuilding architects. It also provides a 
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basis for social contestation and power play within borderland micro-territorial 
governance spaces.  
 
Informal Ordering: Contextualizing Local Actors, Structures and 
Processes. 
 
Informal ordering represents patterns of social ordering occurring outside the 
postwar state, yet in constant interaction with statebuilding processes given that 
they effectively are based on the negotiation of micro-territorial ordering and 
bordering. They evidence actors who are territorially, socially and symbolically 
rooted in liminal spaces, while remaining nationally and internationally 
networked. Informal orders emerge through the formation of social 
organizations based on spatial proximity and shared community residence 
regardless of origin. Existing at an interspace between the state and the 
household, social organizations develop communally within borderland spaces 
as a result of the negotiation of internal borders within cities and the 
development of quotidian structures and patterns of management of social, 
symbolic and material processes. Their proximity to the household family unit 
coupled with their existence based on negotiated social rules and norms makes 
informal social ordering a cornerstone in the development of grounded 
patterns of authority-based social interaction. Informal social ordering as an 
analytical category is therefore indispensable in understanding the interaction 
of informal and formalized forms of authority and control within the postwar 
borderlands. This section describes how informal orders emerge and function 
in everyday practice, for whom they work and the benefits they provide to the 
borderland communities from which they draw their locally-embedded 
authority and legitimation. Informal ordering gravitates around the postwar 
state, since the state remains the central organizing component and resource 
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custodian within the sovereign territory. However, it is the nature of social 
interaction between informal orders and postwar statebuilding within liminal 
spaces that international statebuilding encounters its purposeful 
‘transformative’ limits. 
 
The emergence and deployment of informal orders in interaction with the 
postwar state and its statebuilding partners does more than just provide a 
framework for understanding the internal mechanics of society-state interaction 
within postwar statebuilding contexts. It exploration of quotidian politics-in-
practice, empirically critiques static institutionalist approaches to political 
development upon which postwar statebuilding is built. It centralizes informal 
ordering in the explanation of postwar state-society relations. Emergent and 
expanding critical peacebuilding and statebuilding research has highlighted the 
salience of processes of social interaction on statebuilding and peacebuilding 
outcomes. In a bid to explore social interactions, actor categories have to be 
identified. Hence critical peacebuilding research on hybridity, for example, 
broadly highlights patterns of interaction and interpenetration of interest-
driven formal state and informal societal actors, with the state’s ‘outposts’ 
mediated by ‘informal’ indigenous societal institutions, which follow their own 
logic and rules within the incomplete state structures (Boege et al, 2008:7, 
2009).  
 
However, the differentiation of social actor categories – whether on the state 
side or on the side of the indigenous social institutions – is important in 
capturing the real, rather than the supposed internal dynamics of these 
categories and the ways in which their internal content shaped modes of social 
interaction and by extension, statebuilding outcomes. The differentiation of 
social actors and the forms of order emerging from their processes of 
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organization provides insights into their political engagement with each other 
as well as with the emergent postwar state. 
 
Social actor differentiation within research on postwar governance hybridity 
highlights the complex interplay among multiple and often competing forms of 
social ordering, each having immanent sources of power, distinct organizational 
logics and particularistic modes of internal and external legitimization 
(Luckham and Kirk 2013: 9). Therefore, a structural and functional 
understanding of individual and socially organized non-state actors provides an 
explanatory basis for their internal authority and accountability dynamics and 
relational engagement with postwar statebuilding.  
 
Empirical evidence of informal ordering of quotidian processes within Liberia’s 
postwar borderlands demonstrates the intrinsically interactive and political 
nature of territorially based non-state social ordering processes. These 
processes integrate territoriality, social positionality and symbols in the 
deliberate engineering of informal borderland orders. These socially organized 
actors are subsequently deployed for individual and collective political ends 
within arenas of opposition and domination with the different manifestations of 
postwar statebuilding. Unsurprisingly therefore, is the emergence of a 
networked interpenetration of political and social ordering in everyday practice 
between official and nonofficial actors and private and public-sector entities.  
This interpenetration, a socio-political manifestation evident from an integrated 
temporal and spatial analysis of postwar contexts, is often marginalized from 
consideration in international statebuilding. Attempts to institutionally 
engineer the selective interaction of state and society during postwar 
statebuilding processes, counter intuitively undermines postwar international 
statebuilding’s autonomy-driven paradigmatic imperatives.   
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The structuring of informal orders is important in understanding non-state 
actor strategic decision-making in engagement with postwar statebuilding 
processes. Processes of informal ordering give rise to hierarchical structures of 
local governance with grounded accountability in the communities from which 
they emerge. Meanwhile, their interaction within arenas of opposition and 
domination vary from contestation to collusion, with different factors affecting 
an actor’s strategic posture. Insights from the internal mechanics of informal 
ordering evidence – the quotidian exercise of functional responsibility; and the 
embeddedness of grounded authority, legitimacy and representation (which will 
be treated in-depth in the following chapter). Understanding the structural 
component of informal ordering contributes to understanding ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
non-state social orders interact with postwar statebuilding.  
 
The objective of non-state informal orders, far from seeking complete 
symbiosis with the state as portrayed in some interpretations of hybrid political 
orders, denotes self-interested motives for entry into and leveraging within 
arenas of opposition and domination with the postwar state. Hence it 
naturalistically undermines the emancipatory effort of the ‘autonomous’ state. 
Most peoples’ primary preoccupation with their everyday living conditions and 
concern about finding new patrons (or old recycled elites) limits their 
individualized interests in changing the complexion of the political order 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999: 44). However, the construction of informal orders 
provides a basis for engagement with the dominant political order. Given the 
gravitation of informal ordering around different manifestations of the state, 
informal political ordering in Africa is a system grounded in reciprocal 
interdependence between leaders, different kinds of intermediaries and locally 
organized social orders. Within borderland spaces, informal ordering reveals a 
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degree of social permanence, which often eludes empirical accounts of the 
transience of cross-border social experiences. That which is transient is fleeting 
and while it might develop its own mechanics for engaging the states, it hardly 
develops a structured basis for engagement with and resistance to the 
permanence of state structures.  
 
The interpenetration of formalized political and informal social ordering 
processes is a mainstay of quotidian postwar borderland spaces. They form the 
basis from which to understand the interaction of differentiated social actors 
with postwar statebuilding. Far from being power neutral, postwar informal 
ordering evidences the reconstruction of non-state power loci through the 
negotiation of spatial, social and symbolic positioning. All political action is 
couched in an environment of reciprocity, which dictates its symbolic and 
instrumental value (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 158). Thus, negotiated emic 
processes hold clues to the sustainability of positional interdependence both 
within formal and informal spheres. Focusing on informal ordering processes 
highlights quotidian understandings of negotiated grounded legitimacy. This 
analytical trajectory reflects complex social interactive dynamics underlying the 
construction, maintenance and deployment of authority by a multiplicity of 
informal postwar social actors.   
 
Thus, the interpenetration of social and political ordering within borderlands 
empirically evidences the emergence of patterns of informal ordering. Seeming 
‘disorder,’ is in fact a different kind of ‘order’, the outcome of – contextually 
constructed political boundary formation and interpenetration; the definition 
of political and social registers; and rationalities (analytically coherent 
explanations for a given political conduct in a given historical context) and 
causalities (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 155). To these factors that explain the 
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emergence of contextually generated informal ordering, ought to be added the 
interweaving of individual and communal historical trajectories within micro-
territorial borderland spaces. 
 
Informal Ordering and Micro-Territorial Governance in Foya (Lofa 
County) and Ganta (Nimba County) – Liberia  
 
Territorial governance is a tool of political, social and economic control. 
Informal ordering emerges out of the formal delineation of internal borders 
through the administrative balkanization of sovereign territory into controllable 
spaces. Exploring non-state micro-territoriality gives rise to analytical categories 
that acknowledge diverse complex organizational assemblages, with variable 
performance in relation to authority and rights, depending on the properties of 
such assemblages within territory (Sassen 2013: 23). Given that cities differ in 
population, composition and economic content, the nature of state territorial 
administration differs from one city to another (Boone 1998) – and so does the 
nature, content and process of informal borderland ordering. While formal 
sub-state administrative mapping seeks to ensure effective state territoriality, 
borderland micro-territorial structuring produces informal orders – which 
develop alternative patterns of social control. Quarter Chiefs (QCs) in Foya and 
Community Chairpersons (CCs) in Ganta (described in this study as Micro-
Territorial Governors – MTGs) informally order borderland cityscapes into de 
facto administrative units. There is variability in their modes of quotidian 
governance as they executively and judicially administer these spaces with the 
assistance of zonal heads or a governing council. The normative differentiation 
between QC and CC evidences the absence of top-down harmonization for 
informal leadership roles. Hence, leadership within informal orders is 
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embedded in the socio-historical fabric of the communities from which they 
emerge. 
 
Evidence collected from over 50 interviews with former and current MTGs, and 
focus group discussions within two borderland cities – Foya in Lofa County 
and Ganta in Nimba County – evidence modes of grounded accountability, 
legitimacy and representation outside the formal state apparatus and customary 
traditional governance structures. Unpaid and volunteer Micro-Territorial 
Governors are the administrative legs upon which the state-appointed City 
Mayors stand to govern borderland cities. In 2008, the Liberian Supreme Court 
ruled against the holding of municipal elections allowing the president to 
appoint City Mayors (Klay, 2013: 82). Despite this ruling, Micro-Territorial 
Governors continued to exist as fixture within borderland cities. These 
products of informal socio-political ordering exhibit an admixture of Weberian 
traditional authority characteristics – patrimonialism, patriarchalism, and 
primary gerontocracy – which legitimates their governance of human and 
material processes within their micro-territorial borderland spaces. The first 
level of analysis is simply that of the physical dynamics of micro-territorial 
borderland ordering. The second level of analysis delves into the implications 
of informal ordering for processes of statebuilding authority and control. Top-
down statebuilding processes refract the physical and bureaucratic state onto 
borderland spaces, but borderlands territorially, socially and symbolically 
reshape that refracted state through a bottom up negotiation of authority, order 
and control. 
 
Population expansion during the postwar years has increased pressure on the 
limited social services that borderland communities benefited from as a result 
of immediate postwar emergency aid. This pressure has increasingly raised the 
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political stakes of micro-territorial governance resulting from informal ordering 
while accentuating the postwar state’s inability to meet the social service needs 
of its liminal communities. Foya’s postwar micro-territorial ordering has been 
in constant flux with the emergence of new communities, due to changing 
population and resource dynamics, micro-territorial negotiation of social 
positionality, with power implications for all of the above.  
 
Within Foya, there is the governing overlap of – the very influential Paramount 
Chief of the Kissi; three Kissi clan chiefs (representing the Rankollie, Tengia 
and Wam clans); the Foya District Commissioner and the City Mayor – as 
recognized government officials. This composite governance structure 
embodies the incorporation of customary traditional governance structures into 
the bureaucratic governance apparatus of the state. Their official status is 
predicated upon their clearly defined roles and authority within the state’s 
apparatus. The fact that these officials are supposed to be on the government 
payroll is often alluded to by the volunteer Micro-Territorial Governors. 
Meanwhile at the level of the city, nine Micro-Territorial Governors govern the 
peri-urban space composed of an admixture of ethnic groups and foreign 
nationals.  
 
In the very structuring of the nine micro-territorial quarters which constitute 
Foya City lies a structural oddity. The nine micro-territorial spaces are 
constituted to coincide with the number of city council members apportioned 
by the state in through Foya’s incorporation statutes. However, the actual count 
of micro-territorial governors exceeds nine and becomes twelve when one starts 
conducting interviews. This difference is accounted for as evidence of the 
politicization of informal ordering. Communities such as Lissassa I and II, 
despite having Micro-Territorial Governors, are considered subsets of Foya 
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Kama Quarter. This, despite their MTGs exhibiting similar autonomy in the 
management of human and material processes within their spaces as all the 
other MTGs. The only difference being that in the escalation of civil cases for 
community resolution, they go to the Foya Kama MTG rather than to the City 
Court, which is presided over by the Head of the Quarter Chiefs10. Hence in 
Foya, the nine main MTGs, nursing the hope of being incorporated into the 
City Council in the event of funding availability, vie to maintain their count at 
nine. This reduces the potential of contestation for limited City Council spots 
when they are finally budgeted for.  
 
Ganta is a more heterogonous city than Foya and their micro-territorial 
governance differs considerably. With a population of 41106 inhabitants (2008 
census) it is the most populous city in Nimba County, with 8- mile 
incorporation radius extending northwards to the border with Guinea (which is 
marked by the St. John River). The City Mayor governs Ganta as the head of a 
9-member City Council representing 9 wards. However, at the level below the 
City Council, Ganta is broken down into 28 communities, led by volunteer 
Community Chairpersons. These communities are further divided into 108 
flexible zones, which allow for better informal territorial administration and 
top-down information dissemination by the City Mayor, through the MTGs to 
Zonal heads and thence to the community. In the absence of a City Court, the 
county uses the magisterial court that dedicates every Monday to hearing cases 
pertaining to the city11.  
 
The influence of traditional customary leadership on city governance is non-
existent as the City Mayor exercises preeminent control. According to a local 
                                               
10 Interview with Foya QC-12 on July 29, 2015 in Foya, Liberia. 
11 Interview with Ganta Oral Historian - 2 on August 2, 2015. 
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historian, Ganta city sits at the confluence point of two main ethnic groups – 
the Mano and the Kpelle, hence the existence of two different names for the 
city – Ganta (Mano) and Ganta (Kpelle)12. Ganta’s ethnic heterogeneity evolved 
historically since its emergence in late 15th century as a trading crossroads. 
“Ganta is said to have emerged in the 15th Century with Mano people coming to 
settle, followed by the Kpelle people from Guinea…the Liberian Frontier Force 
first came here 1914…. then the Mandingo people entering through Yekepa in 
1921 to trade in Kolanuts” 13  noted the local historian. Since the postwar 
settlement different ethnic groups from across Liberia, Guinea and Sierra 
Leone have been attracted to Ganta by the commercial prospects of this 
crossroads borderland city.  
 
Ganta’s encounter with the state came with the arrival of the Liberian Frontier 
Force in 1914. This arrival coincided with the appointment of the first Central 
Province Commissioner, Samuel Smith, in 1914 amid the Liberian government’s 
quest to protect its territory from the French in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. 
According to Ganta’s oral historian, “the people of Ganta became Liberian after 
the entry of the LFF in 1914.” Another important historical encounter occurred 
in 1926 in Ganta with the establishment of the Ganta United Methodist Mission 
in 1926 by Dr. George Way Harley, locally known as the “White Ghost”14. Given 
that the United Methodist mission operated a leper colony, its activity was 
concentrated in what is today known as Blegey Pa Community. In the 1920s this 
mission constituted a clearing in the middle of the rainforest, on the outer 
southeastern fringes of Ganta. However, Ganta did not official become 
incorporated as a city until 1977. 
 
                                               
12 Interview with Ganta Oral Historian -1 on August 4, 2015. 
13 Interview conducted with Oral Historian-1 in Ganta, Liberia on August 19, 2015. 
14 Interview with Ganta Oral Historian-2 on August 2, 2015  
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However, Ganta’s more contemporaneous history is shaped by a series of 
events that occurred over two months (October-November 1985). First, during 
the presidential elections of October 1985, Jackson F. Doe (Liberian Action 
Party) from Nimba County ran against Samuel Doe from Grand Gedeh 
(National Democratic Party of Liberia). Samuel Doe was declared winner amid 
allegation of widespread electoral fraud. Then in November 1985, a former Doe 
acolyte, Thomas Kwiwompka (a Gio) launched a failed coup attempt against 
Samuel Doe. Although the coup allegedly was launched from Sierra Leone 
through Grand Cape Mount County, Samuel Doe meted swift retribution upon 
the Gio and Mano communities of Nimba County (Ellis, 2006: 60). This 
ethnically based repression is thought to have created fissures within the 
Armed Forces of Liberia and driven Liberia over the edge into Civil War in 
1989. 
 
Within Ganta and above the family this historical legacy marked by fear, 
mistrust and uncertainty of “state” action has shaped the emergence of socially 
organized informal orders led by micro-territorial governors. Micro-Territorial 
Governors federate proximate households and bring them under their 
leadership thereby contributing to the informal spatial and territorial ordering 
of borderland cities. By bringing territory and people under their control, 
MTGs in Foya and Ganta establish themselves as gatekeepers between the 
inside (community) and the outside (extra borderland social actors). Focusing 
on this level of leadership, which is one step above the family and one-step 
below the state, evidences a number of observations about the postwar politics 
of micro-territorial governance from the vantage point of borderlands. This 
micro-territorial governance is a central factor in the quotidian management of 
human and material processes within postwar borderlands. 
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Table 1: Non-State Micro-Territorial Distribution in Foya and Ganta  
(As of August 2015) 
City Sub-division 2nd level Division 
Foya 9 Quarters 0 
Ganta 28 Communities 108 Zones 
 
Table 1 shows the multiple levels of governance below the city mayor. The 
relationship between the first level of informal territorial ordering and the City 
Mayor is refracted on the second level administrative division of borderlands. 
In Foya, although there are nine recognized quarters, informal territorial 
ordering is further complicated by the emergence of a number of ad hoc 
quarters as subsets of older quarters – effectively making Foya a city with 12 
quarters. Meanwhile, in Ganta, the 28 communities are further divided into 
zones with 108 zonal heads. The zonal heads compose part of a hierarchical 
governance structure that reports to and relay information from Community 
Chairpersons to the general community. 
 
Table 1 provides an illustration of the extent of informal territorial ordering in 
the micro-territorial governance of borderland cities, confirming that liminal 
spaces of states are simply ‘differently’ governed, rather than ungoverned 
spaces (Clunan 2010: 17). The organizational and functional flexibility evident 
further down the ladder of informal governance is a function of malleability to 
quotidian local politics, resource dynamics and interpersonal relationships. 
This flexibility blurs distinctions between the formal and the informal, the 
private and the public; as the functionally public role of leadership at the 
community level remains a largely informal matter. 
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Micro-Territorial Governance: The System and Its People 
 
They are a complex cast of characters, micro-territorial governors. Across Ganta 
and Foya – of the 37 MTGs, there are three women (two of whom are MTGs in 
Ganta). There are former soldiers with the Armed Forces of Liberia who turned 
on the state to subsequently support different warring factions during Liberia’s 
two civil wars. There are single-barrel soldiers (mainly in Ganta) who protected 
their communities against a marauding and genocidal state. There are those 
who cut a martial demeanor, swear having never carried a weapon during war, 
yet the community suspects differently, especially since wartime displacement 
and return effectively constructed a community mosaic of “strangered” kin. 
Young men and women ex-fighters who had fought for rival factions during the 
war and internally and externally displaced persons return to constitute 
communities. However, most borderland MTGs have glaring gaps in their 
personal histories – many of them do not want to talk in specific terms about 
their wartime experiences. Regardless of their wartime realities, most of these 
MTGs have historical connections to the communities which they currently 
lead. However, more important to understanding how they interact with 
architects and processes of postwar statebuilding, is why and how they 
informally order their communities and how they structure their interaction 
with the postwar state.  
 
MTGs are volunteer leaders of their communities whose occupations are as 
varied as their wartime experiences. They often have full time jobs alongside 
their roles as Micro-Territorial Governors. FB, a Community Chairperson in 
Ganta, was a former officer with the Armed Forces of Liberia. After his convoy 
was ambushed by NPFL forces in Bong County in the early days of the Liberian 
Civil War in 1990, he reneged on the orders they had been given by the Samuel 
Doe regime to pacify the Nimba County hinterlands. He subsequently became 
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unit commander with Prince Johnson’s NPFL faction, commanding combat 
operations in the vicinity of Kakata, Margibi County. After the war his attempt 
to integrate the postwar Liberian Army was scuttled by Dyncorp trainers who 
caught wind of his wartime activities. He feels personally targeted for exclusion 
while many of his former command brethren have found room within the 
postwar statebuilding apparatus. Currently, he is a MTG (Community 
Chairperson) in Ganta who together with a Liberian member of parliament co-
owns a 133-man strong private security firm providing security services to 
business institutions within the borderlands. His prerequisite for serving in his 
private security firm – “you need to have been trained either in the army or by a 
faction during the civil war.”15 He is also the founding MTG for his community, 
which was constituted after the war.  
 
QC-9 cuts a military figure and is the head of the Quarter Chiefs in Foya. He 
barks orders within the community and readily offers a military salute to certain 
individuals he encounters on Foya’s streets or who come to visit him at the City 
Court. Describing Taylor’s NPFL forces as “revolutionaries”, he ardently 
defends “the revolution which was launched to save the Liberian people”16. 
However, he swears never having carried a weapon during the civil war. A MTG 
in Foya, he cumulates that role with the role of head Quarter Chief and the 
head of the City Court. However, city residents note that TN together with his 
older brother are ex-fighters, like a majority of the MTGs within Foya today.  
 
CC-10 is a pastor who recently relocated to Ganta from Kakata. She joined the 
ministry during the war and preached through spells of internal and external 
displacement. She spent some time in Sierra Leone during the war as a 
                                               
15 Interview with CC-4 in Ganta, 23 August 2015 
16 Interview with QC -9 in Foya, 30 July, 2015 
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refugee. She was invited to take over the governance of her community because 
the previous MTG caused more problems than he solved. Soft-spoken, she 
leads a fairly affluent community on the fringes of Ganta’s new layout.  
 
A septuagenarian, QC-3 has been MTG in Foya intermittently since 1984. His 
community hosts the village residence of the Vice President JN Boakai, as well 
as that of a collection of former NFPL commanders. His community also hosts 
Foya’s Saturday market, as well as the Foya Airfield. Therefore, his is a very 
strategic territorial strip of the borderlands. He acknowledged having “worked 
with different groups of fighters who came into Foya over the years. They come 
and go and we stay here. I ran to Buyedu [Sierra Leone] one time when the war 
got too bad. But when I came back, the people asked me to become their 
Quarter Chief again]. “17 
 
This is a synoptic overview of the complex life histories of the MTGs who 
govern informal orders within Liberia’s postwar borderlands. Being unpaid, 
they all described their dedication to their communal duties as driven by “the 
urge to serve my people.” However, to that is often added the individual or 
familial social capital derived from this kind of service. “When I go anywhere, 
although I am not paid, they acknowledge that the Quarter Chief is here.”18 
“Although I am not paid today, I am sure that my children would benefit from 
my service to my people as they cannot pass in the street without being 
recognize. So, I have to do a good job for them also,”19 noted another Foya 
MTG. Despite the seeming call to service, there is more to the quest to retain 
control of human and material processes as leaders of informal orders within 
liminal spaces.  
                                               
17 Interview with QC-3 in Foya, August 7, 2015 
18 Second Interview with QC-1 in Foya, 28 July, 2015 
19 Interview with QC-5 in Foya, 30 July, 2015 
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Leading the informal ordering of human and material processes within 
borderland spaces makes them gatekeepers of entry and functioning within 
borderland communities. “Sometimes we are invited to meetings with NGOs 
and they pay a sitting fee,”20 which CC-3 saw as a negligible reward for the time 
and resources invested in being an MTG. “When NGOs come here, like was the 
case during the storm time or Ebola time, they need the QC to help them 
know who was really affected. We also help the people provide their 
information to the NGOs”21. “When politicians come here from the City, they 
first meet with us so that we can gather the people to listen to them. We can 
hear what they tell us, but when time comes to vote, we do as we like.”22 This 
effectively places MTGs as gatekeepers and local custodians of any resources 
that accrue to the community. As gatekeepers, they are the principal interface 
with all manner of interveners who enter borderland spaces. Most often, City 
Mayors within borderland spaces are quick to bring these MTGs to the table to 
shape the interaction between the city and other formal social actors such as 
international NGOs.  
 
However, the role of custodian at the level of the community comes with 
responsibilities to the community. The proximity of MTGs to the community 
makes them susceptible to arbitrary demands of accountability from the 
community. Where accountability falters, the community engineers the 
destitution and replacement of the MTG. Two communities – one each in Foya 
and Ganta – have recently undergone leadership changes due to crises of 
accountability on the part of the MTG. QC-8 MTG for AG Quarter in Foya, 
evidences the swift local accountability in the way the previous QC was ousted 
                                               
20 Interview with in Ganta, 16 August 2015 
21 Interview with QC-1 in Foya, 28 July, 2015 
22 Interview with QC-5 in Foya, 30 July, 2015 
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“I was appointed in March this year [sic 2015]. PM was in this position before I 
was appointed to take over. PM was here working in the community – he alone. 
He did not have anyone in the community to work with him. Anything drop for 
the community, he will eat it. Even if it was a piece of plank which was given 
for the community, he would keep it for himself. He would not give anything to 
the rest of the community. So, the people they get vexed with him. They even 
took him to court, when they took him to court, the money he was supposed to 
pay [as restitution] was LD13500 and 5 bags of clean rice. Up until now he has 
not paid the money yet. Then the people said he must not be their leader 
because he is suffering them.”23 An elder within Boe Community in Ganta 
claimed that the same accountability proceedings had claimed the head of the 
previous MTG. Evidently, the destitution of the leader might scupper their 
positioning at the helm of the territorially based informal order, however, the 
implementation of decisions from the city court on such matters based within 
informal orders falters.  
 
Beyond the perks derived from the interaction with outsiders and from being 
the faces of borderland communities, they also control common initiative 
schemes that arise from within the community. The limited development of 
social programs within borderland spaces by international NGOs in partnership 
with the state provides a static resource base for contestation which hardly 
adjusts to population changes and demands. Considering themselves as key 
borderland stakeholders, MTGs often attribute the limited success of different 
development programs to their exclusion from different stages of program 
planning and execution. “One NGO came here and was sharing mosquito nets 
and before you know it, the mosquito nets were cut and you could see them 
selling in the market as skin scrub. On top of that my community did not even 
                                               
23 Interview to QC-8 in Foya, 10 August, 2015 
 199 
receive its own share of mosquito nets them.”24 “When MacArthur brought that 
rice equipment here from Libya, he did not ask anyone. How can you bring all 
these computers to come work rice farm in Foya when they is no electricity? He 
wanted to run the business like a military man without even asking us what we 
think, that was how the business failed.”25   
 
Meanwhile there are MTGs who use their positions of control to shape the 
content of their communities, while projecting their presence across the 
borderland space. Peace Community in Ganta, a nascent postwar community in 
Ganta is noted for its high number of retired members of the AFL and ex-
fighters. It is not uncommon upon entering the compound of the MTG of 
Peace Community to be greeted by the appearance of military-aged males from 
adjoining houses. The MTG claims to be wanted at The Hague for trial for 
atrocities committed during the war. However, he operates a security firm 
which provides private security services to commercial entities – lounges, hotels 
and motels and night clubs – across the borderland. This private security 
apparatus, besides ensuring the security of commercial premises, also collect 
intelligence on all modes of goings and comings from Ganta.   
 
However, the hand of the MTG in the constitution of a human protective 
network in other communities is subtler. “I have built houses around here that 
I put up for rent and in which I only want young men. No young women,”26 
stated a notorious MTG-cum-liege lord. He acknowledges having been a single 
barrel soldier during the Liberian Civil Wars in order to protect communities 
from predation by both state and insurgent groups. However, some community 
                                               
24 Comment made by RC, a resident of Bass Community during a Focus Group Discussion in 
Ganta, 17 August, 2015 
25 Interview with QC-1 in Foya, 28 July 2015	
26 Interview with CC-3 in Ganta, 12 August 2015 
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members claim that if that was the case, DD had become a predator himself as 
he harnesses dubious relationships within Ganta’s community of hustlers and 
“grona boys” to extend his financial wealth. Meanwhile his preference for 
young men is to have on hand the human base for convertible peacetime and 
wartime predation. 
 
The mosaic of characters that constitute micro-territorial governors evidences 
the differentiation of interest-driven motives for serving as MTGs.  However, 
they sit at the helm of an informal order, which the city administrator seeks to 
incorporate into decision-making processes of city governance. This 
incorporation effectively creates a system of hybrid governance. This would be 
further developed in the chapter on authority, which delves into the nature and 
manifestation of embedded local authority. Capturing why and how informal 
orders are governed evidences patterns of proximate local accountability based 
community mediated moral norms.  
 
Therefore, informal ordering springs from the organization of proximate 
households into organized social units aimed at giving predictability to 
communal social relations and provide communal representation in 
interlocution with formalized social actors – state and international NGOs. 
Analytically, the voices of community leaders as they articulate their 
motivations for service, the authority and control they wield in the sustenance 
of socio-political order in borderland spaces provide insights into patterns of 




The Politics of Informal Ordering and Flexible Micro-Territorial 
Governance  
 
Informal ordering is shaped by the flexible horizontal and vertical construction 
of local territoriality, which is evidenced when combining a spatial and 
temporal exploration of borderland transience and permanence. This flexibility 
is shaped by the negotiation of space through the enforcement of land tenure 
rules, community resource allocation and endowments, population density, 
community history and the charisma of specific Micro-Territorial Governors. 
Territorially, internal borderland space is highly dynamics as local politics 
determines the fusion or splintering of communities. The negotiation and 
contestation for spatial merging and splintering characterizes quotidian 
borderland community politics. Informal ordering constitutes local hierarchies 
of centralized predominantly male-dominated powerful networks, which 
statebuilding interveners can hardly ignore.  
 
Liberia’s international borders with Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire are 
hardly ever in question, having resulted from colonial treaties. The territorial 
markers carved by rivers and mountains represent internationally static 
territorial limits. However, quotidian dynamics reveal evidence of heuristically 
reflexive informal ordering within Liberia’s borderlands. These have 
implications for postwar statebuilding. While the expansion and contraction of 
borderland cities’ communities/quarters through splintering and merging do 
not occur daily, they are the long-term outcomes of everyday politics. This 
splintering and merging emanate from economic, demographic and 
developmental conditions. These processes are steeped in political 
machinations and contestation between local actors. Local leaders resist 
splintering or merging of territory under their control, which would wither 
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dilute their local political clout or completely eliminate their territory from the 
borderland’s micro-map by bringing them under the control of another MTG.  
 
Micro-territorial units within borderland spaces emerge either as original units 
in spaces which were previously uninhabited, or as the result of splintering 
from existing units. Demographic, economic and developmental pressures 
emerged as the principal drivers for the emergence of new communities and 
quarters. Increasing return of internally and externally displaced populations 
after crises’ end coupled with a bustling informal economic sector on the 
margins of the state, drive population growth within borderland spaces. 
Generally, spaces splintered because they had become unmanageable due to 
population growth resulting in pressures on limited social infrastructure (such 
as water pumps, schools, health care centers – where they exist). The 
emergence of intra-communal local leader rivalry also provides impetus for 
spatial splintering. New communities/quarters originate due to the construction 
of household units within previously uninhabited space within borderlands.  
 
In Foya, Peace Community split from Ndama Road Quarter because of what the 
Quarter Chief for Peace Community described as marginalization and neglect 
while they were part of Ndama Road. QC-7, QC for Peace Community noted 
that, “There is only a main road which separates us from Ndama Road Quarter. 
If you stand from here [the City Council building] the left side of the road is 
Ndama Road Quarter and the right side of the road is Peace Community 
Quarter. When we started Peace Community, there were only 100 people living 
there, today there are over 360 households. The Vice President’s house [VP of 
Liberia] is in Ndama Road Quarter. We noticed that everything that used to 
come here would end up in Ndama Road Quarter. On this side of the road 
where you now have Peace Community, people were suffering plenty. So, we 
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decided to reach out to the City Mayor of the time and create our own 
community so that we would be able to negotiate for some good things to also 
happen to our people. Since then many more people have come to live in Peace 
Community which is a growing community in Foya.”27 Patterns of sustained 
marginalization therefore contributed to the negotiation of the splintering of 
Ndama Road Quarter in two. However, the social stature of the founding QC of 
Peace Community also played a major role. QC-7 owns four houses within 
Peace Community and he operated rice, sugar cane cocoa and coffee farms. His 
social stature is based on agricultural wealth. That, according to some members 
of his community, makes him a natural leader and helped them in securing 
their own community.28  
 
However elsewhere in Foya, despite population and administrative pressures, 
some micro-territorial units have either been resistant to splintering or have 
created sub-units. As a youth member noted “In New Foya, the population has 
more than doubled since people started to come back after the war. There is a 
new market here now. At times when we patrol [as part of the Community 
Watch Forum], there is a house, which the representative of Foya is building 
over there, where we find some rogues hiding at times. This community has 
expanded right to the hill. Even our community watch forum cannot patrol all 
over the place. Maybe the solution would be to create another community so 
that we have two communities here instead of one. But that is not easy. The 
quarter chief wants to control this large area.”29  
 
Accompanying the splintering of borderland micro-territorial units, is the 
merging of other MTUs. Rationales for territorial merging included the push to 
                                               
27 Interview conducted with QC-7 in Foya on 1 August 2015. 
28 Focus Group Discussion in Peace Community on 2 August 2015.	
29 Interview conducted with New_Foya_Youth-1 on 27, July 2015. 
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allow for resource sharing between communities, to eliminate ineffective 
leadership and to incorporate micro-communities into larger communities as 
zones. Catholic Community, in Ganta, for example emerged in 1997 out of space 
previously occupied by a rubber plantation. After the current MTG built his 
house, the Catholics came next and built a church and a school in 1999, which 
is where the community gets its name.30 However, given that two neighboring 
communities abutting Catholic Community did not have access to the main 
road and their leaders were not doing much to change the situation, they 
merged to be become zones within Catholic Community in 2008. Furthermore, 
they merged when the emergence of new communities made pre-existing 
micro-territorial configurations too small in terms of size, number of 
households and population to matter. 
 
The splintering and merging of communities creates opportunities for some 
and eliminates possibilities for others. However, this shapes the quotidian 
management of human and material processes within borderland micro-
territorial units.  
 
Borderland Marketscapes: Between Informal Micro-Territorial 
Ordering and Statebuilding 
 
Ganta (abutting Guinea) is Liberia’s second most populous city. Meanwhile, 
Foya (bordering Sierra Leone and Guinea) is the most populous city in Lofa 
County. Foya and Ganta expand outwards for an 8mile radius from the 
epicenter of borderland marketscapes. Marketscapes partially explain the very 
existence of these population centers on the edges of the state, which are often 
mirrored by cross-border city population centers. The marketscape is arguably 
                                               
30 Interview with an originator of Catholic Community, Ganta on 18 August 2015 
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the main employer in borderlands given the streamlined bureaucracies of 
postwar statebuilding that only allow meager investment in the public service 
sector. Nevertheless, the postwar state’s limited investments in revenue 
collection, police and immigration services are meant to seat its authority and 
ensure some visibility within liminal spaces. However, the largely unregulated 
borderland marketscape provides opportunities for material exchange by 
organized informal social actors, while challenging postwar state authority. This 
unregulated physical space captures the resilient hybridity of survival 
economies through the mélange of permanence with transience, legality amid 
illegality, the licit and the criminal.  
 
Two distinct marketscapes are evident in Foya and Ganta – the formalized 
marketscape often run, regulated and administered by the municipality and 
corollary marketscapes – which arise due to the concentration of commercial 
activity around another economic activities such as transportation or banking. 
The agglomeration of cross-border and national wholesalers, retailers, hawkers, 
transporters and porters makes borderland marketscapes a bustling beehive of 
commercial activity. However, the quotidian informal structural and operational 
content of both formalized and corollary marketscapes largely seek to 
circumvent or dilute controls from both state and informal ordering. Therefore, 
the form, content and positionality of marketscapes in Foya and Ganta provide 
a material space for conflict and cooperation between the postwar state and 
territorially based informal orders epitomized in micro-territorial governors.  
 
The hub of commercial activity within Liberia’s borderland cities makes it 
difficult to see where the market starts and where it stops. Formal marketscapes 
benefit from eminent domain laws and dedicated spaces of commercial 
exchange within borderlands constructed to facilitate formal administration 
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and to order economic informality. Exercising eminent domain city ordinance 
rules, city authorities choose to either formalize the physical construction of 
marketscapes in spaces where they had historically existed or construct new 
spaces dedicated to commercial exchange. The same rules are designed to bring 
marketscapes under the control of state-assigned administrators. However, 
given the ordering constraints of formal marketscapes, there is the proliferation 
of informal marketscapes around different forms of social and economic activity 
– such as transportation or even in private residences within borderlands. 
These alternative marketscapes based around transport hubs scattered around 
the borderland city evidence the postwar state’s incapacity to singularly order 
informality (which would be further developed in the next chapter). However, it 
also provides a rationalizing logic to the role of micro-territorial governors and 
their patterns of informal ordering. Given their overlaps with community 
dynamics, borderland marketscapes set up arenas of opposition and 
domination between statebuilding, informal ordering and transient livelihoods. 
 
Communities that blend into both formal and corollary marketscapes face 
sanitary, security and criminal challenges that come with the presence of the 
everyday city market within community limits. Micro-territorial governors 
within whose spaces designated borderland marketscapes fall, organizationally 
straddle the informalized economic and livelihood processes of marketscapes 
and its formal administration by the City Council. The quotidian overlap of 
micro-territorially governed spaces and marketscapes challenges the social 
protective justification for the very existence of micro-territorial governors 
within borderland communities.  
 
In Ganta, for example, the municipal marketscape overlaps four communities – 
Bassa, Old Car Garage, Gbalagbein and Congo communities – whose 
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interaction with the market is differentially based on the community 
composition and emergent modes of intra-community social control. MTGs 
within these communities react differently towards the city marketscape 
overlapping into their community spaces. The predominant view within Bassa 
Community is that the existence of the municipal market on the edge of their 
community constitutes health and sanitation hazards for the entire 
community31. Focus group discussion participants claimed that the hazardous 
conditions persisted because the municipality had neither devised a waste 
management system nor set up public latrines. Meanwhile the municipality 
expected the community to cater to the management of refuse dumps. More so 
a City Inspector who resided in another community controlled the community’s 
main water pomp. Seeking greater control over the resources within his 
community and acting on behalf of his community, the MTG noted that “I 
wrote a letter to the City Mayor saying that – I will not be the Community 
Chairman and the pump is in my community and you are from another 
community and you will be controlling it.”32 The MTG for Bassa Community 
obtained the concession and the water pump was turned over to his control.  
 
The implications for ceding of control of this resource, as was evident in other 
marketscapes within borderlands was the weakening of eminent domain 
control over municipal marketscapes by acquiescing to some parts of social 
control being embedded within informal orders. Resources such as water wells, 
pumps and public latrines (where they exist) which dot the borderland terrain, 
provide a physical arena for control and to generate resources for leaders of 
informal orders. Thus, control of water and sanitation resources is salient in 
liminal spaces where these resources are in short supply. Informally ordering 
                                               
31 Focus Group Discussion in Bassa Community, Ganta on 17 August 2015 
32 Interview with CC-18 in Ganta on 21 August 2015.	
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provided the basis from which to negotiate such control within postwar 
borderland communities in Liberia. However, it also shows the position of 
privilege that communities overlapped by marketscapes have when negotiating 
with state representatives as they simultaneously benefit from and are 
hamstrung by eminent domain laws. 
 
The economic and social content of designated marketscapes enhances the 
social and symbolic posture of the borderland communities within which they 
exist, providing a basis for internal power contestation. In Foya, the daily 
market is located exclusively within the New Foya Quarter, while the Saturday 
market, also known as “Foya’s Birthday” is situated in Ndama Road Quarter. 
While the Saturday market is a historical fixture of Foya’s socio-economic 
landscape, the daily market in New Foya was inaugurated on June 26, 2007. It 
was part of a postwar project to “clear Broad Street which was becoming too 
too crowded as many market people were coming back after the war and our 
brothers and sisters from Sierra Leone and Guinea them were adding too and 
create sheds where people can sell their foodstuff and other products 
everyday.”33  
 
Unlike a majority of informally ordered borderland communities where 
leadership is largely designated by consensus, New Foya prides itself with 
holding elections to select the MTG. Since the end of the war and with the 
arrival of Foya’s municipal market at New Foya – the area has expanded to 
incorporated neighboring villages; the population has grown exponentially; 
there is increasing pressure on the limited water and sanitation resources 
brought in as part of the immediate postwar relief effort; the wave of criminality 
is on the rise; and there is even more pressure on limited Ebola aid resources 
                                               
33 Interview with New Foya Elder, Foya City on July 28, 2015. 
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which are equally distributed to communities regardless of size34. Given these 
circumstances, the community members have recently felt the need to split the 
Quarter in two. However, their desire to create New Foya I and New Foya II has 
met stiff resistance of their MTG in collusion with the City Mayor. 
Furthermore, the people of New Foya claim that their MTG after his designated 
three-year term, continues to postpone the presentation of the community’s 
financial balance sheet report that would precede a new election for MTG and a 
subsequent hand over.  
 
The quotidian micro-politics in New Foya contributes to understanding the 
relationship between informal and formal territorial governors within 
borderlands and their relationships to their communities. Its importance as the 
quotidian marketscape within Foya implies that New Foya is a revenue 
generator for the city. It is a space where the City Court comes to “cut tickets 
for the people who have a table or a shed even people with no table and only 
tray on head you get to pay ticket – 5LD/day”35 – a means of raising revenue for 
a City Council whose City Mayors deplored his lack of a salary despite “already 
being on the job for over 6 months.”36 
 
Cross-border trade and its national extensions contribute to the population 
concentration within borderland cities. The permanence of borderland 
informal orders interacts with the transience of trade, making borderland cities 
important hubs of economic opportunity despite their liminal geographical 
positionality. Given the limited presence of the postwar state, informal ordering 
patterns emerge to give predictability to the proliferating human and material 
processes within borderland marketscapes. Within both borderland cities, the 
                                               
34 Focus Group Discussion in New Foya on July 30, 2015.  
35 Interview with Petit Trader_2-Foya, on August 2, 2015. 
36 Interview with Foya_CM_1 on August 4, 2015. 
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crystallization of informal ordering into permanent micro-territorial local 
governance structures deliberately and collusively positions itself as gatekeeper 
of statebuilding processes.  
 
Secondly, given that these commercial spaces predate civil wars, the permanent 
communities surrounding markets have had to contend with intense postwar 
land tenure conflicts (resulting from coercive wartime land grabs). Thirdly, the 
postwar marketscape physically and functionally becomes a hybrid habitat and 
commercial space, as it serves the omnibus functions for interdependent 
groups of individuals. Marketscapes serve as homes for some market people, 
who find it cost efficient to inhabit the space where they sell their goods during 
the day. This is preferable to incurring the additional cost of traveling with 
their goods to the market every day. The stalls provide impermanent habitat for 
young people who hustle the same spaces during the day for their “bran ma”- as 
car loaders, occasional hawkers of dubiously acquired new and used goods, 
load carriers or informal security providers. This physical and functional 
hybridity (which is not devoid of organized competitive and cooperative 
networks) depends on, and contributes to diluting the form and content of 
social controls that emerge in postwar communities which host borderland 
markets. 
 
Conclusion - Informal Ordering Implications for Postwar Statebuilding 
 
Modes of informal ordering emerging from local communities show the 
structuring of quarters and communities into functional roles and operational 
zones. These functional and structural processes accentuate social control 
within these micro-territorial spaces while concentrating authority in the hands 
of volunteer leaders. Emerging from a protracted civil war, many of these 
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volunteer leaders recognize the transitional nature of their everyday contexts. 
They also acknowledge their roles in shaping this transition as MTGs within 
spaces where they live. Hence, their leadership is tinged with expectations of 
recognition which would translate to more concrete forms of reward – it is a 
very patient process. In the meantime, they reap social benefits from their 
symbolic positioning. Far from claiming unity in interests, there is a variation of 
motivations underlying community leadership. Beyond their discourses on and 
about leadership, these insights are the observation and interpreted in local 
daily practice. Informal ordering provides a basis for micro-territorial 
governance that is more proximate to communities than the state to which they 
belong. However, most MTGs would prefer a form of incorporation into the 
state, not as a manner of lifting their communities (as the communities would 
expect) but to become part of a centralized bureaucracy of extraction. Given the 
quotidian persistence of informal ordering, caution needs to be paid to 
nuanced interpretations of African political ordering based on a hybridized 
notion of Western norms. These are largely misleading, unless it is made clear 
that the graft did not have the intended results (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 146).  
Informal ordering as a framework of analysis highlights the legitimacy and 
advantage of organized borderland socio-political actors to operate accordingly 
to organizally emergent logics which blend modernity and informality and 
ordering in quotidian practice. 
 
Proximity to the household provides micro-territorial governors a flexible 
position from which to deal with outsiders entering their communities. These 
leaders of informal local orders are thus adept at negotiating different forms of 
rent from all external entrants into borderland spaces including the postwar 
state. Part of their role is to create social protection by building predictability 
into socio-economic relations within their communities, while enhancing the 
 212 
material base of the community. Their detachment from the postwar state 
bureaucracy makes MTGs more nimble, proactive and responsive to the socio-
economic needs of their communities – even if only as a morale presence.  
 
While the quotidian micro-territorial governance within borderland cities 
evidence decentralized governance in practice, there are variations in how 
MTGs get into their leadership roles, as well as their prescribed term in 
office/service. Within Ganta and Foya, the terms of service for incumbent 
MTGs range from 5 months to 32 years. This variation is largely a function of 
physical circumstances, the personal disposition of the MTG and their 
relationships with both their communities and the City Mayor. It is an 
inherently interest-driven process which leverages social embeddedness at 
community level to construct and protect individual interests – the implications 
are the development of “liege lords” through MTG. Their positioning does not 
only reflect individual interest but also community interest, since the 
fulfillment of individual interests is predicated upon community acquiescence 
of informally ordered social configurations. While these are mainly volunteer 
positions, however there is evidence of power politics behind internally and 
externally driven competition for leadership positioning. 
 
Given processes of informal ordering, borderland actors politically acquire 
socially-grounded authority and control over micro-territorial administration 
and human and material processes. Hence their legitimacy is derived from a 
socially grounded interpretation of accountability and direct representation. It 
is a process, which presidentially-appointed mayors constantly seek to 
undermine by discouraging the use of elections to bring community leaders to 
the helm of their communities. However, it traces the contours of ‘negotiated 
statehood’ (Hagmann and Peclard, 2010 543-554) which is often ignored or 
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marginalized when the ‘transformative’ process (Sisk, 2013:5) of international 
statebuilding perceive informal institutions of governance as hindrances to 
advancing their international norms.  
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Chapter 6 : Ordering Informality – Commercial Motorbike Riders 
(CMRs) and the Decentralized Political Economy of Vulnerable 
Resilience 
“I am everywhere in Liberia. Even money changers, I am sponsoring 
them; Pen-Pen Boys (Commercial Motorbike Riders), I am sponsoring 
them. I have a hand in everything in Liberia. It is not because I need 
the money, but what is most satisfying to me is that I am giving a 
Liberian a chance to live because I was once in a position where I 
wanted somebody to help me start off life.” Benoni Urey, 2017 
Liberian Presidential Candidate for All Liberian Party on Voice 




Urey’s statement came after a rally at which he was accompanied by hundreds 
of honking youth Commercial Motorbike Riders (CMRs) to launch his bid for 
Liberia’s 2017 presidential elections. Urey, who made millions by heading a 
crony capitalist business empire ranging from telecoms to agricultural 
investments, served as Charles Taylor’s Commissioner of Maritime Affairs from 
1996-2003. He was under a UN travel ban and asset freeze until late 2014. 
Despite controversy surrounding him and his wartime business dealing, his 
statement captures that informality commands in everyday politics in Liberia. It 
also exhibits understands the complex relationship of youth, everyday informal 
“bran ma” (daily bread) economics [Konings’ (2006: 39) “debrouillardise”] and 
violence in Liberia. As Urey travels a national political trajectory, his political 
rhetoric plays to the informal economic operators who, not only constitute a 
majority of the postwar Liberia population, but who modestly and resiliently 
muddle through the war to postwar transition. These informal economic 
operators, through the negotiation of labor and material positionality, organize 
to sustain their livelihoods amid the flux, uncertainty and vulnerability of the 
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postwar context in what constitutes the everyday political economy of 
vulnerable resilience. 
 
It is important to grasp the complex historical context that gives rise to and 
produces postwar functional dynamics is important. The displacement of 
wartime rebel governance architectures in favor of postwar statist securitization 
processes in borderland spaces, leads to the emergence of immanent 
configurations of economic informality. The immanent configurations of 
economic informality describe processes of ordering informality. Given the 
centrality of individual and socially organized actors in ordering informality, 
these processes are often not connected to pre-war and wartime human and 
material productive dynamics. The reconstruction of the limited state however, 
does not only limit its remit, but it also opens up spaces for alternative 
configurations of economic production. Postwar borderland economic contexts 
are thus characterized by the complex quotidian transaction of informal 
livelihood processes through a maze of refracted state bureaucratic forms.  
 
Ordering informality engages the operational coexistence of uncertainty and 
flux characteristic of postwar contexts to develop vulnerably resilient protective 
mechanisms. Largely occurring within informality, livelihood choices are 
shaped by assessments of their individual and collective human needs. These 
needs assessments are negotiated through the quotidian transaction of human 
and material livelihood processes within contexts of prevailing uncertainty and 
vulnerability. Informal economic actors, in the face of consistent uncertainty, 
usually spend a lot of energy building models or social constructions that serve 
to evaluate possible reactions to the persistence of uncertainties (Raeymaekers 
2014:16). These “rational” calculations account for both individualized and 
collective action outcomes. However, beyond apparently “rational” calculations 
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described here, strategies to confront economic uncertainty also acquire 
different constellations according to social context (Raeymaekers 2014:19). 
Overall though, they lead to the development of strategies which, accounting 
for specific economic group particularities, collectively confront economic 
uncertainty and build individual and sector resiliency. 
 
This study uses the informal social economics of Commercial Motorbike Riding 
(CMRing) as a descriptive analytical prism to explain processes of ordering 
informality. Besides the community leaders who daily informally administer the 
governance of human and material processes within borderlands, Commercial 
Motorbike Riders (CMRs) are quotidian borderland informal economic actors. 
To interact with permanent and transient dimensions of their borderland 
spaces, this externally unregulated and internally structured informal mode of 
economic production has grown exponentially within borderlands in Liberia’s 
postwar years. They also transact international borders and structurally deploy 
themselves within borderland territorial space, not only to optimize profits, but 
to minimize internal conflict, strengthen resiliency and network into political 
orbits to gain and maintain leverage and informal social protection. 
 
Ordering informality, explains multiple dimensions of informal economic social 
structuring that arises out of a specific livelihood factor of production – the 
motorbike. The commercial motorbike requires relatively high capital 
investment, its operation requires low skills training with a corollary high 
personal risk of injury. Meanwhile planning around the business normally is 
done within short time horizons. As TF noted in Foya, “I know that I cannot 
ride a motorcycle forever, so I have to use my young years to make some money 
so that I can buy my own motorcycle, build a house and take care of my 
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family.”37 Therefore every CM plying the borderland streets brings together a 
complex array of negotiated interests – the operator, the owner, the public, the 
Union and state agents. Therefore, looking at the individual component within 
ordering informality accounts for a host of actors, actions and processes 
surrounding the Commercial Motorbike. 
 
Moving from the individual to the structural level, there is the Union. 
Commercial Motorcycle Riders Unions are collectives which serve a 
representative and gatekeeping function for a rather significant socio-economic 
grouping of postwar youth.  Thus, the Unions with varying histories and 
purposes epitomize ordered informality and stand between the operator and 
the state. They give structure to the evolution of postwar configurations of 
economic informality within borderlands spaces. This explanation purposefully 
engages Raeymaekers’ (2014: 26) analysis of informal borderland economies as 
generating a liminal political order that sits uncomfortably in the twilight 
between the power of states and markets.  
 
Except that ordering informality evolves sets of structures which seek to build 
resilience and protections despite contexts of vulnerability. In doing so, they 
embed their activity within the borderland market and build networks into the 
centralized state. This process of ordering informality is explained through two 
sets of narratives. The first being the interactive exploration of individualized 
CMRs transacting borders and borderlands. The second set of observations 
analyzes unions (epitomizing ordered informality) and standing between 
multiple states (home and cross-border) and the CMR. Ordering informality 
within this context therefore describes the constitutive, process and interactive 
dimensions of informal economic actors within Liberia’s borderland spaces.  
                                               
37 Informal discussion with TF in Foya on 24 March, 2014. 
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Ordering informality begins to discern the emergence of informal economic 
groups and networks as unionized/associative spaces. Within these spaces, the 
negotiated alignment of individuals and the structural interests generates a 
socio-economic power nucleus with political implications. Consequently, these 
power spheres are individually and collectively leveraged in quotidian 
transactions with agents of postwar statebuilding. The overriding objective is to 
systematize different forms of quotidian security and economic protection for 
the CMR on one hand, and Union executives on the other.  
 
The CMR sector interacts with the postwar state through the daily navigation of 
internal and international borders. It also engages with international NGOs 
through training, safety and public health programs. CMR “Unions” provide a 
central entry point for postwar state agents and their partners to engage with 
youth-related issues. This interaction legitimates union, strengthening 
representative position and encourages further entrenchment in informality. 
Their position between youth CMRs and the State, provides CMR Unions with 
a platform from which to appropriate, instrumentalize and subjectify 
interventions meant to target youth education, insecurity and unemployment, 
with consequences for postwar state authority and control.  Understanding 
their internal mechanics and politics as well as their organizational structure 
provides a premise from which to discern patterns of interaction with or 
disconnection from architects of postwar state building. Understanding how 
and why crystalizing informal economic groups and networks interact with 
postwar statebuilding in practice holds clues to the durability of statebuilding 
outcomes. Far from implying a one-way relationship, there is also evidence of 




The Political Economy of Ordering Informality: Escaping Interpretive 
Traps 
 
The political economy of war highlights interconnected ordering patterns that 
undergird rational choice decision-making by individuals and socially organized 
and networked (local, national and international) constellations of actors 
involved in the strategy and economics of war (Reno 2004, Keen 2004, Pugh et 
al 2004). Often and rather interchangeably – “informal”, “shadow”, “illicit”, 
“clandestine” and “underground” – have been used to describe patterns of 
wartime economic exchange taking place in areas of alternative or contested 
governance. This conceptual occlusion ought not be transposed in analyzing 
non-state postwar economic patterns characterized by nuanced interweaving of 
economic informality and formality, illegality and legality, daylight and shadowy 
practice, given the normative contextual fluidity. By focusing on borderland 
dynamics this study implicitly contests these ascriptions that align with state 
and international conventional normative construction of categories, which in 
reality fail to advance a political analysis of ordered economic “informality” 
based on the vicissitudes of quotidian practice.  
 
Where the literature has turned towards analyzing society-based quotidian 
economic livelihood phenomena, the focus has revolved around four 
interconnected interpretations of the political sociology of postwar 
statebuilding and peacebuilding – taking actors as socio-economic agents; 
exploring interactive processes; providing crosscutting multi-level analysis and 
giving historical depth to emic constitutive mechanics. Given that ordering 
informality centralized borderland commercial motorbike riders within postwar 
statebuilding processes, this study benefits from political anthropologies of 
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youth, gender, warlords and strongmen. Such studies have contributed to 
problematizing war and postwar individualized agency as contextually shaped 
universal human phenomena rather than distinctly “African” wartime cultural 
phenomena (Reno 1998; Moran 2006; Macauley 2012 and Utas 2003, 2012). This 
line of research broadly explains the relationship between human agency and 
systemic processes by dovetailing interpretations of human agency with the 
negotiation of the emergence and sustenance of pluri-positional postwar social 
structures (Roitman 1990, Brast, 2013, Paffenholz, 2015). However, Paffenholz 
(2015: 868) even encourages adding analytical layers to render more complex the 
essentialist understanding of the local and the international systemic 
dichotomy. This study does just that by delving into the emic mechanics of 
ordering informality within postwar contexts. 
 
This study further seeks to escape the elite interpretive trap, given that focusing 
on elite dimensions of violence, peace settlements and statebuilding often 
overlooks the quotidian dynamics manifest in the quotidian content of postwar 
spaces. Additionally, it seeks to escape the linear interpretive trap, by assuming 
that the non-linear transitional evolution from war to postwar exhibits 
multilevel dissonance and misalignment. Autesserre (2005) does this brilliantly 
by evidencing the paradoxical coexistence of local violence with a context of 
internationally guaranteed national peace in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Deepening the trans-spatial understanding of livelihood resilience 
within contexts of historical and functional duress, Raeymaekers (2014: 2) brings 
together the complex historiographic interplay of cross border human and 
material processes as they engage in transactional micro-economic production 
and reproduction in encounters with different temporal iterations of the state. 
These studies situated in disparate contexts and timeframes as Sierra Leone in 
the 1990s, Liberia between 1989-2005 and contemporary DRC emphasize the 
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necessity to incorporate historical dimensions of human and spatial reality to 
the interpretation of social choices which undergird ordered informality within 
postwar state building contexts.  
 
Understanding postwar ordering informality emphasizes a non-linear and 
deliberate interrogation of the reconstitution of postwar communities, which 
are individually interwoven in prewar, wartime and postwar modes of 
socioeconomic production. The implication here is that postwar livelihood 
economics can neither be understood in a vacuum nor disconnected from the 
dynamics of war and its resultant loss of human life, transformation of property 
bases and population displacement. Therefore, the life histories of postwar 
informal economic actors are important in understanding their individual 
trajectories and livelihood choices. Second economic activity within postwar 
liminal spaces is predominantly informal. The informality, far from implying 
illegality, points to the non-regulation of land, labor and capital processes 
appropriated and deployed as modes of economic production. This is not to 
claim that the informal economy does not incorporate illegality, but rather to 
make a case for looking at the informal economy as an organic process, which 
far from seeking to benefit from illegality, arises from a context of uncertainty 
and resilient vulnerability.  
 
Meanwhile, informal economic actors build networks of protection in order to 
optimize gains from the entrenching of informality. These protective networks 
contribute to deeper explanation of what Raeymaekers (2014:24) describes as a 
subjective dimension of economic entrepreneurship under conditions of long-
term instability and violent change. Given that human livelihood processes 
especially within postwar contexts outpace the gradual return of the state, the 
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state's capacity for regulation is often playing catch-up to crystalized and 
entrenched socially organized economic informality.  
 
Finally, the interactive processes, which produce formality and informality 
occur across multiple levels – spanning from the individual to the national 
level. Hence ordering informality is a systematic process that produces 
operational hybridity where informality is subject to localized patterns of 
unionized formalization, often at the expense of the state. Thus, ordering 
informality as quotidian practice within borderlands seeks to escape total 
formalization while benefiting from selective interaction with the state - 
creating an outcome where the state instrumentally varies in centrality and 
marginality in relation to their livelihood options.  
 
Ordering informality as a process, structurally organizes informal socio-
economic actors – traders, commercial motorbike riders, tailors, money 
changers and petit traders – into associations with fairly loose hierarchies. 
While these groups of individuals might be preoccupied with subsistent 
livelihoods (Chabal and Daloz 1998) their associative structures provide a 
platform for engagement with different kinds of state agents and policy. This 
growth of the CMR sector particularly has led to a process of unionization 
(neither original nor innovative), which serves two purposes – to order the 
informality by gaining the ability to license CMRs and to represent the interests 
of CMRs through as a socially organized unit on the one hand. On the other 
hand, Unions provide an apparently monolithic interlocutor with which state 
agents and statebuilding partners engage in attempts to influence certain 
aspects of ordered informality. Despite operating within a highly deregulated 
environment, CMR Unions are organized more like lobby groups within the 
postwar context.  
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Ordering informality does not merely seek to provide behavioral and 
operational predictability. It also provides a socially organized basis for 
negotiating internally designed and externally supported protection schemes 
and provides a platform for engaging the postwar state. This view is somewhat 
dissonant from Meagher’s (2011: 51) observation that social marginalization and 
livelihood pressures often leave the associations of the poor vulnerable to 
opportunism or political capture by public officials, NGOs, or even by their 
own leadership. By exploring how structures of ordered informality appropriate 
norms and values projected by external interveners and transform them 
through processes of reinterpretation, instrumentalization and subjectification 
(Roitman, 2004:10; MacGinty 2014) this study relativizes both poverty and 
marginality. The “susu” informal credit scheme among CMRs and regulated by 
their Unions exemplifies social development strategizing emerging from 
marginality and based on learned wartime socio-economic practice in spaces of 
displacement. The ability to translate the “susu”’s purpose into empowerment 
outcomes would obviously be the subject of further mixed methods research.
  
Youth Agency and the Postwar Informal Economy 
 
According to the CIA World Factbook, in 2014, 61.1% of Liberia’s total 
population was under age 24. At the individual level, the reference to CMRing 
largely “a young man’s” job38 is particularly important given the historical 
significance of youth agency in the Liberian civil wars. This study privileges 
Utas (2003:8) analysis of “youth combatants” as active agents over Blattman and 
Annan’s (2010: 882) concept of “child soldiers” with its implicit passivity. Thus, 
youth agency is centralized in the construction and maintenance of ordered 
                                               
38 Discussion with Immigration Officer_1 at Guinea Road Border Control Post, March 28, 2014. 
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informality. It also contributes to setting up analyses of generational fault lines 
characterized between youth CMRs on one side and older union leaders and 
formal and informal territorial administrators on the other, as CMRs transact 
borderscapes.  
 
Historically, the uses of and abuses by youth combatants during Liberia’s civil 
wars made international headlines and retook center stage during Charles 
Taylor’s trial at the International Criminal Court. “Youth combatants” enjoyed 
more agency during the Liberian Civil war than any time before, with a high 
proportion of the fighting forces during the Liberian Civil Wars consisting of 
youth combatants (Utas, 2003:9). While youth combatants of Liberia’s first civil 
war (1989-1997), by 2014 have grown into adults, “youth” continues to be 
associated with the bio-technology of war in the collective Liberian 
imagination. This association of youth and violence born of historical reality 
sustains fear and suspicion about youth cultures and political violence in 
Liberia. CMR Unions continue to contend with this stigma in the quotidian 
interaction with borderland communities.  
 
A number of studies have traced the social evolution of Liberia’s ex-youth 
combatants. Soderstrom (2013: 410) identifies ex-combatants in postwar 
countries as central, as they as a group can form a bedrock for renewed 
violence.  Through experimentation with cognitive behavioral therapy among 
Liberian ex-combatants in Monrovia, Blattman et al (2015) observed that 
participants who had felt ostracized by society at the start of the project came 
out believing in their potential for societal inclusion. While these studies hold 
interesting insights for building upon DDRR interventions, they unfortunately 
do not say much about the penchant of contemporary youth for political 
violence. There was not a single CMR in the study areas – Foya and Ganta – 
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who had been a youth combatant during Liberia’s civil wars. Although some 
“ex-fighters” as well as formerly displaced persons serve within the leadership 
of CMR unions. Focusing on understanding the responses of ex-fighters to 
postwar changes often creates blind spots to contemporary alternative loci of 
violence within more general explorations of postwar youth cultures. 
Contemporaneously, wartime youth agency of which Utas (2003) wrote has 
hardly dissipated, but has morphed into postwar youth agency, manifested 
within the informal economy.  
 
Liberia’s youth CMRs have collectively engaged the state, through their Unions, 
to seek and earn protections while retaining non-regulatory concessions. That 
however does not imply the complete exoneration of CMRs from informal 
controls by localized state officials. Meanwhile, outside the unions, they have 
also used the credible threat (and occasional deployment) of violence against 
representations of state authority – such as police stations, and the private 
sector, such as hotels – to different ends. These modes of operation from within 
and outside Unions highlight misalignments that exacerbate tensions in the 
triadic engagement of CMRs, Unions and the postwar State. Understanding 
these misalignments further deepens the understanding of systematic local 
micro-politics of ordered informality.  
 
However, ordered informality has also contributed to dealing with crisis. CMRs 
were active participants in the fight against the Ebola Virus Disease, given the 
popularity of their mode of transportation as potential disease vectors within 
the Ebola’s triangular borderlands of liminal Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. 
The livelihoods of youth borderland navigators are based on mastering the 
socio-political and physical topographies of their borderlands, which to them 
straddle the national and the international. During the EVD crisis, the lives and 
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livelihood of borderland CMRs came under attack by an “invisible enemy and 
we changed the way we operated, protecting ourselves and our customers to 
continue earning money”39. This resilience of youth agency makes “youth” a 
prized bio-political asset in Liberia’s postwar political landscape. Capturing a 
majority of Liberia’s differentiated youth, endows political actors with 
tremendous leverage. However, it is as perilous as herding cats, given the hard 
bargains, which they drive. The confluence, of youth, politics and informal 
economics in Liberia captured through the social organization of ordered 
informality in the CMR transport sector has implication for postwar state 
authority and stability.  
 
Given these processes of ordering informality, borderland economic actors 
develop grounded competitive authority and control over means and ends of 
economic production. With legitimation of Unions occurring through socially 
grounded interpretation of direct accountability and representation, they 
cannot be ignored in the governance of liminal spaces. Far from implying the 
total ideational alignment of Riders and their Unions, their internal politics 
reveal schisms when Unions are perceived to be passive clients to political 
power elites. This challenge the notion of a wholesale capture of these 
associative bodies by public officials (Meagher 2011:51), although within 
Liberia’s postwar context political elites are perceived to have contributed to 
the fracturing of existing unions and the emergence of new ones more 
compliant to their political whims.  
 
 
                                               
39 Interview with CMR_5 in Foya on July 4, 2015.	
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Commercial Motorbike Riding: The Emergence of a Postwar 
Borderland Political Economy 
 
“After the war in 2006, when we came back this place was just like that, nobody 
was capable to eat, no jobs, no NGOs. So, we were here, you know our 
neighboring country that is here, Guinea – I think we were six that planned 
that thing. We went to Guinea, we bought motorbikes, we crossed the 
motorbikes here. At that time, the roads were so deplorable that you cannot 
move.” –  JTS, Foya Commercial Motorbike Pioneer (July, 28, 2015). 
 
The borderland wakes and beds down to the purring daily soundtrack of 
motorbike engines. Ganta and Foya, as borderland cities, have historically 
stood at the crossroads of formal and informal sub-regional economies. In 2012, 
Liberia’s Ministry of Transport estimated that there were around 500,000 CMRs 
in the country, earning between USD6-20 per day (CNN, 2013). Despite the 
predominance of quotidian human and material economic exchange, research 
on Liberia has largely privileged explaining macroeconomic causes and 
consequences of state institutionalization and performance. Export 
commodities (with Firestone’s rubber exploitation and LAMCO’s iron ore 
mining) were seen as central to the construction and decline of the pre-1980 
neo-patrimonial state in Liberia (Sesay et al 2009; Ellis 2006; Sawyer 2004). For 
centuries, the political ruling class (4% of the population) controlled the 
mechanisms of resource allocation and supervised the means of production 
through the entire economy (Asibey, 1991: 389). More so de facto economic 
apartheid made the hinterland provinces the suppliers of labor and financing 
for the central government with the hut tax (Levitt 2005). Subsequent analyses 
highlight the role international aid in sustaining the pre-civil war Liberian state 
from 1980 to 1989. This approach presents the state as both structure and 
principal agent in political outcomes, sapping society of any agency.  
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Quotidian patterns of informal livelihood economics have largely been as 
macroeconomic causal interpretations of Liberia’s political outcomes have been 
favored. Coincidentally, LAMCO’s mining operations, which were taken over 
by Arcelor Mittal Liberia in 2006 are primarily based in Yekepa, on the Nimba 
Mountain ranges which separate Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire. While 
macroeconomics of natural resource endowments is important for the state in 
theory, the microeconomics of social livelihood processes form the core content 
of daily encounters with the state in practice. Within Liberia’s borderlands 
informal livelihood economies do not only predate the state, but they produce 
socio-political dynamics that appropriate and limit the state’s remit of authority 
and control. The Mandingo first arrived in Lofa in the seventeenth century as 
individual traders conducting long-distance commerce between the forest areas 
of Liberia and the savannah regions further inland, bringing much-needed 
goods as well as important skills such as blacksmithing (Bøås 2014). 
 
The integration of CMRing into the borderland economy is very much a 
postwar phenomenon. Multiple accounts in Foya narrate return from external 
displacement (predominantly from Gueckedou, Guinea) to a barely 
recognizable borderland. There were no jobs and diminishing non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) presence, which had supported them 
during the refugee life. In 2006, six returnees from came together to give 
structure to what had been up to this point, the indiscriminate transportation 
of human and materiel within Foya and its environs. They had many templates 
from which to work – ranging from the Liberian Road Transporters’ Union 
(LRTU) and other models of unionizing they had experienced in exile. Today, 
Commercial Motorbike Riding has grown to over 455 (as of July 2015) riders in 
Foya. Meanwhile, in Ganta City, there were over 1400 CMRs registered with the 
local Liberian Motorcycle Transport Union (LMTU) chapter in August 2015. In 
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sheer numerical terms, CMRs are an unavoidable part of the borderland 
informal economies. 
 
According to accounts by LMTU representatives, in both Foya and Gompa, 
local unions started as “social projects” – to combat the marginalization and 
stigmatization of the CMR and to empower CMRs. Though the emergence of 
local unions antedates the creation of the first national union, the LMTU in 
2004, there was no evidence to suggest that local unions used the LMTU as a 
blueprint. In 2005 the Ganta Motorcycle Transport Union (GMTU) formally 
emerged in Ganta to assemble the CMRs in the city and its environs into a 
socio-political movement to serve the interested of CMRs. It is not until 2012 
that the GMTU was incorporated into the LMTU. Once established, they 
worked as a social bloc to counteract the stigmatization of CMRs as uneducated, 
unruly and undisciplined youth. A Sike notes that it was also “to put boys 
under control and to organize people.”40  
 
Meanwhile the local Foya Motorcycle Union chapter emerged in 2006 and was 
incorporated into the national LMTU chapter in 2007. As JS Tomah noted, 
“every now and then we are getting new members and the job is very 
challenging, because there are no jobs and youths are many. And among the 
motorcycle riders, there are many high school graduates. Without a job, the 
person won’t sit. We welcome them on board and we won’t deny them because 
if we deny them, there will be increase in criminal activity.” JS Tomah presents 
the composition LMTU Foya’s membership as predominantly composed of 
high school graduates who do not have the opportunity for advancement to 
higher education. This compositional factor of borderland CMRs runs counter 
to narratives that link youth violence and CMRing to the proliferation of ex-
                                               
40 Interview with LMTU Ganta Official_1 in Ganta on August 25, 2015. 
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combatants within the ranks of CMRs. “The pen-pen drivers are mostly ex-
combatants who fought during the Liberian civil war. As they engaged in the 
process of disarmament, demobilization and integration (DDR), many of the ex-
combatants used funds from the DDR process to buy motorcycles and become 
pen-pen drivers.” (Purdue 2013). In 2013, CNN This view is corroborated by 
personal interactions with CMRs on all the five operating bases within Foya 
and seven operating bases in Gompa. Furthermore, according to JST, LMTU 
Foya performs a social function of reducing criminal activity by providing a 
social avenue for youth empowerment, which is beneficial to local and state 
government.  
 
As an emancipatory socio-economic project with national implications, local 
chapters subsequently sought incorporation into the national LMTU chapter. 
Incorporation into the national chapter, not only gave them the leverage when 
dealing with local authority/bureaucrats, it also provided them with the 
instruments (stickers and ID cards) with which to deal with international 
border agents. However, local LMTU chapters have avoided the homogenizing 
influence of top-down diktat from the national chapter, who in turn gives them 
decentralized control of the affairs of the local chapter. Salient points of 
convergence are the reporting of membership numbers, the payment of 
registration fees for the printing of stickers and IDs, communication of 
leadership changes and solicitation for coordinated campaign action.  Taking 
an example of the way registration numbers are reported to the national LMTU 
chapter, Gompa and Foya record and report their CMR registrations 
differently. While Gompa City records registrations by fiscal year, Foya records 
its registrations by calendar year. Nevertheless, CMRs are expected to renew 
their registration annually, at risk of facing penalties from the local chapter.  
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Figures obtained from local LMTU chapters are indicative of the proliferation 
of CMRing and its indispensability as a borderland economic activity, which 
blends three production factors – capital, labor and the owner (entrepreneur) – 
into a hybridized (in)formal postwar economy.  Table 1 shows the number of 
registered commercial motorbikes from 2005 – 2015 in Gompa, Nimba County 
and Foya, Lofa County. The focus of this table is on the technology – the 
motorbike –, which carries a capital investment of approximately USD850, 
since it is the motorbike that is registered and not the rider. The figures Gompa 
from 2005-2007  
 
Table 2: Annual Figures for Union Registered Commercial Motorbike Riders 
City/YR 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Gompa 1085 600 700 580 1500 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Foya 56 200 234 252 230 260 275 310 356 455 
 
Having created a socio-economic space for themselves, CMRs transact 
international borders where they ‘talk’ with immigration and security officials. 
They crisscross the borderland space in interaction with symbols of state, 
society and markets. Though operating within the informal sector, given that 
CMRs often escape direct state taxation, CMRs contribute to formal and 
informal local revenue generation. As the community of CMRiders (CMRs) has 
grown, so has the propensity for self-organizing.  
 
Commercial Motorbike Riding and the Postwar Youth Cultures 
 
With the proliferation of CMRs, youth cultures have emerged around CMRing 
in borderlands, which makes it a medium through which youth assert their 
agency, interact with the rest of the society and the state and in the process gain 
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relative control over their life options. Despite their life histories being shaped 
by and tinged with references to war, their daily discussions remain anchored 
to vogues and trends reflective of global youth cultures. During a focus group 
discussion meeting at the Makona River waterside border crossing from Foya 
(Liberia) to Gueckedou (Guinea), they teased each other about their origins 
(Guinean, Sierra Leonean and Liberian). Subsequent focus group discussions 
at several CMR bases confirmed many of the insights gleaned from the first 
one.  
 
Mainly young men, they spoke of migratory dreams to the United States of 
America. They thought that migration would provide the next step on their 
journey to being able to provide for their families. The talked about rumors that 
the United States Army or Marine Corps was recruiting service members in 
Liberia. This to them, was a way to fulfill the migratory dream. All the while, 
they fingered their mobile phones imported from Dubai through Guinea and 
Monrovia, with Facebook profiles showing off the ‘friends’ they had worldwide 
through the power of mobile connectivity. They wanted to banter about the 
soccer rivalry between Christiano Ronaldo and Lionel Messi, with sharp 
differences in opinion about the role of the individual in a team and role of the 
team in individual performance. They were fans of Real Madrid or Barcelona, 
Chelsea or Arsenal. And many of them are regulars at JT Soriba’s video club 
where they watch games form live satellite downlink, after which bets are often 
settled. They have hope and dreams rooted in their agency.  
 
They generally did not think that their government could do much for them, 
feeling the need to “make a way for myself and my future”41, ST noted. If 
anything, they felt that government was composed of a bunch of opportunists, 
                                               
41 Interview with ST at Sorluma border crossing on March 22, 2014. 
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no different from those who had ruled Liberia before the wars. However, they 
remain young men, whose dreams, ideals and aspirations are hinged on their 
occupation as CMRs and their occupation of symbolic, social and physical 
centrality within the borderland space.  
 
This sets up several generational fault lines with borderland actors who feel the 
need to assert control over the youth agency garnered through CMRing. Thus, 
CMRs confront a counter perspective from older individuals (mostly state 
representatives in borderlands) who see CMRing as “mortgaging the country’s 
educational future, since youth run away from education for the immediate 
gratification of a few LDs (Liberty Dollars)/day as Pehn Pehns or even working 
on the rubber farms. It is a serious problem”42. This perspective, however, does 
not capture the complex social ties, which bind individual CMRs to an 
emergent socio-political group and its implications for long-term livelihood 
projection.  
 
Borderland CMRs and an Informal Economic Agenda 
 
The motivations that drive CMR on the borderlands are principally economic. 
In the pursuit of their individualized economic agendas, they encounter 
different societies and different manifestations of the state. They follow some 
rules and circumvent others. They seek to optimize their profits, which 
translate into a concomitant flexibility of social and symbolic options. 
Interviews with individuals at different levels of the CMR chain evidence the 
evolution from riding to ownership, which in borderlands represents a path 
towards empowerment on the margins of the state while remaining embedded 
within one’s local community. According to JS Tomah, he “began riding bike 
                                               
42 Interview with Immigration Official at St. John River Crossing, Ganta on 30 March, 2014. 
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in 2007. I bought my own bike. I bought it in Guinea for USD750. The rate at 
that time was a little bit encouraging 70LD/USD… You know in this world, 
there is a lot of suffering. You walk long distances moving from one place to 
another. When I came to get my first money, which of course I did benefit to 
buy a bike. Where I used to go, because I had a distance to go teach, using the 
bike to go and come. After teaching I did CMR. The union came, I became part 
of the union. They saw my input and output and that is why I was encouraged. 
And also, what I was making on the field of teaching is very little. So, the bike 
can embark me at least to succeed my family and do other things. You see bike 
riders, so people have two, two houses right now. Some people start from bike 
riding, now they have cars. As we are speaking now, some are here.” This 
narrative captures the aspirations of the CMR in Liberia’s borderlands, but 
those aspirations do not end at the acquisition of wealth. 
 
Young CMRs use their bikes to project messages of self-worth and their views 
of the world. Fig 1 below shows some of the messages, which personalize and 
transform the motorbike from a random piece of mobility into an individualized 
symbol.  The rider of panel #6 is a 24-year-old rider who spoke of how “when 
you struggle, people dem don’t know you. Them when dem see you on 
motorbike, dem want make you give them free ride. Nah dem dey put food for 
my table?” The CMR on panel #3 said he had left school when he got the 
opportunity to ride a commercial motorbike because “I did not think that 
school will provide for my future. You see any office jobs since you have come 
around here?” These are only a selection of the perspectives captured in an 
attempt to understand what some of the personalized inscriptions on 
commercial motorbikes meant to the riders.  
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Being on the borderland, they experience border crossing, with the interaction 
with border agents on both sides of the border. According to JS Tomah “At the 
time when the border was open, before Ebola, I crossed so far at Gueckedou, 
because when you get to the waterside you have to talk with the security this 
side, they will give you a pass and when you cross, then that is the pass you will 
show to the Guinean security. After they can judge it and tell you to go and do 
what you are supposed to do. When the border is open, when you get there you 
only pay 30LD. Before you go through the Guinean side you give them about 
2000 Guinea Franc… [sic On the Sierra Leonean side] When the road is open, 
here it is dry land. When you get to the checkpoint on the Liberian side, you 
talk with the security, they give you a pass to go to the Sierra Leonean side. 
You pay 25LD on the Liberian side and when you get on the other side, you 
pay 2500 Leone (about 45LD). On the Sierra Leonean side, we go all the way to 
Kenema… Once you have your identity and your plate, you go, you come, no 
disturbance… On the Sierra Leone side, when they see Liberian bike, they will 
identify it because we have the sticker, you show your ID card, because we 
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trained them and gave them ID cards most of the riders, that you need to show 
it. The computerized ID card is issued by the union. The card comes directly 
from the National head office.” JS Tomah’s is the official narrative as he is the 
chairman of the local chapter of the LMTU. TT, a young CMR, however noted 
with surprise, “which borders are close? When did they close them? I carry 
market women everyday from the waterside to Foya here and they cross, no 
problem. When they reach the small gate, they take temperature and wash 
hand, nah all.” This dual narrative captures the official line the LMTU provides 
in consonance with the state’s narrative of closing borders in response to the 
Ebola pandemic. However, in reality, the interconnectedness of borderland 
communities makes preventive measures, such as temperature controls, hand-
washing and collection of traveler contact information (for tracking purposes) 
more effective than attempts to close borders. Border closures invariably lead to 
the use of alternative crossing points devoid of controls and through which 
travelers would be unaccounted for.   
 
Not all interactions with neighboring authorities are made equal. As JS Tomah 
noted, “Traveling on the Sierra Leonean side is a little bit easier than on the 
Guinean side. You can use your bike to go to Sierra Leone once you have the 
necessary documents without disturbance and go all the way to Kenema. 
Sometimes people used to go there and buy goods in Kenema same day and 
come back. You will go the same day, come back. But sometimes you will enter 
here now night hour. Sometimes when you reach to the border, security will 
tell you to wait until the next morning before you cross. On the Sierra Leone 
side, when the war broke out, we went there. I was stopping at Bo. I later went 
to Freetown before I came back. I know most of that area. I know Kenema, I 
know Kailahum, I know Bo, I know Pujahun, I know Freetown, I know 
McKinney, I travelled all these towns.”   
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Interactions with the Guinean authorities seem to be more challenging than 
with the Sierra Leonean authorities. According to TT, they cannot purchase 
fuel in Guinea for sale in Liberia because, “Guinea, you don’t even tamper to 
even take a half liter to even bring it across here. They don’t allow it. Nah [sic 
because it is] the peoples’ policy. Nah [sic because it is] French speaking 
country. You don’t take even bag of rice from over there to bring it here. 
Things leave from here go there like oil, coffee, cocoa go across. But now oil 
can go there. You only go you buy these finished goods, you bring it in Liberia, 
but they don’t allow you to bring any other thing. Except when you carry your 
bike sometimes, you buy, you put it in the tank, that is the only way you can 
bring it in.” Despite trade enforcement measures on the Guinean side, the 
transporters of the borderlands have devised ways of circumventing these 
controls. 
  
The road infrastructure affects the cost of transportation, which in turn affects 
the cost of products that end up on borderland market. As JS Tomah averred, 
“for now from here [sic Foya] to the waterside, you can pay 200LD because they 
have paved the road, the machine worked on it. It is okay. First time, when you 
talk about 2009-2010, 500LD for one person because of the road condition. 
From the waterside to Gueckedou town is 5000 Guinea Franc. There is two 
fares because you have to pay the canoe from shore to shore which is 1000LD. 
From that, if you want to cross your bike, you put it on the canoe and they 
cross you, you pay 5000.” It also affects the cost of operating the bike between 
rainy and dry seasons. There are no price controls on the CMR fares, which are 
the product negotiated consent between the CMR and the passenger either 
prior to or at the destination of the fare. However, this has its own 
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complications, which often lead to wrangling between the CMR and the 
passenger.  
 
From Rider to Owner: Labor, Credit Facilities and the Entrepreneurial 
Dream 
 
At 31, JT Soriba is a young borderland entrepreneur and a CMR pioneer in 
Foya, Lofa County. He evidences the individual and collective resiliency 
developed through displacement and which is visible in most borderland life 
histories. New patterns of livelihood organization learned and developed 
through displacement are often deployed for social advancement on return. JT 
Soriba was 21 when he returned to Foya from Gueckedou, Guinea in 2005 (two 
years after the signing of the Liberian Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
Accra in August 2003). A year later, he returned to Guinea to buy his first 
motorbike for USD650 (2006$). Today, he owns four commercial motorbikes in 
Foya among other social and business ventures. Residents of borderlands 
largely depend on CMRs for basic transportation within the borderlands, 
between borderlands and County centers and across borders. As a technology, 
the commercial motorbike circumvents challenges posed by the rugged terrain 
of rolling hills. It overcomes the infrastructure lacuna exhibited by the 
prevalence of seasonal roads. It also informalizes the engagement between the 
technology and its operator and the emergent state. Despite the risks of serious 
bodily harm involved with using commercial motorbikes for their daily 
displacement, CMRs provide transportation for all seasons. Their social and 
economic place in the postwar borderland space makes them a centerpiece of 
bottom up postwar reconstruction. 
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The capital investment in the commercial motorbike is simultaneously 
financial, social and human. The manifestation of that capital is inseparable 
from its labor and entrepreneurial components, given the nature of the largely 
informal contracts that associate both worker (CMR) and entrepreneur (CMO) 
to capital. J.S. Tomah described the two types of schemes that bind CMRs to 
CMOs are the “Work and Pay” scheme and the “Daily Work” Scheme. 
According to JS Tomah, the Work and Pay scheme “lets the rider free the 
bike…If at all we make an agreement, you [the CMR] and myself, I go and 
purchase the bike [the CMO]. Then we agree on a certain amount for you to 
pay. After you pay the amount, the bike will be yours. I will give you the 
freedom to run the bike. When you generate the required amount of money, 
the bike is for you. This way, many bike riders work their way to becoming bike 
owners within a year.”43 However, such programs often do not take into account 
the depreciating values of these assets, which depend on seasonal roads to 
generate revenue. 
 
The Daily Work scheme operates slightly differently. According to A. Sikeh, 
“The rider and the owner, they agree on the money which the rider will give to 
the owner at the end of the work day. Everything that the rider makes above 
the agreed money, he will keep.”44 This interpretation of the Daily Work 
scheme is corroborated by both JS Tomah and JT Soriba.  
 
In both schemes, both the CMR and the CMO are vested and invested in the 
productivity of the asset – the motorbike. This arrangement transforms the 
CMR into a vested worker with stock options in the delivery of transport 
services. Meanwhile the aspect of ownership itself is pluralized through the 
                                               
43 Interview with JS Tomah at LMTU Foya Office on July 29, 2015. 
44 Interview with A. Sikeh at LMTU Ganta Office on August 25, 2015.	
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degree of control, which both CMR and CMO have on the fixed, yet 
depreciating asset. Thus, the CMO engages with the emergent postwar state in 
the borderland by proxy of the CMR even in cases where the CMO is a state 
agent. Both CMR and CMO have an interest in increasing their income by 
circumventing costs imposed by local (unions and city councils), national 
(commerce and law enforcement) and international actors (border agents) who 
administer these modes of production.  
 
In most cases, oral contracts are executed between nuclear or extended family 
relations (laborer and entrepreneur), based on filial trust. Even when contracts 
are written out, they are hardly ever notarized into the rational-legal domain. 
Though the enforcement of such contracts could possibly end up in the 
rational-legal sphere, it is usually a last resort after having made its way through 
informal dispute resolution channels. It is from this very informal place that 
CMRs have proliferated the borderland space. The “work and pay” and “daily 
work” contracts are often oral as the investor (owner) meets the laborer and 
they both reach agreement about over the means of production – the CMR. 
This has contributed to the emergence of informal labor management 
mechanisms within the business of CMRing, as well as the use the Unions as 
internal and external conflict resolution mechanisms. 
 
Ordering informality has led to the internal configuration of CMR unions into 
in-house credit schemes – known as the “susu”, which has also attracted 
investment from CMOs. Local unions oversee “susu” schemes, which 
encouraged CMRs to move from the driver seat to full ownership of their own 
means of production. Hence local unions developed an emancipatory project 
for operators within their economic sector in rural communities, until then, 
largely dependent on seasonal agriculture (Foya) and commercial trade (Ganta). 
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This contributes to the development of a sustainable framework of youth 
empowerment through CMR. In Foya, for example, there are 16 susu groups 
across the 4 bases, with a majority of 6 susu groups operating out of Base 2 – 
New Foya.  
 
Meanwhile, derivative businesses such as fuel sellers, foreign exchange sellers 
(coupled with telephone refill cards and cell phone charging stations) and food 
sellers congregate around these CMR bases, effectively and heuristically 
spawning multiple and decentralized commercial hubs within the borderlands. 
 
Between Commercial Motorbike Riders and the State – Commercial 
Motorcycle Unions and Borderland Ordering of Informality 
 
Establishing the pluralized logics and registers which frame the interaction 
between CMRs, CMR Unions and State agents provides would provide an 
understanding of the emic mechanics of the triadic relationship. The 
constitutive mechanics of ordering informality is fluidly predicated upon its 
organizational logic and internal politics that differs from one informal 
economic sector to the next. Internal politics of ordering informality are subject 
to the alignment of interests between individual economic actors (as members) 
and unionized social structures (as institutional and associative bodies). The 
socially negotiated interdependence of the individual economic operator and 
the social organization (also a socio-political actor) is built upon constant 
interaction between both parties. Ordering informality occurs when quotidian 
livelihood processes encounter hegemonic orders – incarnated in the State. 
Hence it is in the exploration of the triadic interaction between – the informal 
economic operator, the structural manifestation of ordered informality and the 
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state – that an explanation of the tenuous relationship between bottom-up 













As evidences in Figure 1, the internal and external politics of CMR unions 
straddle borderland youth dynamics and the state. The internal Union political 
dynamics exhibit formalized modes of participation through membership rights 
and privileges. Meanwhile the Unions also have formalized relationships with 
the state which licenses them. This coincides with the definition of informal 
institutions advanced by Bagayoko et al (2016: 5) as largely structured around 
implicit practices, social understandings, networks of interaction of interaction 
and social sanctioned norms of behavior. However, the direct relationship 
between the state and individual CMRs and the state is either mediated by the 
Union or largely informal. The expectation of these groups, given their 
proximity to the border, is one of protection as they transact international 
borders. Organizing as a union provides a framework for engaging both their 
state of origin as well as neighboring states. Therefore, when CMRs cross 







Figure 2: Relational Triad Between CMRs, 
CMR Unions and the State 
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Given the membership expectations of individual CMRs from the Union, there 
is a degree of participation that is not experienced with the state. However, this 
participation also often translates into the political misalignment between 
individual CMRS and the Unions. Despite differences between borderland 
cities, there are patterned organizational and functional similarities in the 
interaction between motorcycles unions, CMRs and the state within these 
borderlands. 
 
What began as local unions have been incorporated into a national union – the 
Liberian Motorcycle Transporters Union (LMTU). Meanwhile, the local politics 
of unionization has also led to the emergence of competing unions. For 
borderlands once dependent on a subsistence-agriculture based economy, the 
CMR sector has become a cornerstone of the borderland economy in its own 
right. It has also spawned the growth of related economic sectors such as – local 
foreign currency exchange; a local petroleum wholesale and retail market; and a 
technical service sector in motorbike maintenance. Meanwhile, forms or 
ordering and control embedded within unionized CMR structures, provides a 
platform for networked social and political organization. So, organized, they 
become a coveted political force for both local and national politicians. 
 
The management of local LMTU offices shows that despite being tethered to 
the national chapter, they have largely escaped the homogenizing influence of 
top-down ordering. According to its charter, “LMTU Ganta [Gompa] is a union 
of motorcyclists operating in Ganta and its environs that works for sustainable 
unity, empowerment and social welfare amongst motorcyclists.”45 Locally, they 
also remain gatekeepers between the state (in its local and national 
manifestations) and CMRs. Registration numbers, for example, are a 
                                               
45 LMTU Ganta Charter displayed in their offices in Ganta on August 23, 2015. 
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contentious issue within unions and between local and national union chapters. 
There is a fiscal cost associated with accurate reporting of registration figures. 
It binds the local chapters to produce an equivalent amount of funds per 
registered member to the national chapter. Hence underreporting registration 
membership implies a smaller contribution to the national chapter. Thus, 
registration reporting has often been the source of conflict between national 
and local chapters and between local chapters and their membership. In Foya, 
JT Soriba notes that, “when we do all our collections from our members, we 
can report to him [the LMTU county representative], then he has to take the 
report to Central [Monrovia]. So, when he comes back we ask him for receipt 
that he paid to the Central, we can’t get receipt.”  
 
Within borderlands, the result of non-accountability has often been the 
emergence of alternate Unions. In the case of Foya, a new union, the Liberian 
Tri-MotorCycle Association (LIMCA) is currently being established. Meanwhile 
in Ganta, the United Safety Motor Cooperative of Liberia (USMOL) is already 
in existence. Meanwhile, at the national level, there are three unions – the 
LMTU, USMOL and United Motorcycle Transport Union Liberia (UMTUL). 
The emergence of these competing unions within both center and margins 
reflects competing resource agendas within both borderland and the center. 
 
However, different explanations were gleaned for the challenge with getting an 
accurate count of CMRs. A. Sikeh, the Vice President for Operations for 
LMTU-Gompa, explained that, “it is extremely difficult to keep track of the 
CMRs, because there are some people who buy a motorbike and give it to a 
relative to run as a business for them with no registration. Our field officers are 
there to make sure that they are registered and accounted for. But there are 
times when the unregistered CMRs physically attack and insult our field 
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operators.” However, HS, a 20-year-old CMR in Gompa noted that “I cannot 
tell you how many motorbike riders there are in Gompa. But we plenty, plenty. 
If you think that the union will tell you how many we be, nah lie. I no even 
know their own work. They sit in office and chop money.”  
 
Meanwhile, JS Tomah, the Foya LMTU Chapter Chairman, noted that, “we are 
working for the motorbike riders at the Union, because the annual registration 
of 500LD can only cover the costs for printing the sticker and the ID card. Here 
we don’t use plates as the other people do it in the town [Monrovia], here we 
deal with stickers. The sticker is just for 500LD. So, we get help from NGOs 
and when politicians come to town they also help us.” This ID card and sticker 
prove invaluable when crossing international borders, but do not matter much 
when working within the internal borderland. Hence some borderland CMRs 
are reticent about acquiring stickers and ID cards, if they do not need to cross 
borders, a view, which runs counter to union rules. This difference in 
perspective captures the quotidian misalignment between the Unions and their 
members around the issue of numbers, membership and roles.  
 
Beyond its socio-economic youth empowerment project the Union also works 
actively to promote rider and passenger safety, mainly through training. In 
order to meet their training objectives, unions have worked with NGOs to 
develop training manuals used to educate new riders and for refresher 
programs for older riders. According to JS Tomah, in Foya, “The training that 
we took [dispensed] was on bike riding concerning violations. You don’t ride 
bike carelessly. You know, for someone who has not been trained on a 
motorbike before does not know most of these things. He has to be trained. We 
also train on the manner of approach of the passenger or joint security. Even as 
a bike rider, you don’t just get drunk or you take any other drugs to help riding 
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your bike. All these things were done, I have the manuals here. So, there are 
lots of things in that manual that we talk about. Rights and Rice Foundation. 
All these guys that were trained before, you hardly see them go against these 
things. Only the new riders, even some accidents can happen, probably you 
only see like new riders. Or those that are just joining the group.” As 
gatekeepers, the unions interact with NGOs, such as GiZ and the Rights and 
Rice Foundation, which have dedicated programs to enhance the safety of the 
CMR sector, seen as a cornerstone of Liberia’s postwar reconstruction, given its 
engagement with Liberia’s youth.  
 
In Ganta, promotion of rider and passenger safety has gone beyond training 
into the LMTU’s recommendation to purchase insurance and a crash helmet 
(sold through the LMTU) for rider and passengers. This has been a source of 
contention within LMTU Ganta stemming from a rise in motorcycle accidents 
with the increased urbanization of the commercial center and the concomitant 
proliferation of auto, trailer and motorcycle traffic. According to A. Sikeh, “no 
CMR wants to buy the insurance because they always say that ‘it will never 
happen to me’ and when it happens it is too late, they lose their investment and 
at times, even their life”. While CMRs have been more responsive to 
purchasing personal protective equipment (including crash helmets) for 
themselves from commercial vendors, they neither extend the privilege of 
protection to their passengers (because it presents a public health challenge), 
nor have they warmed up to purchasing insurance policies. MD, a CMR in 
Gompa, talking through his crash helmet noted that, “the union dey sell helmet 
wey cannot even protect you in accident. So, I buy my own for Main Street. But 
that insurance, no way. I ride safe so no need for insurance… God always 
protect me. Even through war he protect me. Even now he protect me.” While 
A. Sikeh points to the need for a sensitization campaign to get CMRs to buy 
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into the purchase of insurance policies which protect both them and their 
investments, he notes that it is extremely difficult to even embark on such a 
sensitization campaign since in Ganta, the riders hardly attend meetings except 
in moments of crisis, since the time spent at meetings is often considered to be 
a loss of revenue. 
 
Calling union meetings is not harmonized from one borderland city to the next. 
According to JS Tomah, “we have a schedule to meet two times a month. If 
there is any information or emergency, I have a taskforce on the field who 
work. If you violate, they will be able to straighten you, they are not military 
people, so they talk to you actually, they arrest your bike if you violate. They 
carry messages to every rider on every base and when time goes on, I send them 
to the field to the various parking lots to oversee whatsoever is going on and 
sometimes in the evening they give me a report. Or sometimes weekly, I ask 
them to give me a report. Or if the situation is beyond their control, I do go on 
the field and handle the case if there is anything like that and address the 
situation.” There are elements of direct and effective control of the CMR sector 
in Foya by the union in Foya which deserve deeper analysis.  
 
Borderland motorbike Unions have unavoidably morphed from a socio-
economic project into political movements. Liberia’s war history is wrought 
with images of drug-induced gun-toting youth combatants wreaking havoc on 
the civilian population. Borderlands have been particularly vulnerable to the 
challenges posed by this youth bulge, given the relatively meager state 
investment in social services (schools, health care and job training programs) 
although youth unemployment numbers remain unknown. Even when NGOs 
have partnered with the state to meet social service needs, it has been 
unsustainable. Hence CMRing has absorbed many of these borderland youth, 
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who otherwise will be left either unemployed or over reliant on agricultural 
jobs. 
 
By creating avenues for otherwise disenfranchised borderland youth, unions 
become gatekeepers between CMRs and the state. According to JS Tomah, “we 
encourage them to be part and parcel of the Union. Show them all the talents 
to be a motorcyclist, the rules of the union and rules of the road. We can write 
a proposal to NGOs for help for some to go and advance themselves in school 
or a trade.”  A Foya LMTU leader noted that “sometimes the District 
Superintendent or the Commissioner call me. Sometimes if they see certain 
acts that are going on, since you cannot travel behind every bike rider, 
sometimes they go out, if they misbehave in his presence, sometimes they do 
complain.”46 He continued, “The Commissioner calls me and tells me things to 
advise them and sometimes when we get to the meeting here I can advise on it. 
Sometimes he himself used to arrest them because when you do that kind of 
bad behavior, or you don’t want to take your time, he will ask you to stop, tell 
you what you’re supposed to do as a rider, because you don’t overtake someone 
on the right while the person is going. Sometimes he used to call me to say 
‘there are certain riders here that are doing thing which can cause an accident 
if they continue.’ So, I call them, talk to them, advise them.”  
 
In Ganta, A. Sikeh explains how he de-escalated a situation when “the 
motorbike riders came here and told me that they wanted to go burn down the 
police station. I asked them what they wanted to accomplish by burning down 
the police station. After listening to them, I told them that they will be more 
effective in making their concerns known by parking their bikes for a day and 
letting everyone in Ganta try to find a means to go to the market, send their 
                                               
46 Interview with LMTU Foya Official_2 July 28, 2015 
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children to school, or go to hospital or go to work. The pressure on the people 
of this city will force the authorities to call the police to order and it is better 
than burning up the police station.” He might have saved a situation from going 
out of control, but with radical fringe group of CMRs, this amounts to collusion 
with the police.  
 
JS Tomah captures the relationship between the Liberian National Police 
(LNP) and LMTU Foya when he notes that, “On the line of security, as a 
chairman I work directly with the Traffic Officer of the LNP because that is our 
guide. On the field, because they are so many, because as you know after the 
war people got on the field of motorcyclist, some have fought war before, but 
now to cool them down we have to encourage them to be on the field. Anything 
that happens there, I will channel it to the LNP traffic officer so they will be 
able to help assist me.” Hence for reasons of public safety symbiosis between 
state agents and the LMTU is unavoidable. While it is a delicate balancing act 
for the union leadership to work between the state and the CMR, it is a 
position, which empowers them to spatially order and position CMRs within 
borderscapes.  
 
The leaders of the local unions are usually selected to serve in those positions 
by the members of the union. However, quite a bit of politicking goes into this 
selection process. JS Tomah was ‘elected’ by acclamation on 23 July 2012 to 
serve a three-year term as chairman of the Foya LMTU local chapter. He 
expected to hand over the reins of the organization to a new bureau in August 
2015. Being a public-school teacher by day, a CMR during his non-teaching 
hours and an owner of two commercial motorbikes himself, he presents the 
hybridity of the CMR sector within borderlands. By his accounts, “before 
starting as a motorcyclist, I was in the teaching field. So, I bought my bike and 
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after class, I will join with them and ride. Under their leadership [the previous 
union leaders] CMRs were suffering… This is why a group of people came to 
me and said that we want you to lead us. Later, they contacted the LMTU Lofa 
County coordinator and he called for election. We went to election and I won.” 
He claims that the previous leadership whom he ousted had tried to form a 
counter union, known as AUTO. However, the wrangling has continued, 
leading to papers being filed with national and local authorities for the 
establishment of a second motorcycle union in Foya.  
 
Having established himself as a local organizer, JT Soriba, once led the local 
Foya chapter of the LMTU, and is the current leader of the union seeking to 
establish itself as a rival to LMTU in Foya, the Liberian Tricycle and Motorcycle 
Association (LIMCA). Typical of occupational hybridity within borderlands, JT 
Soriba owns four commercial motorbikes. He is also invested in telecasting 
soccer games from the restored carcass of an abandoned warehouse, which still 
exhibits bullet holes on its façade, on Foya’s commercial Broad Street. He is 
also currently serving as chairman of the Foya Progressive Intellectual Forum 
(FPIC), a social group of 70 young members (25 female). The FPIC organizes 
public debates and discussions on hot button issues and plays a central role 
during elections. He considers himself a political figure.  
 
Therefore, his role in the emergence of LIMCA is as political as it is social. He 
uses his business acumen to develop political networks and increase his social 
stature within Foya. The rivalry between LMTU-Foya and LIMCA therefore, 
captures the political dynamics which belie unionization within a 
predominantly youth operated sector on the borderlands. 
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Despite these rivalries that develop talent in local political organizing, Unions 
leverage their position within borderlands to spatially order CMRs within the 
borderscape. Spatial ordering of informality benefits unions, CMRs, derivative 
businesses, customers and the state. In Foya, the Union has ordered CMRs into 
four bases, strategically situating – Base 1 on Broad Street; Base 2 at New Foya 
Market (the daily market); Base 3 at Kpormu Road Market; and Base 4 at Ndama 
Road (where the Saturday regional weekly market occurs). In Ganta, staging 
areas are divided into 7 bases – Base 1 at Saclipea Parking; Base 2 on Guinea 
Road; Base 3 at Gbahn Parking; Base 4 at Beer Garden; Base 5 at Kpein 
Parking; Base 6 at LPMC; and Base 7 at Market Parking.  
 
This spatial distribution of bases, allows for all areas of the borderland city to 
be within a short distance from a CMR staging area. The predominance of their 
locations at intercity automobile parks in Gompa also allows CMRs to serve as a 
relay to those who arrive by car to be transported to their specific borderland 
homes/destinations by commercial motorbike. This scheme also gives Unions 
easier operational control over CMRs while bringing order to a potentially 
chaotic situation. It also provides an organizational base for the informal credit 
schemes – the ‘susu’, since an operational leader on each base controls the 
‘susu’ operations to minimize disputes between the participants in the ‘susu’ 
scheme.  
 
The fuel business within borderlands has flourished on the back of CMRing. 
According to TT, “We buy gas from the gas seller who also have a union. They 
buy gas from Monrovia, bring it and we the riders buy it from them. The 
mayonnaise bottle, that is 100LD. The gallon is 400LD. On the urban side, they 
use gallon. Most of the motorcyclists buy in gallons, but we here, because we 
are not equally equal, we have been selling in liters. That particular mayonnaise 
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bottle nah liter. Nah how we measure it. Because of the road network, prices 
will go up. Actually, when the sellers struggle hard to go to Monrovia, so when 
they go bring it because of the road network, so they can raise the price certain 
time. But for this year, we thank God, since the year begins we are buying it 
even 85LD. Only recently they have raised it up to 100. All the gas comes from 
Monrovia.” The leader of the gas seller’s union is a Gambian national who has 
lived in Foya for 3 years. He is both a gas wholesaler and a retailer who gets his 
supply mainly from the Freeport in Monrovia.   
 
Appropriating NGO Interventions – Interactions and Expectations 
 
Though operationally inscribed within the informal sector, given that CMRs 
often escape direct state income taxation, CMRs contribute to formal and 
informal local revenue generation through the payment of fees to cross borders 
and daily local council charges. According to TT, “When you go the waterside, 
you don’t need to pay anything at the control post. They see your motorbike 
and they know you from here. But if you want cross to the other side, you 
better take your ticket from them. Because the Guinea people dem will not let 
you pass if you no get ticket from here.” He further notes that ““I go Guinea 
plenty more than Sierra Leone, so I cannot really compare the two. When I 
cross Guinea side, I talk in Kissi, but I know small French too, hahaha 
‘bonjour’. But if I am not making good money, I will not pay to cross the border 
because there is no guarantee to get a good customer to come back. And I no 
want burn my gas and money if I no get round trip.” 
 
However, like much of the communities in the borderlands, they have 
challenges to which they look to both the government and the non-
governmental sector for help. As CMRing has established itself as an integral 
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economic and occupational activity within borderlands, its relationship to social 
and political violence has become an issue. This awareness has attracted the 
attention of international NGOs – such as the German Cooperation Mission – 
which have sought to developed programs to enhance the safety and 
proficiency of CMRs within borderlands.  
 
However, many of the programs are unsustainable and therefore have a spotty 
record within the borderlands. According to JT Soribah, “The Rights to Rice 
program provided training for trainers of commercial motorbike riders and I 
was one of those who got training through the program. They pay us to 
participate in the program and that was good. But since then, no training.” 
However, subsequent training programs have evolved from training trainers to 
the provision of training manuals, which JS Tomah acknowledges. Although a 
huge Rights and Rice Foundation billboard sits at Foya’s main intersection of 
Broad Street and Ndama Road, a majority of young CMRs claim to never have 
benefitted from any training through the program. 
 
However, Unions particularly remain hopeful that NGOs would continue to 
promote development in borderlands. According to JS Tomah, “we can write a 
proposal to NGOs for help for some [CMRs] to go and advance themselves in 
school or a trade… We wish for NGO or government to come in, we have some 
high school graduates who want to advance themselves, but there is no chance 
for now. At least to help for those who are out of high school to go and advance 
themselves. Those who have not graduated should be encouraged to go back to 
school because bike is not something you depend on forever, but education, 
when you learn, you learn it forever until your death.”47 The reason they need 
this help from NGOs is because “You don’t just go to the big town [to go to 
                                               
47 Interview with JS Tomah in Foya on July 29, 2015 
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university] because you see your friends going there. You have to at least 
develop or have a foundation where to start. Maybe in that process you will get 
the help. But if you don’t start anywhere, only go there, maybe you will join an 
ugly group, and you will suffer tomorrow. This is why they are hustling (not to 
say they are stealing) but they are on bike looking for money to get to the city or 
any other area they have colleges or universities to attend.” They need some 
kind of support mechanism to leave the borderlands to attend universities and 




Local politicians have a vested interest in organizations through which they can 
reach out to an influential youth constituency. Both national and local 
politicians and parliamentarians keep close contact with LMTU leaders. JT 
Soriba, through the FPIC notes that “Our leaders that are in Monrovia over 
there, always when they come here, I think nah the first place [sic the FPIC] 
that they can go to talk to us. When they come, they book appointment with us. 
We schedule them time, when they come, we discuss relevant issues of this 
district.” On the side of the union JS Tomah, notes that “Our local politicians, 
they can give jerseys to the union. We use these jerseys when we organize 
outing on Sorlumba highway to play football and enjoy ourselves.” 
 
The CMR provides economic rhythm to a borderland landscape, which in its 
marginality has been bereft of the public works projects that transform seasonal 
roads to macadamized thoroughfares. As individuals, they are an unavoidable 
presence in quotidian borderland economies. However, collectively, CMRs 
empower themselves where the state has failed to provide meaningful social 
investments. Through the organization of local micro-credit schemes, CMRs 
 255 
can make the leap from riders to owners, thereby boosting their economic 
potential.  
 
However, with the return of the postwar state, they have been obliged to join 
unions in order to develop social protection mechanisms and guarantees as 
they navigate international borders. Despite the occasional misalignment of 
interests between Unions and their members, Unions have emerged into 
gatekeepers between the state and CMRs. This gatekeeping role evidences 
interdependence between the union and the state to meet the mutual objective 
of diminishing social violence. Their role also reflects the gradual process 
through which these actors generative of a liminal political order that sits 
uncomfortably in the twilight between the power of states and markets 
(Raeymaekers 2014: 36).  
 
CMRing also spawns the emergence and ebullience of derivative economic 
activities which transform the hitherto plain physical borderland spaces into 
hubs of petty trading, thereby enhancing the livelihood options of borderland 
communities. However, they remain expectant of help, mainly from the non-
governmental sector, because they are acutely aware that the CMR is a short-
term activity, which many youths engage in for a few years before moving on to 
other commercial or political activities. Therefore, it is a sector, which 












Grounded authority is largely the product of organized informality, 
administrative plurality and complex endogenous and exogenous networked 
interaction. Thus, it does not fit neatly into Weberian rational-legal, traditional 
and charismatic patterns of authority that focus on explaining the production 
and maintenance of order through the interaction of subjects and leader within 
the verband [which Parsons (1964: 56) translates as the “corporate group”]. This 
sociological interpretation of organization structuring and processes highlights 
three interrelated factors. Firstly, there is the internal differentiation of roles as 
a fundamental distinguishing factor of the organized social group. Secondly, 
this role differentiation derives from the relationship between the very nature 
of the orientation of coordinated action and an ‘order’ itself. Thirdly, given that 
the terms of the order must be carried out and enforced, it requires a 
responsible agency of administration and enforcement (Parsons 1964; 56). 
Through the structural configuration of informal ordering and ordering 
informality presented in chapters four and five, borderland social actors build 
and maintain grounded authority and control over the informal administration 
of territory (space) and socio-economic livelihood processes.  
 
This chapter builds upon the previous two, by exploring the social construction 
and quotidian deployment of grounded authority through processes of informal 
ordering and ordering informality. These forms of ordering taking place within 
different spheres of borderland activity provide a comparative prism for 
understanding the plurality of grounded authority. Given their grounding in 
everyday practice, these forms of authority highlight social agency within 
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borderland spaces and their differentiated implications for postwar 
statebuilding. Hence grounded authority importantly evidences the postwar 
challenge of recentralizing authority within a hegemonic state. 
 
The assumption here is that the externally driven nature of postwar 
international statebuilding allows for the emergence and maintenance of 
grounded authority. By treating society building as secondary to statebuilding, 
postwar processes have invariably focused on institutions of state its social 
service provision dimensions. However, the heuristic evolution of organized 
grounded quotidian livelihood processes is obliged to engage with the re-
emergent externally backed postwar sate. It is in the process of social 
organization for engagement with the postwar state and its statebuilding 
partners that historically embedded practices reconstruct and deploy grounded 
authority.    
 
Thus far from viewing grounded authority from the limited postwar temporal 
frame, an expansive historicization of grounded authority would contribute to 
understanding its social embeddedness. Furthermore, narratives about the 
evolution of grounded authority within borderlands also provide a comparative 
temporal frame for understanding relational continuity and change. This is 
particularly important within Liberia’s borderlands, given the role rebel groups 
played in deploying differing modes of coercive, collusive and charismatic 
authority within borderland spaces.  
 
Grounded authority in everyday practice derives from the specificity of informal 
spatial (physical), social and symbolic ordering making it inherently 
particularistic and intrinsically political. Without being legally codified, it is 
socially inscribed into the quotidian configuration of relational intra and inter-
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group dynamics. This inscription into social practice contributed to legitimizing 
informal orders and inures into “a certain minimum of voluntary submission; 
thus, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance of 
obedience” (Weber 1964: 324). This chapter does not focus the moralistic 
qualification of grounded authority whose paradoxical implications are 
captured in much of the literature on the local turn in peacebuilding (Mac 
Ginty, Richmond, Suhrke). However, by focusing on describing the social 
construction and quotidian deployment of grounded authority is evidences the 
complexly connected and disconnected plurality of authority specifically within 
the Liberian context.  
 
While postwar statebuilding research has emphasized linkages between 
political participation and state legitimacy (Call, 2008: 14), in its monolithic 
treatment of its object of inquiry, it has often ignored connections between 
micro-social patterns of legitimation on state legitimacy. Socially grounded 
authority as seen from Liberia’s borderlands is embedded, decentralized, the 
subject of negotiated legitimation, representative and empowered to act on 
behalf of borderland communities. Grounded authority derives from a degree 
of proximate social cohesion or polarizing social fracture, which often escapes 
the control of the postwar state. These are unquantifiable qualities the largely 
unembedded postwar state (the product of international intervention) cannot 
purport to possess. However, it advertently or inadvertently contributes to 
strengthening informal custodians of grounded authority. Interaction with 
national and international statebuilding interveners further legitimizes these 
postwar informal borderland actors.  
 
Processes of informal ordering and ordering informality differ in their 
engagement with the state. Meanwhile, there is also great variation in the 
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demands that state representatives and their intervention partners make of 
informal actors who wield grounded authority. The expectations the postwar 
state, its agents and its intervening partners make of actors of informal actors 
create non-codified, subjective and unstable interdependences. Complex 
bargaining between he central state and borderland elites could create complex 
interdependencies and jointly controlled institutions giving both groups access 
to revenue streams derived from trade, aid, and agricultural production 
(Goodhand 2008: 239). In cases where informal actors appropriate and 
subjectify the state, the transformation of the local components of the state is so 
extensive as to harm significantly the state’s overall chances of achieving 
integrated domination of society (Midgal 1994: 26). The mutual transformation 
of the state and informal orders through interactive processes evidences 
pluralized authority. Thus, quotidian reality nuances Sisk’s (2014: 6) articulated 
objective of statebuilding as a political process through which national-level 
government institutions prevail over rebel groups, warlords and hereditary 
authority.  
 
In every day practice, there is clearly a functional utility for grounded authority 
within postwar borderlands. Clunan (2010: 6) links the softening of state 
sovereignty in the early 21st century to the state being joined by a number of 
other actors, benign and malign, who sometimes compete and sometimes 
collaborate in providing governance and security through bottom-up and 
horizontal forms of organization. However, there is more critical and 
emancipatory salience to the social construction of grounded authority that 
extends beyond a purely functionalist interpretation. The functionality of 
custodians of grounded authority is intricately interwoven to the history and 
culture of the social, physical and symbolic contexts from which they emerge. 
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This larger interpretive prism that holds clues to the legitimating rationales 
underlying grounded authority.  
 
Informal ordering of territorial governance generates MTGs whose functions 
often fill gaps in state governance, hence the occurrence of governance overlaps 
that tend towards interactions shaped by conflict and confluence. Highlighting 
the role of micro-territorial governors (MTGs) as the embodiment of grounded 
authority, this chapter uses brings together life histories and narrative of 
encounters with statebuilding to provided differentiated interpretations of the 
construction and deployment of grounded authority. Meanwhile socially 
organized ordering of informality highlights the carving out of space for the 
deployment of authority within borderland economic production. Here, the 
emergence of Commercial Motorbike Unions and the authority they exert upon 
their members as well as in interaction with the state and its interventionary 
statebuilding partners highlights the pluralized nature of grounded authority. 
Given that MTGs and CMR Unions offer different historical trajectories with 
they allow for a comparative exploration of grounded authority.  
 
Far from explicitly challenging the state’s extending remit of control, grounded 
authority emerging from informal orders delineate locally based spheres of 
engagement with the state – thereby reshaping the state’s authority to quotidian 
local exigencies. This analysis explores how informal orders shape alternative 
authority and control frameworks, which then engage with the state and 
outside interveners and makes them pliable to the domination of local everyday 
practice. Grounded authority provides a platform for engagement with the 
state, thereby operationalizing political participation, while providing the state 
with a socially constructed entry point into communities. The deployment of 
grounded authority for quotidian crisis management is evidenced in community 
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responses to such events as the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease and latent 
and manifest forms of social violence.  
 
The legitimacy derived from socially grounded interpretations of accountability 
and direct representation contributes to the emergence and sustenance of 
social controls within borderlands. Bleisemann de Guevara (2012: 10-11) argues 
that while states regularly fail to institutionally comply with normative rational-
legality, quotidian life is governed by informal institutions whose legitimacy 
flows from different sources. As Suhrke (2007: 1294) poignantly observes, while 
foreign assistance places significant know-how, capital and, often military force 
behind the reconstruction effort, it does not provide legitimacy beyond the 
utilitarian functions associated with the return of peace and the start-up of 
reconstruction. This has proven insufficient in contemporary cases of 
international administrations of post-conflict areas, which have all faced 
problems of internal legitimacy. However, in a rather circular manner, 
grounded authority remains subject to the internal politics of communities 
(which swiftly changes leadership in the event of perceived incompetence or 
lack of accountability) while simultaneously exercising domination (Weberian 
herrshaft) the same communities. In this setting, presidentially appointed 
mayors constantly seek to de-legitimize socially grounded authority by 
discouraging the use of elections in the process of informal leadership 
legitimation. 
 
When it comes to outcomes of grounded authority, local twists and turns in 
peacebuilding and statebuilding research have enunciated the emergence of 
hybridity and hybrid governance arrangements (Mac Ginty 2008, 2010, 
MacGinty et al. 2013, Millar 2014, Luckham et al. 2013, Boege et al. 2008, 2009) 
and security (Bagayoko et al. 2016) frameworks. Thus the literatures on 
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“locality” and resultant “hybrid” outcomes are an inescapable feature in the 
exploration of grounded authority emerging out of informal ordering processes. 
However, these discourses appear largely to recycle neo-modern 
interpretations, which fetishize the “local” and reify the binarized “hybrid” as 
omnipresent, inescapable and viable alternative outcomes of international 
statebuilding encounters, where more polymorphic understandings of socio-
political configuration, interaction and evolution would be more reflective of 
quotidian reality.     
 
The Negotiated Grounded Authority of Borderland Micro-Territorial 
Governors 
 
Weber (1964: 382) concludes his theorization on the institutionalization of 
authority by stating that it is quite “evident that imperatively coordinated 
groups, which belong to one or another of these pure types [of authority] are 
very exceptional.” Authority is viewed as emanating from a social order that is 
often hierarchical and pyramidal. Socio-political interaction within an 
authority-laden social organization occurs on various levels. There is 
interaction between the head (singular) and the rest of the structure governing 
the corporate group. Another level of interaction occurs between the governing 
structure and its constituent members. Finally, there is also interaction 
between the head and the constituent members. However, taken together, these 
nature and content of these interactions determines legitimacy, shapes 
compliance and enforcement standards, as well as the durability of the social 
organization.  
 
Weber’s analysis of authority and its sources, however, focuses primarily on the 
endogenous construction and maintenance of authority. Furthermore, it does 
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not interrogate how the pluralized manifestation of authority within 
differentiated social organizations existing within a supposed “sovereign” 
interact with each other as well as with that “sovereign”. This oversight stems 
from a fetishization of the top-down centralized bureaucratic state as an 
ordering hegemon within a sovereign territory. However, it is necessary to open 
up an understanding of authority construction, maintenance and deployment 
that accounts for both endogenous and exogenous interactions. This is 
especially relevant in cases contexts where authority is but through networked 
vertical and transversal interaction across local, national and international 
spheres.  
 
The identification of the social order, whether formal or informal, is important 
in the process of understanding in depth, the construction, deployment and 
maintenance of authority through quotidian practice. The nomenclature of 
Quarter Chiefs and Community Chairpersons (grouped into an analytical 
category described as Micro-Territorial Governors [MTGs]) is a fixture in the 
quotidian administration of borderland cities. These MTGs manage their 
territorial spaces in varying forms, however there is the omnipresence of an 
organizational structure in place. This organizational structure often takes 
either the form of a board of governors with specific functions such as – 
assistant quarter, secretary, treasurer, youth representative, women’s 
representative, chaplain and a council of elders. This structure predominates 
within Foya’s micro-territorial governance. Another organizational structure 
exists within Ganta – this is characterized by the deployment of zonal heads 
underneath the MTGs to help coordinate the governance of micro-territorial 
spaces. Hence there is a fluid internal differentiation of roles. “I meet with my 
zonal heads once a week and I update them on what is going on at the city level and if 
there is any information from the Joint Security meetings, which take place every 
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Friday, I pass it to them. They also tell me about the problems in their areas and we see 
how we can solve these problems for our people,”48 noted a community chairperson 
in Ganta. The description of their roles in very glib terms accounts for their 
adaptability to the different challenges they face in managing their micro-
territorial spaces. There is nothing that occurs within these spaces that they 
consider impossible for them to deal with.  
 
However, it raises important questions about sources of their grounded 
authority, how it is deployed and sustained and its implications on the state and 
its quest for effective sovereignty through the centralization of authority. It also 
explores whether these custodians of grounded authority use the state as well as 
other hybrid governance arrangements as sources of income, power and 
legitimacy, penetrating for the sake of their own well-being (Paffenholz 2015: 
864). Thus, the understanding of grounded authority within this study is based 
on the specifics of the postwar context and relational dimensions of governance 
within borderland social groups under study. 
 
Firstly, the historical context provides insights into the construction and 
resilience of grounded authority within borderland cities through different 
critical junctures – the 1980 military coup, the onset of the Liberian Civil Wars 
in 1989 and the end of the civil war in 2004. Within borderlands, the 
incorporation of cities in the early 1970s followed the elevation of hinterlands 
provinces to County status in 1964. The incorporation of cities was a rational-
legal process that brought state agents into the administration of these 
territories. However, they also simultaneously created spaces for the emergence 
of alternative and informal forms of social ordering which straddle traditional-
cum-patrimonial authority and the rational-legal authority of state agents. This 
                                               
48 Interview with CC- 14 Ganta Community Chairperson on August 27, 2016. 
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form of negotiated authority therefore arose out of the informalized social 
ordering of urbanized human and material processes within predominantly 
rural settings. The narratives of current and previous MTGs and their subjects 
provide varying understandings of socio-political phenomena of compliance 
and legitimacy essential to the resiliency of negotiated authority within postwar 
borderlands. 
 
In Foya and Ganta, there is a multiplicity of narratives about the resiliency of 
territorially based informal ordering. “When the ULIMO-K boys entered here 
in 1993. Kromah and his boys, I was the Quarter Chief for this area. They used 
to ask us to provide them with boys to carry their load down to Makona River so 
they can cross it to the other side [Guinea]. We had a hard time because many 
young boys them, they had ran into the bush”49, noted a former Foya QC. “Our 
Quarter Chief made a team of young men them as single-barrel soldiers, I was 
one of them. Since the government has given up its responsibility to protect us, 
its people, we decided to protect ourselves,”50 noted a current Community 
Chairperson in Ganta. Both narratives provide a historical background to the 
functional evolution of MTGs and different manifestations of authority 
captured through temporal vignettes.   
 
Three observations emerge from the historical vignettes about the historical 
role and authority of MTGs within borderland cities. The first observation is 
that informal social ordering within borderland cities has shown a remarkable 
degree of adaptability and resiliency. MTGs, with authority derived from their 
proximate subjects have proven malleable and capable of appropriating violent, 
                                               
49 Former Foya QC Interviewed on March 23, 2014 in Foya, Liberia. 
50 Ganta Community Chairperson Interview on August 17, 2015 in Ganta, Liberia. 	
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administrative and development interventions to perpetuate their place within 
changing political contexts.  
 
Secondly regardless of the political context, MTGs are subject to varying forms 
of authoritative coercion. The state as a socio-political actor, whether in real or 
notional terms, hangs over their communities as an omnipresent hegemon. 
Meanwhile during wartime occupation, they subject to the coercive exactions of 
rebel governance structures. In either circumstance, they straddle their 
communities and the existing hegemon in view of justifying their role by 
harnessing whatever social protections they can for their communities.  
 
Finally, MTGs are inscribed in the DNA of borderland cities. As a borderland 
political institution, they are omnipresent and more embedded within the 
communities over which they govern than either the state or different iterations 
of rebel occupiers. Far from romaniticizing their role, as they are adept at 
developing rent-seeking schemes and authoritarian tendencies their local 
politics evidence networked connections which they harness to strengthen their 
authority over the spaces and human and material processes under their 
control.  
 
The Nature and Function of Negotiated Grounded Authority  
 
Outside the relationship between MTGs and their constituents, different 
iterations of the state (physical and notional) and its international statebuilding 
partners are contribute to the production and reproduction (constitution and 
deployment) of grounded authority through informal borderland social 
ordering. The nature and quotidian functionality of MTGs ensures a deeper 
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understanding of the how and why grounded authority is constituted and 
deployed within borderland informal social orders.  
 
Territorially based informal ordering is proximate to the physical household 
(landed property). It arises out of a cluster of households that develops a shared 
communitarian rationale for social organization. This does not imply that it is 
devoid of its own patterns of conflict ad cooperation (which we will get to on 
the section of functions). However, it provides predictability to quotidian social 
processes within borderland cities where both traditional and state authority is 
diluted. “As you can see, today I have asked each house to provide one person 
so we can clean the area around our well. We don’t want the city council to 
come here and start cutting tickets. We will also go round and tell people to 
brush around their house,”51 noted CC-12. The purpose of the community 
clean-up campaign being undertaken in Dekemeihn Community in Ganta is 
tied to a communitarian understanding of wellbeing, responsibility and 
maintaining a good rapport with the City Council. This proximity allows for the 
MTG to organize labor in the service of standards developed by the City 
Council. This places the MTG between the community and the city council.  
Hence the authority of the MTG has to be negotiated between both parties. 
Given this medial positionality, the authority of the MTG is negotiated on the 
one hand with the proximate constituents and on the other hand, with the City 
Council. 
 
Despite the benevolent discourse that dominates the rationale for MTG service, 
there is a great deal of social capital in serving in the position. Across the 
board, MTGs note that they are neither part of the rational-legal structures of 
state governance, nor are they paid for the benevolent social protections for 
                                               
51 Interview with CC-12 in Ganta on August 16, 2015. 
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which they lobby on behalf of their communities. “I am only doing this job as a 
service to my people. They need someone to speak for them and they asked me 
to speak for them and that is what I am doing,”52 averred a Ganta Community 
Chairperson. Despite the volunteer nature of the function, there are some 
MTGs who have been in their positions since 1984. Thus, the benevolence of 
MTGs ought to be taken at face value, given the lengths to which MTGs go to 
make their leadership of communities perennial.  
 
A deeper interrogation of why they serve in positions of authority points to the 
social capital that underpins their service. “When my children walk down the 
street people look at them and see that they are the children of the Quarter 
Chief for this and that community, they can help them get somewhere,”53 noted 
a Quarter Chief in Foya. Therefore, the day-to-day governance of micro-
territorial units comes with its social perks. Meanwhile community members 
are equally aware that MTGs are interest driven actors. “Since they speak for us 
and judge cases, they decide the penalties for every case and it is hard for 
anyone to bring a case against them. Like our Quarter Chief has not presented 
his accounts report at the end of his term, which would permit us to go ahead 
with the election of a new Quarter Chief”54, noted an elder resident of New 
Foya. 
 
Beyond the social recognition that comes with being an MTG, they also manage 
common resources like water sources, while advocating for the provision of 
more social services. “My job is to control these water wells which were 
provided by Equip Liberia. The money that we collect when we sell water goes 
                                               
52 Interview with CC-8 in Ganta on August, 22, 2015. 	
53 Interview with Foya Quarter Chief on July 29, 2015. 
54 Interview with Foya resident on August 1, 2015. 
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to buy cement and other things for the maintenance of the pump,”55 noted a 
community chairperson in Ganta. These resources, which overwhelmingly 
reach the borderland spaces courtesy of INGOs contribute to the daily 
projection of grounded authority by MTGs. Hence INGOs are complicit in the 
entrenchment of informal ordering and the quotidian deployment of grounded 
authority. However, overall, the accounting that goes into the management of 
these communal resources remains rather spotty, as they were unable to 
provide any ballpark estimates of daily revenue generated. Accounting and 
accountability often becomes a problem when water pumps go into disrepair 
for protracted periods. 
 
Meanwhile, in some communities, the infusion of INGO materiel and funds 
leads to the quick turnover of leadership in the case of proven 
misappropriation. This was clearly the case in the transfer of MTG leadership 
in AG Quarter in Foya. As narrated by the incumbent Quarter Chief (who 
happens to also be Foya’s first female QC): “I was appointed in March this year 
(2015). PM was in this position before I was appointed to take over. He was here 
working in the community – he alone. He did not have anyone in the community to 
work with him. Anything drop for the community, he will eat it. Even if it was a piece 
of plank which was given for the community, he would keep it for himself. He would 
not give anything to the rest of the community. So, the people they get vexed with him. 
They even took him to court, when they took him to court, the money he was supposed 
to pay [as restitution] was LD13500 and 5 bags of clean rice. Then the people said he 
must not be their leader because he is suffering them. During the time they removed 
PM, they put TFK as acting QC.” 56  Politics of aid administration within 
communities evidences the gatekeeping role of local actors. However, it also 
                                               
55 Interview with CC-12 in Ganta on August 16, 2015.	
56 Interview with Foya Quarter Chief on August 2, 2015. 
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shows the malleable accountability exercised by MTGs. Depending on how the 
local political game is played, the resources deployed by INGO aid programs 
get appropriated to deepen the authority of MTGs who manage processes of 
informal ordering.  
 
MTGs are acutely aware of their positionality as entry nodes into the 
communities. This allows them to leverage their relationships with state and 
statebuilding actors seeking access to the quotidian dynamics of their micro-
territorial fiefs. As gatekeepers, they position themselves between their 
communities and the state and non-state actors who seek entry into these 
communities. As Goodhand (2008: 231) observes borderland elites may play a 
crucial mediating role, acting as powerbrokers with the capacity to extend the 
influence of the state or make the borderland ungovernable. However, in the 
case of Liberia’s borderland MTGs, they actually make the borderland 
differently governable – straddling a state engagement function with 
entrenching and informally institutionalizing their own roles.   
 
This position allows them to personify a conduit between the formal and the 
informal, the official and the non-official, thereby increasing the social and 
symbolic components of their grounded authority. They benefit from bases of 
governance grounded in community-based norms of legitimacy, accountability 
and representation that differ from the positionality of state-appointed officials 
within borderlands. Hence the legitimacy gap between micro-level state 
governance and micro-level informal governance. To create illegitimacy 
synergies, City Mayors have consistently discouraged the use of elections, while 
privileging consensus in the designation of MTGs, based on the premise that 
“since I was not elected myself, I do not see why you should worry about elections 
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within your communities.” 57  However, some MTGs have disregarded this 
recommendation and proceeded to “institutionalize” electoral processes in the 
designation of MTGs.  
 
Hence MTGs perceive themselves as legitimate stakeholders within 
development planning meetings. They take partial credit for the successful 
delivery of social services that ameliorate local livelihoods and advocate for 
their community’s needs to be met by both state and non-state actors.  If 
anything, they exhibit the manifestation of efficient local capacity, which is 
often silent in development discourse. Through the negotiation of entry into 
their communities they exhibit an astute mastery of local knowledge, daily 
practice as well as the role, practices and functions of INGOs. Fieldwork within 
Liberia’s borderlands suggests that international NGOs, despite being 
heterogeneous in nature, function and program content, tend to bring 
homogenous sets of guidelines into the borderlands. The encounter of INGO 
ontologies with ontologies of local borderland communities as evident through 
daily practice produces mutually transformative outcomes for both the subject 
and objects of aid intervention. Communal reconstitution of grounded 
authority contributes to the development and deployment of sophisticated 
modes of interaction with intervening configurations of authority, order and 
control (be they the state or INGOs).  
 
Take for example the Action Contre la Faim (ACF) water provision programs in 
Foya which were part of a broader health and sanitation project. The New Foya 
MTG describes the appropriation of the wells to evidence social cohesion and 
income generation possibilities opened by the project. “In my community, we 
stick together and that makes us strong… when ACF were here, they dug some water 
                                               
57 Interview with Ganta Community Chairperson on September 2, 2015. 
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wells, that’s where we generated some funds for our community. When we say we want 
to gather ourselves together, we want to do anything, that’s where we collect our 
percentage from. Every month end we collect LD20 from each of the family heads and 
that money goes into savings. Whenever we need to get a census or we need any other 
thing that we want to do for the community, we take it from there,”58 he noted. This 
provides a common description of the grounded authority wielded by MTGs in 
resource controls within their micro-territorial units. In an almost naturalistic 
fashion, they described themselves as using these social resources for the 
community.   
 
However, this same process of income generation creates accountability 
tensions between MTGs and their communities. An elder member of the same 
community noted that the Quarter Chief had failed to meet the accounting 
requirements necessary to allow for succession: “On the elder side, the challenge 
number one is that our QC’s time is over. We asked him to make a report to which he 
paid a deaf ear to us. We do not know why he is acting like that, but we have asked 
him. This is the third week we asked him to make his end of term report. The first 
week, he failed. The second week he failed. That is why we came back Monday. From 
there we can forward it to the City Mayor for advisement. He has to make a report of 
all his activities – money (whatever he possesses or what he has given out on behalf of 
the community) – that is the report we want from him.”59 Despite the grounded 
authority wielded by the MTG, the state representative remains an arbitrator of 
local matters. Far from pointing to the instability of the system, it points to the 
interpenetration of grounded authority derived from informal ordering and 
rational-legal authority derived from the state authority. This interpenetration 
crystallizes both authority structures regardless of the individual exercising 
grounded authority or rational-legal authority. 
                                               
58 Interview with Foya Quarter Chief on July 28, 2016. 
59 Interview with Foya elder on July 31, 2015.  
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MTGs use of both INGOs and nationally based politicians to simultaneously 
justify and deepen their grounded authority. “When politicians come out here 
during campaign election time, they meet the mayor and the mayor asks us to assemble 
our people so that they can talk to them. Although we cannot tell the people which side 
to pick, they know,”60 chimed a Foya Quarter Chief. In other cases, congressional 
members have been known to contribute to emergency relief supplies in cases 
of natural disasters, through interaction with the MTG. Therefore, their 
informality hardly takes away from the daily nature of grounded authority 
which they wield.    
 
As part of their deployment of authority, MTGs receive training from INGOs to 
serve as community conflict resolution actors. Tetra Tech is an NGO, which is 
invested in training and facilitating community dispute resolution and 
community securitization. The training that they provided to Community 
Chairpersons in Ganta city is described by CC-3, Catholic Community 
Chairperson as such, “There are certain forums here called watch forum, whose role 
it is to educate us on what we need to do within our communities to secure it. Just as I 
was telling you we are trained that as town chiefs, when woman and man fight in a 
home and they bring the case to you, you should settle it good. Talk to the man good, 
talk to the woman good, if there is no compromise, you carry it to the City Mayor’s 
office. Or if somebody steals within your community and you happen to catch that 
person, call the security to come apprehend him/her and take them to the police station. 
That is what we are here doing.”61 This kind of training assumes the absence of 
these skills within the authority-wielding position of the MTG, despite the fact 
that individuals who had served in these functions prior to the civil wars, 
                                               
60 Interview with Foya Quarter Chief on July 31, 2015.	
61 Interview with CC-3 in Ganta on 16 August 2015. 
 274 
performed the same functions based on the normative social construction of 
micro-territorial dispute resolution.  
 
Furthermore, INGOs are at the center of the institutionalization of security 
council meetings which assemble both formal and informal actors involved in 
territorial administration. As CC-14 noted “As part of my job I also participate in 
the Security Council meeting which takes place on the first Friday of every month. It is 
sponsored by Tetra Tech.”62 These Security Council meetings effectively are an 
external legitimating factor for MTGs wielding grounded authority.  
 
Grounded Authority in Interaction with INGO Programmatic 
Dissonance, Incoherence and Resistance  
 
Speaking to local capacity and the expectations they have from NGOs, Edward 
Yeamah of New Foya said: “We are looking for NGOs who can put us together to 
make farm, because that is the easiest work that we can do and generate money quick. 
Whenever you say “let us go on farming”, when we say farming we say we must go to 
farm to say let us go plant palm farm or plant cocoa garden, that will cause problem 
among ourselves, because to receive a bush, that is agriculture, which can hardly be 
removed. Whenever you put it on ground now, to remove it would be hard. And to go 
somewhere and get bush from somebody or from any other village and say “oh you all 
give us bush we want to do farm here to say we want to plant cocoa or garden,” it 
won’t be necessary. But farm, you can borrow somebody’s farm and develop it, you 
need to do something inside for which at the end of the year any seeding which you 
people get, the person will benefit from the seeding too. You can give the person a 
certain percentage of the seeding that you receive and the soil will be developed. 
Whenever you leave the area, the benefit will still be there.” 
                                               
62 Interview with CC-14 in Ganta on 27 August 2015. 
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 Furthermore, in terms of community development projects, he noted that, 
“Like New Foya, if I say we want to form a project, like to make a swamp. We are 
going to include the youth mostly. Elders will be amongst us for advice, So the youth, 
both boys and girls – they will form the youth body. They will meet the core 
requirement of the work. They will come up with one group understanding that this 
work we are going to do, we are going to be supported by somebody. Before we get the 
support from somebody, how are we going to work? We should hire our labor out or 
we ourselves should be the labor for this project? So that question will be asked among 
ourselves. We will come up with one decision. On my own style, my youth I have here, 
we ourselves would be the laborers for that work then we will see how best we can 
work. Because even on the farm everyday if you send a person says “go do work for 
me” and you cannot monitor that farm, maybe the extent to which you want to go with 
the farming the person may not reach there because he will see some grass that can be 
to heavy or him. If I go there myself, I will first ask them to clear that area up. My 
Youth Leader is a very strong man.”63 The relationship between the youth leader 
and the Quarter Chief falls in line with customary and age structured 
distribution of roles within Liberia’s postwar communities.  
 
CC-18 of Bassa Community in Gompa City noted that “We had a mosquito net 
distribution here two months ago. It did not reach all the communities. I can tell you for 
a fact that it did not reach my community. When I enquired, I was informed that the 
NGO people had few workers so they were unable to cover the entire city. The next day 
in the market we saw mosquito nets around, people were cutting it to make “sarpo” 
(sponges with which people take baths) and selling it.”64 This same notion of the 
challenge with aid effectiveness was captured in the words of the head of the 
Foya Tailor’s Union, I.T.K, when he described how – “UMCOR [United Methodist 
                                               
63 Interview with QC-1 in Foya on 28 July 2015. 
64 Interview with CC-18 in Ganta on 16 August 2015.	
 276 
Committee on Relief] provided vocational training for some people to become tailors. 
They put the trainees under me, since I had been tailoring before and was still a tailor 
when I was living in Buyedu [Sierra Leone] during the war years. But after their 
training and when they continued as apprentice, they had to pay their license for 
500LD every year. Some time, them don’t work plenty, so them sell their machine to do 
agriculture…After some time, we get all the machine into my shop and negotiate with 
Revenue collection to pay for 5 instead of 7 machines.” This evidences a way in 
which social actors negotiate economic livelihoods with the state creating a 
win-win situation for both parties involved. However, it also shows that local 
state agents often act independently from the hierarchical constraints of 
centralized bureaucracies.  
 
Reflecting on the elusive quest for INGO projects into their community, a 
Pastor from Bassa Community in Focus Group Meeting narrated their futile 
outreach to NGOs: “We have been hearing about NGOs and sometimes we engage 
them face-to-face. And sometimes we write letters. Sometimes they promise us saying 
that they will come back and for us to look for conducive areas. Sometimes, we find the 
areas, but other areas are benefitting and we are not benefitting. So we do not know 
whether we are marginalized in the system. Other communities receive aid and they 
are benefiting, but we are not benefiting from anything. Most especially, this 
community is also put under the pronouncement of “eminent domain” by the president. 
So based on that, they feel that it is just like a no man’s land and because of the 
“eminent domain” pronouncement, anything you say, nobody wants to listen to, so they 
can do whatever they want within the community.”65 However, Bassa Community 
represents a spatial complexity within Gompa City. It is a community, which 
overlaps with the Gompa City daily market, which falls under the eminent 
domain rules of national authority. However, given the limited presence of the 
                                               
65 Notes from Bassa Community Focus Group Discussion on 16 August 2015. 
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state to enforce these rules, it had developed into a space with diluted social 
controls as it eludes both the control of the state and the informal local 
community leader.    
 
Given their impermanence within borderlands, INGOs are seldom in tune with 
local needs and realities. However, even if there more tuned in, their resource 
base would hardly enable them to overcome historically entrenched structural 
challenges. These are challenges that clearly belong within the purview of the 
emergent state, which outsources them to be dealt with through the structuring 
of informal orders and the ordering of informality.  
 
Ordering Informality and Alternate Socially Grounded Authority  
 
Modes of informal economic ordering within borderlands develop their own 
“corporate group” governance structures with hierarchical interaction between 
leaders and their member. While they are a function of changing socio-
economic conditions, grounded authority arising from the ordering of 
informality constitutes a political configuration deployed in interaction with the 
postwar state and its statebuilding partners. This variant of grounded authority 
is not based on specific territorial control, but is strategically positioned to 
optimize economic productivity within borderland informal economic orders by 
building political protections against persistent uncertainty and enduring 
vulnerability.  
 
Commercial Motorbike Riders (CMRs) and Commercial Motorbike Owners 
(CMOs) are the individualized embodiment of multiple factors of production 
(service, labor and capital) within postwar borderlands that were historically 
dependent on cross-border trade and agriculture. However, their choice of 
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membership within any of the competing CMR Unions occurs within the 
constructs of a social contract. Membership provides the basis for the social 
organization of politically-networked protections in the quotidian performance 
of their livelihood functions. In return they produce, support and legitimate a 
powerful social organization within grounded authority is embedded.  
 
Raeymaekers (2014:31) aptly identifies the environment of constantly shifting 
border identities as the spatial context within which businessmen (a complex 
admixture of formal and informal economic actors) – smugglers, entrepreneurs, 
and transnational traders – have come to occupy a central role both as brokers 
and enactors of this transformative borderland space. However, focusing on the 
deployment of grounded authority by units of ordered informality – CMR 
Unions – turns the explicative lens upon the quotidian interactive mechanics 
between CMRs, CMR Unions and multiple states that sustain grounded 
authority. Hence it shifts the locus from “economic strongmen” who use 
agricultural land for other kinds of economic investments without worrying 
about its productivity (Raeymaekers 2014: 34) to postwar Liberian borderlands 
modes of economic production, which clearly compete with agricultural 
production and supplement trade networks, while serving as the main youth 
employer. 
 
The quotidian limit a border imposes on individual borderland navigators is 
captured when H.S, a Ganta CMR, notes that, “I do not like crossing the border 
because headache on that side plenty for nothing. So, I just wait on this side of St. 
John’s bridge for passengers. Or if I am lucky, like I bring you here, I will find person 
to take back to Ganta. The bridge close at 6 o’clock in the evening. If by mistake I want 
to return after the bridge close, how I go stay for Guinea?”66 The limits are not only 
                                               
66 Discussion with H.S. at St John Border Crossing on April 2, 2014. 
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temporal, but they are also administrative, given that there were persistent 
complaints about difficult with cross-border immigration and customs officials. 
These types of quotidian challenges are partially assuaged by membership 
within CMR Unions. The CMR Unions enters into engagement with different 
states with the representative and grounded authority of their members.  
 
Entering into these engagements, they often seek to develop informalized 
frameworks that facilitate CMR navigation within borderlands and across 
borders. This is done, for example, through the issuing of licenses, which are 
recognized as valid identification document for CMRs crossing borders with 
human and material cargo. The use of CMR licenses to cross borders is a 
localized phenomenon negotiated by local CMR Unions and immigration 
officers, given the degree of quotidian exchange between both authority figures. 
The outcome is the effective introduction new documentation into immigration 
practice that does not conform with any de jure immigration stipulation. 
 
However, the documentation does not save the individual CMR from the 
continuing informalization of exchange with state authority represented by 
immigration and customs officials, a practice, which is replete in cross-border 
ethnographies. TF, a Foya CMR noted, “some customs people them humbug too 
much. If you don’t know your rights they can give you a hard time like they have never 
seen you before. But that when they are hungry. Sometimes, you give them small 
thing…like 10LD. But when business bad and you no want give them anything, some 
understand, but some bring problem and they waste your time.”67 TF’s explanation of 
the quotidian exchange with state agents reflects a familiarity and complicity 
characterizing individual relationships outside the socially organized framework 
of CMR Unions. This aspect is important in understanding the complex 
                                               
67 Interview with TF at Makona Border Crossing on March 23, 2014. 
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interaction between the CMR and pluralized manifestations of authority in the 
Unions and state agents.  
 
Organizing CMRs into socially organized unions, endows the unions with the 
grounded authority to formalize informality through incorporation with state 
agencies. They are recognized by the state as legitimate socio-political actors. 
However, internally it also implies the development of governing principles and 
by-laws, with the assignment of roles and responsibilities. Members have 
protective and facilitative expectations as much as they union expects 
compliance and loyalty from its members. This is ultimately the basis from 
which grounded authority is constructed within CMR Unions. However, 
functional compliance by both member and Union leaders is constantly tested 
in quotidian practice. 
 
However, organizationally JST, Foya CMR Union head noted, “we have a 
schedule to meet two times a month. If there is any information or emergency, I have a 
taskforce on the field who work. If you violate, they will be able to straighten you, they 
are not military people. They talk to you actually, they arrest your bike if you violate. 
They carry messages to every rider on every base and when time goes on, I send them to 
the field to the various parking lots to oversee whatsoever is going on and sometimes in 
the evening they give me a report.”68 It is not uncommon therefore, for the 
authority of the Union to enforce membership rules or to coerce CMRs into 
membership to be questioned. This often leads the to bring the state in as an 
arbitrator, especially in cases where violence is deployed. Therefore, CMR 
Unions have developed enforcement mechanisms that exercise the rights to 
arrest bikes over violations, a function which would ordinarily be reserved for 
local law enforcement.  
                                               
68 Interview with Foya LMTU head on August 3, 2015. 
 281 
 
Despite the bureaucratized structuring of CMR Unions, both in Foya and 
Ganta, challenges to Unions’ legitimacy and accountability has led to the 
emergence of rival unions. Describing the ongoing creation of a new CMR 
Union in Foya, JS noted, “This is just a very new union. We want to coordinate the 
affairs of our county first, because that’s the first job that the people gave us. When I 
raised this idea, we sat down in our own little way, we put small small thing together 
as to how this message can reach over those in places like Vahun, Kolahum, Bolahum 
and Foya and Voinjama as well. Now we have the operation in Voinjama that’s 
working for LIMCA [Liberian Tricycle and Motorcycle Association]. So, central gave 
us the numbers so we can call them here they should come for meeting here so we can 
settle and we can serve all over the county. That is the process we are on presently.”69 
The creation of a CMR Union is a deeply political process that is networked to 
“central”. This points to a circular process of emergence originating from the 
de-legitimization of the existing union within a borderland space. This is 
followed by a resource generation process and seed membership to drive the 
process of creation of a new social organization. Therefore, rather than 
directives coming from “central”, it become a object in the rivalries of liminal 
social organizations.  
 
Leadership within borderland CMR Unions has exhibited deep connections to 
centralized political actors. The authority wielded by CMR Unions matters 
because they are youth-driven organizations, which gives voice to a youth-led 
profession in a majority youth country. Centrally located political actors covet 
the active support of the LMTU and in exchange, they provide patronage and 
protection to issues relating to licensing and regulation of commercial 
motorbike operations. As JS Tomah noted, “Our local politicians, they can give 
                                               
69 Interview with JS in Foya on August 1, 2015. 
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jerseys to the union. We use these jerseys when we organize outing on Sorlumba 
highway to play football and enjoy ourselves.” This is just one way in which 
centrally-based elites seek to instrumentalize CMR Unions into their personal 
political agendas.  
 
Local politicians have a vested interest in having an organizational outfit 
through which they can reach out to the youth trough a constituency, which 
appears to represent their interests. It is not uncommon therefore, for local 
politicians and representatives in parliament to keep close contact with the 
leaders of the LMTU. JT Soriba, through the Foya Public Intellectual Forum 
notes that “Our leaders that are in Monrovia over there, always when they come here, 
I think nah the first place [sic the FPIF] that they can go to talk to us. When they come, 
they book appointment with us. We schedule them time, when they come, we discuss 
relevant issues of this district.”70  
 
Given their grounded authority derived from ordering informality, CMR 
Unions interface with the state and its international statebuilding and 
development partners, as well as with its predominantly youth labor 
constituency. While this is akin to the gatekeeper role of MTGs, their sources 
of legitimacy and capacity for enforcement differ.  
 
Given their position as borderland navigators, they constant encounter 
different manifestations of grounded and state authority – mainly represented 
by union leadership, MTGs and state immigration agents.  
 
The CMR Union leaders see the functional aspects of their authority as 
representative, nodal, agenda building, empowering and problem solving. The 
                                               
70 Interview with JT Soriba in Foya on August 1, 2015. 
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representative function is leveraged through the membership rolls they build 
up and it is in turn deployed to negotiate with the state and INGOs. Given that 
they constitute a legitimate “verband” they sit at a nodal point between the 
individual CMR/CMO and external agents of statebuilding and development. 
Meanwhile, they develop the specific agenda-setting function of challenging 
social stereotypes about youth culture and violence in Liberia. In the process, 
they create, manage and sustain micro-credit schemes such as the “susu” to 
contribute to turning bike riders into bike owners. Overall, their nodal 
positionality gives them an internal mediatory role in membership conflicts, as 





The question that arises from the postwar context is about the possibility of 
establishing a stable government with the multiplicity of entrenched informal 
orders and their patterns of grounded authority that effectively makes them 
more important social actors than the state within borderland spaces. This 
chapter highlights the pluralized and differentiated construction and 
deployment of authority within postwar Liberian borderland spaces as a result 
of informal ordering and ordering informality. The comparative explanation of 
the interactive construction and deployment of grounded authority in quotidian 
practice within borderlands evidences the multiplicity of the phenomenon. It 
also shows the complexity faced by the state as it seeks to centralize authority in 
the face of competing patterns of grounded authority which are sedimented 
through daily practice. While the postwar state is in constant mutation based 
on its arrangement with its international statebuilding partners, it also 
constantly being engaged by these liminal informal political orders.   
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Grounded authority provides quotidian stability amid the uncertainty and 
vulnerability of life on the edge of the state. While they are subject to 
exogenous influences, their normative basis is embedded in their quotidian 
experiences. Therefore, individuals may rotate out of MTG positions, however, 
the authority embedded within the role and function of MTGs or CMR Unions 
are presented as perennial. Given the proximate legitimation of their 
constituencies, custodians of grounded authority flexibly adjust and negotiated 
with demands for accountability, in the absence of which there is often fairly 
expedient de-legitimation (often with the intervention of state authority). 
However, processes of legitimacy and de-legitimation are also grounded, 
proximate and normatively inscribed in social codes deployed in everyday life.    
 
The grounded authority of these informal socio-political orders is 
simultaneously based on balancing endogenous structuring and exogenous 
influences. Grounded authority derives from and is strengthened by the 
relationship between the leader, their leadership structure and the 
constituents. However, exogenous social actors such as state agents, centrally 
based local politicians and INGOs also contribute to strengthening the 
grounded authority of specific individual custodians of grounded authority. 
Given the influence that grounded authority wields within borderland spaces, 
the postwar state is compelled to function with and attempt to penetrate and 
control informal orders. Given that the grounded authority within informal 
orders comes with implicit and explicit acquiescence of the postwar state, the 
distortion of classical notions of the bureaucratized centralization of rational-
legal authority centralization is a quotidian reality within postwar borderlands. 
This coincides with Suhrke’s (2007) assessment that the process of 
strengthening the central state in conditions of feudal-like dispersion of power 
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in potentially leads to confrontation with locally based structures of power and 
authority. Custodians of grounded authority are permanent markers of 
borderland spaces, making the state rather impermanent and fleeting within 
borderlands. The historical permanence of grounded authority compels the 
state to adapt to local ordering and control, while negotiating its authority in 
relation to grounded authority. 
 
What devolves out of the interaction between the grounded authority 
custodians and state authority within postwar borderlands therefore is a 
pluralized and differentiated coexistence of multiply constructed and deployed 
authority nexuses. In everyday practice therefore, grounded authority takes the 
lead in conflict resolution practices and broader management of livelihood and 
securitization processes. Meanwhile the limited postwar state is obliged to 
depend on these entities that develop their own modes ordering, governance 
and administration.  
 
Given that INGOs often straddle the state and local communities and 
contribute to the depending of grounded authority, the resulting hybrid 
security and postwar development arrangements such as those sponsored by 
Tetra Tech imagine stable outcomes based on unsustainable and often 
competing authority arenas. The complex interaction of pluralized authority 
reflects what Wacquant (1997: 347) describes the active “engagement with 
external and internal social forces that crosscut and mould their world,” in a 




Chapter 8: Politicized Social Controls: Understanding Pluralized 
Informal Ordering and Power in Liberia’s Postwar Borderlands 
 
Introduction: Violence and Elusive Social Control Amid Statebuilding  
 
Anecdote One: During the week of July 20th 2015, a Sierra Leonean national in 
his early 30s was the victim of mob violence in Ganta. According to John T., a 
Sierra Leonean community leader from Yekepa, his countryman was a 
businessman who became the victim of a wanton act of mob violence. “I hear 
that he was walking in an area around the market and then he heard people 
shouting ‘rogue, rogue, rogue’ so he started running. Since he was running, 
others stopped him and beat him to death before the police could arrive,” he 
noted71. Mob violence as response to the transgression of some social norms 
represents a quotidian challenge within borderland. MTGs and their 
communities struggle with this arbitrary and collective enforcement of the 
normative content of socio-moral codes which itself transgresses the function 
and operative authority embedded within informal orders.  
 
The social control issues at the core of this anecdote are inherently political. 
Firstly, they provide a basis for the empirical interrogation of non-state actors’ 
quotidian reconstruction of social control mechanisms into frames of micro-
territoriality and micro-sovereignty. Secondly, it raises important questions 
about the political implications of alternative social control mechanics in at the 
margins of states. Finally, it necessitates an understanding of the differentiated 
subjectivities of social control as a function of the configurative (structural), 
symbolic and relational (networked) factors. 
 
                                               
71 Interview conducted with John T. in Yekepa on August 10, 2015. 
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Anecdote Two: On September 30th 2015, Ganta, a series of violent events 
ground Ganta to a halt. The discovery of the bludgeoned lifeless body of Nyah 
Domah, a CMR and union member in his 30s mobilized the union and its 
members to action. On one hand, the union leadership urged a restrained 
response to the murder. Their position was simple – halt CMR activities and 
conduct a sit-in strike to pressure the Ganta police into a swift investigation. 
On the other hand, the Union membership wanted swift justice for the 
perpetuators of this act of violence against one of their own. This particular 
murder came only a couple of weeks after the supposed ritualistic killing of 
another CMR. Bill Lauriss, a grona boy from Congo Community was arrested 
and questioned in relation to Domah’s murder. His alleged accomplice, a Sierra 
Leonean national, was beaten to death by an angry mob. Meanwhile, almost 
spontaneously, links were made between Lauriss and a prominent local 
businessman, Prince Howard (who has maintained his innocence). A mob 
burnt down Howard’s Alvino Hotel (which straddles Congo and Guinea Road 
Communities) and his home. Almost simultaneously, a mob also vandalized the 
Ganta Police Station (which sits on the edge of Bassa Community) – a symbol of 
state ineptitude and perceived elite protection. All this happened before the 
state could reassert a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence by 
mobilizing the Police Support Unit (PSU) in Gbarnga (neighboring Bong 
County) to intervene in Ganhpa.  
 
The widespread nature of the second incident resulted in the institution of a 
curfew from 6pm to 6am in Ganhpa. Movement and business activities were 
halted between those hours. Activities of Community Watch Forums (CWFs) 
that had contributed to population securitization and sensitization during the 
Ebola pandemic were suspended. The Liberian state mobilized and deployed 
security personnel from PSU-Gbarnga to enforce the curfew in Ganta. 
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Differing forms of micro and macro violence make up the everyday repertoire 
of social action amid the flux and uncertainty that characterize postwar 
borderland cities. Cities feature prominently in Tilly’s (1990: 17) analyses of war, 
collective action and state formation in Europe - both as favored sites of 
capitalists (defined as those who have worked chiefly as merchants, 
entrepreneurs and financiers, rather than as the direct organizers of 
production) and as organizational forces in themselves. Historical, temporal, 
internally constitutive and global contexts pose daunting challenges in the 
adaptation of Tilly’s to the Liberian postwar context. However, it provides a 
theoretical premise from which to ontologically focus enquiry into the 
implication of everyday non-state social control on postwar statebuilding.  
 
Within liminal cities, the unintended or purposive limited presence of the 
postwar state creates functional and operative ambiguities that result in extra-
judicial and arbitrary mob persecution supplanting rational-legal means of 
criminal prosecution. These omnipresent ambiguities are differently 
rationalized, shaped and given meaning by pluralized informal orders, thereby 
operationally asserting essential non-state social control functions. Thus, do 
communities within postwar borderland cities informally organize themselves 
to endow quotidian human and material processes with regulated predictability 
– a central element of social control. The securitization imperatives at this level 
seek to ensure the predictability of individual and social action.  
 
Social control mechanisms generated as a result of pluralized informal ordering 
have power implications for individual and social actors within postwar 
borderlands and for their engagement with the state. As part of their social 
control mechanisms, pluralized informal orders have negotiated socially 
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accepted – normative – non-state responses to domestic violence, inter-
neighbor conflict, land tenure disputes or different forms of commercial and 
contractual conflicts. On a wider scale the anecdotal examples raise important 
questions about the quotidian interrelated dynamics of informality, power, 
violence, social control capabilities within pluralized informal orders and 
postwar statebuilding in Liberia. 
 
Social Control: Locality, Power and Everyday Social Action in Postwar 
Statebuilding  
 
Socially grounded authority in postwar borderlands derives from the 
structuring of both informal ordering and ordering informality72 and results in 
the emergence and deployment of multiple politicized social controls. MacIver 
and Page (1949: 137) define social controls as institutional mechanisms by which 
society regulate behavior and the way in which patterned and standardized 
behavior in turn serves to maintain the social organization. This definition 
highlights social control as a process of positional and relational negotiation 
between individuals and social organizations with structural maintenance 
outcomes. These aspects of social control are especially important in the 
analysis of postwar borderland contexts where non-state social actors position 
themselves to control social processes.  
 
However, the early definition of social control suffers from power and social 
action outcome blind spots that are especially relevant in understanding social 
controls within postwar borderlands. Focusing on social action outcomes 
within postwar borderlands departs from the individualized and behavioralist 
emphasis within early socio-psychological interpretations of social control. It 
                                               
72 For the purposes of readability, reference would be made to pluralized/plural informal 
orders/ordering to capture coalesced notions of informal ordering and ordering informality.  
 290 
shifts the interpretive lens towards an interrogation of social control as the 
multi-dimensional negotiation of compliance and social action predictability 
within liminal spaces of postwar states. Duffield (2001: 313) highlights this shift 
by noting that contemporaneous regulatory techniques of control create the 
possibility of modulating the behavior of populations or countries through 
controlling processes and networks rather than disciplining the individual per 
se. It is multi-dimensional to the extent that both non-state actors and the 
postwar state are guided by differing rationalities in their attempts to develop 
social control mechanisms and predictable social action outcomes over the 
same territories and peoples. This multi-dimensionality is relevant in the 
exploration of how quotidian leaders of pluralized informal orders engage 
within their communities on one hand and with the postwar state and its 
statebuilding partners on the other hand to negotiate social control, as well as 
to react to the episodic breakdown or systematic dilution of social control.  
 
Social control is not power-neutral. MacIver and Page’s above definitional 
exhibits a power-neutrality that ignores the micro-hierarchies that emerge from 
those processes that seek to shape and determine the regulatory nature and 
content of social action. Given that states remain an unavoidable social actor in 
territorial administration, their deployment of coercion in an attempt to 
exercise clear priority – social control – over all other organizations within 
substantial territories (Tilly 1990:1) puts them into fields of engagement with 
non-state social organized entities. The salience of power and social action 
therefore becomes particularly relevant when advancing social control as an 
analytical framework for pluralized informal orders constituted on the 
territorial margins of postwar states. 
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Recent literature on the local twists and turns has highlighted the analytical 
integration of “power” and an amorphous and often hybridized “local” in the 
explanation and understanding of peacebuilding and statebuilding as political 
social action outcomes. Richmond and MacGinty (2013; 763) argue that this 
local turn has implications for the nature and location of power in 
peacebuilding. Furthermore, the location(s) and nature(s) of power then have 
implications for how, why and to what effect power is deployed as a central 
constituent of social control.  Despite its conceptual and empirical forays into 
power and the local in statebuilding, Paffenholz (2015: 864) correctly observes 
that most critical studies overlook the power of local elites in their 
interpretations of hybrid structures. Especially given that integrative hybrid 
interpretations advance neo-modern and unproblematic interpretations of the 
relationships between encounters between the local and diverse peacebuilding 
and statebuilding interveners. 
 
In cases where power has been centralized as an interpretive category in local 
statebuilding and peacebuilding research, it has often been uni-dimensionally 
articulated as a confrontational rather than a cooperative or even a discursively 
deployed construct.  Confrontation between statebuilding and locally based 
structures of power and authority is captured in Suhrke’s (2007:1296) 
description of processes of state strengthening in conditions of feudal-like 
dispersion of power in Afghanistan. However, the analysis of everyday patterns 
and mechanics of social control assume more subtle forms of engagement 
between pluralized informal orders and postwar statebuilding. These vacillate 
across a spectrum from confrontation to cooperation, making confrontation 
(just like instances of mob violence) one of many products and outcomes of 
social actor engagement.  
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It is interpretively problematic when local actor objectification and 
appropriation of postwar statebuilding interventions are viewed uni-
dimensionally as modes of resistance. Duffield (2000) explains the liberal peace 
project as a colonial approach to governing the ‘borderlands’ as part of an 
apparatus of power which attempts to discipline and normalize.” This is even 
more so when this resistance is pitted against assumed uni-linear and top-down 
patterns of control (domination) inherent within international statebuilding 
interventions. Together, these assumptions that devolve from critical 
statebuilding scholarship reifying the theoretical oppositional obsession 
between power as domination and power as resistance. This trickles into the 
“local turn” research agenda, which Paffenholz (2015: 862) describes as 
identifying the dominant international with a monolithic West, and as a 
continuation of neo-colonial policies of control now taking part in the liberal 
peacebuilding enterprise. However, differing modes, patterns and interaction of 
political and social controls permeate quotidian practice within and across 
international, national and local levels within contexts of international 
statebuilding.  
 
Acknowledging this complexity necessitates an exploration of social control that 
goes beyond understanding how the dominant international seeks to control 
the passive local and the forms of resistance that inure from this interaction. 
Multiple analytical and interpretive trajectories arise from interaction between 
local, national and international actors. Each entity – being networked to some 
degree with the others – develops operational rationales and agendas based on 
their social and symbolic positionality. Escaping the replication of dependencia 
discourses, borderland social actors continuously developed and deployed 
creative ways to alternatively incorporate, appropriate, objectify and resist 
international statebuilding interventions. Most importantly, they continuously 
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seek to make these interventions work for themselves – the networked 
borderlanders. These practices contribute to their development of social 
control mechanisms that they seek to deploy in shaping and regulating social 
action.  
 
However, the sociological turn in statebuilding research has increasingly 
engaged power relations through Bourdieu’s conceptualization of symbolic 
power. Hebert-Lemay (2011: 1834) researching UN interventions in Kosovo and 
East Timor refers to symbolic power as an aspect of most forms of power that 
requires acceptance as legitimate by the subject to reach its aim as it is 
routinely deployed in a quotidian manner in social life. The symbolism, 
routinization and legitimation inherent within the conceptualization of 
symbolic power is therefore more suited to the analysis of the normative 
construction and deployment of social control within pluralized informal orders 
in postwar borderlands. The introduction of symbolic power dimensions, make 
social control processes and outcomes inherently political.  
 
Importantly, therefore, the sources, construction and deployment of social 
control reflects the symbolic, locally legitimized and routinized power wielded 
by informal borderland social actors in engagement with both the postwar state 
and statebuilding interventions. Weber’s (1968: 153) definition of power as the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out 
his own will despite resistance, however, emphasizes the coercive over the 
collaborative exercise of power. Meanwhile, Parsons (1960: 199 – 225) offers a 
cautionary observation against the uni-dimensional interpretation of power that 
limits it to its distributive aspects – power of A over B. He rather theorizes in 
favor of “collective” analyses of power, whereby persons – or social actors – in 
cooperation can enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature. 
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This provides am ampler framework for the analysis of power and social control 
within the contexts of flux and uncertainty that characterize postwar 
borderlands. Furthermore Mann (1986: 6) notes that in most social relations, 
both distributive and collective, exploitative and functional aspects of power, 
operate simultaneously and are intertwined. 
 
This chapter develops an interpretive analysis of the purposive construction 
and deployment of social controls by pluralized informal orders. It also 
describes the endogenous and exogenous challenges encountered in the 
deployment of social control. More importantly, it also describes the 
implications of these patterns of embedded social controls on broader postwar 
statebuilding processes. Social control captures quotidian management of 
social action, which while based within the margins of states, are – 
differentiated based on their configuration, interactional, hierarchical, 
networked and normative. Thus, while some scholars of Liberia such as Ellis 
(2004: 2007) have focused on how politicians use social networks to maximize 
and articulate power, especially when the formal procedures of bureaucratic 
governance have become weak, everyday practice from borderlands explore 
representations of how pluralized informal orders use their political networks 
to entrench social controls within contexts of flux and uncertainty. This is the 
premise from which an interpretation of social controls within Liberia’s 
postwar borderlands develops.  
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Social Control: Micro-Territorial Governors, Power Dispersion and the 
Regulation of Everyday Social Action 
	
A.	Micro-Territorial	Governors	and	the	Maintenance	of	Normative	Codes	
Within cities on the edges of states, customary (often deriving from traditional 
mores), moralistic (deriving from Judeo-Christian teachings) and rational-legal 
codes constitute the core of informal normative guidance that regulate 
individual and social action. While far from rational-legal juridical codification, 
these norms emerge from the constitution of cities away villages as a function of 
the agglomeration of differing identity groups. Although largely informal, these 
norms provide the empirical juridical content to socialized ordering within 
proximate groups in areas where state presence is limited and traditional 
authority is largely suspended. Hence territorial positionality and informal 
ordering matter for the constitution of the normative content of quotidian 
social control that micro-territorial governance grapple with within 
borderlands.  
 
The normative codes that form the basis of quotidian social control within 
borderland spaces are largely negotiated. Negotiating social control refers to 
dynamics of rulemaking, the construction of hierarchies and consent 
mechanisms. This negotiation manifests itself through omnipresence of these 
rules in everyday practice within liminal spaces. Negotiating social control is 
also driven by ever changing dynamics of what Munro (1996: 148) describes as 
relations of control and consent, power and authority. Across the board in 
Ganta and Foya, contestation around the personality of the MTG did not affect 
the normative nature and content of social codes. Hence MTGs could change, 
but the rules by which the new MTGs operated are known, tacitly agreed upon 
by community members and subject to peer compliance.  
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However, in many instances, codes of social conduct developed within 
communities are more expansive than those covered in civil statutes in Liberia. 
Another participatory anecdote best explains this point. My research assistant 
and I arrived on Ganta’s Broad Street at about midnight on March 29, 2014. 
Since we had not made any firm sleeping arrangements, my assistant advised 
that we seek out one of the young men ambling in the shadows of commercial 
activity for advise on lodging options. This young man led us through a maze of 
alternating wooden, zinc and brick seemingly makeshift constructions to a 
motel. The motel attendant noted that they had only one room left, and 
unfortunately, they could not have us share that room because two males were 
not allowed in the same room. Apparently “if we break that rule today, it will 
not look good for the image of our establishment, sorry,” the lady had noted. As 
we trudged back to the main road to find alternative accommodation, my 
research assistant and I ruminated about the assumptions the hotel attendant 
might have made about us and the social codes she was applying which 
ostensibly or actually might have tarnished the reputation of their 
establishment. However, this example pointed to the everyday application of 
social codes emanating from lived experiences. While I did not proceed to 
research questions of the enforcement of sexual standards, it provided insights 
into the generalized enforcement of social controls.  
 
The codification of social control within borderland communities also 
emphasizes the regulation of subtler forms of perversion. While hurling an 
insult is not prohibited by civil statutes, except in cases of slander and 
defamation, most borderland communities have instituted fines for “public 
misconduct” which captures violations related to physical and verbal abuse 
towards one’s household member or a neighbor. “If people come and stand on 
their veranda and start to throw insults at each other. We bring them, judge the 
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case and give a fine,”73 noted TK, the female MTG for Assembly of God Quarter 
in Foya. These statues bind all members of the community, meanwhile the 
MTG, her secretary and treasurer track and collect the fines levied to 
community members. She in turn presents quarterly reports to the community.  
 
While these norms that constitute the institution of social controls are used to 
regulate individual and collective action within the community, the fines 
collected constitute a resource which politicizes social control and leads to the 
rise and fall of MTGs and in some cases the politics of perennial leadership. 
The utilitarian dimension of social control is also evident in the rule 
surrounding community use of shared resources – such as wells, public latrines 
and palaver huts. Acknowledging CIFORD (Community Initiative for Rural 
Development) for their contribution to installing a well in Deakehmein 
Community, Ganta, for example, the following rules and regulations are 
inscribed on the wall which encloses the pump –  
A) The pump shall open for service from 6:AM-10: AM – 2nd 
service from 3:PM – 7:PM;  
B) Pump user fee - $5.00LD per container;  
C) Only from 10 years and above are allowed to get water from this 
pump;  
D) The trained community pump mechanics should be up to the 
task of repairing the pumps;  
E) Feet wear are not allowed;  
F) Don’t use your mouth to drink from this pump.  
While these rules are inscribed on the pump’s enclosure, not all pumps within 
Deakehmein Community benefit from the same normative transparency. 
Neither is this general practice across communities within borderlands. 
                                               
73 Interview conducted with CC-2 in Foya, on 31, July 2015.   
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However, these rules are peer enforced as the MTG noted “we are all security 
for ourselves. So together we make sure that the rules are respected.” This 
consensual enforcement of social controls culminates with violations being 
brought to the attention of the MTG for resolution.  
 
Fines derived from the enforcement of these rules are used both for the 
maintenance of the pump and the expansion of health and sanitation initiatives 
within the community. Some of the money is used to buy gloves, shovels and 
wheelbarrows that are used in an ongoing campaign to rid the community of 
plastic and other forms of debris. These campaigns are developed by the MTG 
in collaboration with his zonal heads and mandatorily involve participants from 
all of the community’s nine zones. Households supply the voluntary manual 
labor for these campaigns in which most of the community claim a vested 
interest. However, the MTG raised a difficulty with getting home renters within 
the community to participate in these community activities. Given that they are 
renters and not homeowners, “they feel that it is not their business to take care 
of another person’s house. So, we try to convince them that it is in the interest 
of everyone to keep clean surroundings. If we fail, we take the matter up to the 
City Mayor,”74 noted S.A.G, MTG for Deakehmein Community.   
 
Social control within Liberia’s borderlands is manifested in implicit 
codification of non-state regulations governing human and material production 
– single space (city), multiple nexuses of social control (MTGs). While Peclard 
and Hagmann (2010: 544) use the framework of negotiated statehood to 
investigate past and ongoing dynamics of state domination, the normative 
codification and dispensation of social control within postwar borderland 
spaces focuses the ontological lens on immanent dynamics that strengthen the 
                                               
74 Interview with CC-12 in, Ganta on 12 August 2015.  
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hierarchical positionality of specific informal social actors in consensual 
relationships with their communities.  
 
B.	Incorporating	Borderland	Cities	–	Reproducing	Non-State	Social	Controls	
Comments from residents and MTGs within Liberia’s borderland cities reflect 
the opinion that “there are not enough police to enforce law and order in this 
city,”75 or “if someone steals my wood and I report to the police, they will take 
him to Voinjama for judgment. If I have to go to Voinjama to bear witness in 
the case, can you imagine how much money I will spend to travel and stay 
there? Just for wood that the man stole.”76 Furthermore, an MTG linked 
security and justice as interrelated issues by noting that the judicial system 
seemed to abet criminal behavior through its leniency, thereby stoking the 
proliferation of mob justice77. These views reflect the incapacity, cost and 
distance attributed to the everyday regulation of human and material processes 
by the state in borderland cities. The agglomeration of ethnically and nationally 
diverse populations at these borderland trade nexuses necessitates the 
production and reproductions of everyday social control mechanisms to ensure 
even a semblance of predictability in behavioral and social action. The 
communities that inhabit borderland cities understand this and so does the 
state. Hence, the patterned reproduction of social control results from and in 
deepening engagement between the borderland communities, MTGs, centrally 
based borderland elites and the state.  
 
Historically though, the nature and content of social control within borderland 
cities predates the incorporation of these spaces into cities by the state. 
Historical archives evidence the emergence of Liberia’s borderland 
                                               
75 Focus Group Discussion held in Bassa Community, Ganta on August 17, 2015.  
76 Focus Group discussion in New Foya on 28 July 2015.  
77 Focus Group Discussion in Jacob’s Town, Ganta on August 9, 2015. 	
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agglomerations (particularly in Foya and Ganta) as a result of cross-border trade 
by kin communities who spoke similar dialects despite divergent colonial 
histories. Kissi-speaking traders who spanned tri-national border communities 
in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone dominated trade in Foya. Meanwhile, 
Mano and Gio-speaking traders from Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire largely 
contributed to building and sustaining Ganta as a trade hub. However, both 
Bøås and Ellis also point to the omnipresence of Mandingo traders across every 
borderland space within the Mano River area. Implicitly therefore, even before 
Foya and Ganta were incorporated by the Liberian state as cities in the 1970s, 
they already exhibited city-like characteristics of capital flow and accumulation, 
ethnically heterogeneous populations and trade networks that expanded 
outwards – nationally and internationally. This is the historical backdrop 
against which borderland communities constituted themselves into non-state 
configurations of non-state informal ordering to engage initially with the 
extractive imperatives of the Liberian Frontier Force prior to incorporation and 
with Internal Revenue agents after incorporation.   
 
Since the incorporation of agglomerated borderland spaces into cities, social 
controls have adapted to and engaged changing political contexts – in a process 
of production and reproduction. Charts 7.3a and 7.3b descriptively depict the 
time in service of MTGs in Ganta and Foya respectively (as of August 2016). 
They range from 0-32 years in Foya and 1-32 years in Ganta.  
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Figure 3: Duration of Current Micro-Territorial Governor Service (Ganta) 
 
 
Figure 4: Duration of Micro-Territorial Governor Service (Foya) 
 
 
Both charts evidence the exceptional nature of 32 years of MTG leadership. In 
the case of Foya, Saah Dukor’s leadership at Ndama Road Quarter, was 
interrupted by a brief refugee sojourn in Buyedu in Sierra Leone during the 
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leadership of Guinea Road community has been uninterrupted by years of civil 
war. The historical context surrounding MTGs leadership is important because 
crises, while evidencing adaptive modes of human and material production, 
also offer insights into the production and reproduction of modes of social 
control.   
 
Foya was subject to different modes of occupation by rebel factions during 
Liberia’s Civil Wars. At different points Foya came under NPFL, ULIMO-K 
and LURD occupation. According to OMF, who was MTG during the NPFL 
and early stages of the ULIMO-K occupation, the difference between both was 
that the NPFL sought to collude with MTGs to administer Foya and its 
surroundings, while ULIMO-K imposed rather repressive modes of social 
control – including the institution of forced labor to finance their war effort and 
obliging the civilian population to purchase human body parts78. Importantly, 
the social control importance of MTG that emerged with the incorporation of 
the city has shown remarkable resiliency through wartime and postwar 
statebuilding. Among other factors, this is partly attributable to Baud and Van 
Schendel’s (1997: 226) observation that it is only in borderlands that the power 
of the state is circumscribed by local political networks that (continue to) 
connect the two sides and are therefore international too. 
 
In the long run, therefore, social controls benefit borderland communities, the 
state and even occupying rebel factions. The management of everyday basic 
social service provision (such as water, dispute resolution and securitization) 
and local knowledge developed through daily practice contribute to the 
production and reproduction of social control mechanisms. Crises engender 
innovative social control mechanisms that largely depend on non-state 
                                               
78 Discussion with OMF in Foya on March 27, 2014. 
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informally socially organized actors. One of such social control mechanisms is 
Community Watch Forum, organized by local Liberian National Police (LNP) 
units at the informal community/quarter level prior to the Ebola pandemic, but 
reinforced during the health crisis. The idea was to get local communities 
involved with their public safety and security given the limited human assets 
available to Police Support Units in borderland cities. When they were 
organized, CWFs were armed with flashlights and batteries. These groups of 
volunteer community-based informal security personnel were divided into 
severe shifts. From dusk to dawn, they conduct patrols within their community 
areas of operation. These vigilante-style (mainly youth) groups are supposed to 
monitor, inform and transmit criminal transgressors to the local police.  
 
CWFs consider themselves an essential element in the securitization of human 
and material processes within the borderland communities in which they live. 
Nevertheless, most members of these groups nursed they hope that it was a first 
step to them being called into a more formal and paid role within the police 
and security system. However, this volunteer force runs on informal 
organizational and operational rules (which differ from one community to 
another within the same city) on the spatial margins of the state. They have 
generally adopted and sought to enforce the state-endorsed ‘bring the rogue to 
formal justice’ mantra. However, they have proven more efficient at deterring 
criminal activity within their communities than the PSUs, and many of their 
members remain disappointed that the formal police system fails to keep up 
with their ‘informal policing’ efforts. CS, a female CWF member in Foya noted 
that “we caught a rogue and handed him over to the LNP. He disappeared and 
after two weeks we saw him again and when they come back they are more 
dangerous, since they live in the communities with us.” There are obviously 
functional, process and outcome disharmonies between the LNP and the CWF. 
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These disharmonies contribute to entrenching this social control mechanism, 
which might have emerged to support local policing, but which over time may 
overtake it and potentially provide an additional challenge to state-described 
law and order.  
  
C.	MTGs:	Shaping	and	Deploying	Social	Control	in	Everyday	Practice	
Having empirically outlined the negotiated normative content of quotidian 
social control within Liberia’s borderland spaces, necessitates moving on to the 
shaping and deployment of social control. The social, symbolic and territorial 
positionality of Micro-Territorial Governors (MTGs) centralizes them in relation 
to the community as well as the state in the mutually beneficial construction 
and maintenance of social controls. The mutually beneficial nature of these 
interactions neither assume nor imply either symbiotic hybridity with the state 
or generalized “decentralized despotism” (Mamdani 1996: 52) towards their 
communities. This is especially the case given that the “institutionalization” of 
informal ordering runs counter to the power centralizing imperatives of 
statebuilding. Discerning the different registers from which MTGs operate viz 
their communities and the state in quotidian practice allows for variation in 
social control along a scale from – hegemonic to consensual. This variation 
arising from daily practice provides an interpretive basis for understanding 
competing, cooperative or merely survivalist political agendas and strategies 
deployed by MTGs. Secondly shapes an understanding of the patterned 
reproduction of social controls through the triadic encounters of people, social 
groups and the state in the longue durée.  
 
Finally, the reproduction of social control provides insights into local power 
dynamics and the deployment of local power within borderlands. Assuming 
that the postwar state and its interventionary partners seek to recapture the 
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statist imperatives of effective territorial control inherent tensions emerge 
between this statist objective and society-based pluralized informal orders.  
 
Of the 37 micro-territorial divisions analyzed within two borderland cities, 51% 
(19) were created either during Liberia’s interwar years (1997 – 1999) or 
thereafter. Of these 19, only two – New Foya and Kpormu Road Quarters in 
Foya had proceeded with a change of leadership during this timeframe. 
Understanding leadership alteration points to the negotiation of hierarchical 
positionality within informal orders. This in turn reveals insights into the 
everyday politics of hegemonic and/or consensual social control negotiated 
endogenously within informal orders and exogenously with networked external 
actors – the state and statebuilding interveners. Implicitly, informal ordering 
does not directly coincide with what Mamdani (1996: 41) analyzed as 
“decentralized and democratic forms of organization” as it sometimes exhibits 
centralizing and controlled access characteristics (as shown in Fig. 7.1 below). 
Given that informal ordering develops a scale of social control ranging from 
hegemonic to consensual, their functional dynamics in daily practice are 
located along this scale. 
 
Figure 5: Variation Along Hegemonic-Consensual Governance Continuum 
Hegemonic  Consensual 
• Personalized  • Collective 
• Static   • Alternating Leader 
• Centralized  • Decentralized 
• Controlled Access  • Open access 




Given that the MTG function is largely benevolent, occupants of this role 
deploy multiple interrelated registers in the maintenance of varying patterns of 
hegemonic and/or consensual social control. Two synoptic cases illustrate the 
appropriation of different registers in the development and deployment of 
social controls by MTGs – one each from Foya and Ganta. In Foya, EN, the 
New Foya MTG also runs a dry goods store at the New Foya daily market. He 
claims that, “I even use the money from by business to fix the pump for the 
community when it breaks down.”79 This overlapping financial element in the 
performance of MTG roles does more than simply make for rather convoluted 
accounting. It also provides a rationale for the community to be beholden to 
the MTG, thereby legitimating his preferred mode of social control and eliciting 
tacit compliance.  
 
Furthermore, the interwoven finances also explain the tardy bookkeeping 
reports that often precede MTG elections in New Foya. This led an elder within 
the community to note that “if by next week we do not get a financial report, we 
would take the matter up to the City Mayor.”80 However, it is not certain that 
such a move would lead to the eviction of the MTG, given that Foya’s nine 
MTGs are also de facto “unofficial” members of the City Council. 
 
This case illustrates the complex dynamics linking MTGs to their communities. 
However, reflecting a predominantly consensual social control framework, 
interactions between the New Foya MTG and his community are largely 
consensual as he requested and was granted extra time to prepare his financial 
report. Moreover, unlike more hegemonic MTGs and despite attempting to 
control the members of his community whom I could engage with during my 
                                               
79 Interview with QC-1 on July 28, 2015 in Foya, Liberia. 
80 Interview with New Foya Community Elder on August 1, 2015 in Foya, Liberia.	
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research project, he respected the confidentiality of interviewees from his 
community and stayed away during focus groups discussion. This reflected 
relatively open access to community members and their opinions about 
informal ordering in its multiple dimensions.  
 
The complexity of MTG-community negotiation is exacerbated when the 
relative absence of the state elevates MTGs to unofficial positions in city 
management thereby limiting the capacity of their communities to effect 
leadership changes in the face of the personalization of relationships between 
the City Mayor and his non-official council members. In the case of New Foya, 
which social control although negotiated and consensual, nevertheless depicts 
the MTG wielding considerable gatekeeping and executive powers in shaping of 
social control within his micro-territorial space. By negotiating the extension of 
financial reporting deadlines, he astutely buys time beyond his two-year term 
limit.   
 
The second illustration is from Peace Community, Ganta. This is a relatively 
new, postwar community, which sits at the entrance of the city along the 
Paynesville-Guinea Border highway. “When I came here, this area was a new 
layout. It was a bush,” noted the MTG for Peace Community. However, the 
MTG, FB, uses his position to control the human content of his community. He 
asserts that, having served as an officer in the Armed Forces of Liberia, I try to 
convince former soldiers and friends to come a build within this community.” 
FB also operates on multiple registers, serving as Director of Nimba Guard 
Services, a private security firm he operates together with a sitting member of 
Liberia’s House of Representatives. FB’s deployment of his 119 man NGS team 
to guard private business premises in Ganta provides his with a web of 
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intelligence collection, which spans hotels, motels, bars and financial 
institutions.  
 
The second case reflects patterns of social control closer to the hegemonic end 
of the spectrum. By singularly defining and inviting a specific category of 
individual – former AFL members and ex-fighters – to provide the core 
membership of his community, FB effectively builds a social control 
mechanism into community composition. This social control mechanics 
effectively determines subsequent patterns of community legitimation of MGT 
leadership and compliance to social control norms. Like a broad group of 
MTGs within communities that emerged out of inhabited spaces after Liberia’s 
civil wars within borderlands, their claim to consensual leadership does not 
translate into everyday practice. In Ganta mainly, MTGs of these postwar 
communities point to the former city mayor, Dorr Cooper telling them that 
communities did not need to elect their MTGs, given that he the city mayor had 
not been elected to his position. However, their grip on the definition and 
deployment of social control within their communities, coupled with their 
longevity in service (15 years on average) point to patterns of personalized 
entrenchment of positional power. Meanwhile, they use their diverse and 
networked connections to build greater leverage into maintaining their local 
positions.   
 
Manifestations of social control at the territorial margins of the state operate at 
an informalized intersection between the individual and the state in daily 
practice. It is evident in interactions between mayors and MTGs as they seek to 
regulate human and material processes within these margins. Both cases 
illustrate the nature and location of symbolic power within informal orders 
deployed through varying patterns of social control. These processes that 
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centralize MTGs in the daily lives of borderland communities make the postwar 
state the “twilight institution” (Lund, 2006: 687). This is especially the case 
given the state’s dependence on these MTGs to exercise effective territorial 
control. Hence this analysis coincides with Moore’s (1978: 56) reading of 
networked micro-political configurations in and their broader interpenetrated 
connections to state formation writ large.  
 
Socially grounded authority derived from informal ordering endows 
community chairpersons with the power to resolve community disputes, 
apprehend criminals and hand them over to the Liberian National Police, 
mediate the engagement of international NGOs with their communities, 
manage community projects which devolve from prior NGO engagement and 
negotiate with the City Mayor (the official representative of the state). 
Therefore, there is a naturalistic and direct link between community leaders 
and the community. The functions performed by community leaders are based 
on power informally vested upon them by their communities and acquiesced to 
by the state – therefore they derive from the demographic constitution of the 
spaces they control, territorial control itself and the limited state presence. 
 
However, the state’s enforcement of eminent domain rules within communities 
that predate it has effectively created internal borders between communities 
and areas designed as state controlled spaces – such as marketscapes and areas 
subject to road construction projects. The overlap between the state’s eminent 
domain and informally ordered spaces diffuses social controls in areas 
proximate to these state-governed spaces. However, since these spaces are 
marked by the absence of the state, they also escape the controls developed 
through informal ordering. They become refuges for transient livelihoods and 
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criminal activity stoking intra-communal, inter-communal and communities-
postwar state tensions. 
 
Social Controls within Ordered Informality – The CMR, The “Susu” 
and Transitions to Ownership 
 
It is not uncommon to see makeshift wooden barricades blocking the uneven 
paths that link borderland communities. These barricades epitomize the 
rivalries that exist between the public transport functions of Commercial 
Motorbike Riders (CMRs) and the non-trespassing private property demands of 
micro-territorial communities. It is also a microcosm of larger generational 
cleavages between the largely youth CMRs and older MTGs and family heads. 
“You see these young boys prefer to either go tap rubber or ride motorcycles 
than to go to school,”81 noted a Guinea Road community elder in Ganta. 
Meanwhile CMR Union leaders “fight against the predominant view within the 
community that we are young, violent and uneducated, although most of our 
members have high school diplomas,”82 articulated an LMTU-Ganta leader. 
Having focused the first part of this chapter to mechanics of social control 
emanating from territorially based informal orders, the ensuing section 
describes social controls put in place through processes of ordering informality. 
While the emergence of social controls from the management of proximate 
household relationships seems rather naturalistic, the negotiation of social 
controls informal economic operators – Commercial Motorbike Riding (CMR) – 
highlight rational logics and mono-registers, with differing and more mediated 
patterns of social control. The nature of social control to which CMRs get 
subjected also differ depending on the regulators – whether state or non-state. 
 
                                               
81 Interview with a Guinea Road community elder on August 24, 2015.  
82 Interview with LMTU-Ganta leader on August 16, 2015.  
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Most critiques of international statebuilding interventions deplore its emphases 
on markets and democracy, while ignore local knowledge and processes 
(Chandler 2006: 14-16). Donais (2012:4) avers that even where the importance of 
“local ownership” proclaimed by interventionists, it is about convincing and 
cajoling local actors to accept the wisdom and utility of what remain externally 
defined policy prescriptions. This justifies understanding the contributions of 
active local agency in the regulation and facilitation of everyday aspects of 
postwar socio-economic and development – job creation, welfare and basic 
service provision – which Francis (2012:2) acknowledges have critical 
implications for creating the durable foundations for winning the peace in 
divided communities.  
 
Transportation is arguably the most important informal economic sector within 
Liberia’s postwar borderland cities. This importance is predicted on sheer 
numbers (of CMRs), relatively minimal capital and human investment and 
maintenance costs, challenges of navigability within and between borderscapes, 
and the historical importance of borderland cities as national and international 
trade hubs. Given its informality, the social control of CMRing within 
borderland seeks to regulate the activity in relation to borderland communities, 
the home state and neighboring authorities. The implications of these social 
controls do not only take regulation of CMRing out of the hands of the state, 
but it places CMR unions as a mediating social control mechanism between the 
individual CMRs and the State. 
 
Social controls emerging from ordered informality, while centralized and 
hierarchically structures, remain very ineffective in imposing effecting shifts in 
the collective social action of the intended subjects of control, especially when 
they opt to act collectively outside the impositions of the recognized social 
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order. The case of the interaction between Commercial Motorbike Rider 
Unions, CMR (Commercial Motorbike Riders), the state, and borderland spaces 
is used to present these processes. CMR Unions have the authority to negotiate 
licensing for CMR operators, but are limited in either enforcing the mandatory 
use of protective equipment for CMRs and their passengers or encouraging the 
purchase of accident insurance coverage. These state-desired measures have 
the buy-in of the CMR Unions but not the CMRs. However, they develop 
territorial management policies, which ensure the CMR coverage of entire 
borderland cities through the creation and management of staging areas. The 
challenge of imposing social controls on the informally ordered private sector is 
also evidenced in what was largely described as a culture of violence among 
CMRs. Therefore, this section shows that though processes of informal 
borderland ordering within postwar states create different forms of social 
control outside the state. 
 
At the main intersection in Foya, there sits the biggest signpost in this 
borderland city. The signpost epitomizes cooperation between the international 
(German Cooperation Mission), the state (Liberian National Police), the national 
non-state (Rights for Rice Foundation) and the local (Foya Youth Motorcyclists 
Training Project). These signposts outline the personal protective equipment 
necessary for operating motorcycles in general as well as the speed limits when 
riders navigate inter and intra-borderland spaces. The history and social 
control utility of this signpost offers insights into the non-state negotiated 




Figure 6: NGO-Sponsored Public Service Billboard 
 
 
The signpost (visualized above) is the product of a 10-year old (as of August 
2015) CMR Training for Trainers’ program which JTS credits with providing 
him with the resources to extend his fleet of commercial motorbikes and to 
become active within the leadership of the pioneering Foya Commercial 
Motorcycle Union. However, this program has yet never been replicated since 
its initial stint, despite the growing number and expanding informality of 
CMRing within Foya and its environs. The assumption by the international and 
national actors involved seems to have been that through the initial training 
session, capacity for sustained training had been transferred to the CMR Union.  
 
There are different patterns in the institutionalization of CMR training and 
refresher as social control programs by CMR Unions within borderland cities. 
According to AS, Chief of Operations for the union in Ganta, they work to 
organize two training programs per annum. These programs are sponsored by 
the CMRs themselves through the contribution of 150LD. Despite the payment 
of these training dues, he noted that CMRs hardly turn up for training sessions 
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because it taken them away from working83. However, JSTomah, the head of 
CMR Union in Foya noted the challenge of conducting regular refresher 
training exercises in the absence of the financial and human resources that had 
supported the first training of trainers’ session84. Nevertheless, the Foya CMR 
Union collects 25LD per meeting for the two meetings they strive to hold each 
month. However, JSTomah’s argument for the absence of subsequent training 
sessions reflects a justification for dependence on external resources for the 
organization of training, without providing the necessity for such training. 
These sporadic training of trainer missions emphasize the essentialist capacity 
and safety component of individual CMRs. However, they are oblivious of the 
local politics of CMRs and their Unions and the peacebuilding implications of 
the relationship between CMRs, their communities and the state.  
 
The social control of CMRs by the state is predominantly mediated through the 
CMR Unions. This mediated social control often avoids direct confrontation 
between individual CMRs and state agents. As JSTomah stated “When the 
commissioner of police is riding around and he sees certain violations by riders, 
he calls me and described the rider and the violation and I will look into it.” 
This mediated social control mechanism puts the onus within the CMR Union 
to manage the social behavior of its members within the borderland spaces.  
 
Mediated social controls through the CMR Union is made possible by the 
robust and structured capabilities that union Chiefs of Operations build within 
these social organizations as part of the process of ordering informality. The 
Chief of Operations in Ganta, AS, A. Sikeh, the Vice President for Operations 
for LMTU-Gompa, explained that, “it is extremely difficult to keep track of the 
                                               
83 Interview with LMTU Ganta Chief of Operations in Ganta, Liberia on August 14, 2015. 
84 Interview with LMTU Foya Chairperson in Foya, Liberia on August 3, 2015	
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CMRs, because there are some people who buy a motorbike and give it to a 
relative to run as a business for them with no registration. Our field officers are 
there to make sure that they are registered and accounted for. But there are 
times when the unregistered CMRs physically attack and insult our field 
operators.” The CMR Unions have proven adept at dealing with sporadic and 
quotidian violence from their members. These issues are also resolved within 
the organization without recourse to the state. 
 
CMR Unions play a central role in socially controlling and mitigating quotidian 
violence perpetuated by and inflicted upon CMRs. AS evoked “a culture of 
violence surrounding the motorbike rider. This can be explained by the lack of 
adequate education and training and our country’s [Liberia’s ndlr] long history 
of civil war.”85 He referenced the recent spate of violence in River Gee county 
where CMRs had burnt down a police station because the police had 
“protected” a motorist accused of having been in an accident that was fatal for a 
CMR. This specter of violence that hangs over the CMR activity within 
borderland cities necessitates social control mechanisms to avoid CMRs 
perpetuating disorder.  
 
By creating different bases which are micro-managed by CMR Union officials, 
the union does not only order an informal economic activity, it develops a 
framework for social control through its own appropriation of borderland 
territoriality. In Ganta, for example, these bases facilitate the collection of the 
20LD/day operating fees which the Union requisitions from CMRs in Ganta. 
These bases – 4 in Foya and 7 in Ganta are symbiotically attached to 
commercial and commercial motor transport hubs within the borderland 
spaces. However, more importantly, their micromanagement decentralizes and 
                                               
85 Interview conducted with AS in Ganta, Liberia on August 14, 2015. 
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expands social controls to the benefit of mediation and conflict resolution 
amongst CMRs and between CMRs and borderland communities and state 
agents. 
 
The CMR Unions heuristically sees linkages between peacebuilding and the 
creation of growth opportunities for CMRs – another social control mechanism 
is built on the creation of growth opportunities. There is consensus between 
CMRs and union leaders that “motorbike riding is not a career.” Hence CMR 
unions in Foya and Ganta have created micro-credit schemes to provide 
opportunities for riders to become owners. This microcredit scheme known as 
“susu” incentivizes CMRs to look beyond immediate daily gains from CMRing 
towards future ownership and possible capital investment in other economic 
sectors.  
 
CMR Union officials within the different bases manage “susu” schemes. There 
are various “susu” schemes on each CMR base in Foya and Ganta. According to 
JSTomah, there are – five susu groups on Base1; six- Base2; three-Base3 and 2-
Base4. Hence a total of 16 CMR susu groups in Foya alone. Together with base 
members representative CMR Union officials set up and enforce rules for – the 
amount of contributions, disbursement timeframes, penalties for default and 
mediation mechanisms for the processing of complaints resulting from disputes 
relating to the “susu” scheme. According to TT, a member of the a “susu” 
group in Base1- Broad street, Foya – the voluntary nature of participation in the 
group mitigates the conflicts that could have arisen through mandatory 
participation.   
 
The negotiated and constructed social control capabilities embedded within 
social organizations such as CMRs that order informality exhibits regulative, 
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symbolic and responsive capacities. The multifarious agenda of CMR Unions 
incorporates mutual interests of its members, community members, MTGs and 
state representatives. Ordering informality mandates membership within this 
unions, however the voluntary participation in union activities mitigates 
internal conflict. Meanwhile, the issuing of registration cards provides CMRs 
with a rational-legal document that allow them to negotiate national and 
international border authorities and also ensure compliance to union rules and 
regulations. The expected outcome is to endow predictability of behavioral 
action of CMRs on one hand and social action on the part of Unions from 
whom social responsibility is expected. The ability of borderland CMR unions 
to socially control their predominantly youth members endow them with 
political power in their mediation with state agents and community 
representatives. However, as was evidenced in the violence that gripped Ganta 
in late September 2015, social control is also often elusive. When the Unions 
fail to control their members during critical junctures, the resultant outcome 
results in the temporary muscular intervention of the state in a legitimization of 
its monopoly over the use of violence. 
 
Violence and the Elusiveness of Social Control  
 
The encounter of permanent and impermanent livelihoods within borderland 
cities brings issues of quotidian criminality, justice and violence to the fore. 
“The Minister of Defense [Brownie Samukai ndlr] is building a house towards 
the other side of New Foya here. Because the place is still under construction, 
you see these thieves for a jump the fence and stay there,” noted a New Foya 
youth. Meanwhile the problem of the encounter of permanence and 
impermanence was posed differently in Ganta. During a focus-group discussion 
in Bassa Community, an elder noted, “the overlap of the city market into our 
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community has brought challenges without any benefits. We cannot even 
control the water pump that is there. People throw dirt anyhow making 
problems for our health.” Both communities are overlapped by borderland 
daily marketscapes and pose different sets of challenges for the community 
members and their MTGs.   
 
It is within the informality of these peri-urban borderland spaces, where the 
state resources are thinnest, that Community Watch Forums have arisen as 
UNMIL troops have been drawn down. Despite the growth of CWFs, ‘faceless’ 
mobs often appropriate justice and victimize the singular ‘rogue’ posing a 
challenge for MTGs, the custodians and enforcers of micro-territorially bases 
social controls. The MTG for Gbalagbein community noted that “a few months 
ago we could not wake up in this community without seeing a body in the 
streets, beaten to death as a rogue.” Despite conflict resolution training 
dispensed to MTGs by the INGO, TetraTech, to foster community justice 
mechanisms and securitization these often-impermanent singular borderland 
‘rogues’ are scarcely given the chance at community justice as conceived by 
international interveners. 
 
Nevertheless, the socialized roguishness embedded in marketscapes as well as 
community spaces bordering markets is organized, protected and controlled 
through modes of alternative governance which are tolerable to both the state 
and the local community. Socialized roguishness applies within those spaces 
where according to WM of Blegey Pa Community “local leaders endorse the 
settlement of ‘grona boys’ [vagrant stragglers ndlr] who use any means necessary 
to get their ‘bran ma’ [daily bread ndlr]”. Within these limited spaces, there is 
sustained interdependence between MTGs and the ‘grona boys’. It is through 
this prism that differentiated illicit and roguish actions are interpreted as either 
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worthy of death or simply part of the struggle for “bran ma”. The socialization 
of grona boys through the deliberate or passive acquiescence of some MTGs, 
therefore legitimizes their predominantly illegitimate activities. 
 
MTGs have been more adept at dealing with cases of household violence than 
mediating broader issues relating to mob violence. “When a husband beats a 
wife. Or there is a disagreement between them and they quarrel. They come to 
me and my advisers. We hear the case and try to bring them together,” noted 
the Catholic Community MTG in Ganta. This seems rather straightforward. 
However, the MTG for Gbalagbein community noted that “it is hard to 
intervene when people are beating someone they call a ‘rogue’ because if you 
intervene, you can also lose your life.” Thus, sporadic instances of mob violence 
within Liberia’s borderlands have deepened uncertainty and mistrust in the 
rational-legal administration of justice. No individuals have been prosecuted in 
Ganta, for example, for participating in acts of mob violence targeting the 
“subaltern” rogue.  
 
However, the state’s response to the burning of the Ganta police station as well 
as the hotel and residence of a centrally-connected borderland elite following 
his alleged involvement in the murder of a CMR was markedly more robust. 
This differentiation does not bode well for the uniform application of the 




The social, symbolic and territorial positionality of pluralized informal orders 
centralizes them viz-a-viz their community as well as the state in the mutually 
beneficial construction, reproduction and maintenance of social controls. The 
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mutually beneficial nature of these relationships does not imply symbiotic 
hybridity, given that the “institutionalization” of pluralized informal orders runs 
counter to the power centralizing imperatives of statebuilding. However, the 
state benefits from non-state sources of social control, despite the individual 
and communal advantages that flow to MTGs and representatives of CMR 
Unions. Informal ordering processes in Liberia’s postwar borderlands lead to 
social control outcomes (which depending on the context) conflict and 
cooperate with the state. By discerning the different registers from which 
pluralized informal actors operate viz their communities and the state in 
quotidian practice this chapter allowed for the development of differentiated 
typologies of politicized social control.  
 
Differentiated construction and enforcement of quotidian social controls 
provided an interpretive basis for understanding the competing, cooperative or 
merely survivalist political agendas and strategies of pluralized informal orders. 
This differentiation framed the understanding of the mechanics of social 
control constructed as a result of the triadic relationship between people, 
informal social groups and the state.  Furthermore, it highlighted a historical 
dimension to the production and reproduction of non-state social controls in 
the longue durée.  
 
Pluralized informal orders provide non-state borderland social actors with an 
organized basis for the negotiated construction and deployment of power 
within liminal spaces and beyond. The reproduction of politicized social 
controls provides insights into local power dynamics within borderlands 
through an understanding the local deployment of power. Assuming that the 
postwar state and its interventionary partners seek to recapture the statist 
 321 
imperatives of effective territorial control there are inherent tensions between 
this objective and the very existence of these pluralized informal orders.  
 
Evidenced in quotidian practice show that differentiated typologies social 
controls inure into rather incipient power loci within Liberia’s postwar 
borderlands. By highlighting the inherently political imperatives for social 
control – i.e. power dynamics, agenda setting and influencing – by informal 
socially organized borderland actors, insights are drawn into the transformative 
pursuit of stable social action amid contextual flux and relative vulnerability. 
This empirical exposition of differentiated social control outcomes resulting 
from pluralized informal ordering within postwar borderlands evidences 
syncretic dissonance between borderland socio-political dynamics and 
international statebuilding. 
 
Evidently, exchange and interaction between pluralized informal orders and 
postwar statebuilding interveners is mutually transformative and largely 
characterized by the paradox of formalized informality. This is partially 
rationalized through the postwar context of flux and prevalent vulnerability 
within which it is occurring. The quotidian micro-sociological interaction of 
locally-based social agents and structural dimension of postwar statebuilding 
gives consideration to Wendt’s (1987: 356) argument for a synthesis that 
develops mediating concepts that can link structures and agency in empirical 
situations, thereby binding agents and structures into mutually implicating 
ontological and explanatory roles.  
 
Evidence from the study shows that social control resulting from informal 
ordering flows from the recursive centralizing and hierarchical configuration of 
non-state social actors. It is through this negotiated integrative structuring that 
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non-state informal actors garner their legitimacy. As Mary Parker Follett (1941: 
204) noted “We get control through effective integration. Authority should arise 
within the unifying process. As every living process is subject to its own 
authority, that is, the authority evolved by or involved in the process itself, so 
social control is generated by the process itself. Or rather, the activity of self-
creating coherence in the controlling activity”. Thus, as with the case of 
pluralized informal orders social control arises out of necessity rather than 
being imposed exogenously. It is its endogenous that makes pluralized informal 
orders particularly potent and resilient.  
 
Despite the power centralizing imperatives of international statebuilding, the 
daily deployment and enforcement of social controls by informal non-state 
actors within postwar borderlands points to postwar pluri-centrality of power. 
Without claiming the absence of a struggle for statist hegemony, the 
assumption of power pluri-centrality emphasizes the importance of local actors, 
structures and processes to postwar statebulding outcomes. Their power of 
pluralized informal ordering derives both from their communities and from 
their interactions with formal social actors who seek to engage with borderland 
spaces. The power embedded within the behavioral regulation negotiated by 
pluralized informal orders within borderlands provides the basis for their 






Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Through two Liberian postwar borderland cities, Foya and Ganta, this thesis 
offers an interpretive analysis of how differentiated localized forms of informal 
ordering generate and maintain emic ecosystems of social control. These end 
up structuring quotidian livelihoods on the margins of Liberia’s postwar state, 
providing a bottom-up and interactive lens through which to understand 
outcomes of international statebuilding intervention in practice. The return of 
relative stability to the Liberia’s borderlands, occurs despite the processes of 
international statebuilding interventions, but largely through micro-territorial 
processes of informal ordering by actors who often escape the ontological gaze 
within classical International Relations.   
 
The quotidian informal ordering by micro-territorial governors (MTGs) 
evidences bottom-up processes that are produced through everyday social 
action in liminal spaces. Far from being apolitical and stripped of power 
dynamics and implications, micro-territorial governance, which falls outside 
formal territorial administration, actually straddles the postwar state under 
construction and geographically-situated communities.  
 
This position between communities and the postwar states, though informal 
from the view of the state and its international statebuilding partners, is 
endowed with grounded authority derived from a complex admixture of 
representative, performance and process legitimacy constantly negotiated and 
renegotiates through rules-based quotidian social interaction. Therefore, MTGs 
provided the ontological position from which to understand the interaction 




As gatekeepers into the borderland’s micro-territorial spaces, MTGs are not 
only a repository of spatial and historical knowledge, but they also wield 
grounded authority in the management of quotidian human and material 
processes. They develop dispute resolution mechanism, manage the 
community’s collective resources and represent their communities in 
interaction with both the state and its international statebuilding partners.  
 
The political economy of statebuilding within Liberia’s postwar borderlands 
also evidenced multifarious and often interconnected ordering patterns 
undergirded by rational choice decision-making. Hence, by describing 
processes of informal ordering and ordering informality, this thesis does not 
only seek to show the multiplicity of informal social organization within 
Liberia’s postwar borderlands. It also demonstrates similarities and differences 
in their informal rules-making, basis of grounded authority and their 
interactions with international statebuilding processes.  
 
Commercial Motorbike Rider Unions (CMR) provided the basis for 
understanding processes of ordering informality. Transportation is a 
centerpiece of borderland livelihoods as individuals and communities based 
within liminal spaces seek to forge opportunities with both the national and the 
international. The topographical dispensation of postwar borderlands with its 
seasonal dirt roads, naturally advantages navigation by CMRs. Hence, CMRing 
becomes a social action that incorporates interpretive elements of topographical 
space, the economics of social symbolism and physical interaction with 
multiple others, including passengers, border controllers, police officers and 
the Ebola Virus Disease. 
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CMRing is understood to be an informal economic activity because other than 
respecting the formal rules of the road, it is not governed by a professional 
deontology. Therefore, anyone with access to a motorbike could use it for 
commercial purposes. In order to bring some form of order, which invariable 
creates a centralized node of social control to this disparate informal economic 
ecosystem, CMR Unions were created.  
 
These CMR unions are social organizations which wield an inordinate amount 
of political leverage within borderland spaces. It is worth noting that within 
each borderland spaces, there is at least one CMR Union. These unions 
coordinate the activities of the CMR through borderland spatial management. 
By setting up staging areas they carve out the borderscape, not only to manage 
competition between CMRs, but also to determine pricing from one point of 
the borderland to another.  
 
Given the strong youth presence among the ranks of CMRs, their unions serve 
as a legitimate interlocutor with the local, the national and the international. 
Nevertheless, this research also evidenced inter-generational conflicts between 
youth CMRs and older state administrators alongside the potential for socio-
economic mobility created through the “susu” financial self-help scheme.  
 
These processes of informal ordering and ordering informality occur largely in 
interaction with international statebuilding processes. Their contribution to the 
ordering of quotidian livelihood processes is an often-neglected part of the 
explanation of international statebuilding outcomes in classical IR.  These 
individually and socially organized, and networked (local, national and 
international) constellations of actors form an essential part of the statebuilding 
ecosystem, and not just as potential spoilers.  
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Micro-Territorial Dynamics and Postwar Statebuilding  
 
The obsession with the state in International Relations creates disciplinary and 
methodological blind spots that have been largely exploited by historical, 
sociological and anthropological ontologies. Firstly, International Relations 
theory largely ignores the empirical content of state-society relations, which is 
banished to the sub-discipline of Comparative Politics. Secondly, the focus on 
the state has inured into the subliminal assumption of the Western state as 
“ideal” despite the typological, functional and ontological fallacies embedded 
within such a generality. Thirdly, the focus on the monolithic state in IR has 
privileged static, uni-linear and modernizing modes of explaining and 
understanding phenomena reminiscent of Fukuyama’s (1994) “end of history” 
narrative and Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” interpretation of 
International Relations. These are dominant paradigms that have privileged 
Western understandings of IR at the expense of the relational impact of 
differing forms of hegemony propagated by Western states thereby creating 
distortions in the empirical content sovereignty and territoriality within the 
“global borderlands” (Duffield).  
 
The dominant paradigms within IR have contributed to policy designs that 
privilege the hubris of social engineering projects such as international 
statebuilding and peacebuilding. Fukuyama’s (1994) prophesy of the liberal 
democratic and capitalist economic end of post-polar human history has failed 
to materialize. However, it has largely informed the demand and supply 
modeling of the state that amounts to the commodification of governance. 
Critics of international statebuilding have zeroed in on its perverse liberal 
political and economic bias (Chandler 2008 and 2010, Mac Ginty and 
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Richmond, Richmond, Millar). Given the historical importance of state-society 
interpenetration in processes of statebuilding, Engel and Halden (2013:7) note 
that a proper understanding of different state forms requires close analysis of 
the conflicts between different social forces as they promote state projects that 
will advance particular interests over others. Given the fixed nature of state 
boundaries across most of Africa, even where societal processes appear to 
undermine the statebuilding project, they might contribute to long-term state 
formation.  
 
Critics of International Statebuilding have contributed varying interpretative 
trajectories, which accentuate the interactive and real role of locals and locality 
in processes of postwar reconstruction. However, even this body of literature 
has largely fallen short of engaging constructs of informality that fall outside 
the interpretive purview of Eurocentric IR. Informality is messy, complex and 
challenging and ignoring it would not wish it away. The tendency for classical 
IR to “romanticize the local as a zone of incivility” (Richmond 2009: 152), to 
criminalize informality and cast it in “shadow” terms (Hagmann and Peclard 
2010: 5442-544) and transnational criminal enterprises is problematic. It does not 
account for the mutually constitutive and sustaining relationship between 
informality and formality in actual territorial governance and in establishing the 
empirical content of sovereignty.    
 
This characterization results in the second tendency within IR to strive to 
domesticate, tame and subject the informal through processes of hegemonic 
ordering. The empirical content of sovereignty and territorial integrity in most 
post-colonial states is premised on the coded modernization of traditional 
societies. However, these processes have not necessarily met with compliant 
informal actors. In adapting to the crystallization of the hegemonic state, 
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informal actors have constituted themselves into social orders, which do not fall 
within the strict confines of Eurocentric understandings of civil society.  Cubitt 
(2013: 93) argues that during war to peace transitions, most democratizing 
interventions generally disregard and disrespect local versions of civil society. 
This represents a contradiction of the demos ideology and develops into a 
manipulative distortion of the state/society relations at the heart of democratic 
postwar statebuilding. By focusing on localized borderland representations of 
informal ordering of territoriality and the economy and their implications for 
international statebuilding in Liberia, this thesis contributes to an 
understanding of local dynamics to international issues that are often ignored.  
 
The role of informal actors and processes in postwar international statebuilding 
engages with contemporaneous theoretical and empirical evolutions of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding in International Relations. By situating its 
ontological lens on borderland spaces, this thesis importantly engages with 
alternative manifestations and interpretations of territoriality and sovereignty 
within postwar statebuilding contexts. It specifically makes an empirical 
contribution to bourgeoning theorization on and about local twists and turns in 
international peacebuilding and statebuilding. However, it views the 
determinacy of “local agency” in postwar statebuilding (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond 2013) as inalienably intertwined with the empirical content of 
postwar territoriality and the negotiation of decentered sovereignties amid flux 
and uncertainty. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013:764) see unpacking the local 
turn as an exercise necessary to understand the changing conditions of peace – 
understanding the critical and resistant agencies that have stakes in subaltern 
views of peace, how they act to uncover or engage with obstacles, with violence, 
and with structures that maintain them. However, understanding locality and 
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local dynamics within peacebuilding and statebuilding takes more than just 
making ontological and empirical twists and turns.  
 
It necessitates the centralization of spatial multidimensionality as relationally 
constituted and constituting. These processes of constitution account for messy 
historical, social, symbolical and transversal engagement that produces complex 
informal outcomes of everyday livelihood processes. Instead of treating ‘local 
actors’ as a residual category in investigations of the effectiveness, efficiency, 
coherence or comprehensiveness of their own operations; Engel and Halden 
(2013:4) centralize local actors and their worldviews, positions and conflicts vis-
à-vis each other and vis-à-vis intervening forces. Meanwhile by focusing on the 
interface between the formal and informal, particularly with local reactions and 
engagement with formal statebuilding programs, Mac Ginty (2013: 28) develops 
a process-oriented empirical research agenda for statebuilding in IR. Both 
perspectives, while instructive in investigating the implications of informal 
ordering on international statebuilding, provide interesting theoretical 
trajectories in need of confrontation with quotidian processes. It is these 
quotidian processes that provide the empirical content for a pluralized 
understanding of the empirical content of territoriality and sovereignty within 
postwar contexts of flux and uncertainty.  
 
Historicized Locality in State Formation 
 
While some interpretations of international statebuilding interventions have 
evidenced their unavoidable necessity within postwar contexts (Paris 2010; Paris 
and Sisk 2012, Sisk 2014, Fortna 2008), their positioning based on the intent of 
the intervener is deeply problematic. Siding with the hegemon has spawned 
counterarguments decrying the purposive “social engineering” inherent within 
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international statebuilding (Krause and Jutersonke 2005). However, even the 
counterarguments have remained largely based on Eurocentric understandings 
of the concept rather than the pervasive nature of the process (Sabaratnam 
2013). While acknowledging the contributions of both perspectives to the 
development of a distinctive theoretical space for statebuilding in IR, they have 
largely remained silent to the histories, contexts and micro-relational dynamics 
of exchange within contexts of international statebuilding. Meanwhile these are 
actually the processes, which produce international statebuilding outcomes.  
 
Shifting theoretical and analytical foci towards in-depth empirical case studies 
of international statebuilding have pointed to more nuanced understanding of 
the complexities underlying local, national and international interactive 
processes and their implications for postwar statebuilding. Exploring 
interaction between networked local, national and international actors and 
processes evidences how local actors (whether at national or subnational level) 
develop the ability to construct and maintain alternatives to the liberal peace 
statebuilding project (MacGinty 2013: 21). Meanwhile in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, for example, internationally driven national peace has not 
stemmed the proliferation of interconnected pockets of local violence as part of 
ongoing contestation within state formation Autesserre (2008). Although these 
explorations of postwar statebuilding in IR have shifted the ontological lens to 
the sub-state level, they have largely remained ahistorical. They have not 
developed in-depth understandings of historical continuities and change that 
account for the constitutive, interactive and eventual outcome implications of 
international statebuilding.  
 
Local history holds clues to patterns of everyday socio-political resistance to 
antecedent statebuilding and national building efforts that have inured into 
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alternative spaces and patterning of order, authority and social control. The 
evolution of historicized research on state formation has focused on long-term 
process trajectories within the European context with (Tilly, 1991). However, 
while this has often been cited in the critical statebuilding literature, human 
and material history has largely remained marginalized in the IR literature on 
statebuilding. Cramer’s (2006) emphasizes the importance of political history in 
understanding the outbreak and evolution of violence in developing countries 
since not much can be deduced from a theoretical, ahistorical model, however, 
sophisticated its array of variables. While historical and development studies as 
disciplines have embraced historicized understanding and explanations of 
social phenomena, IR has made only timid steps in that direction.  
 
However, the critical tradition of statebuilding research continues to push the 
disciplinary boundaries by incorporating the historical evolution of concepts 
and phenomena within IR. Richmond (2005) for example has also contributed a 
to a historical understanding of peace formation since the nineteenth century 
by developing an understanding of precursory concepts to the liberal peace in 
IR. Richmond (2016) has pushed that thinking further by exploring the 
implications of peace formation for political order. This paradigmatic push is 
reflected among statebuilding actors in Global North who have increasingly 
normatively recognized the importance of understanding antecedent 
statebuilding history. As articulated in the OECD’s (2011: 25) policy guidance:  
“viewing statebuilding in a historical context reminds us not only that it has 
often been a tumultuous and lengthy process driven by internal and sometimes 
external upheaval, but also that the historical antecedents of any state are 
fundamentally important to its contemporary character.”  
 
Despite this recognition, it remains to be seen how this history gets accounted 
for within postwar statebuilding programming. More than just acknowledging 
this history, there is the necessity to understand the plurality and the 
 332 
differentiated nature of the interaction between society and state as captured by 
Boone (2003) in her exploration of political topographies in Senegal and Cote 
d’Ivoire. 
 
In practice international statebuilding has often taken the peace accords as the 
starting point of peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, amounting to what 
Mac Ginty (2013:19) describes as international actors being “present at creation,” 
given that in the liberal worldview, the past can be regarded suspiciously and 
equated with illiberal political practices that must be replaced with ‘modern’ 
practices (Mac Ginty 2013:25). Hence international actors implicitly marginalize 
the importance of antecedent processes of statebuilding and their implications 
for the construction of patterns of differentiated social dynamics. It also ignores 
the historical implications of state-society interpenetration through mutual 
constitution as evidenced in society’s different historical encounters with state 
and nation building. Therefore, as much as the state cannot be considered 
pristine and completely disconnected from society, the same can be said of 
society. Everyday practices and processes, however, evidence historical 
resilience and the heuristic evolution of lived experiences.  
 
A historicized understanding of spatial, symbolic and social locality contributes 
insights to three interconnected levels of positionality – that of individuals 
within their communities; that of communities in within the city; that of the 
city within the state and that of the state in the world. Positionality has 
implications for the construction, negotiation and deployment of power 
relations over time. Historicizing this interactive positionality connects the 
formal and the informal for a to capture the actual complexity of relationships 
within contexts of international statebuilding. In the case of Liberia, it 
highlights borderland communities that predate different iterations of the state. 
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These communities have evolved progressively, while the state has often been 
subject to capture, subversion or disintegration. This invariably shapes the 
historical relationship between the communities and different iterations of the 
state. Secondly, the state has used different patterns of territorial 
administration over time to construct and impose its sovereignty while 
protecting its territorial integrity (even if its international borders have 
remained stable since 1921 (Gershoni 1985). However, by focusing on individual 
life histories in interaction with their communities and the constitution of 
micro-territoriality, this thesis goes to the core of micro-territorial governance. 
It evidences the importance of micro-territorial governance, which though 
informal, contributes to strengthening the sovereignty of the state and its 
territorial integrity, by harnessing embedded alternative authority structures 
and informal modes of social control.   
 
Silences of Micro-Comparative Statebuilding: Alternative, Pluralized 
Informality  
 
By opting for a micro-comparative understanding of informality within 
Liberia’s internationally driven postwar statebuilding project, this thesis 
evolves an understanding of quotidian territorial and economic ordering. 
Empirically, the postwar state exhibits a limited presence within Liberia’s 
borderlands. This limited presence does not necessarily contrast the historical 
disposition of the Liberian state. Whether it was the creation of districts out of 
hinterlands and six counties out of the settler coastal territories by the King 
administration in 1923 (Gershoni 1985: 59) or Tubman’s National Reunification 
Policy in 1964 that normatively transformed provinces to counties (Hosloe 
2009), the relationship between administration and the territory have remained 
tenuous. Kings territorial administration decree instituted the hit tax of one 
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dollar and educational taxes in areas where schools had been established 
(Gershoni: 1985: 59). Therefore, since the declaration of Liberia’s independence 
in 1847, different iterations of the state and statebuilding processes have 
struggled with the effective exercise of sovereignty and territorial control.   
  
It was evident therefore, that communities exhibited age-old social processes in 
quotidian practice as they engaged with different iterations of the state. 
Evidently, borderland actors in postwar Liberia are connected to the state 
through formal processes of legislative, executive and judicial representation. 
However, borderlands exhibit historical interconnectedness between its 
communities and the territory – they are composed of old communities – that is 
not evident in their discourses of connection to the postwar state. The social 
engineered imperatives of postwar statebuilding projects centralized, top-down 
administrative units. Its bureaucrats are dispatched to administer and order 
human, territorial and material space. They also seek to generate revenue from 
the commercial content of borderland spaces. By seeking a break with the 
governance and administrative past, which is seen to be a proximate cause of 
civil war, postwar statebuilding opposition between the old and the new are 
created into statebuilding practice. Postwar borderland communities emerge 
through the heuristic reconfiguration of social relations – a composite product 
of life histories and prewar and postwar experiences. Meanwhile the postwar 
state rides on the back of its international statebuilding partners driven by a 
“mission civilatrice”. The confrontation of heuristic process with strong spatial, 
social and symbolic linkages to the past and exogenously programmed 
intervention sets up fields of opposition and domination. It is within these 
fields that local power is constituted and deployed to social, symbolic and 




This thesis acknowledges notes that Liberia’s de jure international borders with 
Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, the product of colonial border treaties, 
have remained largely uncontested since the 1920s. Nevertheless, everyday 
processes captured within Liberia’s borderlands reveal evidence of heuristically 
reflexive territorial use and governance from below. Micro-Territorial 
Governors (MTGs) constitute unavoidable gatekeepers and facilitators or 
hindrances to engagement with borderland communities. By governing 
informal orders emerging from micro-territorial structured – quarters and 
communities – they are endowed with embedded authority. The deploy this 
embedded authority to develop modes of social control steeped in the socio-
cultural mores and codes of their proximate communities. Given their 
positionality at the helm of micro-territorialized informal orders, MTGs 
effectively interact with both the state and its international statebuilding 
partners to endow territoriality at the margins of the state with its empirical 
content and alternatively negotiated sovereignty. These are modes of 
territoriality that effectively subjectify the state, which is obligated to 
informalize its interaction with MTGs in order to govern effectively.  
 
While the state constantly redraws its administrative cartography to facilitate its 
territorial management and enhance its penetration of society, micro-territorial 
configurations are also subject to their local political cartographic 
reconfigurations. This results in the splintering and merging of micro-
territorial units in processes, which eliminate leadership rivalries and 
consolidate territorial control over expanding spaces and population densities. 
New informal micro-territorial borderland units emerged either through 
origination – community construction in previously uninhabited spaces – or as 
a result of the splintering or merging of existing units. The principal drivers for 
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the emergence of new micro-territorial units were demographic, economic and 
developmental pressures, which had implications for the constitution and 
deployment of power through local, national and international networks. 
Rationales for territorial merging included the promotion of resource-sharing 
between communities, the elimination of “ineffective” leadership, and the 
consolidation and expansion of political power by some MTGs. 
 
Micro-Comparative Pluralized Informal Ordering 
 
MTGs account for informal territorial ordering in a critical geo-political sense. 
However, the micro-comparative comparison of borderland cities within 
contexts of postwar international statebuilding would have been incomplete 
without understanding the role of informal economies, which are the quotidian 
heartbeat of these liminal spaces. The marketplace is the main employer within 
Liberia’s borderlands. Even in borderland concession areas where the state 
heavily invests in securitizing natural resource extraction by multinational 
corporations, the informalization of the marketplace dominates economic 
activity. Borderland investment in the police and immigration services are 
meant to reassert postwar state authority, despite the relatively unregulated 
borderland market challenging that authority and actively working to escape its 
control. 
 
Designated market spaces are historically, materially and functionally 
constituted. Depending on their cartographic positionality, borderland hub 
cities in Liberia have long histories of commercial exchange with both the 
Freeport in Monrovia and sahelian trade routes (Gershoni 1984: 16). This history 
puts agriculture and trade as the main economic activities within Liberia’s two 
hub borderland cities – Foya and Ganta – where this study was centered. 
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However, commercial transportation has emerged as a major informal 
economic activity since the end of the Liberian Civil Wars. Materially, 
designated market spaces within borderlands attract goods and services from 
the broader sub-region. The concentration of human and material capital 
within borderlands makes subjects these spaces to systematic revenue controls 
from multiple sources – the municipality and the State. Meanwhile, 
topographically, the entire borderland space appears to be one big market. This 
decentralization of the market space functions to dilute the state’s capacity to 
control economic activity while deepening economic informality. Therefore, an 
exploration of economic informality within postwar borderlands within this 
thesis benefitted from a focus on the socio-political configurative dimension of 
informal economic sectors with a focus on Commercial Motorbike Riders. 
 
The relatively unregulated designated market space captures the resilient 
hybridity of informal survival economies through the mélange of permanence 
with transience, legality amid illegality, the licit and the criminal. Economic 
operators straddle these seemingly oppositional registers, as they constitute 
themselves into unions to enter into fields of opposition and domination with 
the postwar state. Communities that blend into market spaces exhibit the 
tensions between MTGs and municipal representations of the state. Therefore, 
they provide a prism for understanding informal and alternative responses to 
sanitary, security and criminal challenges that come with the presence of the 
official market within community limits. However, the presence of the market 
also enhances the community’s social and symbolic posture within the 
borderlands. These communities have a privileged position when negotiating 
with the state as they simultaneously benefit from and are hamstrung by 
eminent domain laws. 
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Meanwhile the social organization and functioning of CMR Unions provide 
insights into the power relations between subaltern postwar actors and the re-
emergent state. These Unions evidence the ordering of informality as they work 
to set and build a policy agenda that represents and protects CMRs in the face 
of the flux and uncertainty that characterizes the postwar statebuilding context. 
Through processes like licensing and the formation of mutually beneficial 
credit schemes they deftly blend formal and informal resilience based on their 
positionality as subalterns within borderlands. Their use of the topography – 
the establishment of operational bases – also evidence how they appropriate 
territoriality to enhance their productivity, transport service provision and 
reduce in-group conflict.  
 
However, whether in the case of MTGs or CMRs, the use or threat of use of 
violence shows their willingness to advance their specific agendas even in the 
face of opposition by the state and international statebuilding partners. 
Therefore, these actors, while not the criminalized and shadowy characters 
depicted in some IR literature, represent informalities that content with 
formalization processes and formal actors to do three things – construct and 
maintain informal orders; enhance and deploy their power-based authority; and 
develop alternative modes of social control that protect their constituencies and 
set up fields of opposition with “outside” actors and processes. Within most 
postwar contexts, such informality better accounts for the empirical content of 
sovereignty and territoriality than internationally imagined and imposed 
programming of statebuilding. 
Further Research Trajectories 
 
This thesis contributes a micro-comparative empirical understanding of 
informal borderland actors and processes in postwar statebuilding. With 
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greater means and time this study would benefit from tracing the networked 
nature of these informal actors and processes with more formal actors and 
processes. These networks would provide a clearer picture of the 
interdependent strengths and weaknesses of these informal processes for 
postwar statebuilding.  
 
Secondly, the question could be asked – why does informality matter? The 
arguments of limited state presence within borderlands and the dominant 
presence of alternative sources of ordering, authority and control may be 
congruent. However, they only provide part of the picture. Therefore, the 
ethnographic interrogation of informality could benefit from more expansive 
mixed methods research for a historical understanding of the political economy 
of informality within postwar statebuilding. Such an approach would not only 
deepen our understanding of the interconnections between informal orders 
and processes of ordering informality, but would ascribe quantitative weights to 
their impact and role in the sustenance of quotidian livelihoods.  
 
Thus, deepening research on informality in international statebuilding would 
develop an understanding of the implications for either completely subjecting 
informality to formal processes or heuristically mainstreaming informal and 


























Old Car Garage Community 
Small Ganta Community 
Boe Community 
Blegay Pa Community 
Peace Community 
Glenyiluu Community 
Gbatu Quarter Community 
Gbalagbein Community 
Gehpa Community 




Toweh Yard Community 
Royal Community 
Nyan Kormah Quarter 
Hope Village Community 
Public Works Yard 
Community 
Bassa Community 
LPMC Bye Pass Community 
Jacob Town Community 
Valley Community 
Deakehmein Community 








Phase One: Life Histories 
Question 1 Would you kindly tell us a little bit about your background? 
 
Phase Two: Process and Structure 
Question 1 What role does quarter chief play in your community?  
Q2  How did you become quarter chief? 
Q3  How long can you stay as QC/CC? 
Q4  How many households are there in your quarter? 
 
Phase Three: Functional and Relational Questions 
Question 1 What is the greatest challenge you face as quarter chief? 
Q2  Are there any privileges you enjoy as quarter chief? 
Q3  How would you describe your relationship to your city mayor? 
Q4 How would you describe your relationship to your community? 
Q5 What are the major needs your community faces? 
Q6 As a community leader how do you address these needs? 
Q7 Do you have any expectations of government? 
 
Phase Four: Project Planning and Execution 
Question 1 How do you address the needs of your constituents on a day-to-
day basis? 
Q2 Are there NGO projects in your community? 
Q3 Are there government-sponsored programs in your community? 
Q4 How do you interact with your community? 
Q5 Are there major businesses within your constituency? 






Introduction: We are interested in understanding how borderland transporters 
deal with the terrain and administration. 
 
Phase One: Life Histories 
Question 1 Would you kindly tell us a little bit about your background? 
 
Phase Two: Process and Structure 
Q 1  How many hours do you work everyday?  
Q2  How did you become a bike transporter? 
Q3  Do you interact with border authorities? 
Q4   What is the nature of your interactions with border authorities? 
Q5  Do you ever get to cross the border? 
Q6  How well do you know the areas on the other side of the border? 
 
Phase Three: Functional and Relational Questions 
Q 1  What is the greatest challenge you face as bike transporter? 
Q2  How do you deal with these challenges? 
Q3  Have you or any of your friends been involved in accidents? 
Q4 Who owns the bike you ride? 
Q5 What are your expectations of the bike owner? 
Q6 Where do you get fuel for your bike? 
Q7 How does the supply of fuel affect your business? 
 
Phase Four: Project Planning and Execution 
Question 1 If there was no trade, how would your life be affected? 
Q2 Why did you not opt for an education? 
Q3 Do you feel secure in your job? 
Q4 What are your aspirations? 
Q5 What are the major businesses within your constituency? 
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